Since the adoption of new rules of procedure by the Congress, following the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act in 1921, the process of obtaining authority for constructing naval Vessels has been somewhat cumbersome and probably not generally understood.
Prior to that time the general procedure was to incorporate authority to build vessels and the necessary appropriation for the purpose in the one bill. This was almost invariably the annual Naval Appropriation Bill. The Navy Department Presented its recommendations for new construction to the Naval Affairs Committee of the House along with its estimates for funds required for ordinary purposes during the next fiscal year. If the Naval Affairs Committee accepted the recommendations for additional vessels or adopted a modified program, the ships were authorized by the appropriation bill and money for their construction was included in this same bill. Thus the entire process was:
- recommendation by the Navy Department
- consideration and recommendation by the Naval Affairs Committee,
- action by the House of Representatives,
- consideration by the Senate Naval Affairs Committee,
- action by the Senate,
- agreement through conference between the two Houses, if necessary, and
- approval by the President.
Thus as a part of seven routine steps— routine since the annual appropriation bill, of which the new ship authorization and appropriation was a part, had to go through the process anyway—the Secretary of the Navy was legally empowered to undertake the procurement of new ships. Normally, the Navy Department made its recommendations when the Congress assembled on March 4 and had the full authority to proceed on July 1 of the same year, an interval of about four months.
The new procedure, adopted by both Houses, to fit in properly with the Budget and Accounting Act, greatly lengthened the legislative process. The act itself established a Bureau of the Budget. It further required that no legislation involving appropriations or obligations of funds could be presented to the Congress by any executive department until the legislation was approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The new parliamentary procedure required that every act appropriating money be considered and reported out by the Appropriation Committee and that that committee could appropriate money only for purposes authorized by Congress by laws considered and reported out by the cognizant Legislative Committee. All of these requirements were of general application and not applicable to the Navy alone. Their effect on authorization of new naval vessels was to substitute for the seven-step, four- month process, the following procedure:
- The Navy Department considers all pertinent factors and makes decision as to the number and types of vessels needed by the Fleet;
- the Judge Advocate General (Chief of the Navy’s legal staff) prepares a bill authorizing the ships to be recommended;
- the Secretary of the Navy presents this bill to the Bureau of the Budget for consideration;
- the Bureau of the Budget holds hearings on the bill and approves it if it is consistent with the financial policy of the President;
- the Secretary of the Navy forwards the proposed bill to both Houses of Congress with the statement that it has been approved by the Bureau of the Budget and is consistent with the President’s policy;
- the Naval Affairs Committee of either House holds hearings on the bill and reports it out, with or without amendments;
- the Senate (or House) considers and passes the bill;
- either concurrently or later, the Naval Affairs Committee of the other House holds hearings and reports the bill out, with or without amendments; and
- it is considered and passed by the other body;
- differences between the bill as it passes the two Houses are ironed out through a conference committee and the compromise bill is passed by both Houses; and
- sent to the President for approval and signature. Thus, in eleven steps the Navy Department has received authority to ask for the appropriation of money to build the ships needed.
If the authorization bill originated with a member of Congress the preliminary steps above would be eliminated. The Naval Affairs Committee would have the bill referred to it directly and then it, the Committee, would obtain recommendation on the bill from the Bureau of the Budget and the Navy Department before hearings were held. Neither the recommendation of the Budget nor the policy of the President is necessarily binding on the Congress or its Committees as they are on the Navy Department.
The most effective difference between the present preliminary authorization procedure and the former is that now the bill is independent of other legislation and must find room on the calendar not only of both Houses but also of both Naval Affairs Committees. It cannot force itself to consideration by reason of its incorporation in an annual supply bill which must be enacted before the legislative session can end. It is possible for an authorization bill to take several years from inception to enactment, and very difficult for one to be enacted during the session in which it was introduced in time to permit obtaining an appropriation to undertake the construction in the same session.
After the ships are authorized by the process described above, the Navy Department includes funds, for the first year’s work on authorized ships, in its regular annual budget which goes through the same process as described for the authorization act except that the Bureau of the Budget forwards the approved budget direct to the House, the House of Representatives must pass it before the Senate considers it, and the cognizant committees are now the Appropriations Committees instead of the Naval Affairs Committees. The program initiated by the Navy Department, even though authorized, may be changed or completely eliminated by the budget, by either committee, or by either House. Thus assuming, which is not always the case, that the incentive for all new naval construction comes from the Navy Department, it must defend its recommendations twice before the Bureau of the Budget and before each of four congressional committees separately and it must be accepted twice on the floor of each House of Congress and be twice approved by the President.
As will be shown there is usually a very considerable gap between the authorization of a ship and the actual start of its procurement. In many cases this delay is due to the Navy Department which may defer recommendation for commencing authorized construction due to considerations of current needs of the Fleet, the budgetary situation, availability of facilities for shipbuilding, or desire to prosecute orderly and well-spread-out building programs.
Authorizations
The mammoth pre-World War building program started in 1916 provided that all vessels included in it should be laid down before July 1, 1919. Since this program was slowed down by the several war emergency shipbuilding programs, all of the 1916 program was not started on the final date, so by an Act of July 8, 1919, the date limitation was removed. With the institution of the new legislative procedure, the following vessels of the 1916 program had not been undertaken: 12 destroyers, 6 fleet submarines, 1 transport. Since the authorization had emanated from the Naval Affairs Committee, it constituted “authorization” under the new system and all that was needed was an appropriation to build the ships. The authorization can be considered as dated July 8, 1919.
Since that date there have been only five naval vessel authorization bills enacted. These have been:
- The first “cruiser” bill passed in 1924 which authorized 8 cruisers and 6 river gunboats.
- The second “cruiser” bill passed in 1929 which carried authorization for one airplane earner and 15 cruisers to be started, 5 a year for the next 3 years.
- The emergency program authorized by executive Order which itself was authorized by National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. This program embraced 32 vessels: 2 airplane carriers, 3 light cruisers, 1 heavy cruiser, 2 gunboats, destroyers, and 4 submarines.
- The Vinson-Trammell Act passed in 1934. This bill authorized appropriations for all vessels which the United States was permitted to build under the terms of the Washington treaty of 1922 and the London treaty of 1930. What was authored in the way of specific ships was rather complicated and will be considered separately later.
- The “auxiliary” vessel authorization act Passed in 1937 which authorized 6 vessels of various auxiliary types: 1 seaplane tender, 1 destroyer lender, 1 submarine tender, 1 oil tanker, 1 mine sweeper, and 1 fleet tug.
Appropriations
Funds for beginning construction of authorized ships were provided by appropriation bills as follows:
1919 Authorization (19 vessels)
Destroyers (12)
- Dewey, Farragut, Hull, Worden, Macdonough
- Aylwin, Dale, Monaghan
- Batch, Clark, Moffett, Phelps
Submarines (6)
- Argonaut, Narwhal, Nautilus
- Dolphin
- Cachalot and Cuttlefish
Transport (1)
Heywood (Not yet appropriated for; will probably never be built under this authorization.)
1924 Cruiser Bill (14 vessels)
River Gunboats (6)
- Panay, Oahu, Luzon, Mindanoa, Guam, Tutuila
Cruisers (8)
- Pensacola, Salt Lake City, Augusta, Chester,
Houston, Louisville, Northampton, Chicago
1929 Cruiser Bill (16 vessels)
Airplane Carrier (1)
1931—Ranger
Cruisers (15)*
- Portland, Indianapolis, New Orleans, Minneapolis, Astoria
- San Francisco, Tusculoosa
- Quincy
- Brooklyn
- Wichita
- Phoenix, Boise, Honolulu, St. Louis
- Helena
1933 NIRA Emergency Program (32 vessels)
Funds for all of the following vessels were provided concurrently by the emergency legislation and the executive order which authorized the ships:
Airplane Carriers (2)
Yorktown, Enterprise
Light Cruisers (3)
Nashville, Savannah, Philadelphia
Heavy Cruiser (1)
Vincennes
Gunboats (2)
Charleston, Erie
Destroyers (20)
Porter, Selfridge, McDougal, Winslow, Mahan, Cummings, Drayton, Lamson, Flusser, Reid, Case, Conyngham, Cassin, Shaw, Tucker, Downes, Cushing, Perkins, Smith, Preston
Submarines (4)
Porpoise, Pike, Shark, Tarpon
1934 Vinson-Trammell Act
This act authorized, over an indefinite period, an indefinite number of vessels. Although numbers of ships were not specifically limited by this act, ships for which appropriations were authorized were clearly defined. The act covered all of the types of vessels limited by the two “disarmament treaties” and permitted construction of all vessels allowed by the treaties over and above those already completed or under construction; and further the replacement of all overage vessels when such replacement was permissible under the treaties. The treaties limited each class of vessels by total tonnage, hence the number of ships authorized by this bill was dependent on the size of vessel which the Navy Department decided to build.
The Vinson-Trammell Act was passed during the fiscal year 1934. Under the terms of the treaties and hence of the act, replacement keels could be laid down for ships of the various types a certain number of years after a vessel was completed. These periods are: Battleships (17) (by a special provision no battleship was to be replaced prior to December 31, 1936); airplane carriers (17); cruisers (17) (13 for two oldest vessels); destroyers (14); submarines (10).
Ships authorized by the act for commencement during the fiscal year 1935 due to deficiencies in tonnage of “underage” vessels as of June 30, 1935, were: battleships, 0; airplane carriers, 15,000 tons; cruisers, 0; destroyers, 99,200 tons; submarines, 35,530 tons.
Replacement vessels thus authorized for the fiscal year 1935 were appropriated for as follows:
Airplane Carriers (15,000 tons)
- Wasp
Destroyers (99,200 tons)
Emergency (14-21,700 tons) (executive order actually effective fiscal year 1935): Somers, Warrington, Gridley, Craven, Dunlap, Fanning, ley, Blue, Helm, Mugford, Ralph Talbot, Henley, Patterson, Jarvis
- (15-23,500 tons) Sampson, Davis, Jouett, Benham, Ellet, Lang, McCall, Maury, Mayrant, Trippe, Rhind, Rowan, Stack, Sterett, Wilson
- (12-18,000 tons) Sims, Hughes, Anderson, Hammann, Muslin, Russell, O’Brien, Walke, Morris, Roe, Wainwright, Buck
- (8-12,960 tons) Benson, Mayo, Gleaves, Niblack, Charles F. Hughes, Hilary P. Jones, Madison, Lansdale
Pending in 1939 Appropriation Act (8—12,960), not yet named.
Not yet provided for (6-10,030), not yet named.
Submarines (35,530 tons)
Emergency (6-7,980 tons) (executive order actually effective fiscal year 1935): Perch, Pickerel, Permit, Plunger, Pollack, Pompano
- (6-8,000) Salmon, Seal, Skipjack, Snapper’ Stingray, Sturgeon
- (6-8,000) Sargo, Saury, Spearfish, Sculpin, Squalus, Swordfish
- (4-5,600) Seadragon, Sealion, Searaven, Seawolf
Pending in 1939 Appropriation Act (4-5,600), not yet named.
The London Treaty contained an “escalator clause” which any signatory could invoke, whereby he could build beyond the treaty limits after notifying the other signatories of his decision to do so. This clause having been invoked by other signatories than the United States, we became entitled to the following additional tonnage: cruisers 20,270; destroyers 40,550; submarines 15,598. This additional tonnage was, by the wording of the Act, authorized by the Vinson-Trammell Act. Provision for its construction has been made as follows:
Cruisers.—The tonnage on cruisers actually obtained by the designs chosen for the vessels authorized by the cruiser bills of 1924 and 1929 now exceed the original treaty limits by 9,425 tons. Thus a portion of the “escalator clause” increase was provided by the previous authorizations. The remaining 10,845 tons will be used up by two cruisers, appropriation for which is now pending in the 1939 Appropriation Act.
Destroyers.—No provision has been made for building the approximately 25 destroyers authorized, including the “escalator clause.”
Submarines.—In addition to four submarines listed above as applying against original treaty tonnage, there are two additional submarines totalling about 2,800 tons pending in the 1939 Appropriation Act. Charging these against the escalator clause” increase leaves about 12,800 tons or about 9 vessels not yet provided for.
Since 1935, a few additional vessels become “authorized” by the Vinson-Trammell Act due to older ships of the type having reached the replacement age. These vessels “authorized” by fiscal years through 1939 have been appropriated for as follows:
Cruisers (2)
- Omaha and Milwaukee, displacing 14,100 tons total. About 1,100 tons of this will probably he used up in the two 1939 “escalator” cruisers, or if these two ships are considered as replacements for the Omaha and Milwaukee, about 2,000 of these replacement tons will be unprovided for along with the balance of 10,845 “escalator” tons, a total of 13,000 tons.
Battleships (13)
- With the expiration of the battleship building holiday on December 31, 1936, laying of keels for the following battleships became permissible. Provision for the replacement was made as shown:
Arkansas, Texas (1937 Appropriation Act),
New York, Nevada (Pending in 1939);
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Mississippi,
New Mexico, Idaho (Not provided for).
- Tennessee (Not provided for).
- California, Maryland (Not provided for).
Summarizing the authorizations of the Vinson-Trammell Act the following approximate number and tonnage of types of authorized vessels will not have been provided for by appropriation when the 1939 bill is enacted:
9 battleships 315,000 tons
0 airplane carriers
2 cruisers 13 ,000 tons
31 destroyers 50,580 tons
9 submarines 12,800 tons
51 391,380
1937 Auxiliary Vessel Bill (6 Vessels)
Seaplane tender (1), Curtiss, destroyer tender (1), Dixie; 3d Deficiency Bill 1938.
Submarine tender (1), oil tanker (1), mine sweeper (1), fleet tug (1); pending in 1939 Appropriation Bill.
The Washington treaty in 1922 was negotiated for the definite purpose of reducing the economic burden of armaments and the possibly controversial (as to method chosen) purpose of balancing the navies of the major powers in such a way that aggression would become improbable. The economic purpose was attained by limiting the tonnage of the larger types of vessels which each nation could possess and by requiring the discontinuance of construction of certain vessels building.
The peace induction purpose was served by adjusting the sizes of the various navies so that, according to expert opinion, each nation would have sufficient naval force to defend its legitimate interests but not enough to insure it of any success in an attempt to infringe on the interests of any other nation. These ratios
Summary
Authorizations Since the World War
Year of Act | Name of Act | Ships Authorized to June 30, 1939 | Ships* Appropriated for to June 30, 1939 |
1919 |
| 18 | 18 |
1924 | 1st Cruiser bill | 14 | 14 |
1929 | 2d Cruiser bill | 16 | 16 |
1933 | N.I.R.A. | 32 | 32 |
1934 | Vinson-Trammell | 141 | 90 |
1937 | Auxiliaries bill | 6 | 6 |
|
| 227 | 176 |
* Includes those in the 1939 Appropriation Act, not yet enacted.
of naval strength accepted by the powers in 1922 were fixed at:
United States | 1.00 |
British Empire | 1.00 |
Japan | .60 |
France | .35 |
Italy | .35 |
|
The ratios, established only as regards capital ships (battleships and battle cruisers) and airplane carriers, were to be maintained by replacing vessels only when they reached a specified age and then scrapping the replaced vessel. The treaty was quite definite as regards maximums. It was only by logical implication that the treaty required signatories to maintain the maximum allowed in order that specified balancing ratios would not be disturbed. It should be apparent that, if the formula used for arriving at the accepted ratios was correct, any nation which fell below the treaty strength became weak enough to permit aggression from any other nation whose navy was right up to treaty strength.
The United States did not accept the implied responsibility of maintaining a treaty Navy. Instead it rigidly accepted the imposed limitation and attempted to bring about reduction in armaments by example. During the life of the Washington treaty the United States authorized one airplane carrier which brought its carrier tonnage to 81,000 of 135,000. O the types not restricted by the treaty, 23 cruisers were authorized but only 13 were appropriated for, and 4 fleet submarines, authorized since the war, were appropriated for. Throughout this period the United States Navy was very weak in both of these types.
The London treaty in 1930 extended the Washington treaty by bringing cruisers, destroyers, and submarines within the ratio. It also imposed a 6-year moratorium on replacing of battleships. At this time we had a large number of destroyers and submarines from the war program, completed in 1917 to 1922. With the accepted useful life of these types—12 to Id years for destroyers with replacement begun in 10 to 14 years, and 13 years for submarines with replacement begun in 10 years—most of our vessels of both types were overage or rapidly approaching that condition on December 31, 1930, when the treaty became operative.
From 1922 to 1934, this country as a signatory to two treaties operated under a naval policy of imposed maximum limits plus an additional self-imposed reduction well below these limits for the purpose of inducing reduction of armaments by example.
The various authorizations and appropriations for new construction did not begin to provide a “treaty Navy” and even with the comparatively large NIRA Program in 1933, provided authorizations for only about one-third the allowed destroyers and submarines. Thus until 1934 the United States naval policy as dictated by shipbuilding legislation was to hold the Navy well below the allowed treaty strength. Realizing that other powers were building much closer toward their treaty limits and possibly recognizing the desirability of maintaining the peace-inducing, nonaggression balance between navies, the Congress in the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 provided a “paper” Navy equal to that agreed upon in 1922 and 1930.
Of 141 vessels which were “authorized” by the Vinson-Trammell Act in 1934 only 90 will have been provided for by appropriations if the 1939 appropriation bill is enacted in its present form.
Under the two treaties the United States is permitted tonnages of underage Vessels of various types and has provided for their construction as follows:
| Allowed | Escalator Clause | Total | Provided for | Percentages Provided for |
battleships | 525,000 | _ | 525,000 | 210,000 | 40 |
Airplane carriers | 135,000 | — | 135,000 | 135,000 | 100 |
Cruisers | 323,500 | 20,270 | 343,770 | 330,770 | 96 |
Destroyers | 150,000 | 40,550 | 190,550 | 139,970 | 73 |
Submarines | 52,700 | 15,698 | 68,298 | 55,498 | 81 |
Total | 1,186,200 | 76,518 | 1,262,618 | 871,238 | 69 |
The above table clearly shows that the United States has had no part in a naval race. A condition of fleet ratios which was established in 1922 and 1930 to be reached by December 31, 1936, will reach only 69 Per cent attainment by June 30, 1939, on the part of the United States. Even excepting the escalator clause, the attainment will be only 73 per cent.
The treaties which set the accepted ratios expired on December 31, 1936, due to the fact that the signatories—the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy—could not agree on a basis for a continuance. A treaty was signed by the United States, Great Britain, and France, but this in no way limited the numbers or total tonnages of vessels which each country could possess. By definition, the age of the battleships was increased from 20 to 26 years.
The change of the date on which battleships become overage has no bearing on the tonnage of this type authorized by the Vinson-Trammell Act since that act was based on the older treaties. Under the 1936 treaty we cannot replace the last seven battleships listed above but we can add new ones.
The plan to increase the size of the Navy by enactment of a bill to provide greater tonnage limits would add 255,412 tons of underage vessels to the paper (authorized) fleet. However, the proposed bill adopts the replacement ages defined in the 1936 treaty. This definition makes seven battleships, whose replacements would total 245,000, unreplaceable for the present. Thus the passage of the act would increase the unprovided for overage tonnage by only 10,412 tons and our present status would be 73 per cent of authorized strength instead of 69 per cent as under present circumstances.
The Vinson-Trammell Act today establishes the maximum Navy which the United States can construct. The proposed increase would raise this limit. Our past and present rate of building provides for a Navy of 69 per cent authorized tonnage by June 30, 1939. Due to the change in legal replacement age of battleships, we would have on that same date a Navy at 73 per cent of its authorized tonnage. We shall be, including vessels under construction, 391,380 tons short of the Vinson-Trammell Act Navy and 401,792 tons below the proposed increased Navy. Adding to these figures the tonnage of vessels becoming overage for which keels may be laid down, the tonnage provided for in the 1939 appropriation bill, if continued as an annual rate, will provide for the keels of present authorized tonnage by the fiscal year 1946. The same rate would provide for the increased Navy by the fiscal year 1950. To provide the increased Navy by 1946 would require an additional 28,800 tons per year, an average of about 4 additional battleships every 5 years.
It certainly appears that any charge that the United States has engaged in a naval race is unfounded. Any charge that it intends to enter such a race must be supported in the future when the appropriations are requested and not at present by an authorization bill.
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The Navy is the country’s first line of defense, and its personnel deeply feels the responsibility entailed. Its motto for the country is “Safety First”; its duty is farsighted preparedness—such preparedness as the action of other agencies of the government may make possible. In advice or action, naval officers^ have a life-long responsibility for the security of the nation, in which respect they, in common with their brothers of the Army, are in quite a different position from that of any other persons in the government. Questions of immediate expediency do not have much weight with them, and they are not perhaps so inclined to take chances with national security as those having a shorter tenure of office. Upon them is bound to fall the brunt of an underestimate of the necessity for defensive measures. That they are conservative is the natural consequence. Their conservatism did not, however, go so far as to lead them into opposition to the principle of limitation of armaments.—Knapp, Limitation of Armament.
* Author's Note.—Since preparation of this article the Naval Appropriation Act for 1939 has been approved. As noted in various places in the article, it provides for commencement of 2 battleships, 2 light cruisers, 8 destroyers, 6 submarines, and the remaining 4 auxiliaries of the 1937 Auxiliaries Bill.
Also H.R. 9218, increasing the allowed tonnages of all combatant types and authorizing construction of certain auxiliaries, has been enacted and approved.