To add anything to the arguments in favor of the offensive spirit that have been adduced by great leaders and students of warfare would seem so unnecessary as to be almost impertinent did it not happen that right now is a time in our history when so many things combine to weaken this spirit as to constitute a real menace to the effective conduct of national defense.
It is impracticable to set forth all the subversive influences which are at work, some of which are of so subtle a nature as to conceal their purpose behind apparently legitimate aims, but we can enumerate some of the more important factors which have the destructive tendency mentioned above. In the first place there are the unreasoning pacifists of extreme type. It is difficult for those whose life is devoted to their country's defense, and who are surrounded by others of the same profession, to realize the extent to which the particular poison of nonresistance is eating in to the minds of young people through the instrumentality of individuals and associations that by the expenditure of large sums of money are spreading false doctrines and advocating a course of action calculated to place the American people at the mercy of a strong aggressive enemy. This influence is not relatively powerful at present, but it is existent especially in colleges and universities and has persuaded many unthinking students to pledge themselves not to engage in a war in which this country might become involved, no matter what the cause. This attitude, if it should become widespread, might easily hamper preparations for war and affect government in its conduct of a war already embarked upon.
It is to be assumed that the international policy of America will always be one of defense and not of aggression, but if, in the pursuance of such defensive policy, government through misguided reasoning should require of the Army and Navy the exercise of purely defensive tactics or strategy it would be difficult if not quite impossible for the Commander in Chief to adopt those courses of action which are indispensable to victory. The adoption of a purely defensive attitude on the part of the armed forces would of course preclude the winning of victory. Students of history realize as an axiom that the best defense is a vigorous offense, but it is not so easy for the man in the street to take this in. If, however, he is told that armed force restricted to defensive action is like a boxer who is only permitted to parry and not strike back, or like a football team that never gets the ball, it may become more understandable. Unless the people of this country have a clear realization of the essentiality of offensive action in pursuance of a defensive policy, public opinion may force the adminstration to adopt such measures as are bound to fail.
Akin to the virus of nonresistance is the fairly prevalent feeling that no object is ever gained by war. People who believe this of course ignore such facts-to take a few simple examples-as the achievement of American independence in the Revolutionary War and the solution of the problem of secession in the Civil War. They forget that the subjugation of France and Belgium was prevented by the World War, and that our own entry was brought about through the threat to our own safety. "World Power or Downfall" was to be the rallying cry1 and President Wilson in his address to Congress, April 2, 1917, expressed it in these words: "The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations."
Another deterrent to the offensive spirit is the present-day tendency on the part of Americans to rely upon mere words in international relations. This acts in an indirect way, in that wishful thinking tends to blind us to facts. In contemplating our own will to peace we are inclined to overlook the continual, flagrant, and contemptuous disregard of pledged words that has shown itself never more openly than within the past quarter-century. If America should be forced to resort to arms, the proneness to rely upon words instead of action might easily discourage the use of vigorous offensive methods at the beginning of hostilities. If, after all, we were unable to obtain our objective by words perhaps we could do so by waging a "gentle" war, it would be argued.
A very important reason for the timeliness of a reconsideration of this important subject is the degree to which we, as a people and as individuals, are in danger of losing sight of the moral values owing to our preoccupation with the purely material side of life. The fundamental material problems of food, shelter, and clothing are no more pressing now than formerly, probably even less so in fact, but it is the vast multiplication of the means of material comfort and enjoyment that engrosses our attention to the exclusion of the life of the mind and its importance in the real problems of existence. The luxuries of living, swift transportation, the radio, tabloid reading and pictures stir no depths of the intellect but act as mere sensory stimuli ruffling the surface like a light breeze on a still pond. Surrounded by this concentration on physical factors the military thinker is apt to be influenced by it, to place too much reliance on the limitations imposed by material as opposed to moral resources. It is not, of course, that material factors are to be disregarded or assessed at less than their real value but that they should not be given greater value than is warranted by the facts. Great leaders such as Napoleon and Nelson never ignored material factors. No one knew or appreciated better than Nelson the effect of such material difficulties as are imposed by weather, by time, and by distance, but what he also knew was that resolution and knowledge provided the means for overcoming these difficulties. They didn't melt away, they were always there but one might say they were hammered into submission. Nelson hammered at time for two years off Toulon, he hammered at distance for 6,000 miles or more in his chase of Villeneuve. He could not have subdued these difficulties unless he was quite completely aware of their strength through study and contemplation. In such achievements we see the spirit of the offensive operating in the sagacious mind of a genius. Foch put his finger on the weak spot in French methods that resulted in the defeat of 1870-71. Speaking of the theories held by the authorities preceding the Franco-Prussian War he says:
The teaching in our military schools was one bad result, as it also aimed only at the material side. Thus came those exclusive studies of ground, defenses, armament, organization, administration, all more or less scientific but dealing only with the physical side of war. As to the moral side, the side which results from human action, it was neither understood nor explained.2
This very same danger now confronts us, a danger due to overlong contemplation of material factors, not with the object of finding ways to subdue them but with the object of ascertaining what they will prevent us from doing. Thus the business of considering an increase in muzzle velocity, not as conferring an advantage at short range but as enabling us to conduct the battle at longer ranges, the business of increasing the speed and range of torpedoes, not so much to increase the accuracy and probability of hitting but with the idea of launching them at a longer distance from the enemy. In this we are losing sight of Admiral Sims' characterization of this weapon, "A destroyer is a projectile and the captain is the fuze."
The timidity induced by contemplation of difficulties goes back a long way. Job said, "For the thing which I greatly feared is come upon me, and that which I was afraid of is come unto me." It is just as well to remember that if we only fear a thing enough it will "come upon us." As a contrast to this state of mind we have that of Farragut. A story relates that while on his way to take command of the attack on the Mississippi forts he visited another officer of high rank who said after the interview, "Farragut is not the man for that job. I labored with him a whole forenoon trying to impress upon him the dangers of his undertaking, totally without success."
A later instance of defeatism is furnished in the Gallipoli campaign. General Hamilton was conducting the last great offensive. He writes "I said to Stopford, 'We must occupy the heights at once. It is imperative we get Ismail Oglu Tekke and Tekke Tepe now.' " 3
Some time subsequent to this conversation Hamilton received a dispatch from Stopford:
IX Corps to G.H.Q.
I foresee very great difficulty. The only ... etc.4
The remainder of this dispatch, whatever it is, is unimportant. The important thing is that, having been given a clear and specific order by one who knew the situation, a subordinate should "foresee very great difficulty." The very great difficulty had doubtless been seen and given due weight by the commander. Stopford's job was to "take the heights" in spite of the difficulties.
What inspired Jellicoe to turn away from the German Fleet about 7:21 on the day of Jutland rather than turn toward them when a turn toward would have more quickly enabled his ships to parallel the course of the approaching torpedoes? In this connection a quotation from the book The Riddle of Jutland which in general presents Jellicoe in a favorable light is interesting as setting forth the views of Jellicoe shortly after he took command of the Grand Fleet.
He (Jellicoe] notified the Admiralty that in certain circumstances, if he found himself in battle with hostile forces, he proposed to break off action rather than advance into submarine waters. The pursuit of a retreating foe appeared doubly dangerous, both as a lure to draw him into a submarine trap, and because the retiring vessels might lay mine fields as they went. The Admiralty signified its official approval of this cardinal change in Britain's traditional battle tactics. For the first time for centuries the policy "attack on sight and pursue until the enemy is annihilated," was modified.5
Whatever the motive, by that turn away close touch between the two battle fleets was lost and never regained. And there were no submarines present at Jutland.
In September, 1917, a certain officer in London who should have been in a position to know the facts, stated that there was not enough shipping in the world available to get a million Americans to France in time to have a decisive effect in the war. We all know the answer to that one. Vision, the spirit of the offensive, a correct appreciation of the difficulties and their complete frustration resulted in the accomplishment ·of "the impossible.''
The offensive use of new weapons deserves special mention since we have in aircraft not only a new weapon but one that in addition to newness possesses a speed beyond anything hitherto experienced. The advantage inherent in the offensive use of aircraft seems to be generally recognized, but the extent of that advantage is probably not appreciated except by the Russians, who have demonstrated the possibility of placing a body of troops at a critical point in a very short time provided they have enough transport planes (which is probable) and provided they can be effectively protected en route (which is more doubtful). At any rate their experiments with parachutes are worth Watching, not only with a view to the transferring of bodies of troops on the battlefield but also with a view to the possibilities of this method in effecting a landing against opposition. Right here should be inserted a warning against such misapplication of the spirit of the offensive as leads to the bombing of other than military objectives. A true application of the spirit of the offensive does not involve the ruthless killing of noncombatants and the destruction of private and unproductive property, for the very good reason that such measures have not proved instrumental in winning wars, but in most cases have simply hardened the will to resist. Let us take an imaginary case. Let us suppose a war in progress between the United States and some other country in which those in the interior, in apparent security, are not wholly united in its prosecution. What could be better designed to solidify the national spirit than the bombing of a few inland cities?
It is not desired in this discussion to counsel a blind, hammer-and-tongs attitude in the conduct of any war in which this country might be forced through the aggressions of others to engage, but it is desired once again to emphasize the necessity for bold aggressive action in the actual conduct of operations, once war has been decided upon. Careful and thoughtful consideration of difficulties and obstacles is justifiable in planning, for although a bold plan may be advisable, mere boldness of plan is not going to frighten the enemy. It is boldness of action that brings real results. Once the plan has been decided upon the spirit of the offensive should be given free play. Then vigor, power, and boldness should characterize our operations.
1 Germany and the Next War, Von Bernhardi, translated by Allen H. Powles, p. 154.
2 The Principles of War, Foch, translated by J. de Morinni, pp. 9-10.
3 Gallipoli Diary, Sir Ian Hamilton, Vol. II, p. 63.
4 Ibid., p. 67.
5 The Riddle of Jutland, Gibson and Harper, p. 44.
HOW THE SHIPS OF THE CONTINENTAL NAVY WERE PAINTED
For what little we know on this subject we are indebted to William Bell Clark, author of Lambert Wickes, Sea Raider and Diplomat. His researches have disclosed exact descriptions of the hulls of the three little vessels in that gallant commander's squadron. The vessels were the ship Reprisal, the brig Lexington, and the cutter Dolphin. Concerning the Reprisal, "Her sides were plain black except where a white molding ran around her quarters and a touch of yellow paint had mingled with the more somber shade upon her stern." He describes the Lexington as "Black of sides, also, but with yellow moldings, a yellow squared tuck, and her low, round stern lead-colored." The Dolphin's "stern was painted green and her counter black." Black was the predominating color on the hulls of these ships, and it seems fair to assume that a similar color scheme was used on the hulls of the infant navy's other ships.