EUROPEAN WAR TENSION
Emergency Preparations.—The seriousness of European conditions was emphasized by Premier Daladier in a statement at the close of June ending the French parliamentary session in which he declared that “for 20 years the situation has not been so delicate as now.” In England War Minister Hore-Belisha announced that at least 750,000 men would be in arms before the close of the summer. Normal leave periods for ships of the Home Fleet were advanced in July so that in August in the danger period following the harvest the main strength of the British Navy would be refitted and assembled for maneuvers in the North Sea. On July 1 the British National Council of Labor adopted the unusual course of sending out on the British Broadcasting Corporation’s German language program an appeal to the German people “to do whatever you can to make it known to your government that you want peace and not war.” As a further move to support the nonagression front, England prepared to furnish credits up to £60,000,000 to facilitate purchase of war materials by her continental allies.
In Danzig an influx of Germans as recruits to a newly established Heimwehr brought the reported armed strength in the district to over 10,000 men. Poland refrained from protests, but to end all uncertainty as to its position on the Danzig issue, the British government prepared a statement declaring unequivocally that any unilateral change in the status of the Free City would mean a British call to arms. France had previously given similar notice in a message to Berlin. From German official sources, however, assurance came that Germany had “no desire to go against the territorial integrity of Poland” and that if Germany had wanted to let the matter come to military action it could have done so at any time. Suspicion grew that the next move of the Rome-Berlin Axis might develop in the Balkans, where it would less directly challenge the Western powers.
Bargaining with Russia.—Mutual suspicion and conflicting demands prolonged Franco-British discussions with the Soviet government at Moscow from June 15 to mid-July, without complete assurance that Russia would be fully linked up with the Western powers. The British were apparently willing to give guarantees against aggression in the Baltic States if the Soviets would give similar guarantees for the small states on Germany’s Western frontier. But a further complication arose over the Soviet proposal that the guarantees cover “indirect aggression,” i.e., political changes arising from a revolutionary movement engineered from within. Meanwhile the small states both east and west protested vigorously that in the interests of complete neutrality they desired no protection at all. President Cajander of Finland even stated that the Soviet insistence on guarantees could not be considered a friendly act. But the Fins, like Holland and the Scandinavian states with the exception of Denmark, had also declined a nonaggression treaty with Germany. In general it appeared that the stumbling blocks in the negotiations were insufficient to cause real difficulty, if there were full will to agreement on both sides, or if the international situation were regarded as sufficiently critical. Hence highly varied speculations were advanced to explain the delay.
Franco-Turkish Pact.—Duplicating the earlier Anglo-Turkish pact, and preliminary to a more complete accord, France and Turkey on June 23 signed an agreement that “in case of any act of aggression that might lead to war in the Mediterranean region, they would be ready to co-operate effectively, and to give each other all the aid and assistance in their power.” It is assumed that this, like the British agreement, was accompanied by secret pledges relating to the free use of the Dardanelles. In return for her support, Turkey secured one immediate concession from France, the complete sovereignty over the former Sanjak of Alexandretta, an area of 1,500 square miles between Turkey and Syria which last September was made a republic under the name of Hatay. Though the Turks number 40 per cent of the population of Hatay and constitute its largest single racial element, the complete loss of the district was a serious one for Syria, since it took her most important city, Alexandretta, and practically her only outlets to the sea. Thus the Arabs of Syria, like the Jews of Palestine, may consider that their rights and interests have been sacrificed to the exigencies of European power politics.
UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
Coverage of Monroe Doctrine.—Of chief interest in the July number of Foreign Affairs is an article by former President A. Lawrence Lowell of Harvard entitled “The Frontiers of the United States.” Mr. Lowell points out that while the Monroe Doctrine expresses our opposition to any extension of the power or influence of a non-American nation in the Western Hemisphere, the coverage and the implications of that doctrine have never been fully defined.
Clearly, he says, the United States under the Monroe Doctrine would be inclined to oppose the transfer to another non-American state of territory in the Western Hemisphere now held by European powers, such for example as Dutch, French, and British Guiana, and islands in the Caribbean or near our Atlantic seaboard, such as Dutch Curacao, French Guadeloupe and Martinique, and the British Bahama and Bermuda Islands. Of more distant islands in the Atlantic there is less certainty, as for instance the Portuguese Azores, the Madeira and Cape Verde Islands, and the Spanish Canary Islands. These are not a part of the Western Hemisphere, yet a strong enemy naval base in any of these groups would constitute a serious menace, particularly if we should ever be called upon by our South American neighbors for assistance against European aggression. In the North Atlantic also, we should not like to see Greenland and Iceland pass from the hands of Denmark to a strong European power. But, as Mr. Lowell remarks, the results of a general war in Europe might quite possibly leave both these areas in the hands of Germany as potential air or naval bases. “All this,” he adds,
raises the question whether the State Department and the people of this country ought not to consider, earnestly and at once, what islands in the Atlantic, if any, we should be unwilling to see pass from the hands of their present owners into those of another European nation. Having reached a decision, should not our Government state it publicly?
The same problems arise in the Pacific, where we are concerned not only with our own west coast and communications but also with the Panama Canal. Thus, according to Mr. Lowell, we could not see the Galapagos Islands to pass from Ecuador’s possession to that of any other power without our consent. (There has been some talk of Ecuador’s using the islands as security for a $17,000,000 loan in the United States, or selling them outright for perhaps $100,000,000.) There might be a similar question regarding the Marquesas Islands. Mr. Lowell even suggests that a general declaration might be issued bringing under the Monroe Doctrine all Pacific Islands east of the longitude of Guam, “for no great foreign nation would want to acquire such islands now except as a coign of vantage in some policy relating to America, North or South.” If issued in time of peace such a general declaration would be recognized as part of a legitimate policy of defense; if not issued, action under it in time of emergency might take on a different aspect.
Neutrality Legislation.—At the time of going to press new United States neutrality legislation was still held up in Congress. Its ultimate terms, if passed at all, were made increasingly uncertain by the statement of 34 Senators headed by Senator Johnson of California that they were “unalterably opposed to the repeal or modification of the present neutrality law prohibiting the sale or exportation of arms, munitions, or implements of war to nations engaged in war,” and also that they were “against any discretion being lodged in the hands of any chief executive to determine an aggressor or aggressors during any war abroad.” This position they were “determined to maintain by any honorable means.” It was well understood that the Administration attitude, as stated by the President and by Secretary Hull, favored repeal of the automatic arms embargo and shipment of both munitions and non-munitions to belligerents after transfer of title to the foreign purchaser.
Anglo-American Trade Deal.—On June 23 British and American officials signed in London an accord providing for the exchange of about 600,000 bales of surplus United States cotton for 85,000 tons of British Malaya rubber, the first movement of goods to begin on October 1. Before final action, however, the agreement required approval by a two-thirds vote of the Senate and an enabling act by Congress. The cotton would supply about one- half of England’s annual needs, and the rubber about one-fifth of the normal American consumption, but it is provided in the agreement that both commodities will be held in reserve as a measure of war preparedness and not thrown upon the market for the next 7 years if no war occurs.
The United States made proposals to both Belgium and the Netherlands for a similar exchange, but word came from The Hague that such a transfer of Dutch tin and rubber for American cotton was made difficult by pressure from Germany. Holland preferred not to put herself in a position where the Reich could approach her with demands for exchange of goods on the same favorable terms.
FAR EAST
Baiting Britain.—In early July the conference at Tokyo on the Tientsin blockade was about to open, with British; insistence that it be limited to the Tientsin issue and with slight prospect that it would settle the larger questions involved in Japan’s drive to end foreign concessions in China and in particular to undermine Britain’s position in the China trade. The trouble at Tientsin arose over the refusal of British concession authorities to surrender four Chinese refugees accused of assassinating a pro-Japanese customs officer. The British held the evidence insufficient, and their offer to submit the matter to arbitration was not accepted. Instead the Japanese army leaders blockaded the British and French concessions with electrified wire, cut off food supplies from Chinese sources, and subjected British crossing the barrier to search, stripping, and other alleged indignities. Japanese demands were also increased, and were said to include surrender to the Peiping regime of over $6,000,000 held in British banks at Tientsin, co-operation in North China economic developments, and in general withdrawal of financial and other assistance to the government at Chungking.
British feeling was deeply stirred by the events at Tientsin, which at a less critical time in European politics might have been regarded as little short of an act of war. Measures of trade reprisal were examined but not openly threatened. Premier Chamberlain declared no British government could “tolerate” such treatment, and expressed the hope that the “Japanese government had no intention of condoning a group of acts of its soldiers and no intention of challenging the rights and interests of the British people in China.” At Tientsin as elsewhere the Japanese policy was evidently to prevent concerted action on the part of the Occidental nations by singling out the British for attack, while avoiding so far as possible direct challenge to America. Secretary Hull stated that the United States was not directly concerned in the Tientsin affair but interested in its “broader aspects.”
South China Ports Seized.—In attacks on the remaining unoccupied ports along the South China coast, as a means of further cutting off China’s munition imports, Japan again came in conflict with United States, British, and French naval and consular officers. At Swatow, prior to its occupation on June 21, the Japanese Consul General requested foreign naval vessels to leave the harbor. To this Admiral Yarnell replied that it was the primary duty of American naval vessels to protect American citizens, and that our ships would remain as long as needed for this purpose. While an effort would be made to avoid interference with military operations, Japan would not be regarded as free from responsibility for any injury incurred. The U. S. destroyer Pillsbury was re-enforced by the Pope, and two British destroyers also remained in the harbor. The Japanese demand was subsequently explained as merely a warning, and the Japanese naval commander expressed “appreciation of the American Navy’s sympathetic attitude toward Japanese operations.” After the Japanese occupation of the port, foreign vessels were prevented from landing or taking on cargo, save for a single vessel weekly with mail and provisions. Later, on June 28, requests that foreign naval craft leave the treaty ports of Wenchow and Foochow were similarly rejected by the British and French authorities. No American vessels were in these ports.
Japan’s War Supplies.—In an extended survey by T. A. Bisson of “Japan’s Economic Outlook,” in the Foreign Policy Report for June 15, the conclusion was reached that an economic breakdown could not be regarded as imminent, though the strain was evident in Japanese domestic restrictions, decline of exports, and approaching exhaustion of gold reserves and foreign credits. Though the China campaigns might be continued, two years of warfare had narrowed the ability of Japan to participate in possible war on a large scale.
The article cited figures showing that out of 528 million dollars of American exports to Japan in the two years 1937-38, 326 million dollars’ worth, or 61.2 per cent, were essential materials of war (not including raw cotton). Oil products accounted for about 91 million of this, and scrap iron for 67 million. According to figures published by the Chinese Council for Economic Research, over 85 per cent of Japan’s imported war materials have come from the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands; less than 9 per cent from Germany and Italy. Obviously an embargo on such exports to Japan—or for that matter restrictions on her exports to other countries—would seriously hamper her ability to carry on war.
Mongolian Frontier Clashes.—From both Japanese and Soviet sources during June and early July there were continued reports of aircraft and ground warfare on the Manchukuo-Outer Mongolia frontier, with highly conflicting accounts of the losses entailed. A tabulation of these reports at the end of June showed that Moscow claimed the destruction of 91 Japanese planes with a loss of 22 Soviet-Mongolian craft, whereas Tokyo figures set forth a loss of no less than 250 enemy aircraft to only 11 Japanese. In fact practically all that could be gathered from the two sets of reports was that there had been frequent aircraft raids extending from 50 to 70 miles beyond the frontier, with considerable losses of planes and personnel, yet with no apparent intention on either side of declaring open war. According to the Moscow press, severe fighting recurred on July 2-5, with planes, tanks, and artillery resulting in the alleged loss of 800 Japanese-Manchukuoans. Tokyo reports as usual announced victory, and expressed the view that the frontier warfare would not develop into a wider conflict.
Philippine Issue Revived.—The question of the wisdom of casting loose the Philippines was again raised by a statement of High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt upon his return from the islands in June. The Commissioner’s statement as quoted in the press was in part as follows:
Complete independence for the Philippines now probably would mean servitude. They are unable to stand alone amidst the violent forces now loosed in the Far East. If the United States flag descends the result will be a bloody struggle for control.
The question of either retaining the Philippines or continuing to protect them is of course bound up with our whole Far Eastern policy, and the fate of a free Philippines also hinges the outcome of Japan’s present China war. From the economic standpoint alone, Philippine independence might be fatal to the prosperity of the islands if it involved loss of trade with the United States, which at present takes about 85 per cent of Philippine exports and supplies more than 60 per cent of the imports.