*This article was submitted in the Prize Essay Contest, 1938.
The Battle of Salamis was one of the steppingstones of the democratic principle of government. The truth of this statement can be readily seen when the governments of the two opposing nations are compared. The Persian Empire at the time of the battle consisted of a monarchial or regal government in which the great mass of people paid honors to a sovereign on the throne because he represented the Deity. In this form of government the ruler had a life and death power over his subjects. He made all the laws to fit his whims, and the mass was forced to accept his rulings. The soldiers of Persia fought not because of a patriotic love for their country but rather because they were driven forward by officers with lashes. On the other hand, many of the Greeks lived under a democratic government in which the people decided the important issues. Athens was the model democracy of the ancient world. The Greek soldiers, unlike those of Persia, were men of character, men trained in initiative, and men who fought for the love of freedom and of their homes. The Battle of Salamis was therefore not only a struggle between two nations; it was a fight between the monarchial and democratic forms of government. The Greek victory not only established the supremacy of Greece; it permitted the continuance of the democratic principle. Salamis was the triumph of a people over the arbitrary authority of a despot.
For fifty years (500 B.C.-449 b.c.), the states of Greece and the Persian Empire engaged in a series of wars known in history as the Persian Wars. These wars started in 500 b.c. with the Ionic Revolt, an attempt on the part of the Greeks in Asia Minor to free themselves of their Persian rulers. The Greek states (especially Athens) sent money, ships, and men to aid this revolt; and when the rebellion was quelled, Darius, the Persian king, swore revenge. His first attempt in 492 b.c. to fulfill this oath ended in defeat when the fleet of warships and transports was shattered by a tempest while rounding the dangerous headland of Mount Athos in Chalcidice. In 490 b.c. the second invasion, which went directly across the Aegean Sea to avoid the dread sea coast of northern Greece, was defeated by an inferior force of Greeks at Marathon; and the Persian fleet was forced to retreat.
After the Battle of Marathon there arose two prominent Athenian leaders who were to render a great service to their state. One was Themistocles, a resourceful, energetic, and farsighted statesman, who used any means to gain his ends. The other was Aristides, who, though not as farsighted as Themistocles, was a true patriot and was so honest that he gained the name of “The Just.”
Themistocles urged the Athenians to prepare for a renewal of the Persian invasions by building a powerful navy and a naval base at the Piraeus. At this time the Athenians were developing the silver mines at Laurium, a mountain in southern Attica. With this silver and under Themistocles’s leadership, a fleet was built that proved to be the salvation of Greece. While the other Greek maritime states were building ships, no state made as rapid an advance as Athens. Within two years 200 triremes had been completed and provision was made to build 20 new triremes every following year.
Aristides, on the other hand, opposed this policy very strongly. He recalled to mind the victory of the army at Marathon. He urged Athens to rely on her demonstrated advantage in the army. He opposed experiments now that Athens had already proved her army superior to that of the Persians. The quarrel between the two rivals became so fierce that an ostracism was held, and Aristides was obliged to go into banishment.
In 480 B.C. the third invasion, which is said by Herodotus to have consisted of an army of 1,700,000 fighting men and 80,000 cavalry and a fleet of 1,207 warships and tenders and transports under the direct command of the Persian King, Xerxes, crossed the Hellespont and marched along the coast of Thrace into Greece. The Persians met with very little resistance until they reached the northern boundary of Locris. Here, at Thermopylae, a narrow mountain pass, they were confronted by an army of approximately 7,000 Greeks under the Spartan King, Leonidas. On the sea the Persian fleet was opposed by a Greek fleet of 271 triremes at Artemisium, on the northern coast of Euboea. After being stopped for seven days, the Persians were led around the pass by a Greek traitor. The Greeks were trapped and slain, and the road into Greece lay open to the Persians. Before the final battle Leonidas allowed any of his allies to retire except the Thebans; and all, with the exception of 300 Spartans, 700 Thespians, and, of course, 400 Thebans, took advantage of this opportunity to escape. Thus the army on the last day consisted of 1,400 Greeks. The seven days of battle caused the death of some 4,000 Greeks and about 20,000 Persians. Meanwhile, a series of indecisive battles, which resulted in great damage to the ships of both sides, took place between the Persian and Greek fleets; and the latter upon hearing of the loss of Thermopylae retreated through the Euripus to the shores of Attica.
After the destruction of Leonidas and his army the Persian host poured through the pass into central Greece, crushing all resistance in their way. When the news of their approach reached Athens, the city was thrown into consternation, but Themistocles comforted the citizens by reminding them of the prophecy of the Delphic Oracle. When the news of the preparations for the third Persian Invasion reached Athens, the Athenians sent envoys to Delphi to seek the advice of the oracle. The first answer was: “Wretched men, leave your homes and flee afar; fire and sword shall destroy your city and the temples of the gods.” The envoys pleaded for a better answer and were then told: “Pallas Athene cannot entreat Zeus for you; but he grants that, when all else is destroyed, the wooden wall shall protect you. Divine Salamis will make women childless.” The “wooden wall” was finally interpreted to mean their fleet, and the entire city with the exception of a few who remained within a wooden palisade in the Acropolis was moved to places of safety, some to the islands of Salamis and Aegina, others to Troezen, in Argolis. At length the Persians reached the uninhabited city and destroyed it, and their fleet took up its position in the bay of Phalerum, some 5 miles distant from the bay of Salamis, where the Greek fleet was stationed.
Meanwhile, the Spartans under the command of Cleombrotus, the regent for Leonidas’s son, Pleistarchus, with their allies, the Arcadians, the Corinthians, the Eleans, and the other members of the Peloponnesian states, were busy building a wall from sea to sea across the Isthmus of Corinth, instead of advancing to the defense of Boeotia as had been previously arranged. Their plan was not only selfish but foolish, for the wall would be of little service as long as the huge fleet of the invaders was able to sail around the coast and make descents wherever the leaders chose. Therefore, Themistocles saw that the only way to defeat the Persians was to destroy their fleet. If the Persian fleet were destroyed, their line of supplies would be interrupted, and they would be forced to retreat for fear of annihilation, thus bringing the invasion to an end.
The two sides now held councils. The Persian council was held on board a ship (undoubtedly Xerxes’ favorite Sidonian vessel) with Xerxes in the seat of honor and the sovereigns of nations and the captains of the fleet seated according to rank. Xerxes had Mardonius, who acted as a sort of mediator between the king and his councilors, question each member as to whether a sea fight should or should not be risked. All, save one, answered for battle because they knew it was the king’s inclination. Artemisia, the Carian queen, was the one who opposed battle. She showed the dangers of coming to blows with a people who were much more skilled and more expert in maritime affairs than the Persians. She went on to show that the loss of the naval battle would spell defeat for their invasion; whereas by attacking the Peloponnesus they would create jealousy among their enemies, or rather widen the breach which was already great among them; that the confederates would separate to return and defend their respective states; and that then the king could easily make himself master of all Greece. It was expected that her life would be taken because of her having opposed the king’s intentions. But Xerxes took it good-naturedly, gave orders that the advice of the greater number should be followed, and determined to be an eyewitness to the combat. If the advice of this lone woman had been followed, the Persians would have undoubtedly conquered all Greece, democracy would have been destroyed, and the human race would have continued in slavery under the absolute government of one man.
At the same time another council, quite different in character and procedure, was being held aboard the Greek flagship at Salamis. The Spartan admiral, Eurybiadas, and the Corinthian captain, Adeimantus, insisted that the fleet should retreat to the Isthmus of Corinth and there await the attack of the Persian fleet. They stated that the advantage of this movement was that they would be in close touch with the land forces and would have the Peloponnesus as a retreat in case of defeat; whereas they would be entirely cut off at Salamis. This decision meant the abandonment of Aegina, Salamis, and Megara; and it was naturally strongly opposed by the Aeginetans, Athenians, and Megarians. They charged that it would be betraying their country to abandon so favorable a position as that of Salamis. Themistocles supported this opinion with such fervor that Eurybiadas lifted his cane in a minatory manner. “Strike,” said the Athenian, unshaken by the affront, “but hear me.” He then uttered with restrained oratory the following argument:
It is now in your power to save Greece, if you will allow me to persuade you to remain and fight here, and do not yield to those here present who urge you to remove the fleet to the isthmus. For if you engage the enemy at the isthmus, you will be fighting in the open sea, where it is inadvisable for us to go, for the reason that our ships are heavier and fewer. Moreover, you will lose Salamis, Megara, and Aegina; for their army by land will advance with their fleet, and thus you will actually be leading it against the Peloponnesus,and will endanger the whole of Greece. But, if you will follow my advice, you will find that by fighting in the Salamis Strait with few ships against many, we shall probably win a great victory, because to us it is favourable to fight in narrow waters, whereas to fight in the open sea is to the advantage of the enemy.
At one point of the dispute Themistocles was told to be silent “since he was a man without a country,” and he replied that his 200 ships of war were as good as any city; and that if the Peloponnesians retired to the isthmus, the Athenian squadron would separate itself from the allied fleet, take on the fugitive Athenians at Salamis, Aegina, and Troezen; and sail to Italy with the idea of founding a new Athens. Eurybiadas was so disturbed by the threat that he gave his influence to Themistocles, and before daybreak the council of war decided to stand their ground.
Even though the council had decided in favor of battle, Themistocles feared the Peloponnesians might call another council and decide to retreat. This premonition proved to be true, for the Peloponnesian commanders brought pressure to bear on Eurybiadas and another council was called. Themistocles, seeing that his hard- won decision was to be overthrown, determined to try a bold move. That night he sent a trusted Asiatic slave named Sicinnus to the Persian fleet. The man bore letters to the king which stated that his master, Themistocles, considered the Greek cause lost, and was, therefore, anxious to join the Persians; that he could not leave openly because of his high position in the fleet; and that, since the Greek fleet was in a helpless condition due to internal strife and some of its divisions were on the verge of desertion, he (the king) could capture the entire squadron by closing the western entrance to the bay of Salamis. The king believed the message and played right into Themistocles’ hands by dispatching 200 vessels of the Egyptian division of the Persian fleet to block the Megarian outlet of the strait and by placing his main fleet across the eastern mouth, thus making flight impossible for the Greeks. He also had men transported to the small island of Psyttaleia, which lies at the mouth of the strait, in order that they might capture any Greeks whose vessels might be forced ashore there.
The Greek commanders were still engaged in fiery discussion when in rushed Aristides, who had sailed across from Aegina and brought the news that the fleet was completely surrounded by the ships of Xerxes. At first the council doubted the truth of the statement. However, they were convinced by the arrival of a Tenian trireme, which had deserted the Persian ranks because of the commander’s loyalty to the Greeks and their cause. The arrival of this ship proved a valuable asset to the Greeks, since it put an end to their disputes and united them in the work of preparing for action. The vessel also served valiantly in the battle which ensued; and the Greeks were so grateful to the commander and his men for the courage which they displayed in coming over to their side that after the affair was over they caused a sacred tripod upon which all their names had been engraved to be deposited at the oracle of Delphi.
Thus the Greeks were really forced into battle by Themistocles’ trickery and Xerxes’ bad strategy. Xerxes undertook to do by brute force what he might easily have accomplished by strategy. If the Persian king had been gifted with even the slightest knowledge of naval and military strategy, he would have realized the advantages he possessed over the quarreling Greeks by simply delaying battle. He would have seen the folly of fighting in a narrow bay where he could not use the advantages of superior numbers. He would have realized some advantage in the separation he had produced between the Greek fleet and army. Finally, he would not have risked the life line of supplies for his army by fighting a disadvantageous sea battle. Unfortunately for the Persians, Xerxes knew nothing of strategy and still less of tactics; therefore, he blindly ordered his fleet into battle under most disadvantageous circumstances.
After the arrival of the Tenian warship all thoughts of flight by the Greeks were cast aside; and preparations were made for an immediate battle. Preparations were carried forward with much energy and fervor in both fleets. Plans of battle were formed; orders were given; arms were examined and placed in readiness on the decks of the galleys. The officers and soldiers made mutual agreements with each other in which each promised to care for the other’s friends and belongings in case of either’s death. The commanders tried to cheer the men by words and looks of confidence and encouragement. Those who were strong sought to enliven the weak and doubtful; while those who feared the battle and its result, hid their dread and tried to appear restless for battle.
Xerxes had a golden throne erected on the Attic shore, by the slope of Mount Aegaleos, in order that he might be an eyewitness to the battle. He was surrounded by guards, attendants, and a number of scribes or secretaries who were prepared with writing material to record the events as they occurred and especially to register the names of those whom Xerxes should see distinguishing themselves by their courage or achievements. He justly believed that his presence would inspirit the commanders with a spirit of rivalry and excite them to double their efforts to win the battle. Xerxes was also prepared to punish failure. It happened in many cases during the battle that the commanders who had lost their ships and escaped to the shore were led before Xerxes’ throne and were beheaded on the spot, without mercy. Many of the officers so cruelly treated were Greeks, who could not compel themselves to fight against their own countrymen.
As the day was dawning, Themistocles assembled as many of the Athenian force as was possible in order that he might make a speech, as was the custom of the Greek commanders. He told them that, in an engagement such as they were about to contest, the outcome depended, not on the mass of the combatants, but on the activity and force they showed. He also reminded them that small bodies of men, firmly banded together and under strict discipline, had often defeated enemies whose numbers exceeded their own by far. He admitted that the Persian force was numerically superior, but he said the Greeks could conquer them. He said he was sure of victory, if his men faithfully obeyed their orders, followed the plans of their commanders, and displayed the usual courage and determination showed by Greeks.
As soon as he had finished his speech, he ordered his men to set sail immediately and to range in battle array near the harbor mouth. The western or left wing was formed by the Athenians; the right, by the Spartans and Aeginetans; and the center, by the other contingents. Their battle formation consisted of a rectangle—15 ships in line abreast and 25 lines deep—of 375 triremes. This arrangement filled the narrow strait with galleys. The Persians were, therefore, exposed to a flank attack as they entered the bay of Salamis. Only their leading vessels could enter the battle, and they were prevented from using their greatly superior force.
At sunrise (Curtius and Duruy give the date as September 20; Holm, as September 27 or 28, 480 b.c.), the Persian fleet advanced into Salamis Harbor from the southeast in three lines. The right wing was occupied by the Phoenicians; the center, by the Egyptians; and the left wing, by the subject Greeks and other allies from Asia Minor. The first line, the Phoenician squadron, occupied the narrow strait between the island of Psyttaleia and the mainland of Greece. It was chiefly upon this squadron that Xerxes based his hopes of victory. The second line, the Egyptians, was stationed between the island of Psyttaleia and Piraeus to guard the main entrance into the strait. The third line, which was chiefly composed of the Ionian Greeks, took up its position in the passage between the shore of Salamis and the island of Psyttaleia, for the purpose of preventing a flanking attack on the part of the Greeks. It is believed by some historians that the maneuvers of this division in emerging into the main channel again during the battle added much to the confusion that seized the Persian fleet. The Persian princes Aribiagnes and Achaemenes, brothers of Xerxes, commanded the entire fleet.
At the first sight of the enemy the Greeks began backing water and retiring into the harbor; however, an Athenian captain named Amineas of Pallene suddenly surged forward and drove his bronze ram into the middle of a Phoenician trireme. The two vessels became entangled and could not separate and the entire Greek armada, inspired by this true example of courage, charged forward as one to his aid and engaged the advancing foe. This is the manner in which the Athenians say the battle started; however, the Aeginetans claim it was started by a vessel which had come to Aegina for the Aeacidae. There is also another story which states that a phantom in the form of a woman appeared before the Greeks, and in a voice that was heard by the entire fleet, rebuked them by saying, “Strange men, how long are you going to back water? Come on! come on! this is no time to linger on your oars.” The voice then beckoned and cheered them into battle.
As the Greeks advanced, the Phoenician galleys, the right wing, moved in column formation to meet them; while the other two sections of the Persian fleet remained in their original positions. The fighting began on the Greek left wing, and it was the Athenians and Phoenicians who carried the real weight of the battle. The Persian galleys, which were heavy in construction and overwhelming in numbers, forged irresistibly up the channel and compelled the Greeks, who fought desperately, to retire before them. Squadron after squadron of the Asiatics poured into the narrow straits, and they tried to compress their enormous force through the narrow channel at the eastern side of the island of Psyttaleia, where it was not more than yards in width. They were forced to reduce from three broad shallow lines into probably nine single deep columns. Confusion set in and progress ceased! Oars were shattered and broken; and when in the middle of the day a stiff breeze arose and a heavy swell rolled in from the Aegina, the disorder became more involved. They fell afoul of each other; and in order to escape they tried to withdraw some ships from their line.
In the meanwhile the Greeks, who had been able to keep their ships under control, were quick to take advantage of their enemy’s helplessness. At a given signal they drew back their ships and then with tremendous speed drove forward into the inextricable Persian ranks. They repeated this maneuver again and again, and each time caused great damage among their foe.
At this time the Greek right wing made a maneuver that later proved to be the deciding movement of the battle. The Aeginetans pressed forward, rounded the jutting promontory of Salamis, and attacked the Persian left wing, which was stationed about the island of Psyttaleia. They succeeded in smashing through the Ionian line, and in the last stages of the battle this position proved to be valuable, as it allowed the Greeks to cut off the retreating Phoenician vessels. After routing the Ionians, they probably launched a flank attack upon the Phoenician position and made it very uncomfortable for them. Whether they did or did not make this move, their position made that of the Phoenicians indefensible and it determined the outcome of the battle.
After the Ionian flank had been rendered useless, Aristides, the Athenian who brought the news of Xerxes’ surrounding movement to the Greek council, performed a most valuable service. With a number of heavy-armed Athenian hoplites, who had been formerly stationed on the shore of the Salamis, he crossed over to the island of Psytteleia and put to the sword the garrison that Xerxes had stationed there.
In this bad predicament, the Persians fought heroically and stubbornly, for they were conscious that their king’s eyes were upon them. They feared his ire and desired to win his approval. Even the Asiatic Greek division, which showed signs of desertion, fought admirably for their tyrannical ruler. However, the subject races of Persia, the Asiatic Greeks, the Egyptians, the Phoenicians, and the others, lacked the spirit of patriotism, the willingness to die for one’s country which inspirited all the free Greeks and especially the Athenians. Therefore, when the battle was lost, they thought only of flight, as they had no desire to stand the inferno that raged about them. Thus the Persian fleet became a defeated mass of sinking, struggling ships and men with the sole desire of getting free and of reaching the open sea. The slaughter was horrible, for thousands were put to death by Greek swords or by drowning in the swirling water, since they did not know how to swim. On the other hand, only a few of the Greeks perished, for they were able to swim, and if not killed outright by the Persians, they escaped from the sinking vessels and swam to the shore of Salamis. Among the Persians who fell in combat was Ariabignes, the brother of Xerxes. With him perished a vast number of the high ranking Persians, Medes, and allies. The great destruction took place when the van began to retreat; for those in the rear were anxious to display their courage before the king and they made every effort to force their way to the center of combat, thus becoming entangled with the ships in retreat.
Seeing that they could be of no further help, the Persians at the rear sought to escape to the harbor of Phalerum. The Aeginetans were waiting for them at the southern tip of the island of Psyttaleia, and pounced upon the Persians as they left the strait.
Thus did the Battle of Salamis, which had lasted from sunrise till sunset, come to an end. Probably one of the greatest short poetic descriptions of the battle and its outcome was given by Lord Byron:
“A king sate on the rocky brow
That looks o’er sea-born Salamis;
And ships, by thousands, lay below,
And men in nations,—all were his!
He counted them at break of day—
And, when the sun set, where were they?”—
Don Juan, Canto III.
The Persian fleet, which had lost about 300 ships, both sunk and captured, retreated into the bay of Phalerum under the protection of their immense army; while the Greeks, who lost about the same proportion in ships, gathered all their vessels at Salamis and prepared themselves for another engagement, as they believed the king would renew the fight. This belief was not realized, however, for the Phoenician squadron, terrified by Xerxes’ boundless wrath, hoisted anchor secretly at night and set sail for home. The king was thrown into great despair by the defeat of his fleet; and though his army was victorious and his fleet was superior in numbers, he began to think only of his own safety. A Greek who pretended that he was a deserter brought Xerxes the news that the Greek fleet might sail directly to the Hellespont and destroy the bridge located there, thus stranding him in Europe. Xerxes knew the nature of his empire and feared that his subject states would revolt. So he made up his mind to flee. He wanted to hide his purpose from the Greeks and his own people, so he set to work building a mole from the mainland to Salamis and extending a number of Phoenician merchant ships to act as a bridge and a wall. He also made it look as though he were preparing for another naval battle with the Greeks. A few days later he ordered his fleet to set sail at once for the Hellespont to guard the bridge, while he and the bulk of his army commenced a long and tiresome retreat overland through Thrace during which the losses due to famine and pestilence were enormous. He left Mardonius with 300,000 picked troops behind to occupy the central portion of Greece and to conquer if possible the Peloponnesian states. Mardonius was defeated at Plataea in 479 b.c.—the battle which ended the Persian invasions. When Xerxes arrived at Sestus on the Hellespont he found his bridge had been destroyed by storms—the same storms that wrecked a portion of his retreating fleet off Magnesia. The remnants of the army were ferried across to Abydos by the fleet and wintered at Sardis, while Xerxes, striving to erase the disappointment of defeat from his mind, returned to his luxurious court at Susa. Before leaving Sardis, however, he dispatched an army of men under Artabazus to Macedonia—a final attempt to fulfill his ambitious desires. This was the last effort that Xerxes made to conquer Greece, for he was so broken by his defeat that he never again set foot in Europe. He was murdered in bed in 465 b.c. by his chamberlain and the chief of his guard after he had reigned for 20 years.
At the close of the battle the Greeks returned to Salamis and prepared for a second engagement. The second morning after the battle they were surprised to learn that the entire Persian fleet had left Phalerum and was heading at top speed for the Hellespont. They hoisted anchor immediately and started in pursuit. Going as far as Andros (an island southeast of Euboea), they saw nothing of the enemy’s fleet, stopped at that place, and held a council of war. At this council Themistocles advised that the fleet should sail immediately for the Hellespont; and that, if they reached there before the Persian army, they should destroy the bridge of boats, thus stranding Xerxes and his army in Europe. Eurybiadas and the Peloponnesians opposed this proposal, however, for they believed that the destruction of the bridge would be the worst thing that could happen to Greece. They stated that if the Persians were compelled to remain in Europe, they would give the Greeks no peace and they might be able to subjugate all Europe some day. Whereupon Themistocles, finding that the majority was against him, yielded to their judgment. After an unsuccessful siege of Andros (because that city had contributed to the Persian fleet) they returned to the Isthmus of Corinth, where prizes were given to the cities and men who fought in the battle. By using the fleet to threaten the destruction of the bridge of boats at the Hellespont, the Greeks made the most intelligent use possible of their fleet. No battle was necessary. Only a threat was sufficient to clear Greece of the great Persian army. Perfect strategy gives the rewards of victory without risking the possibility of defeat or the loss of life and war material. This use of the Greek fleet after Salamis is the first example in history of the proper use of sea power.
As in all battles, both naval and military, there occurred many incidents that deserve to be mentioned here. The most oustanding was the exploit of Artemisia, the Carian queen, who so strongly opposed battle at the Persian council. During the confusion that enveloped all the king’s fleet, she was closely pursued by an Athenian trireme, and having no outlet, since she was fronted by a number of friendly vessels and exposed to the enemy, she resolved to try a daring measure. Still pressed by the Athenian, she headed straight toward a Calyndian ship of her own fleet, which was commanded by the Calyndian King Damasithymus (some historians have it that she purposely attacked this vessel due to previous differences she had had with the king; while others say that this vessel merely chanced to be in her way), and sank it. Through this procedure she gained a double advantage for herself. For the Athenian captain, when he saw her sink one of the enemy’s vessels, thought her either to be a Greek or a deserter from the Persian ranks who was now fighting on the Greek side; and he therefore gave up the pursuit and proceeded to attack other triremes. Through this action she saved her life, broke clear of the battle, and while in the action of doing the king an injury she raised herself to a greater height in his esteem. For as Xerxes observed the fight, those about him, supposing the destroyed vessel to be a Greek, exclaimed, “Sire, seest thou how well Artemisia fights, and how she just sunk a ship of the enemy?” Then the king asked if the attacking vessel really was Artemisia’s, and the bystanders replied, “Certainly,” for they all knew Artemisia’s colors and they were sure the sunken vessel was of the opposite side. Thus everything fell over to the queen’s side, for no one survived on board the Calyndian ship to become her accuser. Xerxes (it is said), after hearing these remarks, made the famous observation: “My men have behaved like women, my women like men!”
Salamis was more decisive in its effect on the Persian War and history than any of the other outstanding combats of that war. It is true that Marathon proved the superiority, both in leadership and patriotism, of the Athenians over the Persians; but this supremacy had already been shown at Lade, though in not as clear a manner. Also, the battle of Plataea, which occurred one year after Salamis, rid Greece of the Persian soldiers forever; but it was made possible only by the great naval victory at Salamis. It was in the control of the sea that the key to the entire situation lay; for as long as the Persians controlled the sea, they were supreme. But, as soon as Greece gained this sovereignty through Salamis, the Persians were forced to withdraw a large part of their land force, for they were dependent upon their fleet for their supplies and for a safe retreat. The loss of naval supremacy also destroyed the communication between Persia and the army remaining in Greece, and it allowed the Greeks to set both the time and place for the final battle. In fact, the victory at Plataea was not even necessary; for, even if the Persians had been victorious, they would have been unable to control Central Greece or subjugate the Peloponnesus without the support of a superior naval force.
Though Salamis was decisive, it was in the moral effect that the true usefulness lay. The losses of the two sides were proportional. In fact, the Persians were no worse off in comparative naval force at the end than they had been at the start of the battle, for their fleet was still superior to that of the Greeks and their army was still undefeated. The great difference was in the morale. The Greeks were victorious and exultant; while the Persians were overwhelmed and subdued.
The victory on the Greek side was probably due to the choice of the site of battle, to superior arms, and to technical advantages (leadership, discipline, direction of wind, etc.); while the loss on the part of the Persians was due to bad strategy in fighting in a confined bay where they were unable to use their superior numbers, to poor maneuvering in the face of the enemy, and to lack of discipline. We must also remember that the Greeks were fighting to protect their women and children from the shame and misery of slavery. Every man who fought for Greece that memorable day fought for life, for liberty, and with their wives, mothers, and children before their eyes. To them, Salamis was the last hope: if they did not win that day, everything was lost.
The victory of Salamis ensured the survival of the Athenian democracy. It meant that a people had been made conscious of their power. The Athenian people were rejoicing in their right to order their lives to suit themselves. The victory made the Athenian common man realize that he had in himself the divine possibility of achieving through hard work success of the highest order in any work he might undertake. Athens entered upon the most brilliant period in all history. The next century of her history included the marvelous Periclean Age. In this era the Athenian philosophers attained a leadership of thought not yet taken away from them. Their sculptors, their architects, their playwrights developed a perfection of technique that is still an example for the world. The Greek ideal of physical perfection of the human body attained through athletics still dominates the world. All of this wonderful development is attributed to the Greek ideal that the innate nobleness of mankind is attained by making men realize more and more his true power through self-government in a democracy.
The importance of battles does not depend on the numbers engaged or the numbers killed or taken prisoner or the numbers of boats destroyed. The only true measure of the importance of a battle is the consequence involved. Salamis was the most important battle of ancient times because so much depended on its result and so many principles of sea fighting were there developed. It was the first sea fight where the true principles of naval strategy were employed by the winner. At Salamis was demonstrated the correct tactics for sea fighting with the boats and weapons of the time. After the battle the proper use of sea power to decide a war was exhibited for the first time in history. And finally, on the result hinged the question of the supremacy of the one-man absolute government with the accompanying slavery of all the rest of mankind and the repression of individual development, or the survival of democracy with freedom for all and the marvelous development of human thought that has always accompanied a popular government.
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What is needed is a humanity strong in will and firm in the determination to preserve itself. Freedom must learn to walk in armor and to defend itself against its deadly enemies. It must finally understand that a pacifism which admits it will not wage war under any circumstances will surely bring about war.—Thomas Mann.