FROM FEBRUARY 3 TO MARCH 3
CENTRAL EUROPE
AUSTRO-GERMAN UNION ASSURED.-A Peaceful putsch," a "cold Anschluss"-these were phrases used to describe the sharp break in Central European politics that came with the sudden summons of Chancellor Schuschnigg of Austria to Fuehrer Hitler's Berchtesgaden retreat on February 12. As the outcome was slowly revealed, it became clear that what the Austrian government had received was practically an ultimatum-acceptance of the German proposals or a turning on of Nazi pressure from within and outside the Austrian frontiers. Even after the acceptance it appeared highly doubtful whether such pressure could long be restrained, in view of the roused enthusiasm of Austrian Nazis. Austria retained independence, and the impression that Chancellor Schuschnigg would rally all possible forces to tight for it was strengthened by his vigorous speech of February 24 in which he declared that the agreement was for a peace of the German peoples but not German dictation, and in which he invited all parties to join the Fatherland Front in support of continued national existence. Assurances of Austrian independence were expected in the address of Chancellor Hitler before the Reichstag on February 20, but in the 3-hour speech no such assurances were given. Instead the Fuehrer spoke of "More than 10,000,000 Germans in states adjoining Germany [7,000,000 in Austria and 3,000,000 in Czechoslovakia] who against their will were prevented by peace treaties from uniting with the Reich," and who should enjoy the "right of racial self-determination."
The specific terms of the Berchtesgaden agreement called for a truce with the pro-German party in Austria and inclusion of their representatives in the Cabinet, a general amnesty for some 3,000 political prisoners, and a plan of closer trade and economic co-operation. In the reorganized Ministry, five pro-German members were included, and the key post of Minister of the Interior went to the Austrian Nazi leader Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who immediately left for Berlin to complete arrangements for the new deal.
REORGANIZATION AT BERLIN.-The Austrian coup was apparently prepared for by the German Cabinet and army changes earlier in February. These were generally explained as a kind of bloodless purge by which elements were removed who had proved hostile or recalcitrant in regard to church policy, the league with Italy, the support for General Franco, and other more radical aspects of Nazi policy. Such w.as the substitution of a man of the "activistic energy" of Ambassador von Ribbentrop for the conservative Baron von Neurath in the Foreign Office, the latter being let down easily by retention in the Cabinet as president of a new Cabinet council on foreign affairs. The army changes were less easy to gauge but tended toward a closer unification of all military and economic resources in preparation for war. The Chancellor himself assumed "personal and direct command over all the armed forces." General Wilhelm Keitel succeeded General von Blomberg in the War Ministry and also became the Fuehrer's personal chief of staff, in charge of "unitary preparations for war in all fields." General Walther von Branchitsch succeeded General von Fritsch as army commander in chief, and General Goering was made a field marshal.
KING AS RUMANIAN DICTATOR.-As a quick solution of the tangle of internal and external difficulties that piled up during Premier Goya's brief control in Rumania, King Carol on February 11 dismissed his poet-premier, declared martial law, abolished the old Constitution, and set up a modified royal dictatorship. The aged Patriarch Miron Cristea was put at the head of a cabinet of mixed political figures but without representation of the large National Peasant party or the Fascist Iron Guard. The latter in fact was abolished along with other political factions. A new Constitution was quickly completed and on February 24 was presented for approval by an oral plebiscite, in which, as inevitable in such affairs, the opposition was practically nil. By it the old parliamentary system was abolished and a bicameral legislature was created along corporative lines. The King appoints half the Senate and has full veto power over all legislation. The Lower Chamber is elected by three groups or guilds representing agriculture and labor, industry, and the learned professions. The announcements regarding foreign policy indicated a swing back toward the traditional co-operation with France, Britain and the Little Entente, but no doubt, in view of Germany's new hold on Austria, the Rumanian dictatorship will keep in touch with Berlin and Rome.
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH Exit Eden.- The rift in English foreign policy between the advocates of a truce with the Continental dictatorships and the friends of France and the League was opened wider on February 20 by the resignation of Foreign Minister Anthony Eden on the issue of accepting or rejecting Premier Mussolini's alleged "now or never'' proposal for an Anglo-Italian entente. Despite Mr. Eden's immense popularity with liberal elements in England it appeared that Parliament and perhaps the country also were ready for a fair trial of Premier Chamberlain's more "realistic'' methods, as was evidenced by the substantial vote of confidence for the government following Mr. Eden's resignation and the approval of his successor, Viscount Halifax, by a majority of 226 to 99. Subsequently Mr. Eden also announced that he would not join the Labor and Liberal opposition or otherwise hamper the government in its new Italian approaches. In France the Chamber voted approval of the Cabinet's decision to follow the new line of British foreign policy.
To mark the eased relations following the fall of Mr. Eden, both Italy and Germany before the end of February signified approval of the British proposals for troop withdrawals from Spain. The details of the new plan were not announced and are perhaps not of great significance, since actual withdrawals seem hardly likely to prove a decisive factor in the Spanish outcome. England had suggested 75 per cent withdrawals and Italy 60; it appeared that Premier Chamberlain would be content with "substantial" withdrawals of 15,000 or 20,000 from each faction, which could be arranged without the delays of a census.
DEALINGS WITH DICTATORS.-In the negotiations for a broader Anglo-Italian understanding, it was believed that Italy Would ask for (1) recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, (2) naval parity in the Mediterranean, and (3) recognition of both sides in Spain as belligerents. It was rumored that Italy might also seek a Permanent naval base in the Balearics and a share in Suez Canal control, but these unpleasant suggestions did not emanate from official sources.
For Great Britain and Italy the path toward an agreement is made easier by the fact that no vital conflicts of interest separate the two nations and both can profit greatly by a renewal of traditional friendship. Between England and Germany more serious difficulties bar the way, as was manifest in the stiff anti-British trend of Chancellor Hitler's Reichstag speech of February 20. In it he insisted that on Germany's colonial demands there could be no compromise and that they must take first place in coming discussions. As a lesser matter, both he and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop have demanded that British freedom of the press be curbed in such fashion as to prevent attacks on the Nazis.
THE ULSTER OBSTACLE.-That Ulster is still a stumbling block in the way of Irish unity and Anglo-Irish agreement was proved sufficiently by the Ulster elections called in February on the fusion issue raised during Premier de Valera's recent talks in London. As a result of the elections Prime Minister Viscount Craigavon, already Premier for the past 17 years, won by an increased 80 per cent majority which insures five more years in office.
In London Anglo-Irish negotiations were delayed by the British Cabinet crisis and their successful outcome was threatened by Premier de Valera's insistence that the Ulster question be kept in the foreground as a make-weight in trade bargaining and in arrangements for transfer of British naval bases on the Irish coast.
NAVAL PROBLEMS
JAPAN WITHHOLDS NAVAL DATA.-ln view of the escalator provisions of the London Naval Treaty of 1936, which permit the signatories to depart from treaty limitations if such limitations have been disregarded by non-signatory powers, the United States, Great Britain, and France in early February sent practically identic notes to Japan requesting information regarding her naval construction program. The American note asked in particular the size of capital ships undertaken since 1936, the caliber of rifles for the new ships, and whether Japan would build or acquire any ships above 35,000 tons prior to 1943. An answer was requested before February 20.
The Japanese reply on February 12 declared that, while Japan was still ready to consider reductions on an equality basis, the Japanese government were of the opinion that
the mere communication of information concerning the construction of vessels will, in the absence of quantitative limitation, not contribute to any fair and equitable measure of disarmament, and regret that they are unable to comply .... They fail to see any logical reasoning in the assumption on the part of your government that this government must be deemed to entertain a scheme for constructing vessels which are not in conformity with the limits provided by the London treaty of 1936, from the mere fact that they do not dis· patch a reply ...
In view of the Japanese refusal and in view also of information regarding naval construction derived from other sources, it was regarded as certain that the treaty powers, following consultations in London on March 2, would eliminate treaty restrictions and project extensive battleship construction up to 43,000 tons, including 4 or 5 American ships, 5 British, and 2 French. That Japan might attempt to check this expansion was suggested by a subsequent statement of Foreign Minister Hirota in the Diet to the effect that Japan would not join in a building race, but hoped to stop it "by appealing to the powers' sense of fairness and justice."
NAVAL AND NATIONAL POLICY.-In the course of Congressional hearings on the pending Naval Appropriation Bill, Secretary of State Hull specifically denied any understanding with Great Britain or any other power for concerted action in any field or for any purpose, and Admiral Leahy declared that "there is nothing in this program that would permit of aggressive action, of policing the world, or of projecting an attack against the territory of any other naval power. As regards the purpose of the proposed increases, Chairman Vinson of the House Naval Committee stated that the following would be inserted as a part of the pending bill:
It is declared to be the fundamental naval policy of the United States to maintain an adequate navy in sufficient strength to guard the Continental United States by affording naval protection to the coast line, in both oceans at one and the same time; to protect the Panama Canal, Alaska, Hawaii, and our insular possessions; to protect our commerce and citizens abroad; to maintain a navy in sufficient strength to guarantee our national security, but not for aggression; to insure our national integrity, and to support our national policies.
It is further declared to be the policy of the United States that an adequate naval defense means not only the protection of our continental coast line, the Canal Zone, Alaska, Hawaii, and our insular possessions, but also a defense that will keep any potential enemy away from our shores.
The United States looks with apprehension and disfavor to the general increases in naval building throughout the world, but it realizes that no single nation can reduce its naval armament without jeopardizing its national security except by common agreement.
UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
SOUTH AMERICAN AMITY.-The inauguration in February of President Roberto Ortiz of the Argentine Republic, marked by the visit of a squadron of 6 U.S. Army bombing planes with a congratulatory message from President Roosevelt, was regarded as assuring a continuance of the cordial attitude toward the United States instituted by his predecessor, President Justo, in whose Cabinet Senor Ortiz was Minister of Finance. Further evidence of this cordiality was seen in the proposal, figuring in news from Buenos Aires at the time of the inauguration, for an inter-American military and naval alliance, including the United States, as a protection against the possible aggression of non-American powers. The proposal would substitute joint action for the old protectorship of the Monroe Doctrine, and would put force behind the tentative agreements for concerted action made at the Pan- American conference of last year.
Aggression from abroad in any part of the Americas is no doubt a remote contingency, but it is interesting to note the appointment in February of a U. S. governmental committee to study "international broadcasting problems," as a means of combating the aircraft advertising and other forms of propaganda by certain European powers now flooding the South American field.
FAR EAST
PROTECTION OF AMERICAN INTERESTS. -In view of Japan's request early in February that foreigners evacuate war areas in Central China and mark their property as a protection against aerial bombardment, Secretary Hull at the close of the month sent a strong note to Japan, declaring that while safety measures might be taken by American citizens or officials in China, there was no obligation to do so, and the obligation to safeguard American lives and interests rested rather with the Japanese armed forces. The Japanese government would be held strictly accountable for all injury done.
In subsequent comment Japanese officials made no objection to the position taken by Secretary Hull, the purpose of which was interpreted as that of establishing the validity of future damage claims. In an earlier note of February 12 Japan had explained injuries at Nanking and Hangchow as the outcome of inevitable confusion during the operations of occupation. The note denied requisition or seizure of foreign property other than foodstuffs and promised more adequate protection of foreign interests by detail of officers at important points for this special duty and by increase of military police. Claims would so far as possible be adjusted on the spot.
AMERICAN POLICY IN FAR EAST.-The Foreign Policy Report of February 15 was devoted to "The Role of the United States in the Conflict in the Far East." The conclusions reached were in part as follows:
Secretary Hull's statement of October 6 denouncing Japan's treaty violation went further than any utterances of Secretary Stimson. The Department has insisted on observance of its rights, but has refused to risk the use of force. This stand has not halted Japan's course in China. The success of any coercive measures economic sanctions, naval demonstrations, or "long distance" blockade-would probably require readiness for a showdown in the Western Pacific, which the American public appears unwilling to face. . . .
Despite this country's reluctance to use force, the "middle-of-the-road" course has led distinctly away from isolationism. The traditional policy of protecting American interests abroad has been strongly reasserted. The President's wide discretion to apply or withhold application of the Neutrality Act has been demonstrated. Confronted by the growing danger of a world war, the American government has, as a corollary to its trade agreements program aiming at "peaceful change," aligned itself more actively with Britain, France, and other powers which oppose change of the status quo by force. It has shown support for international co-operation generally and has sought to discourage prospective aggressors by the threat of co-operation with powers which oppose them. Whether this policy, if continued, will reduce the threat of a general war or merely hasten American entrance into such a war, are questions on which contemporary opinion remains sharply divided.
JAPAN'S WAR PLANS.-At the close of February the Japanese "national mobilization" measure was hotly debated in the Diet though its passage was assured by the full weight of cabinet and military support. In brief, the bill gave the government practically complete control over Japanese economic activity, with power to draft labor, requisition all forms of property, control foreign trade, muzzle the press, and determine all uses of capital. Its acceptance was made easy by the patriotic fervor which has rallied behind the capitalistic-military combination responsible for the China war. The two chief political parties in Japan, Minseito and Seiyukai, are weakly led and subservient; and the laboring classes, though inclined toward radical ideas, are now dominated by nationalistic feeling. Restraint is more likely to come from above. In fact it is now accepted that such moderate influences were brought to bear at the Imperial Conference of January 11 to prevent a complete break with China and a declaration of war. The decision to avoid this final step was attributed partly to the stiffening of American and British policy after the Panay affair, partly to difficulties that might develop with the application of the U.S. Neutrality Act, especially in the event of Russian entry into the war, and partly to the resultant impossibility of securing British or American capital essential for the exploitation of Japan's vast continental schemes.