The Development of Fleet Aviation during the World War
(See page 1297, September, 1938, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Thomas H. Robbins, Jr., U. S. Navy.—Lieutenant Commander Brown’s article is of particular interest at this time when the Navy is again embarking on a program of “experimental” dirigible construction. In all fairness to the lighter-than-air enthusiasts, it must be brought out that although the development of the aircraft carrier in the war in the North Sea may have sounded the death knell for extensive tactical scouting by German rigid dirigibles over sea areas controlled by England, it by no means canceled out all the functions of the aerostat in naval warfare.
There is probably little doubt in anyone’s mind but that a balloon whether inflated with expensive gas or with hot air is a target made to order for squadrons of enemy airplanes. Further than that, we all know that from the surface or from the air we can sight a balloon, dirigible, or other gas bag, much farther than its value as a scout should be worth to the force trying to gain information.
The arguments against “lighter-than- air aviation” seem to be based on one or nil of the following reasonably sound assumptions:
- A gas bag is highly vulnerable.
- It can be seen as far as, or farther than, it can itself see.
- Its operation is seriously restricted by weather.
- The large rigid dirigible is tremendously expensive (in money and men) to build, to maintain, and to base.
- The large rigid dirigible must operate from bases, permanent or temporary, which at best are few in numbers.
- Why not do the same job faster and better with heavier-than-air craft?
Well, as a matter of fact, these are pretty good reasons for doing away with something. But are they sufficient grounds for damning all lighter-than-air activities? In addition to the many hysterical or emotionally inspired pleas for the continued development of lighter-than-air, there are some arguments in its favor which stand up. Among these is one which is of overwhelming importance but which is often disregarded because it does not involve the use of the large rigid dirigible. It is here submitted that there is a real need for lighter-than-air craft both as used during the World War in some theaters, and along the lines now being developed abroad.
First, and most important, it will be remembered that the convoy system was developed into a successful defense against the submarine. Presumably it will be again so used—but not in waters where the convoy would be subject to air attack. In other words, the convoy system as seen in the World War will probably only be used where control of the air is established. In such a situation the balloon is not at the mercy of enemy planes, because by assumption they do not exist. It is believed safe to say that the continued operation of small dirigibles is more economical and reliable for the protection of coastal convoys than would be the operation of an equivalent force of airplanes over the same length of time.
Similarly, small dirigibles have a definite place in the daily work of offshore patrolling near all of our home area. Patrol planes can do the job, but here again the question of relative cost in money, men, maintenance, and fuel, must be decided in favor of the small gas bag.
Another field for the lighter-than-air specialist appears to exist in the operation of balloon barrages. If our bases are threatened with large-scale air attacks, it would be well to make use of all available forms of defense. According to press reports, the balloon barrage now seems to mount higher and higher in importance in the protection of some foreign positions. Can we afford to overlook its potentialities?
Now to get away from facts and into the realm of pure conjecture—the large rigid dirigible airplane carrier. When the Navy does get one, where might it be useful? I should say that it might penetrate undetected into areas under enemy control for great distances, only provided the weather is solid overcast with a relatively low ceiling. It must be remembered that there are many large sea areas where a solid overcast persists for a long time, and besides where the top of the cloud level is usually low enough to be within the limits of the dirigible’s ceiling.
In conclusion it must be admitted that the presence of the airplane carrier in the North Sea does not prove that enemy airplanes will “darken the sky” of all possible important theaters of operation all the time, and that our home harbors and nearby waters form in themselves an important theater. It is in these areas, if none other, that there remain many tasks to which lighter-than-air aviation is well adapted.
A Comment on H.O.211
John Schimm, Master Mariner.— H.O.211 has become the adopted method of many navigators, and to comment upon it would be considered sheer heresy, and would be received with doubtful appreciation. This writer uses Lieutenant Ageton’s method almost exclusively, more so to keep in style than for any consideration of advantage in either speed or accuracy over Marcq Saint-Hilaire’s original formula: cot dec cos H.A. = cot K sin dec cosec K cos(Lat ±K) = sin H tan (K + Lat) tan H = cos Z.
The above formula and that of Lieutenant Ageton are based on the identical principle, and their similarity is apparent at a glance. With well-appointed tables of logarithms it may be worked out speedily to a fraction of a minute, which cannot be said of H.0.211 under the present arrangement.
By transposing this formula to:
cot dec................ cosec dec.........
cos H.A................ sin K..................
cot K.................. sin H.................
K cos (Lat ± K). .
Lat ±K
-K
Lat
we obtain a convenient latitude formula for sights near the meridian, which ought to be well remembered by navigators who still use the time sight irrespective of azimuth.
Lieutenant Ageton’s and Marcq Saint- Hilaire’s formulas display a decided weakness when the declination used is 3° or less, and it is then mathematically quite admissible to substitute the declination with the latitude and vice versa, only that the azimuth then will have to be found by different means.
Not infrequently it will happen that the sun may not be visible for observation until its altitude is well past 65°. An inspection of H.O.211 for this altitude will readily disclose the sluggishness of its logs, which has dropped to 4 places of figures, and finally at 77° and 45' to only 3. The Marcq Saint-Hilaire formula displays the same weakness for the observation of higher altitudes, a defect inherent in secants, and it becomes evident that the correct solution of this problem can only be found in a tangent formula as given here:
cot dec cos H.A. =cot K tan dec cosec H.A.
cosec K sin (Lat +K) =cot Z cot (Lat ±K)
cos Z = tan H
Peruvian Landing Party, San Francisco, 1849
Javier Buenana M.—Perhaps readers of the Proceedings might be interested in knowing that Peruvian armed forces were once landed in San Francisco, California, in order to help establish order ashore. Frequent have been the cases in which American warships have been sent to Latin-American waters to protect the fives and properties of American citizens, but I am quite certain that very few people have heard of a Peruvian warship doing the same thing in American waters.
I am attaching to this letter the information that I have obtained from a publication of the “Liga Naval del Peru” (Peruvian Naval League) which I have translated and which I hope will be of interest.
When gold was discovered in California in 1849 men went there by the thousands from all parts of the world determined to make their fortunes in the newly found gold. Peruvians were no exception and frequent were the sailings from the Port of Callao for San Francisco where a considerable number of Peruvians were established. In those days of very little law and order frequent were the cases of robbery and assault of which the Peruvian adventurers were not immune. Reports reached Lima of the maltreatment of several Peruvian citizens and of the death sentence passed on a Peruvian and an Italian by an improvised court which resulted in a vigorous protest by the French Vice Consul in Monterey to the Governor of California. The Peruvian government soon received complaints from the Callao shipowners regarding the shipping situation, as there were several ships flying the Peruvian flag abandoned in San Francisco Bay by their crews who had deserted to look for gold. This was the fate of most ships of all nationalities that entered California waters at that time.
In view of this situation of the Peruvian shipping in California, and of the frequent reports of maltreatment of Peruvians, the government of President Castilla ordered the brig of war B.A.P. Gamarra to proceed at once to San Francisco. It left Callao on February 2, 1849, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Don Jose M. Silva Rodriguez and after 57 days of sailing arrived at its destination, having encountered rough weather for three days off the California coast which caused some damage on board ship.
Upon entering San Francisco Bay commander Silva Rodriguez was advised by the Port Authorities to anchor at least 6 miles from the town where the warships Lord Nelson, British; Calais, French; and the Walton, American, were anchored in order to avoid desertions. He was told that the crew of the Walton had been reduced to only 18 men due to this cause. The Gamarra anchored according to instructions near the other foreign warships but closest to the shore. It is speaking highly of the order and discipline that prevailed on board the Peruvian warship to note that during the ten months that the brig was in California waters not a single man deserted in spite of the fact that hauling up the ship’s boats at night and other measures of precaution carried out by the other men-o’-war was not done on board the Peruvian ship. Upon arrival of the Gamarra, there were over 40 merchant ships of all nationalities abandoned by their crews.
The incident that required the landing of Peruvian seamen occurred on April 19, 1849. On this day rioting broke out ashore which got beyond the control of the local police authorities who had to appeal for help from the warships lying at anchor in the bay. Landing parties from the warships already mentioned were organized and landed and finally established order ashore. In the fighting that ensued the Peruvian contingent took an active part.
The commander of the Gamarra had to overcome considerable difficulties in obtaining crews for the Peruvian merchantmen but he finally obtained crews from the Peruvian colony in San Francisco for the brigs Calderon and Elba and also for the barque Elisa, all three ships sailing for Peru on May 7. A few days later the brig
Dolphin and the barque Josefina sailed with crews furnished by the Gamarra.
The dispatching of these ships back to their home port was not the only mission entrusted to Commander Silva Rodriguez. He had also been ordered to try to obtain the recognition of the Peruvian Consul in San Francisco by the government of California. Sr. Varea had been appointed Peruvian Consul but, as he had not been recognized, he was therefore unable to render aid to Peruvian citizens when so required nor attend to his duties of Consul. After a period of negotiations in which Commander Silva Rodriguez had to play the part of the diplomat he finally obtained the official recognition of the Consul and having thus successfully complied with his mission weighed anchor and left for Callao.
1938—A New Safety Era in the American Merchant Marine—“Safety in Operations”
(See page 990, July, 1938, Proceedings)
The Merchant Marine Reserve Cruise, 1937
(See page 975, July, 1938, Proceedings)
Brockholst Livingston.—Again we have the advantage of the opinions of writers in close touch with the actual operations of the Merchant Marine. Lieutenant Commander Holden has had wide experience in several branches both at sea and on shore while Lieutenant Horka is now actively engaged in a seagoing capacity. It is to such as these, rather than to the mere theorists, that we must look for guidance in the future development of our shipping industry.
Lieutenant Commander Holden states that:
In no sphere of human relations is the spirit of responsibility, understanding, and co-operation more essential than in the steamship industry. Hope in the future for safety in operations lies in the successful attainment of this spirit.
The mutual acknowledgment of responsibility and common interest is likewise essential and he has pointed a way to the solution of our problems. Full agreement cannot, however, be given to his conclusion that one of the reasons for the present conditions is the lack of personal relations between employer and employee. Granting that in the old days the owner-master knew his crews better, there is no reason why equally close “contact” cannot be maintained under present-day conditions. The spirit of loyalty up and loyalty down, which is a first rule in the Navy, can well be adapted to the merchant service. In an organization of a hundred thousand men it has been possible to instill the spirit of a common purpose. Surely it is equally feasible to do so in private organizations of far smaller proportions. Following through the chain of command from ordinary seaman to master and the personal relationship (indirect as it may have to be) from the same seaman to the company president, the mutual understanding of the clipper-ship era may easily be revived. The establishment of a Maritime Labor Board (authorized by the last Congress) should also be a valuable aid in solving many of the problems which have hindered progress in labor relations in the recent past.
It is gratifying to the opponents of standardized ships to note that Lieutenant Commander Holden blames part of our labor troubles on the “fo’c’sle conditions” of emergency-built ships “put into commerical trades for which they were not originally designed or intended.” One finds it difficult to point to any real advantage of the standardized ship. And yet, in place of the “16 guinea pigs injected with the same disease” to which the present writer referred in the July issue of the Proceedings, there are now 20 of the C-2 design ships—more than one-eighth of our entire subsidized Merchant Marine— under construction. It will be interesting to learn in what trades these vessels will be operated when they are completed. Almost forty million dollars is being spent on another “experiment” in merchant ship construction. Would it not be wiser to profit more by the lessons of experienced operators such as the writer of the article under discussion?
The type of man who follows the sea has changed and he now rightly demands fit accommodations. The very fact that the present-day sailor desires better living quarters than did his predecessors is an indication that our personnel is improving in quality. If we can profit by that fact our future holds more promise. No one who knows denies that there are subversive influences at work, but even they can be (and have been to a great extent) overcome. Which brings us to the question of the adverse comment which has been so rampant in the past year.
In the course of a recent conversation, I asked someone who was about to make a cruise why she did not travel by an American vessel. The reply, given without hesitation, was that American ships were unsafe, their crews mutinous, and the service poor. Upon investigation I found that the source of this information was the representative of a foreign line. Thus has the deliberate and pernicious campaign of the past year borne fruit. It is seldom that we have been subjected to as subversive a Program of propaganda as that which has been directed at our shipping industry in the course of the past twelve or more months. In January of this year I wrote:
I do not agree with the wholesale condemnation of our personnel for I have traveled on enough ships of many nationalities to know that our officers and men, as a whole, are not deserving of the slights which are the vogue. As to conditions under which they are employed, foreign merchant marine personnel can readily enough furnish one with never-ending tales of their own grievances against their employers and the systems in general. While I believe that the public must be made to appreciate the need for properly trained men in the Merchant Marine, I do not believe that the position of the shipping industry is improved by the rather too strenuously reiterated condemnation of its personnel. There are faults on both sides, undoubtedly, but it is not going to do us much good to wash our dirty linen in public.
That statement was based on such pronouncements of the Maritime Commission as “Labor conditions in the American Merchant Marine are deplorable,” and “Unless something is done to reduce interunion friction, to increase the efficiency of our crews, and to restore order and discipline upon our ships, all government efforts to develop a strong American fleet will be futile,” and yet, in a recent speech, Chairman Land said:
While conditions in some sections of our shipping industry undeniably have been bad, and the foreign competitors of our steamship lines have not been slow to capitalize on this situation, these troubles have not been confined to our merchant marine alone. Foreign shipping has been similarly afflicted, but their differences are not advertised to high heaven. Let us stop washing our soiled maritime linen in public!
Has not the stable door perhaps been locked too late? Even if it has we can always buy another horse and take the necessary precautions in the future. Let us stop advertising our differences “to high heaven” and act as the other, successful, maritime nations do.
Lieutenant Commander Holden aptly remarks that “Trained men who are trustworthy, honest, efficient, and loyal are the best guarantees for safety of life at sea.” Congress has directed that the question of training men for the sea be studied and a comprehensive plan for the training of citizens as licensed and unlicensed personnel reported by January 20, 1939. By the same act Congress authorized the establishment of a United States Maritime Service “to be a voluntary organization” consisting of such licensed and unlicensed personnel as may be enrolled. It is proposed to establish immediately a training school for seamen on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and eventually on the Gulf coast. The Coast Guard will administer the training courses which will to begin with, cover a period of three months, partly ashore and partly afloat. For the present only unemployed seamen who have had at least two years’ sea service will be selected for training. As a first step in the execution of the plan the steamer Edgemoor will be converted into a training ship and Hoffman and Swinburne Islands in New York Harbor will be rehabilitated as the Atlantic land base.
In the oft-quoted Economic Survey by the Maritime Commission the question of training was discussed and the matter of a maritime service was recommended for further study in these words:
The Commission has given consideration to a more comprehensive program affecting the existing personnel. It has considered the establishment of a maritime service. . . .
The Commission is of the opinion that such a program should not be undertaken, however, until there has been further opportunity for study.
It is only reasonable that the “comprehensive system for the training of citizens . . . to serve as licensed and unlicensed personnel” should include the training contemplated by the maritime service. Whether Congress or the Commission is responsible for the suggestion that a maritime service be established before we have decided on our comprehensive system of training is not known but it would appear that we are moving too rapidly and without taking a sufficiently long-view of the subject. It is such moves which prompted the remark in my discussion in the July issue that we are drifting in the formulation of our policies. We cannot afford to drift and the sooner we realize that the better it will be for the future of our Merchant Marine. Even if the acquisition of new ships is delayed, it is wiser for us to postpone their construction than to repeat the errors of our war-time building program and the follies of our post-war disposition of the ships acquired by it. To many observers there is as yet no conclusive evidence that the proposal for the Coast Guard to train merchant seamen is the wisest course. Since the Navy takes over the Coast Guard and the subsidized merchant vessels in time of war, it would seem to be more advisable to have the crews of the latter trained by the Navy thus providing an adequate Merchant Marine Naval Reserve and, incidentally, instilling the principles of naval discipline for which there has been found no suitable substitute. In this connection Lieutenant Horka’s remarks on the Merchant Marine Reserve cruise of 1937 bear careful study. His statement that such cruises permit the Navy to gain a new body of friends to aid it in fulfilling its mission is adequate proof of the value of training under the Navy.
Lieutenant Horka has advanced a number of constructive suggestions for the improvement of conditions in the Merchant Marine. His “Safety Plan for ‘Safety in Operations’ ” can better be put into effect by larger organizations than are the rule in the shipping industry at the present time. The company operating two or three ships cannot afford the necessary effort. Greater continuity of service may be induced by the greater variety which the larger organizations could offer. There are excellent possibilities for the future but, as has been said:
We must change the attitude of our seamen by giving them a good name—and then they will live up to it. Proper recognition of and representation by worthy crew members will inspire confidence, loyalty, and discipline. It will provide a much- needed “safety valve.” It will get the men working for the company instead of against it.
We can accomplish nothing by drifting. The 476,560 tons of shipping under construction on July 1, 1938 (as compared with 289,535 tons on the same date of the preceding year), will be of no avail unless the types are adequate to our needs and our organizations on shore and at sea are capable of operating them efficiently. Certain progress has been made in the first year of the Maritime Commission’s existence but there is a long road to travel before we shall be capable of meeting the fair as well as unfair competition of our rivals on the seas. The suggestions of such authorities as the writers of the articles discussed may be studied with profit.
Graveyard of American Sailors Slain by Algerian Pirates in the Mediterranean
By Chief Yeoman Arthur Hentschel, U. S. Navy.—It is interesting to note that during the war with Algeria, in the early nineteenth century, when our wooden ships and iron men operated in the Mediterranean and were so highly successful in their efforts to rid the commerce lanes of ruthless pirates, a burial ground was established at their base in Port Mahon, on the Island of Minorca, in the beautiful Balearic Islands, not far off the coast of Spain. There our fallen naval heroes of a long-ago age were buried by their shipmates with all justly due honors in accordance with the best traditions of the sea.
In November, 1928, Vice Admiral John H. Dayton, U. S. Navy, Commander of the Naval Forces in Europe, visited Port Mahon in the Raleigh. The Admiral, accompanied by the British Consul, Captain Riddle of the Raleigh, Commander Beardall, his aide, and the Admiral’s yeoman, inspected this last resting place of the American officers and men who had fallen in the war with the pirates. They found the graves, nearly forgotten, in a very dilapidated condition. A list was made of the legible inscriptions on the gravestones, and the condition of the graveyard was made the subject of an official report to the Navy Department by the Commander of the Naval Forces in Europe. Many of the headstones were so decayed and broken with the passing of the years that it was impossible to make out the names, etc. of the deceased. It was possible, however, to compile the following list of legible inscriptions:
In Memory of Passed Midshipman John Smith Patterson of South Carolina, acting Master of the U. S. Frigate Congress, who was assassinated at
Mahon on the night of the 28th October 1842. His messmates have placed this stone as a mark of their esteem and regard.
Sacred Memory of Henry Jones, Quartermaster on board U. S. Ship North Carolina, a native of Boston, America, aged 28 years. He was unfortunately killed in this port March . This monument was erected as a tribute by his messmates.
The Bark is waiting
I must be ready
Charon put off
Steer small and steady.
________________
Silas Howard
Seaman, U. S. Ship Delaware
Died 30 November .
David Horton, Native of Baltimore, Maryland, and late a seaman on board the U. S. Ship North Carolina, who died March 2, 1826, aged 45 years. (Inscription illegible).
In Memory of John Landsley . . .
(Nothing else legible.)
BERGER, died----- , on board the U. S. Ship Delaware, aged 19 years.
Sacred to the Memory of Smothers, a Quartermaster of the U. S. Frigate, and native of Salem, Mass., who was drowned in the Harbour of Port Mahon on the night of 24 September, in the 29th year of his age.
John Brown, belonging to the ....
(Nothing else legible.)
In Memory of William Malloy, native of Troy, State of New York, late a -- on the U. S. Ship Delaware.
His adze becoming edgeless
His staves worm-eaten
His hoops consumed and bungs decayed
He yielded up his trade
And with it his life, on the 2nd of
April, 1829, aged 48 years.
_____________________
Lester Johnson, Coppersmith ....
(Nothing else legible.)
Jacob Shane, whose mortal remains lie beneath it. He was a native of the State of Massachusetts, and died in the Harbour on board the U. S. Ship Delaware, December 2, 1843, aged 21.
Few are thy days and full
O man of woman borne
Thy doom is written . . .
To dust thou shalt return.
Morton , HOPE CASTLE
Memory of James M. Lee, a native of Philadelphia, who departed this life on board the U. S. Ship Delaware at Port Mahon, October 30, 1843, aged 19 years and 4 months.
Go home dear shipmates and shed no tears,
For here ye be until Christ appears
When death does call we must obey
Even in my bloom I was called away.
It is gratifying to learn that as a result of this inspection and report by Vice Admiral Dayton, funds were provided by the Navy Department for the restoration of the graves of the American sailors who lay forgotten in Port Mahon.
The graves were situated in a little graveyard in which were also buried some British and German dead from old days. The cemetery had apparently been neglected for some time, and the municipal authorities were on the point of condemning the area and putting it to some other purpose. When the intention of the American government to recondition these old graves became known, the movement gained the support of both the British and Germans, who were interested in the preservation of the graves of their own nationals. As a result of the interest shown, the plans for comdemnation were rescinded, and the work of reconditioning the graves was proceeded with.
This Naval Race?
(See page 1013, July, 1938, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander James E. Hamilton, U. S. Navy.—“This Naval Race,” published in the Naval Institute Proceedings for July, 1938, stated:
Summarizing the authorizations of the Vinson- Trammel Act the following approximate number and tonnage of types of authorized vessels will not have been provided for by appropriation when the 1939 bill is enacted:
9 Battleships 315,000 tons
0 Airplane carriers
2 Cruisers 13,000 tons
31 Destroyers 50,580 tons
9 Submarines 12,800 tons
SI 391,380 tons
The 1939 appropriation act was approved as expected and provided definitely for all Vinson-Trammel authorizations except those contained in the above table. This act also provided for the remainder of the 1937 Auxiliary Vessel Bill authorizations.
H.R. 9218 was approved on May 17, 1938. This act authorized the tonnages of combatant vessels and numbers of auxiliary vessels shown in the following tables. The 1938 Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill, approved June 25, 1938, made initial appropriations for the vessels shown in the tables. The last two columns show the authorized vessels not provided for by appropriations as of July 1, 1938.
TABLE I—Auxiliary Vessels
|
|
TABLE II—Combatant Vessels
|
|
Note: Column VI based on estimated unit tonnages: capital ships—35,000; airplane carrier—20,000; cruisers 6,500.
Column VIII based on estimated unit tonnages: capital ships—35,000 (45,000); airplane carrier 20,000; cruisers—8,000; destroyers—1,600; submarines—1,450.
* 140,000 tons is net change due to outright increase in total tonnage of 105,000 (135,000) and decrease of 245,000 as of July 1, 1939, brought about by delayed authorization of replacements for Arizona, Mississippi, New Mexico, Idaho, Tennessee, California, and Maryland whose replacement keels could have been laid prior to 2/1/39 under the Vinson-Trammel Act but were delayed for 6 years by Section 8 of H.R. 9218. Figures in parenthesis apply if capital ships in excess of 35,000 tons are decided upon.
**This date selected arbitrarily as latest date on which keels of battleships appropriated for by July 1, 1938, would be laid.
Irish Pennants
Lieutenant Robert T. Sutherland, Jr. (C.C.), U. S. Navy.—In his book, The Steam Navy of the United States, Bennett relates some of the hardships suffered by members of the Engineer Corps, including one instance in which the engineer of an armed steamer was overlooked when assigning quarters. For almost two years he enjoyed no other home aboard “except a piece of canvas in form of a tent under "which he was allowed to sleep, summer or winter, on top of the deckhouse” . . . A clause in the Navy’s contract with John Ericsson for the construction of the Monitor provided that the contractor “furnish masts, spars, sails, and rigging of sufficient dimensions to drive the vessel at the rate of six knots per hour in a fair breeze of wind” . . . When, in 1819, one of the first steamboats ascended the Missouri, it had as a figurehead a serpent, through the mouth of which steam was permitted to exhaust. Terrified Indians along the shore fled in alarm upon sighting the ship, assured that the evil spirits were indeed en route to devour them . . . Charles Dickens devoted one chapter of his American Notes to his voyage across the Atlantic on the Cunarder Britannia. Apparently the lithographic pictures in the company’s advertising had led him to expect more than “an utterly impracticable, thoroughly hopeless and profoundly preposterous box” for his stateroom. He describes the saloon as “a long, narrow apartment, not unlike a gigantic hearse with windows in the sides; having at the upper end a melancholy stone, while on either side, extending down its whole dreary length, was a long, long table, over each of which a rack, fixed to the low roof and stuck full of drinking glasses and cruet-stands, hinted dismally at rolling seas and heavy weather.”