FROM NOVEMBER 3 TO DECEMBER 3
THE WAR IN CHINA
FAILURE AT BRUSSELS.-During November the Brussels Conference on the Sino-Japanese conflict moved slowly toward predestined failure. Germany did not participate; the Italian delegation served chiefly as a means of presenting the Japanese point of view; and the Soviet representative, M. Litvinoff, left in some irritation when it appeared that he might be excluded from negotiations as a means of placating Japan. To a second invitation to take part in the conference Japan on November 12 gave a very definite and comprehensive negative reply. Thereafter the Chinese delegation tried in vain to induce the conferees to unite in some form of positive action, such as a joint decision to withhold supplies and credits from Japan and extend them to China. Even Ambassador Davis's proposal to inform Japan that "no dispute was ever satisfactorily settled by armed force" was abandoned when the Italian delegate objected to the statement as "historically incorrect." On November 22 the conference adjourned sine die after adopting a final declaration of principles upholding the sanctity of international pledges, regretting that Japan's concept of the issues "vitally differed from that of most of the nations in the world," and again pleading for a settlement by peaceful processes.
The opening of the conference was disturbed by a report from Berlin that the German government was about to mediate between Japan and China and had received favorable assurances from both parties. This report, however, proved premature, for China denied commitments and neither nation showed readiness to seek a settlement at that time.
SHANGHAI INTERESTS THREATENED.
Japan's action at Shanghai in taking over control of customs, mail, radio, and other governmental activities threatened a serious conflict with the long established rights and privileges of the Western nations in the Shanghai area. As quoted in the press, Japanese officials asserted that as a conquering nation Japan was justified in taking over all sovereign powers formerly exercised by China in the International Settlement and the French Concession. This was contested in notes of protest from the United States, Great Britain, and other nations, the American note of November 29 insisting that the United States government be consulted in all matters pertaining to Chinese customs organization. Chinese customs revenues have long been in part sequestered for the payment of foreign debts, including the $16,600,000 credit granted in 1931- 33 for the purchase of American cotton, and the customs administration has been under the supervision of foreign officials headed by Sir Frederick Maze. Japanese control obviously might not only jeopardize these revenues but also be used, as in North China, for the furthering of Japanese trade.
CHINESE RESISTANCE WEAKENED.
With the Japanese occupation of the Shanghai area and the subsequent threat to Nanking, the Chinese government offices were moved to cities to the westward, and the outcome of the conflict hinged more directly on the duration and effectiveness of China's further resistance. Shortage of munitions appeared a vital factor, for although Marshal Chiang was reported to have reserve supplies sufficient for six months' time, munitions imports from abroad were effectively checked by Japanese sea control and the practical impossibility of land transport over the single route open to Russia. Furthermore, as was authoritatively revealed in Paris, munitions exports from French IndoChina had been effectively checked since the beginning of the war by Japanese threats of blockade or seizure of the island of Hainan.
Following the Brussels failure there remained little prospect of assistance to China by concerted action of the Western Powers. Support from Russia was rendered difficult by internal weakness and external pressure on the part of Japan's European allies. Thus there was some justification for the view, most forcibly set forth in the Italian press, that Japan Was invulnerable, and in a position to impose her own terms. Against this it could only be urged that effective guerrilla Warfare such as that waged in the past by China's Red army, might if extended over a year's .time put Japanese financial and economic resources under a possibly fatal strain.
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THE SPANISH CONFLICT
FRANCO DECLARES BLOCKADE.
At the close of November the Franco Government in Spain declared its purpose to establish a blockade of all coasts under control of the opposite faction, including Minorca, despite the fact that recognition of belligerent rights had not yet been generally accorded by foreign powers. The British attitude, as expressed by naval authorities at Gibraltar and Minorca, was that the blockade was illegal, but that British ships could not be guaranteed protection within Spanish territorial waters. British ships were already forbidden to engage in traffic in arms.
To hasten recognition of belligerency, General Franco also approved in November the Non-Intervention Committee's plan for "token withdrawals" of foreign troops, and suggested that the first withdrawals should be 3,000 from each side. He made some stipulations as to the makeup of the neutral supervisory commissions and also asked assurances that all neutral nations concerned would respect the agreement reached. Meantime interest in the whole plan waned as prospects increased for a compromise settlement or an insurgent victory before the withdrawal program could get under way.
ANGLO-SPANISH TRADE.-Closer relations between the British government and General Franco were indicated in November by the appointment of British trade agents in insurgent territory and the semiofficial acceptance of the Duke of Alba as insurgent representative in London. Foreign Minister Eden gave assurances that this action involved no disloyalty to Franco- British neutrality policy, and that at the same time it afforded protection to extensive British mining and commercial interests in insurgent Spain. No doubt also it would give England a more favorable position in the peace settlement, in the event of insurgent success.
EUROPEAN POLITICS DIPLOMATIC VISITS.-A series of diplomatic visits in November marked Franco-British efforts to relieve the European tension. First of these was the journey to Berlin made by Viscount Halifax, President of the British Council and government leader in the House of Lords. The Halifax mission was sponsored by a strong faction of the British Cabinet who favor an understanding with Germany, even at some sacrifice of loyalty to France; as Minister Eden's organ the Yorkshire Post put it bluntly, "a certain number of people-not all of them obscure-who would be prepared to welcome a German campaign of territorial expansion in the East if by that means Germany could for the time being be diverted from exploiting her nuisance value in other directions." The results of the Halifax-Hitler conference were not fully revealed and were presumably not especially illuminating, for as a matter of fact German desires were already pretty well known-a free hand in Eastern Europe, in return for which Germany would agree to defer her colonial claims and assume a more conciliatory policy in European affairs. Or as the press quoted a German diplomat:
The present lodestar of German foreign policy is to pry Great Britain out of the constellation of foreign powers which are permanently hostile to German foreign aspirations. Its components are well known-France, Russia, and Czechoslovakia. At every turn Germany finds herself blocked by this combination which derives its strength solely from Great Britain .... Reduce it briefly to this formula: England's hands off in continental matters; Germany's hands off the rest of the world.
Obviously England could not adopt such a program in toto without a complete shift of diplomatic allegiance. And, despite division of opinion in the British Cabinet, the subsequent conversations in London with Premier Chautemps and Foreign Minister Delbos of France revealed that no such shift was planned. Any concessions to Germany would be made in concert with France and without disruption of French ties. The London talks covered the whole diplomatic field and were marked apparently by the utmost harmony. Thereafter M. Delbos set out on a two-week tour of Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade, and other Central European capitals. It was reported that he would take a stiff attitude in holding Poland to past promises, but that he would suggest to Czechoslovakia a conciliatory policy toward the Sudeten Germans and an effort to put relations with Berlin on a more friendly basis.
GERMANY'S COLONIAL DEMANDs.-Restoration of former German colonial posessions continued under discussion during November both in Germany and in the Franco-British conferences in London. In London French statesmen were reported "amenable," but it was considered a matter for extended study and consultation among all states concerned. In Germany, speaking at Augsburg on November 21, Chancellor Hitler again set forth Germany's imperial claims. In two or three years, he thought the world would become accustomed to Germany's colonial demands, but only "five or six years hence" would the nations settle down to find a solution.
It will be recalled, however, that in Hitler's Mein Kampf, which has been a consistent key to Nazi policy, colonial expansion is pronounced far less desirable than acquisitions in the European home land, and the view persists that the colonial issue is thrust forward largely as a make-weight for diplomatic bargaining in other fields. Colonial restoration might help German pride and prestige but would not go far toward satisfying her economic needs. Her former possessions are now in the hands of seven nations, and there is slight prospect that the Pacific islands would be turned back by either Australia or Japan. Those in Africa are of limited value as sources of raw material, markets, or outlets for population. Though her former colonies included over 1,000,000 square miles, or five times the area of Germany, they had a white population before the war of less than 25,000, of which only 18,500 were Germans. And less than 1 per cent of Germany's pre-war foreign trade was with her colonies. On the other hand, it may be argued that if these territories have a limited value, there should be no great stickling over their return. Togoland and the Cameroons in West Africa would probably be the first called for, together with a share in the economic development of other African territory held by European Powers.
FASCIST TRIPLICE.-The unity of the dictatorial nations was greatly strengthened in November by Italy's decision to join Germany and Japan in the AntiComintern Pact, directed, in language at least, against the machinations of the Communist International. Though her adherence was delayed a year, Italy came in as an "original signatory." So far as Present aims are concerned, the league is regarded less as a barrier to Communism than as a means of co-ordinating opposition to the "democratic bloc" led by Britain and France. Japan by this new link has definitely abandoned her longstanding policy of co-operation with England and committed herself to national expansion in league with the Fascist powers. Following Italy's adherence it was believed that Poland and perhaps also Hungary might soon be induced to join in the agreement. Russia, however, Warned Poland that such action would be regarded as an unfriendly gesture, and also made similar protests to Rome. The Possibility even arose that the pact might be extended to include Portugal and some Of the South American dictatorships, and that, utilizing the communist bugaboo, it might develop into a kind of international league of dictatorial powers.
An immediate result of the closer Italo-Japanese understanding was Italy's decision at the close of November to recognize Manchukuo and establish a legation at Hsinking. In return, Japan formally recognized the Franco government in Spain. German recognition of Manchukuo was not yet forthcoming, but the apparent harmony of aims in the new triplice could be stated as follows (New York Times, November 14):
Their external aims do not conflict-except perhaps for possible German-Italian rivalry in Southeastern Europe. Germany and Italy do not mind Japan's advance in China if their commercial privileges there are protected, as they probably will be. Hitler does not mind Italy's challenging Britain in the Mediterranean. Mussolini does not worry over the fate of Czechoslovakia or the German drive for colonies since German expansion in those directions may help the Germans to forget Italy's annexation of the South Tyrol. Japan profits from all these rivalries because they paralyze Europe and leave her a free hand in the Far East.
SCHACHT QUITS REICH POST .
The resignation of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht from his post as Minister of Economics in the German Cabinet finally became effective in early November, and it was believed that he would also give up the presidency of the Reichsbank at the expiration of his term in April. Dr. Schacht's retirement was attributed in part to conflicts of authority and policy between him and General Hermann Goering. The latter in directing the Four-Year Plan has tended to sacrifice all other considerations to the speeding up of this plan as a measure of military necessity, and seeks its completion if possible within two years' time.
POLISH-GERMAN MINORITIES PACT.
Germany and Poland early in November concluded an agreement on the treatment of minority populations of each nation within the other's territory, the agreement being based on mutual pledges to avoid attempts at forced assimilation or repression of native language and customs. The initiative for the agreement came from Germany, and an immediate effect anticipated was the presention of a united front on the minorities issue on the part of Poles and Czechs.
NEW BELGIAN PREMIER.-After a month of uncertainty during which Premier Paul Van Zeeland remained in charge of the government, a new Belgian Ministry was organized by the Socialist leader Paul Janson. The new Ministry's program included nation-wide equality of the Flemish and French languages, and organization of army recruits in separate linguistic units.
UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADE PROPOSALS.
Announcement was made in November that the United States and Great Britain had agreed to open negotiations for a new reciprocal trade agreement, which if completed will be the :first important revision of trade regulations between the two countries since the most-favored-nation treaty of 1815. Possibilities of increased trade were evident enough from the fact that American exports to England have declined from the 1926-1930 average of over $800,000,000 to only $440,000,000 in 1936. From the British standpoint, however, the gain would be chiefly political, arising from the closer alignment of the two nations and their agreement on a common policy of encouraging international trade as a foundation of peace. Opening of the English market to increased American exports can be accomplished only by some alteration of existing preferential agreements with the dominions, and it remains to be seen how far the latter will be stimulated to give up trade benefits in order to support the old country, oppose dictatorships, and promote world peace.
BRAZILIAN Dictatorship.
On November 10 President Getulio Vargas of Brazil, with the support of Cabinet and Army, issued a decree dissolving Congress and declaring in effect a new Constitution which concentrated dictatorial power in the hands of the President. The action was defended on the grounds of Brazil's economic difficulties, the violence threatened in the approaching elections, and the alleged impossibility of carrying out the President's reform measures under the existent governmental scheme. The new Constitution gives the President all such powers as were previously exercised only by suspension of Constitutional forms, including the power to declare war, dissolve the Lower House, promulgate laws by decree (upon authority granted by a hand-picked Parliament), and nominate another candidate for President at the end of his six-year term. In the new Parliament the Lower House will be elected in popular vote but the Upper House or Federal Council will consist of 30 members 10 of whom are named by the President. A distinctive feature of the new scheme is a council of National Economy representing workers, employers, farmers, and other industrial interests.
The new regime in Brazil was generally viewed not as a shift to the European brand of Fascist state but rather as a dictatorship of the familiar Latin-American pattern. Nevertheless it was regarded with some concern in the United States as another example of the present South American trend toward extreme types of Right or Left dictatorships, abandoning even the semblance of democratic forms. Of the South American nations six show a strong Rightist tendency under a wealthy and powerful ruling class. These are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Chili and Ecuador lean to the Left. Only Colombia remains in any measure truly democratic.