A Joint Military and Naval Operation
The French and Indian War, which is generally known in Europe as the Seven Years’ War, presents two outstanding examples of joint military and naval operations. One of these was the capture of Louisbourg in 1758 and the other the capture of Quebec in 1759.The question of the boundaries of the British and French colonies in North America had not been settled by the year 1755. France claimed all the lands drained by the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, and the Mississippi and its tributaries, which included practically all the land between the Mississippi and the Allegheny Mountains. But save at the mouth of the Mississippi and along the shores of the St. Lawrence there were only scattered French settlements and a few small isolated forts. If England had recognized the French claims to this great territory, her colonies would have been restricted to a small strip along the Atlantic sea coast.
Although England was slow to see the value of the empire that lay on her western frontier, the colonists had some appreciation of the value of this land that lay west of the Alleghenies; and their traders and hunters pushed ever westward over the mountains and into the region claimed by France. Here it was that they came into conflict with the French, and here the war actually began long before there was a formal declaration of war between France and England. Such a condition was possible in those days when the acts of colonists against colonists were regarded as matters of “reprisal” or “hostile intercourse short of war” rather than acts of actual war.
Although somewhat delayed, events finally led to a formal declaration of war on May 18, 1756, when word was received in England that the French had landed in Minorca.
That war extended from the wilds of America to the Indian Ocean. While other countries were involved, it was primarily a conflict between a great continental power having a strong army and a moderate navy, and an insular power having a strong navy and a weak army, and which fostered alliances in order to keep the armies of her enemy occupied while she applied that pressure which her superiority upon the sea permitted.
The diplomatic and strategic combinations of France and England that eventually involved all the major powers of Europe is a fascinating study of naval, military, and diplomatic history but it is only the background of the actual joint operations at Louisbourg and Quebec.
Quebec was the capital and center of French power in North America. The governors of New France had visioned the wealth and power that would accrue to France and to the colony through possession of the territory south of the Great Lakes and west of the Alleghenies and they had pushed French forces into those regions and even to the mouth of the Mississippi. They established forts to shut out the English colonists and traders, and by 1755 the French had a line of forts extending from Montreal to Fort Duquesne, the present site of Pittsburgh.
These forts depended upon Quebec and Montreal for their support and those cities in turn depended upon France. If the line of the French could be pierced and held, those interior forts to the west and south would have their lines of communication cut and would fall an easy prey to the colonists if they were not actually abandoned. In the earlier stages of the conflict this dependency was not fully appreciated by the British and their efforts were directed at isolated forts which the French held. The capture of these forts would have removed an immediate threat to the colonists but the retirement of French forces toward Montreal and Quebec would have resulted in a concentration of strength at the very point that was the real key to the situation.
In 1755 Braddock’s expedition against Fort Duquesne, Shirley’s expedition against Fort Niagara, and Johnson’s expedition against Crown Point, had all failed. Only Colonel Monckton’s expedition against Acadia had succeeded and that was an operation that was eccentric to the main theater of operations, and the only one in which the troops and supplies had been transported by sea. On the other hand Montcalm, in 1756, moving up the St. Lawrence had captured Fort Ontario and Fort Oswego at the eastern end of Lake Ontario, thus strengthening the French line between Fort Duquesne and Montreal. The following year he captured Fort William Henry at the southern end of Lake George and burnt the English Settlements along the Mohawk.
Situated near the eastern end of the Isle Royale and endowed by nature with a fine deep harbor, Louisbourg possessed a splendid strategical position. It lay on the flank of the entrance to the St. Lawrence and a fleet operating from it as a base could readily control the river. The French had appreciated both its natural and strategic advantages and had so strongly fortified Louisbourg that it was referred to as the “Dunkirk of America” and was generally regarded as the strongest fortress in North America. Under its guns a fleet might lie in safety.
While the capture of Quebec was ultimately contemplated by the English, they failed at first to perceive that it was the real key to the continent. If Quebec fell all the forts would fall also; but so long as Quebec remained in French hands no final decision favorable to the English could be reached.
Quebec could be reached by three routes. One, the most direct, was the land route following the line of the Hudson, Lake George, Lake Champlain, and the Richelieu River, and thence down the St. Lawrence to Quebec; the second was the sea route through the Gulf of St. Lawrence and up the river to Quebec; a third route overland to Lake Ontario and thence down the St. Lawrence to Montreal and then on to Quebec was possible, but was more difficult and less direct than the Hudson River route.
An expedition against Quebec via the Hudson and Lake Champlain was primarily a military operation involving great difficulties over a long and dangerous route. An expedition against Quebec via the St. Lawrence would permit an English army well rested, well provisioned, and well equipped to be moved in large ships up the St. Lawrence and placed ashore within a few miles of Quebec, provided the French Navy did not interfere.
Though inferior in naval strength to Great Britain, France still possessed a formidable navy and it was quite possible that favored by wind and weather she might be able to concentrate and maintain at Louisbourg a fleet that would be a constant menace to the line of supply of any force operating up the St. Lawrence.
The destruction of an enemy fleet is the most certain and most decisive way of disposing of it but when fleets are of unequal strength it is difficult for the stronger to force battle upon the weaker, which will endeavor to seek safety in one of its fortified harbors. If the inferior fleet cannot be destroyed its menace can only be removed by blockading or containing it.
An effective blockade off the tempestuous and foggy coast of the Isle Royale in the days of sailing ships was almost impossible and consequently the capture of Louisbourg, the only fortified harbor that the French possessed in North America east of Quebec, was a necessary prelude to any attempt to capture Quebec by an expedition moving up the St. Lawrence, for without Louisbourg the French could not maintain a naval force in North American waters. As Quebec was the key to Canada so Louisbourg was the key to Quebec.
The capture of Louisbourg, however, was no simple operation. It involved gaining and maintaining control of the sea in the area off the Nova Scotia coast and the mouth of the St. Lawrence for the double purpose of preventing the French from receiving re-enforcements and of protecting English land forces that had to be escorted to the immediate theater of operations.
In 1757 Lord Louden had attempted the capture of Louisbourg and had assembled nearly 12,000 troops at Halifax and a fleet under Admiral Holburn of 15 ships of the line, two 50-gun ships and 16 cruisers with a large number of transports. By the time this force was ready for operations, however, the French had re-enforced Louisbourg so that there were 9,000 available troops there and three French squadrons had assembled, making a force of 18 of the line and 5 frigates. This unexpected strength of the French both on land and on sea caused the abandonment of the effort that year and Louden was superseded by Lord Jeffrey Amherst and Holburn by Admiral Edward Boscawen.
The importance of the American theater of war was fully appreciated by Pitt, the great war minister who was really at the helm of the British ship of state, although the ministry was nominally headed by Newcastle. It was in America, he informed Newcastle, that “England and Europe were to be fought for.” His plan for the year 1758 involved an expedition against Fort Duquesne, an expedition to recover Lake George and Lake Champlain that was to push on as far as possible toward Montreal and Quebec, and, most important of all, an expedition against Louisbourg which if time permitted was to move against Quebec.
General Forbes who commanded the expedition against Fort Duquesne found, when he arrived there in the latter part of November, that the French had abandoned the fort and burnt it. General Abercrombie, who was to regain Lake George and Lake Champlain, attacked the French under General Montcalm at Fort Ticonderoga early in July but was decisively repulsed.
But it is with the Louisbourg operation that we are primarily concerned. Pitt had selected General Amherst to command this expedition and had given him Wolfe, Whitmore, and Lawrence as his brigadiers. Admiral Boscawen was to command the naval forces and he had supreme command over the transports. Sir Charles Hardy was his second in command and Commodore Durell was the third flag officer.
Before Louisbourg could actually be besieged there were certain preliminary steps that had to be taken. First a base for the expedition had to be decided upon and then the troops had to be moved in safety to that base. The selection of the base was simple for not only was Halifax in England’s possession but it was near Louisbourg and had a magnificent harbor. Troops and supplies had to be assembled there from England and Ireland and from Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. Such an operation offered certain hazards, for all the convoys could not be accompanied by strong escorts. Boscawen, however, considered the situation carefully.
The French were in great need of getting their own re-enforcements to Canada and he correctly reasoned that their efforts would be directed toward this end rather than in attempting to attack the English convoys, if they could be discovered and intercepted.
The British Admiralty had received Word that the French were fitting out a military convoy for Louisbourg and Canada. This convoy was to be composed of three divisions that were to sail from Brest, Rochefort, and Bordeaux. The expedition was to be re-enforced by a combined squadron from Toulon and Cartagena under M. de La Clue. Admiral Osborne was given the difficult task of preventing the juncture of the Toulon and Cartagena squadrons and at the same time bolding the Straits securely. This he did brilliantly. Three of the Toulon squadron Under Duquesne, the former governor of Canada, were captured or driven ashore and the remainder of the squadron safely held in the Mediterranean. To Hawke fell the lot of containing the divisions from Brest, Rochefort, and Bordeaux but he was unable to close all these ports and three detachments under des Gouttes, Beaussier de l’Isle, and M. du Chaffault escaped from Brest.
The English had seven ships of the line that had wintered at Halifax and early in the year Sir Charles Hardy had been sent out to command this squadron and establish a preliminary blockade of Louisbourg. In spite of Hawke’s blockade in the Bay of Biscay and Hardy’s blockade off Louisbourg the three French squadrons that escaped from Brest successfully reached their destination with loss of but two ships, the Foudroyant (22) and the Diane (36).
The English convoys from England and Ireland were forwarded with a small escort of heavy ships but had no difficulty in reaching Halifax, for the French, as had been anticipated, were fully engaged in their own problem of re-enforcing Louisbourg and Quebec.
Boscawen with Wolfe himself on board sailed from St. Helens on February 19, 1758, in the Namur but had a very slow passage, and did not reach Halifax until May 9.
Pitt had hoped that the siege of Louisbourg would begin by April 20, but even when Wolfe reached Halifax the assembly of the troops and transports had not been completed nor had Amherst arrived. The troops available were exercised in the operations they were to be called upon to perform and a detachment of light infantry was formed of picked men who were good marksmen and alert, strong soldiers. They were drawn from the regiments present, were equipped with lighter clothing, carried lighter muskets than the regulars, and were expected to be especially valuable against the Indians.
While special equipment had been assembled for the expedition including wide carts with wheels 8 feet in diameter for transporting cannon over marshy ground and special blockhouses for protecting camps, Wolfe complained bitterly at the lack of many important items. Spare rifles and muskets were missing; there were no horses or oxen for the artillery; the clothing, arms, and equipment were improper for the country in which the troops were to operate; there were too few howitzers, no medicines for the hospitals, and no fresh provisions for the men. While the health of the troops was in general good some regiments were reported as having 300 to 400 men down with scurvy. With this there was too much rum which adversely affected the discipline of the troops; sergeants were drunk on duty, and sentries were wallowing in dirt. His estimate of the provincial troops was not high and he regarded the Rangers as little better than “canaille.” Wolfe’s picture is gloomy but it must be remembered that he was an outspoken and severe critic and the troops he describes, with all their shortcomings and lack of equipment, made up the force which was eventually to effect the capture of Louisbourg.
The French force in Louisbourg under command of the Chevalier Drucour numbered about 2,500 regular troops, over 500 burghers and Canadians, and more than 2,500 officers and men from the fleet. The ships themselves carried 544 guns, while the fortress mounted 219 cannon and 17 mortars. Vast sums had been spent on strengthening and repairing it since the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, but as is usual there was still work to be done. While much information as to the forts and guns at Louisbourg was available to the British little appears to have been known regarding the distribution of the French troops other than that they had entrenched themselves along the shore of Gabarus Bay.
The British had more than 11,500 troops available and there were in the fleet 21 ships of the line as well as two 50-gun ships and numerous frigates and smaller vessels, which with the transports made a total of 157 ships.
While awaiting the arrival of Amherst, a plan of operations was drawn up. The original plan as outlined by Wolfe in his letter of May 24 to Lord Sackville was as follows:
Our present notions are to land 3,000 men at Mire and march towards Gabarus, attack at the same time the further L’Orembeck and La Balleine, get footing in one or other of those little harbors, land a considerable body and march to the nether L’Orembeck which is not above a mile from the end of the North East Harbour. A small body of men (by way of diversion) are likewise to be detached to the bottom of Gabarus Bay, there land and entrench themselves. While these operations are carrying on the Admiral threatens them at the harbour’s mouth with the gross of his squadron and makes all possible show of attack [with the rest] of that part of the Bay of Gabarus here the Americans landed. If neither of these succeed we must fall upon some other method or we must get on shoar or perish altogether in the attempt.
Wolfe was to command the force of three battalions that was to land at Mire;
Monckton the two battalions that were to land at Lorembec; and Lawrence the remainder that were to land at the foot of Gabarus Bay and entrench there. At the Same time that these three detachments were landing, the greater part of the fleet was to threaten the harbor entrance while another part was to make a demonstration against the entrenched position at the 00t of Gabarus Bay. (See Fig. 1.)
After waiting at Halifax till May 28, Boscawen finally put to sea and as the fleet of 157 was standing out of the harbor Amherst arrived in the Dublin and at once went on board the Namur, sending the Dublin on into Halifax.
The original plan, which is usually attributed to Wolfe and which provided for landing on both sides of the harbor of Louisbourg, was superseded by a plan for landing in three separate bodies at three different places west of Louisbourg. The right wing under Whitemore was to land inside the Bay at White Point. The left wing under Lawrence was to land in two small bays near Flat Point, while a detachment of the left wing consisting of the light infantry, irregulars, and Highlanders was to land in the Fresh Water Cove two miles further west “in order to take the enemy in flank and rear and cut some of them off from the town.” (See Fig. 2.)
Men-of-war were ordered to each of the landing places “to scour the coast and protect the troops at their landing.” The men- of-war could not be carried sufficiently near the shore within White Point to cover the landing there, so Wolfe’s detachment that was to land at Fresh Water Cove was strengthened by the Grenadiers from the right wing, bringing the total strength of this detachment up to about 3,300 men. The four oldest companies of Grenadiers were to attack first, two under command of Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher in the little bay upon the right, and the other two under command of Major Murray in another little bay upon the left. After the Grenadiers had landed, the light infantry were to land and push forward into the wood and force the enemy’s irregulars to retire.
Lawrence’s detachment was to draw up behind the frigates covering the center attack ready to land at Flat Point or, if weather or other circumstances made it advisable, to follow the Grenadiers. Similarly the troops of the right wing were to draw up opposite the Bay to the west of White Point to fix the enemy’s attention or to follow the troops of the left wing when they received orders. The boats of the right wing were to keep out 1£ or 2 miles from the land “extending in a considerable length of line.”
While the plan provided for three detachments which might land at three separate points, Lawrence’s detachment was to be prepared to support Wolfe’s detachment if circumstances rendered it desirable, and the right wing was to be in readiness to follow and support Lawrence. The main attack was thus to be made at Fresh Water Cove and Wolfe was to be the spearhead of the attack with about 3,300 men. This plan of attack gradually evolved during the five days of bad weather and heavy surf that followed the arrival of the fleet. On June 6 the weather cleared somewhat and the Grenadiers and first detachments of the left and right wings were embarked ready to land, but the surf continued so bad that landing was not even attempted at that time.
On June 7 final instructions were issued from the Namur as follows:
If the surf should be so great, that the troops cannot land this afternoon, the General intends to attack the enemy to-morrow at the dawn of day, unless the weather is so bad as to make it ] impracticable. The boats are to assemble in three divisions as before; the right wing at the Violet transport, where there will be three lights hung on the off side, near the water’s edge; the left wing at the St. George transport, with two lights hung in the same manner; and the rendezvous of the grenadiers, &c. will be at the Neptune transport, where a single light will be hung out. As the General’s intentions are to surprise the enemy, as well as attack them, he depends upon the care and vigilance of the Officers commanding in the transports, that his orders be strictly complied with.
The troops are to be in their boats by two o’clock exactly. No lights are to be shewn in any of the transports, except the signals above- mentioned, after twelve o’clock at night, and there must be a profound silence throughout the whole army, and, above all things, the firing of even a single musket must be avoided. The men of war’s boats will be sent to their respective transports, by one in the morning.
The General is sufficiently convinced of the good disposition of the troops, by what he has already seen; he desires they will not halloo, or cry out at landing, but be attentive to the commands of their Officers, by which they can never be put into any confusion, or fail of success; their Officers will lead them directly to the enemy.
On the same day Bragg’s regiment (28th) sailed under convoy for Lorembec which was some 4 ½ miles east of Louisbourg and made a great show as they passed the town.
The task that confronted the French was to know where the main attack was to be launched in order to assemble troops there to meet it. They had thrown up breastworks and established batteries at the most accessible landing places from Louisbourg west to Fresh Water Cove. But the British troops on board ships could be moved easily and with little discomfort whereas the French troops on shore were bed to the few poor roads that existed.
Before daybreak of the 8th the British troops were embarked in the boats and ready for landing. Seven vessels were told o5 to cover the landing which began shortly after daylight. The beach at Fresh Water Cove was about a quarter of a mile long with rocks at each end and the French had established there a battery of light cannon with swivels that could sweep the beach and its approaches and had masked them with evergreens planted in the ground before them. Moreover, extensive breastworks covered by abatis sheltered 1,000 French infantry. Frigates were sent ln to bombard the enemy’s shore positions, to cover the landing and to conceal from the French for as long as possible the actual point at which the main landing was to be made. The Kennington (28) and the Halifax (12) covered Wolfe’s attack on the ett flank. The Diana (32), Shannon (32), and Grammont (18) covered the feint at the center and the Sutherland (50) and Squirrel (20) were on the right.
As the attack approached the French held their fire until the boats were close inshore when a deadly fire of grape and musketry was opened. The attack wavered and Wolfe signaled the boats to sheer off three of the boats on the extreme right were filled with light infantry and were little exposed to the fire of the French. Moreover, while the shore was very rocky here was at the extreme right of the cove a small beach and, most important, a small promontory protected this beach from the fire of the French guns. On this small beach the three boats on the extreme right landed and Wolfe seeing the situation directed the whole landing party to that spot. Many boats crashed against the rocks and were stove in but battles on either land or sea are not won without loss and in a short time Wolfe’s detachment had safely landed. Lawrence’s detachment followed immediately after Wolfe’s and the right wing under Whitemore followed Lawrence.
Wolfe upon getting his detachment ashore pressed forward and enfiladed the entrenchments and threatened the French line of retreat. As a result the French made a precipitate retreat toward Louisbourg abandoning their artillery and stores. They were pursued by Wolfe with his Rangers, Light Infantry, and Highlanders, and the French troops at Flat Point seeing that they were in danger of being cut off retreated precipitately. Those at White Point conducted an orderly retreat.
The pursuit of the French continued until the English came under fire of the guns from Louisbourg when they fell back clear of such fire and encamped there outside the range of the French cannon. The landing had been effected with a loss of only 46 killed and 59 wounded. The French casualties totaled 114.
For three days the weather prevented the landing of any artillery but on the 11th it abated somewhat so that the light field- pieces and some artillery stores were landed. None of the heavy artillery was landed till the 18th and by the 23d only twelve 24-pounders and six 12-pounders were ashore.
The successful landing of the English had surprised the French and on the night of the landing the Grand Battery at the north side of the harbor was abandoned. The French called in their outposts, abandoned the battery at Lighthouse Point, and concentrated their efforts upon the defense of the fortress itself, for Drucour realized that the English had designs upon Quebec and that, could he hold them at Louisbourg sufficiently long, Quebec would be saved to France for that year at least.
The harbor of Louisbourg ran in a northeast-southwest direction and was about 1\ miles long and half a mile wide. In it lay 6 ships of the line and 5 frigates flying the colors of France. Midway between the fortress which was at the western end of the harbor and Lighthouse Point on the eastern side of the entrance lay the strongly fortified Isle de l’Entree whose battery commanded the entrance to the harbor and was called the Island Battery by the English. The reduction of this battery was a necessary prelude to the entrance of the English fleet. The French ships in the harbor mounted many heavy guns and they could be moved to positions where their guns could fire effectively against the English approaching Louis- bourg from the west.
On June 12 Wolfe had been sent around to the north of the harbor with a force of about 1,200 men to seize Lighthouse Point and to erect batteries there to bombard the Island Battery and the French men-of- war. His artillery and supplies were to be sent by sea and landed at Lorembec. The seizure at Lighthouse Point was easily accomplished as the French had abandoned the battery there, but considerable difficulty was experienced in getting the guns and mortars into position. However, by the 19th all was in readiness and the bombardment of Island Battery began and continued till the 25th when this battery was silenced. Little damage had however been done to the French fleet although the heavy ships had moved close under the guns of the fortress. With the silencing of the Island Battery the French feared that Boscawen might attempt to enter the harbor and on the night of the 29th sank the four ships: L’Appolone (50), La Fidele (36) Le Biche (16), and Le Chevre (16), in the channel entrance to prevent this.
After the English had effected their landing Des Gouttes, who commanded the French Squadron, had begged leave to take his ships out and attempt to escape but Drucour denied his request. The ships were immobilized and finally disarmed and their crews used to assist in the defense of the doomed fortress. Meanwhile Amherst had begun regular siege operations against the fortress. The terrain back of Louisbourg and the harbor was marsh, woodland, and hills. The roads were little more than wagon trails cut through the forest. One of the first tasks was to provide a road from the sea to the left flank over which supplies and artillery could be taken- Green Hill, about a mile southwest of the town, was selected as the first objective. Work on a road leading to Green Hill was commenced but the progress was so slow that Amherst finally decided to attack it with the light infantry and on the 26th a detachment of 400 captured the hill without the loss of a single man. Following the capture of Green Hill siege works were pushed steadily forward. On July 1 Wolfe seized a hillock near the northeast end of the Barrachois or inner harbor. Here a battery was erected and fire opened on the frigate Arethuse (32) which was moored in the Barrachois and whose guns commanded much of the terrain between Green Hill and the city. The Arethuse was soon driven from her advantageous position and shortly afterwards was sent to France with dispatches, successfully escaping through the blockade.
The English gradually advanced their trenches on both the right, and left of the doomed fortress. A sortie by the French on July 9 was driven back after an initial success but nothing stopped the steady progress of the siege.
On the 21st a bomb fell on the Celebre (64), one of the heavy French men-of-war, and set her on fire. The flames spread to two other heavy ships, the Entreprenant (74) and the Capricieux (64), which were completely destroyed. On the 22d a shell pierced the roof and set fire to the citadel of which the King’s Bastion formed the front and which contained quarters for the governor and for the officers and men- On the night of July 23d the wooden barracks near the Queen’s Bastion which housed most of the garrison was set in flames by the English gunfire.
Not to be outdone by the army, a cutting-out expedition was organized by the Navy to capture the two French men-of- War that still remained in the harbor, and 0n the night of July 25, 600 sailors under command of Captains Balfour and Laforey rowed silently into the harbor and captured the Prudent (74) and the Bienfaisant (64). The Prudent was found to be aground and could not be towed out so she was set fire, but the Bienfaisant in spite of heavy fire from the French batteries was successfully towed to a position under Wolfe’s guns in northeast harbor.
The situation of the French had now become desperate. A breach had been made in the walls and not a single French ship remained in their possession. Boscawen informed Amherst that he was prepared to send six ships of the line into the arbor where they could attack Louisbourg from the harbor side, but before any action was taken a message was received from the French governor proposing a capitulation but demanding the same terms that had been granted to Blakely at Minorca. This Amherst refused demanding that the garrison surrender as prisoners of war and requiring a reply within one-half hour. Drucour was forced to accede to this and the final articles of capitulation were signed at midnight of July 26 by the French governor. On the 27th the Dauphine’s Gate was turned over to the English and at noon the garrison was assembled at the Esplanade where they laid down their arms, implements, colors, and Ornaments of war. The terms provided that the garrison be sent to England as prisoners of war, that the merchants and clerks who had not borne arms should be sent to France, and that all artillery, war-like stores, and provisions, as well as arms all kinds which were within the town of Louisbourg, the Isle Royale, and the Island and of St. Johns should be delivered to the English without waste for the use of the Britannic Majesty. The garrison when it surrendered consisted of 9,637 persons of whom 4,000 were civilian inhabitants of both sexes and 2,606 were seamen.
The stores surrendered included 11 stands of colors, 220 drums, 222 pieces of cannon, six 13-inch mortars, 2 brass 13- inch mortars, three 10-inch mortars, 4 royals, 200 spare carriages, 15,000 stands of arms, 4,000 shells, 14,000 shot, 200 boxes of small shot, 5,000 barrels of powder, 10,000 barrels of flour, and 5,000 barrels of beef and pork.
In the capture of this fortress the English had lost 172 killed and 354 wounded, a total of 526, certainly a small price to pay for the strongest fortress in America.
The capture of Louisbourg was the first real success the English had achieved in North America and it added greatly to the military reputation of Amherst and Wolfe and to the great reputation of Pitt. He it was who after a world-wide survey of the situation had clearly seen that the vital theater of the war was in Canada, that the vital point in Canada was Quebec, and that the first and most necessary step in the capture of the capital of New France was Louisbourg.
The capture of Louisbourg having been decided upon as the immediate objective, the task of assembling forces adequate for the purpose had to be accomplished. Not only that but offensive operations to prevent the re-enforcement of the fortress had to be undertaken. Initially at least, the theater of operations covered not merely the coasts of Nova Scotia and the Isle Royale but extended to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic coast of France. Osborne in keeping the French re-enforcements in the Mediterranean and Hawke in preventing the expeditions from Rochefort and Bordeaux from sailing from those ports contributed in no small degree to the capture of Louisbourg, although many hundreds of miles away.
The successful assembly of the military forces at Halifax and the subsequent movement to Gabarus Bay was accomplished without loss and the credit for this must go to Boscawen and to Pitt whose instructions gave Boscawen complete command of both fleet and transports.
Both Amherst and Boscawen were particularly able in their own profession and were entirely willing to co-operate wholeheartedly with each other, a quality so essential to the success of joint operations. The lack of those qualities had resulted disastrously at Rochefort only the previous year when indecision, vacillation, and lack of interest as well as of professional qualifications had marked the conduct of that expedition.
Pitt’s choice of Amherst and Boscawen as the commanders of the military and naval forces was a most happy one, as was that of Wolfe. The splendid co-operation that existed between the Army and Navy is testified to by Wolfe himself. Writing to Lord Sackville after the capture of Louisbourg he said:
The Admiral and the General have carried on public service with great harmony, industry, and union. Mr. Boscawen has given all and even more than we could ask of him. He has furnished arms and ammunition, pioneers, sappers, miners, gunners, carpenters, boats, and is I confess no bad fantassin himself and an excellent back-hand at a siege. Sir Charles Hardy, too, in particular and all the officers of the navy in general, have given us their utmost assistance and with the greatest cheerfulness imaginable.
The forces after assembly at Halifax were given such training as was possible and the light infantry was organized with a view to the special work it was to be called upon to perform. Plans were drawn up for the joint action of both Army and Navy based upon the best available information.
After arrival at Gabarus Bay and after a reconnaissance had been made, these plans were modified so that the landing parties were all to land to the west of the harbor and be in a position to better support each other.
Not only did complete co-operation exist between the Army and Navy but the co-ordination in the actual landing operations was excellent, though Wolfe condemned them as rash and ill-advised plans which succeeded only by the greatest good fortune. Wolfe’s plan had provided for landing on both sides of the harbor, but Amherst concentrated the attack on the west side where the two divisions that merely threatened Flat Point and White Point were available to re-enfore the division on the extreme left where the real attack was made. Any landing in the face of strong enemy resistance is hazardous but battles are not won without some risk and the success of the landing amply justified Amherst’s judgment.
Once ashore the operations were pushed with thoroughness though not with the rapidity that the impetuous Wolfe desired. Amherst desired no slip-up and conducted a regular siege which lasted 49 days.
Boscawen wisely was unwilling to send his ships into a harbor where they would have to run past the French batteries at close range and then be subjected to the fire of both French men-of-war and French shore artillery. With the destruction of the Island Battery and the capture of the Prudent (74) and the Bienfaisant (64) he was ready to send ships into the harbor to accelerate the capture of the fortress, but this was not necessary as the French resistance had already been broken.
Such are the high lights of this important joint operation which ended so successfully for England and laid the groundwork for another similar operation the following year that was to bring to an end French rule in Canada. It is an excellent example of that wholehearted co-operation between military and naval forces that is so essential to the success of any operation in which the two branches of the service are engaged.