Sidereal or Mean Time Chronometers?
(See page 1430, this issue)
Captain Radler de Aquino, B.N.— Since this article was written one year ago a very important development has taken Place in Great Britain.
The British Air Ministry requested His Majesty's Nautical Almanac Office to prepare a new Air Almanac, along the lines of the French Ephemerides Aeronautiques for 1936 and 1937.
The following quotation from the well- known Nautical Magazine of Glasgow for July, 1937, page 84, shows the importance of this new development, and the writer is assured that the price of the new British Air Almanac will make it equally acceptable to sea navigators as well:
The Nautical Almanac is of immediate and vital concern to the navigator. The 1938 Abridged Edition provides the well-established features of previous years, retaining the twilight tables introduced in 1937. But the Nautical Almanac Office, under the superintendency of Mr. D. H. Sadler, M.A.; with a staff of 13 full-time assistants and a number of part-time computers, has recently undertaken the compilation of a special Air Almanac for the Air Ministry. The Purpose of this Almanac will be to make possible the navigation of aircraft by astronomical observations, and for this reason the tabulation of right ascension of the heavenly bodies, as given in the Seaman’s Almanac, is to be superseded by the direct tabulation of the Greenwich hour angle, at small intervals of time. The efficiency of this tabulation is greatly facilitated by the lower degree of accuracy (one minute of arc) that is justified by conditions of observations in the air; the necessary interpolation tables are thus very much simpler than would be the case for a similar almanac designed for use at sea, where the accuracy required is 0.1 minute of arc in the tabulated data. The intervals of tabulation to be adopted for the various heavenly bodies are: sun 1 hour; moon 1 hour; planets 6 hours; first point of Aries 10 minutes (really the sidereal time at Greenwich), in combination with some fifty stars. The interpolation of the G.H.A., which presents the greatest obstacle to the ease with which a “G.H.A. Almanac” can be used, is performed by means of three separate tables, one for sun and planets, one for the moon and the third for the G.H.A. of the first point of Aries, with a further small supplementary correction for the moon and planets. The conditions in which the air navigator has to work and the great speed of modern aircraft demand that the determination of a position line should be possible with the minimum of calculation and in as short a time as possible.
The Sea and Air Chronometers will avoid the necessity of publishing every year such voluminous Air Almanacs and will allow their reduction to about 100 pages only.
The first British Air Almanac will appear in September, 1937.
Naval Power as a Preserver of Neutrality and Peace
(See page 619, May, 1937, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral W. W. Phelps, U. S. Navy (Retired).—The subject of the 1937 first honorable mention essay should be the most important of our national domestic policies. If, since John Adams’ day, it ever has been a policy, which is doubted, it is now dead as a doornail.
The essayist takes a text from George Washington, “To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval force, organized and ready to vindicate it from insult and aggression. This may even prevent the necessity of going to war.” It is not enough to have the naval force ready, there must be the will to use it to “prevent the necessity of going to war.”
John Adams understood what Washington meant. Adams in 1798, used the then tiny navy against the French depredations, and prevented war. Had the Jefferson administration, without declaring war, after the example set by John Adams, used the navy against British cruisers when the Leopard shot into the Chesapeake in 1807, there would have followed an increase of the navy to beat down the ensuing belligerent depredations; there would have been handed on to succeeding American generations traditions that would have bred the Americans to defend their neutral flag from “insult and aggression.” But no! Thus early were the Americans taught to become servile on the high seas; for, contrary to the essayist, it was not, in 1812, that the Americans were “exasperated beyond endurance by illegal and gravely injurious practices against our commerce on the sea” that caused the Americans to declare war against the British, it was “That the U.S. went to war with Great Britain in 1812 at the insistence of western and southern men, and over the opposition of the northeast, is a fact about which there has never been any doubt.” “If [continues Pratt] the real grievances which were the excuse for the war were interferences by Great Britain with American commerce, and the rights of American sailors, why was war to redress those grievances opposed by the maritime section of the nation, and urged by the inland section, which was scarcely affected?” . . . “The war party [continues Pratt] found itself in full control when the Twelfth Congress met. It was soon apparent that the war to which this faction was committed was to be waged aggressively, and with the conquest of Canada as a major object.” Space does not allow me to enlarge on the wretched strategy of dissipating resources, resulting in the ultimate defeat of the United States on land and sea. While it is true that there would not have been the excuse for the war of conquest if there had been no belligerent depredations to furnish the excuse for the “war hawks”; it is equally true, that had there not existed the cause, the ambition to conquer Canada, also there would not have been the War of 1812.
Thus, displacing the old spread-eagle propaganda of our school histories, it is no longer exact to say that belligerent depredations were the cause of the War of 1812.
Similarly, there is nothing in the historical use of the neutral U. S. Navy since 1798 to justify the essayist’s conclusion that “if we had then [January, 1917] had sufficient means to quell submarines, the fateful decision [of the Kaiser] would have been far different—and most likely reversed—and America no doubt would have remained at peace, and at the same time, enjoyed respect for her neutrality and vital interests.” The Germans were not to be restrained by a mere show of force.
There is now everything in the record of those times (1914-17) to indicate that the Americans did not have the will, nor the understanding of preventive strategy, to use the Navy to enforce “respect for their neutrality”; in spite of the fact that our Navy in 1914-17 was far more able to defeat the submarine than was John Adams’ little navy in 1798 able to drive French depredations out of the western Atlantic.
Here is the record. Lansing and the administration had no plans matured when he broke with Germany in February, 1917. The Navy Department had no plans. Says Lansing in his memoirs, “convoy was strongly opposed by the Navy because the possibility of hostilities would find the Atlantic fleet scattered and not mobilized to defend coast cities from attacks by German cruisers and submarines.” The lack of Navy Department action was such that, having had two years to work out a plan since Lansing decided that he would eventually put the country into the war—it required Sims2 to get Page to send (about July, 1917) a personal dispatch to the President urging action.
The Navy Department, from August, 14, to February, 1917, had not developed a plan to beat off belligerent depredations nor for keeping the country from declaring war. It did nothing to protect shipping beyond arming the merchant ships after February, 1917. It dispersed all its anti-submarine elements in coast patrol squadrons from the Rio Grande to the Bay of Fundy. It fell back, according to Lansing, on the strategic fallacy of defending the coast by remaining on the coast. It had failed to understand that John Adams’ system of defense of commerce protected home territory. It did nothing as a counter-offensive to the submarine. Sims had to nag the Navy Department for weeks to get that Department to understand that the Navy’s job was an aggressive effort against the submarine, not an idle defensive.
Coming down all the years from 1807, the State Department had not inherited a tradition of using the Navy to prevent war by suppressing belligerent depredations; nor had the Navy Department an inherited tradition of an aggressive defensive. Now, both the State Department and the Navy department are probably rendered morally weaker by the recent domestic legislation practically validating all kinds of future belligerent depredations; practically abandoning American shipping to future belligerents; practically surrendering American independence on the high seas; practically running the American Navy in behind the 3-mile limit when the next war of the sea powers breaks out.
The essayist’s suggestion that it was “the ruthless submarine warfare that forced the United States into the World War” should not be taken as the cause of the United States declaring war on Germany, for that would not strengthen the essayist’s plea to follow the admonition of Washington (once followed by John Adams) which is, manifestly, to use sea power to prevent the necessity of going to war. As a matter of principle, the ruthless submarine warfare 1914-17 was no different, considering its strategical answer, from the ruthless operations of the French sea forces in 1798. Both were to be taken care of by maritime defensives. Without declaring war, the neutral navy in 1917 could have operated defensively against the German submarines from friendly belligerent bases in France and Ireland, just as the neutral navy in 1798 operated against French sea forces from friendly belligerent British bases in the West Indies. Furthermore, there are authorities who, while not contesting the theory that German submarine operations might have been the excuse, find that the United States was not forced into the war by the German submarines; but rather, that American offensive unneutrality brought on German unlimited submarine operations.
Judge John Bassett Moore, our foremost authority on international law has said that the book
examines the question whether, during the days of its supposed neutrality, the United States was in fact and in law neutral; and from the authentic records, official and unofficial, which are at length available, it conclusively demonstrates that the confused notion, which has in recent days so extensively and disastrously prevailed, that the United States became involved in the war through the defense of neutral rights, is destitute of foundation.
Having dismissed the fiction that German submarine warfare was the cause of the Americans going into the War of 1917, Judge Moore goes on to point out that Lansing, as early as July, 1915, wrote that Germany “must not be permitted to win this war or to break even, and that American opinion must be prepared for the time when the country might have to cast aside its neutrality and become one of the champions of democracy.” (No idea here of keeping out of war.) To this end Lansing tells us that his notes to England were in the nature of skillful temporizings; Page in London was helping the British foreign office defeat American protests.
Recently, we have the story of the Sunrise Breakfast Conference of April, 1916, at which the administration proposed to the Speaker of the House, the Majority Leader of the House and the Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee the prompt entrance of the United States into the war. (No idea here of keeping out of war.)
Next, in March, 1916, we have the administration defeating the Gore-McLemore Resolution aimed to keep Americans off belligerent merchant ships; defeating the suppression of the principal unneutral American course of action. (Defeating the idea of keeping out of war.)
Judge Moore says:
But the more the evidence is studied, the clearer it becomes, that what most decisively contributed to the involvement of the United States in the war was the assertion of a right to protect belligerent ships on which Americans saw fit to travel, and the American treatment of armed belligerent allied merchantmen as peaceful vessels. Both assumptions were contrary to reason and no other professed neutral advanced them.
No. The story that the Americans went into the war of 1917 in defense of neutral rights is pure fiction. In 1917 the Americans went into the war because they had always intended to get into the war; because they were from the early days of the war unneutrally hostile to Germany and unneutrally partial to the Allies. W. J. Bryan saw this when the Americans began storming at Germany over the Lusitania, in June, 1915.
It is hardly correct to say that belligerent depredations on United States commerce have ever caused the Americans to declare war. In 1812, belligerent depredations was the excuse, the cause was ambition for territorial expansion by conquest. In 1917, belligerent depredations was the excuse, the cause was plainly hostility to the Germans, plainly partiality to the Allies. Never, since 1798, have the Americans used their Navy to defend neutrality. Because since 1798 they have never used their Navy to defend their neutrality, the wars of 1812 and 1917 have obliterated American neutrality; have changed American neutrality into American servility.
What is the use of having a gigantic, costly Navy if the Americans will not use it to keep the country out of war? Our Merchant Marine will surely die out, if we are never to have a Navy Department strong enough to teach the politicians how to use the Navy to preserve American independence while preventing war. When we not only have nothing in our record since John Adams’ time indicating that the country knows anything about using the Navy to preserve neutrality, when we even have gone to the other extreme and legislated away American independence on the high seas, what justification is there for a belief that foreigners will respect American neutrality, well knowing that the Americans do not know how and have not the will to use their sea power, no matter how powerful, to prevent belligerent depredations, to prevent war?
License by Regents
(See page 255, February, 1937, Proceedings)
Lieutenant W. N. Mansfield, U. S. Naval Reserve.—Mr. Hartley refers particularly to merchant officers who receive their training in the forecastle. In general, I believe that his remarks are well taken as regards the passing of the various subjects for his license at different times provided he has had a year’s service in his department. Such a system would preclude cramming, provide a more thorough examination (hence better preparation), and the candidate would not have to take several days off in order to stand an examination. Several of the examining boards will not allow the candidate to take his examination while the ship is in port and complete it in installments at later dates when time permits. This means that he seaman must be discharged from his ship and take his chances of getting another job after completing his examination, to say nothing of having to pay his own way while ashore.
It is suggested that the endorsements as completion of the several required subjects be made on the back of the seaman’s certificate of Service rather than in the continuous Discharge Book (or certificate of identification). The Continuous Discharge Book, as its name implies, is intended to show the seaman’s record of service (no marks as to ability may be entered under penalty of law). It should be remembered that under the new laws, all seamen serving on board vessels over 100 gross tons are required to have a license or certificate for the position they are employed in. A seaman having a license as md mate cannot be employed (is not considered qualified) as an able seaman unless he possesses a certificate as such.
Able seamen’s certificates are of two types depending on service. In general, the green certificate is awarded after 3 years service. Sixty-five per cent of the deck force on merchant ships must be able seamen. A blue certificate is awarded after 1 year’s service, but not more than | of the number of able seamen required on a vessel may be composed of seamen rated on such service. An examination is given in either case.
The requirements for an Ordinary Seaman’s Certificate are 6 month’s service as a deck boy—a rating that few of our merchant ships carry. In the engine department the seaman is required to have served 6 months and pass an examination for the rating desired.
An inconsistency is apparent in the service requirements for third assistant engineer. A school ship graduate qualifies immediately but his Naval Academy brother must complete not 3 years and 2 cruises (as for third mate) but 4 years.
Naval service as a commissioned officer does not count unless one is so fortunate as to have served as an executive officer, 6 months qualifying for chief mate and 12 months for master. The writer had the sad experience of being no better off after 5 years’ commissioned service (plus qualification for submarine command) than any Naval Academy graduate who automatically qualifies for second mate. This was simply on account of the rigidness with which the examining boards follow the regulations.
It is believed that the Department of Commerce requirements in all licensed grades should be stepped up and made just as comprehensive as the British Board of Trade examinations. It is further believed that a candidate should be allowed to use any method of navigation he desires in solving a day’s work. The writer was quite embarrassed on both the second and chief mate’s examinations to be required to memorize formulas and use methods of navigation that were not considered worth teaching at the Naval Academy and which he promptly forgot as soon as he returned to sea.
Mr. Hartley’s proposal as to endorsements could be extended to an officer’s license. Another technicality that could be worked out would be to have the assigned mark in each subject appear on the certificate or license.
American Personnel for American Merchant Ships
(See page 171, February, 1937, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander. J. H. B. van Weelderen, U. S. Naval Reserve.— The above article, as also the comments in the July issue by Lieutenant Commander L. W. Branch, are of great interest to the Merchant Marine and to the American people at large.
That the building of a loyal and efficient American Merchant Marine personnel structure is a dire necessity nobody acquainted with the actual conditions will deny. The plan evolved by Lieutenant Commander Branch seems to solve the problem admirably and would at the same time remove the often-heard complaint that there are no Americans available to man our ships.
If the government would offer American youths a thorough training in Merchant Marine academies in exchange for an obligation to serve in the U. S. Merchant Marine service for a certain definite period as assigned by the Department of Commerce, I believe there would be an ample response, provided the creation of such academies would go hand in hand with a complete and drastic change in the methods of and the requirements for the obtaining of licenses.
Few young men with a high-school training will ever be interested in an officer’s berth in the Merchant Marine as long as they find that the man in the forecastle (often without as much as a complete grammar school education) can acquire the necessary knowledge to pass a third mate’s examination in the ridiculous period of time of 4 to 8 weeks for the sum of $50 to $75 at one of the many “schools” now in existence in most of our large ports. Ambitious young people look up for their future, not down.
The government examination system is the cause of the lack of real nautical schools (along the lines of our schoolships) where a student could acquire a comprehensive knowledge of our profession. All our examinations are in writing and the Local Inspectors usually have the choice of a few sets of printed questions and answers. These questions and answers are in the possession of the so-called schools and all the student learns is to answer these questions “the way the Inspectors want them answered.” Fundamentally he learns exactly nothing of the science of navigation and when he finally joins his first ship as third officer, he is worse than useless. If he has any backbone and is fortunate enough to fall in with a shipmaster and officers who take an interest in him, he will now begin to learn what he should have known before a license was issued to him.
In many instances our new third officer will find himself under the orders and guidance of a captain and mate of the “old-time sailor” class. His education will then take the form of painting, varnishing, washing pilot-house windows, overhauling life boats, etc. while on watch on the bridge, and assisting the mate with the upkeep of the ship for at least 2 or 3 hours of his watch below. Needless to say that wearing a uniform is taboo; dungarees is the style. Does this make the officer’s berth desirable to young Americans of good families and with a good schooling? Too many of our so-called officers never get out of the forecastle stage.
The remedy I would like to suggest is this. Let the examinations be held at a certain number of conveniently situated ports by specially appointed boards; these boards to consist of ex-naval officers, shipmasters, and chief engineers. Let there be a definite length of time for the examination, let us say 2 days. A day and a half should be used for the oral examination of about 5 candidates at a time, rotating the questions, and the remaining half a day to be used for the solution (in writing) of a certain number of navigational problems. The total examination should then be rated and a certain percentage required for passing.
The present system allows a candidate almost unlimited time to “stew” over his problems. If he makes a mistake the work is returned to him for correction until the answer is right and in some instances he is allowed to leave the building and find the answer he cannot readily supply. Such system is not conducive to the production of real nautical schools where men would have to spend 2 or 3 years to thoroughly study our profession. Furthermore, how are we going to get up-to-the-minute navigators as long as the U. S. Local Inspectors insist on the use of methods entirely obsolete?
Lieutenant Commander Branch mentions “the present unsatisfactory system of having men with master’s licenses occupying positions as third mates, etc.,” intimating that an oversupply of the higher licenses is the cause of this phenomenon. However, this touches a little known phase of the question, i.e., little known outside Merchant Marine circles.
In my own experience I have met very few competent young officers, holding master’s licenses, in the third mate class. There are quite a few elderly men with such licenses filling third and second mate’s berths. Part of them are, of course, plain failures, but a large percentage are victims of circumstances, beyond their control, always ominously suspended above the heads of the Merchant Marine officers like the sword of Damocles. Many a man has worked hard and loyally for his owners, became master of a vessel, raised a family, bought a house, only to find the ship sold from under him and the new owners replacing him with one of their own officers without as much as offering him a job. If the victim is fairly young he may start at the bottom again with another company and finally work himself up to the top once more, but should he be in the fifties his chances are poor of getting anything better than a third or second mate’s job.
Then there is the elderly first mate who worked like a slave on deck with a paintbrush and scaling hammer for many years instead of being an officer and preparing himself for the duties of a shipmaster. The shipowner passes him by, because, though he may be a fine sailor and a good painter, he is not the type to represent the owner in foreign ports or at any port or place, for that matter.
What we need then is good schools, where the future officers may obtain a worth-while education for a worth-while license, guaranteeing them a reasonably secure future as long as they perform their duties faithfully and capably.
I therefore answer the final question in Lieutenant Commander Branch’s article with a hearty: “Yes, by all means! So mote it be.”
Progress of Work on the Battleships North Carolina and Washington
(The following Navy press release dated August 4, 1937, is repeated here as being of considerable interest to readers who wonder how the design problem is handled for a projected battleship.)
As previously announced to the press, the two new battleships will be built at Navy Yards. The North Carolina will be constructed at New York, and the Washington at Philadelphia. The estimated time of construction of these vessels is 48 months, which means that they probably will not be delivered by the building yards until 1941.
The Secretary of the Navy has assigned the major part of the design work for the construction of these vessels to the New York Navy Yard. There are two types of design work required in the construction of naval vessels, general and detail. The general design work which covers matters of characteristics and outline of arrangements was, of course, completed in the Bureaus several months ago, as such plans must necessarily be furnished to all bidders as a basis for making up their bids.
The navy yard which is responsible for the design is confronted with a large and difficult task which involves the preparation of plans covering every detail of construction, even including the size and type of every rivet and increment of welding, the specific arrangement of piping as to size, joints, valves, etc. The size of the task of detail design can be gauged by the fact that the total number of detail plans required will be in excess of 7,000. A large number of additional plans, probably as many as 5,000, also will be required for the large number of items of machinery, auxiliary machinery, and equipment, which will be purchased from contractors throughout the country, for which detail plans and operating instructions must be furnished by the contractors. The amount of technical work involved in this quantity of detail is obviously of very great proportions.
The New York Navy Yard has started making up detail plans of those structural parts of the vessel which will be required first on the building ways. Naturally, the procedure is for the design group to furnish first the plans which are needed first in the regular sequence of fabrication, assembly, and erection of the vessel. In order to insure a satisfactory procedure in this regard, it is the custom for the design group to make a schedule of plans in accordance with the sequence desired by the production group.
In addition to production of blueprint plans for the use of the production forces, the design yard must order the material which the plans show will be needed. It is usually the case that plans must be completed before the material which they require can be ordered, although in certain kinds of structural work it is entirely practicable to order material, such as steel, as soon as the approximate sizes can be determined. However, orders must be placed for thousands of specific items of steel of numerous qualities, types, and sizes; the total weight of structural material and protective material is nearly 25,000 tons for each ship. In the case of certain items of machinery, equipment, etc., it is necessary for every detail to be shown on the plans which are sent out to prospective bidders.
As indicated above, the design yard controls the rate of progress and the starting of actual work in the shops, as no productive work can be carried on until approved plans and material are available. Also, the progress of work in the field depends upon the accuracy with which the design section handles its work, because errors or omissions in detail plans or in orders for material often show up most disadvantageously when the production section finds that assembly and erection of parts cannot be accomplished as intended.
It is often believed by the general public that the plans for construction of a vessel are practically completed before the keel is laid, or at least that the plans are all completed during the early stages of construction. This is not the case, as it is necessary for the design group to continue with its work up to the very time of the completion of the vessel; in order to accomplish changes and improvements which may be found in the course of the work to be essential for satisfactory operation. The plan schedule mentioned above is laid out with the idea of insuring that work on certain plans is begun at a proper time during the building period. This proper time should not be so late as to risk the nonavailability of necessary materials when needed, but should be late enough to insure that the most satisfactory technical solutions can be seen from the ship itself, and not only visualized by draftsmen.
When the design group disposes of the multitudinous questions concerning design of the hull and machinery proper, they then have the enormous task of working out the details of hundreds of items of auxiliaries, equipment, etc. The many items of material, such as instruments, furniture, auxiliary machinery outfit, and equipment must be located in the most satisfactory position, and it usually develops that such location cannot be entirely satisfactory either to the operating personnel or to the designer himself, on account of the fact that the utilization of the united space available on shipboard is Practically always a matter of compromise. The advantages of a certain location must always be weighed against the various disadvantages which are thereby imposed on other items. It is interesting to note the extensive involvements encountered in considering the relocation of an item of furniture or equipment, as it usually affects electric leads, pipe lines, access, lighting arrangements, etc.
The complexities of the turrets of a modern battleship and the magnitude of the work of building them, installing the guns and turret machinery, are such that, it delays are not to result, it is necessary to start actual work on the turrets about the same time as laying the keel of the ship. The work of preparation of the detail and working plans for the turrets will begin shortly and will be carried on with the utmost expedition looking to starting actual construction work of the turrets by the time the keels of the vessels themselves are laid on the building slips.
Electric welding, which carries numerous advantages for ship construction, will be employed very extensively. Tests in large number to determine the extent to which welding can properly be used on naval vessels are constantly under way, and results of these various tests will regulate the amount of electric welding to be used. Welding has been used extensively in recent new vessels and has been found generally satisfactory. The specifications for the battleships regulate the design of welded joints and therefore control the type and amount of welding for any particular purpose. The quality of welding performed on the ships themselves is governed by very rigid inspection and by requiring each electric welder to pass difficult qualifying tests before being assigned to the work. There are two chief reasons for using welding: (1) to save weight, and (2) to obtain tighter joints than obtainable in riveted joints. The saving of weight results from the fact that welded joints are made up without the use of straps in the make-up of joints and without flat surfaces on the frames and longitudinals to provide an area to hold the rivets.
The number of men to be employed on both of these vessels is a matter of considerable interest. The maximum force will depend upon various factors, and will approximate 5,000 men for each ship. This does not include the large number of workmen who will be engaged in manufacture of material of every kind which the Navy Department will purchase for construction of the ships.
Regarding the interesting and important matter of protection against airplane bombs, mines, and torpedoes, the North Carolina and Washington will be provided with the most complete protection that skillful design engineering can devise. It is expected that these two battleships will be at least the equal of any in the world with respect to this type of protection. During the past decade all large naval powers have conducted numerous experiments to determine the effectiveness of various types of protection against airplane bombs, mines, and torpedoes. As a result of such experiments, the larger naval powers are satisfied that the up-to- date battleship is not more vulnerable to bombs, mines, and torpedoes than to modern guns using high explosive charges. The decision of the Navy Department to proceed with the construction of battleships verifies the expressed opinion of experts of all the larger naval powers that the battleship continues to be the backbone of naval power, regardless of the advent and improvement of important weapons, such as the airplane bomb, the mine, and the torpedo.
Still More About the Wilmington
(See page 1213, August, 1937, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Benjamin K. Johnson, U. S. Navy (Retired).—In the above-mentioned number of the Naval Institute Proceedings I noticed an extract from a letter by Captain George H. Bowdey on the rolling of the Wilmington. Apparently there had been previous accounts of the ability of the old packet to roll but these I have missed.
I consider myself something of an authority on the rolling powers of the “Willie,” as I was attached to her for about two years, in 1908-1909, I think, as chief engineer for a short time and then as executive officer, and I agree with Captain Bowdey that her rolling powers have never been overstated.
I think that it was in the summer of 1908 that we left Manila for Shanghai and immediately ran into a blow which lasted for three or four days. It was not a hurricane or typhoon by any means, but for about four days the wind blew steadily with a force of probably 6 to 7 on the Beaufort scale, enough to kick up a very good sea and enable the “Willie” to do her stuff in her best manner.
The captain and executive officer (who was also navigator) took to their bunks and the ship was headed into the sea and allowed to ride it out. There was at that time no clinometer on board which would register the rolls which she made, but when she was doing her best I stationed myself for considerable periods on the after break of the superstructure where I could get a good view of the flagstaff against the horizon and make a fair estimate in that way of the amount of the rolling. Time after time she went far past 45 degrees, and on several occasions she seemed to reach 60 degrees or very near it.
It was impossible to cook and we lived on what we could get. One old Cantonese mess attendant was the only one who kept going out of 15 or 20 we had, and throughout the blow he managed in some way to produce coffee, which was a great help. We had 5 or 6 extra officers as passengers for ships in Shanghai and they helped to keep the watches stood though they were the sea-sickest crowd I have ever seen. One of them, now a captain, upon coming off watch at 8:00 a.m. wedged himself under the chart board and stayed right there until it was time for him to go on watch again.
I was chief engineer at the time, and I have never seen anything more admirable than the behavior of the black gang. They were all seasick, but only one man failed to show up for his watch during the blow. The engines were racing in a manner which it seemed would jerk them right off the bed plates so that the men on throttle watch had to shut off the steam each time she rolled, which was pretty often, as in addition to being a big roller the “Willie” was a very fast roller. They would be sick in the crank pits, but managed to shut the throttle with every roll.
In the firerooms it was worse. A fireman would steady himself as best he could to heave a shovelful of coal into the boiler, and come near to heaving himself in with it. He would pick himself up, burned maybe from shoulder to wrist where he had fallen against the boiler front, swear with such vigor as he had left, and go to work again.
On one night the engines began to run hot and it became necessary to use the water service, always a dubious thing to do. It seemed to work all right, however, and I turned in to get such rest as was possible while I was being hurled from one side of the bunk to the other 10 or 12 times a minute.
About two in the morning I got a call over the engine-room tube that there was trouble down below and when I got there I found about 18 or more inches of water on the engine-room floor plates. The water service was still going and had to be continued while every pump which would connect was working to get rid of the water, which was slowly gaining. The engine-room force were over their knees in the Water and when she would take a roll it would splash clear over their heads.
It looked like hell to tell the captain for a tact, and I decided not to tell him, anyway not until just before she foundered. After some little time lost in trying to overhaul pumps when with every roll all the tools would go skating into the crank-pits, the difficulty was found in a stoppage of the bilge suctions by pieces of waste rags. After a lot of deep-sea diving his was removed and the pumps cleared the engine-room of water in short order.
At one time when the ship was doing her best to show that her reputation as a roller was no exaggeration, I decided it would be a good idea to go up to the crosstrees to see what it looked like from there. I got nearly to the top when I changed my mind. When she took a good roll, from my position as I hung on to the Jacob’s ladder with everything I had, I could spit vertically into the sea at a point 20 feet or more from the side of the ship. In those days I was as sure of myself aloft as the average man, but I wanted no part of the crosstrees that day.
The ship never was in any particular anger, but it was as uncomfortable and as worry-inspiring a trip as I ever made, and when we got into the lee off the mouth of the Yangtze all of us felt a whole lot better.
Notes on Old Guns
(See page 653, May, 1937, Proceedings)
Dr. Ing. Wladimir V. Mendl, A.M.I.N.A.—Commander Bentham Simons, U. S. Navy, in his most timely article, touches upon the nineteenth century development of gun construction in America. Perhaps the present writer may be allowed to add a few comments insofar as older guns are concerned as well as with reference to some more modern developments outside of the States.
First of all it is interesting to know that gunpowder was known in China for a considerable time before its “invention” in Europe. It would appear however that the gun itself is an invention of the Occident and that the Chinese came to know it only during the sixteenth century.
Some people believe that guns were invented by the Moors, who used them in 1340 at the siege of Tarifa and in 1342 at that of Algeciras, as Commander Simons states quite correctly. Nevertheless it is not yet proved that the weapon referred to, called “madfa,” was in reality not throwing merely incendiary bullets with a thin outer shell of iron, instead of cannon ball.
There was an Italian gun in existence bearing inscribed on its barrel the date 1322 and the arms of the city of Mantua. This gun disappeared in 1849 and its authenticity is doubted because of the fact that it was the custom of the time to give similar inscriptions in Roman numbers, whereas the one referred to was in Arabic numbers.
It is a fact, however, proved by documents, that in 1326 the Signoria of Florence ordered two officers to be commissioned to procure iron shot and metal guns for the defense of the castles and villages of the republic. This is the oldest actual proof of the existence of guns.
In France the first mention of guns occurs in documents dated 1338, likewise in England, whereas in Germany the first allusion goes back to the year 1346.
As the English document dated 1338 mentioned above refers to a certain “John Starlyng, formerly dark to the king’s ships” it seems not improbable that the use of guns afloat dates back to the very earliest days of their existence. Anyhow we know that the Moors of Tunis and Sevilla used guns in their naval battles in 1350, the Venetian and Genovese fleets during their struggles in 1377. Curiously enough the guns of these days are said to have been breechloaders. Be that as it may, it was not until the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century that naval ordnance progressed and came into general use.
To begin with, the variety of calibers and models was a very large one. Sir William Monson gives in his Naval Tracts the following information about the diversity of armament in Elizabethan men-of-war:
Name Weight of shot
Cannon-royal................... 66 pdr.
Cannon..................... 60 pdr.
Cannon-serpentine....... 53 pdr.
Bastard-cannon............... 41 pdr.
Demi-cannon................... 33 pdr.
Cannon-perier.................. 24 pdr.
Culverine......................... 17 pdr.
Basilisc..................... 15 pdr.
Demi-culverine.................. 9 pdr.
Bastard-culverine.......... 7 pdr.
Saker.................................. 5 pdr.
Minion................................ 4 pdr.
Faucon............................... 3 pdr.
Fauconnet................ 1½ pdr.
Serpentine......................... ¾ pdr.
Rabinet............................. ½ pdr.
The same applies to the ordnance of other countries. But as the disadvantages of such a large number of types are obvious and were recognized by the leading men of that time, about 1550 Fling Henry II of France reduced the number of calibers to not more than six. A similar simplification was decreed in Germany by Emperor Charles V about the same time.
The “six calibers of France” were the following:
Name | Weight of shot |
Canon........... | .... 33 pdr. |
Grande couleuvrine. | .... 15 pdr. |
Couleuvrine batarde......... | . . . . 7 pdr. |
Couleuvrine moyenne........ | .... 2 pdr. |
Faucon......... | . . . 1 1/16 pdr |
Fauconneau.. | .... 7/8 pdr. |
Although the manufacture of guns, whether of iron (forged) or of bronze (cast), was still in its infancy, there are records of guns of the period having a rather large bore. As such weapons were not only difficult to manufacture but also too clumsy for easy transportation, they were divided sometimes into several parts united by screw threads or bolts.
One gun of this kind is preserved in the ordnance museum at Woolwich, England, having been presented to the British government during the sixties of last century by the Sultan of Turkey. The barrel, which was cast about the middle of the fifteenth century, has a bore of about 24 in., a length of about 16.5 ft., fired a ball of about 660 lb. through the action of 55 lb. of gunpowder, and is still in perfect condition.
The range of all of these guns was small and sights were more than primitive.
As to gun metal and cannon bronze it may be mentioned that the former Austro- Hungarian monarchy as late as in our times was the last country to manufacture its guns of bronze, though this latter was a special steel alloy. It ought to be said that the metal for casting guns varied widely. Thus the one richest in copper is the alloy of a Turkish gun dated 1464 containing 95.20 per cent of copper, 4.71 Per cent of tin and traces of lead and iron. In general all the Turkish, Chinese, etc., cannon bronzes contain up to 1.72 per cent of iron. Some of them have lead as well, the alloy of a Cochin Chinese as much as 13.22 per cent, and a few of them have zinc. These latter alloys merit rather the name of brasses, although zinc is not in every instance predominant over tin.
Now as to carronades, it ought to be said that indeed, as Commander Simons states, they were brought out in 1778 by the Carron Company, a Scotch iron foundry. In December of this same year the manager of the company informed the board that he had constructed a new light gun as armament for some of the company’s vessels. As a matter of fact the Carron foundry had produced already some years before the prototype of the carronade, a light gun called “smasher,” Proposed in 1774 by General Robert Melville. But it was not until 1779 that the carronade was introduced into the Royal Navy.
The considerable effect which the carronade had on naval armament of that time may be explained by the fact that e old long gun fired a relatively small all against which the sides of vessels had been made thicker. A penetrating shot left a clean round hole, easily plugged up by the carpenter, and it had become more and more difficult to sink a vessel by gunfire. Thus it is no wonder that the new weapon was rapidly introduced and it is said that by January, 1781, not less than 429 ships of the Royal Navy were armed partly—with carronades. Notwithstanding this fact the carronade “was at first not recognized as part of the orthodox armament of a ship.” However it was well suited to the British practice of firing at the masts and spars of the enemy. Although it may be concluded rom what has been stated above, that, owing to their practice of firing at the water line of the opponent, the French should have adopted the new gun willingly, they were slow to introduce it on board their vessels.
The result was that H.M.S. Rainbow, an old 44-gun ship on board which carronades of large bore had been mounted in the way of experiment, easily defeated and captured in 1782 the French frigate Hebe, armed with long guns. The frigate proved afterwards very valuable as a model for this type of vessel, in which the French were decidedly superior to the British. As a consequence of this action the carronade was even more widely introduced and formed the larger part of the armament, especially in lesser vessels. Actually it was ill suited as primary armament and could not fail to succumb to an enemy, able to choose his range, an inferiority which was to be proved ere long.
In America carronades had not met with the same favor and thus it has to be accounted for that after the actions in 1812 on Lakes Erie and Ontario the British commander reported that he had “found it impossible to bring them [the Americans] to close action. We remained in this mortifying situation five hours, having only six guns in all the squadron that would reach the enemy, not a carronade being fired.” Not very long after that the U. S. frigate Essex, armed almost only with carronades, was defeated by and surrendered to H.M.S. Phoebe.
Both actions discredited the carronade in every respect and although it continued to be carried in vessels, it came by and by into disuse. Nevertheless in more than one respect it has faired the way to modern ordnance.
Finally, as to the development of gun construction during the nineteenth century, there is at least one more constructor meriting mention. This is Krupp, the German gun manufacturer. His importance for the history of ordnance rests not only in his fame and general influence on the construction of guns, but likewise in the fact that many countries outside Germany and even outside Europe have been provided by him with guns.
Krupp’s contribution to the construction of guns has been twofold. Not only has he developed a gun barrel built up of several sleeves, but just as important is his innovation from the metallurgical point of view, according to which it was possible to cast conveniently the heavy ingots required for guns becoming rapidly larger, not to speak of armor plates.
Up to the year 1858 the Krupp factory had produced but a limited number of cast steel guns and these only of lesser calibers. About this time, that is to say about the beginning of the sixties, Russia was in dire need of armament. On the other side the development of the Armstrong gun in England was still in full swing and, as there was a certain antagonism between Russia and Great Britain, the Russians were forced to look for something better than they had had before. Consequently they went to Krupp’s and it is their merit to have recognized for the first time the suitability of cast steel for naval and coastal ordnance. In 1864 a number of 8-inch guns were tried at St. Petersburg with great success.
At that time Krupp still forged his guns out of a single, large ingot. However more and more was expected of guns and moreover the forging of such large blocks of steel was not devoid of risk. All these contributed to induce Krupp, like other gun manufacturers, to build up the barrel of the gun of several separate sleeves. They comprised a central tube of about § caliber in thickness and one to three shrunk-on outer rings.
Very soon this system of construction won general favor, although in several other countries, e.g., in Sweden and in France, various methods of casting had been devised, the aim of which was to give the greatest resistance to the inner layers of the gun, just as did the cooling from the inside according to Colonel Rodman in America.
Very naturally all of these innovations and inventions aroused fierce discussions during the later sixties of last century. Nevertheless by 1870 these discussions had centered around the two most important methods of construction, those by Armstrong and by Krupp.
To conclude, the writer wants to draw the attention of the reader to the sliding breech mechanism, another important characteristic of the Krupp gun down to our days. As, however, the article referred to does not touch this point, he refrains from entering into details.
Another Short Method
By John Schimm, United Fruit Company.—In an issue of the Proceedings of 1936 was given a short formula for the computation of the longitude, when the sun is on the prime vertical. (Sin H.A. = cos h sec Dec.)
When the declination of the sun is greater than the latitude, and of the same sign, the sun does not reach the prime vertical but reaches a maximum azimuth which is commonly referred to as the maximum digression. When this occurs it is evidently the favorable moment for the determination of the hour angle (H.A.) from which the longitude is derived, and the solution requires only the dead reckoning latitude and the observed altitude of the sun.
From the celestial triangle with the parallactic angle γ = 90°, we derive the following short formulas:
sin H.A. :sin z = sin γ: sin ψ
sin H.A. :sin ψ = sin z sin γ
sin 90° = 1
sin H.A. = cos h sec lat.
To find the apparent time at ship for the observation:
cos H.A. = tan p cotan ψ
cos H.A. = cotan dec. tan lat.
No appreciable error is committed when observing the sun slightly outside the unit of the computation.
Irish Pennants
By Lieutenant (j.g.) Robert T. Sutherland, Jr., (C. C.) U. S. Navy— The northeast trade winds blow so evenly and regularly in the portion of the Atlantic Ocean between 2° and 27° N. that the Spaniards named this portion the Golfo de las Damas or “Ladies’ Sea.” . . .
Just as the three R’s were the goal of all school children, the three L’s were beacons seamen. The three L’s referred to lead, and lookout. An old text states: “The frequent use of the first, a correct knowledge of the second, and the faithful performance of the last will generally insure safety in the vicinity of the coast.” . . . Lake Jordan, in Friesland (Northern Netherlands), is so completely covered by vegetable growth that a wagon may be driven across it. . . . Columbus, on one of is voyages to America, discovered that the natives of Bahama spent much of their time asleep in cotton nets suspended at each end, which they called hamacs, whence we derive the hammock universally used by seamen . . . The “Naval Crown” was one of the nine crowns of heraldry. The Roman Emperor Claudius originated it as a reward for maritime services, and awarded it to the first man to board an enemy ship. The crown has a rim of gold or silver, around which are alternately spaced the prows of galleys and square sails. . . . The United States Naval Lyceum, organized at New York Navy Yard in 1833, was by forty years the forerunner of the Naval Institute. . . . The navigator of U. S. Navy vessels was formerly also the ordnance officer of the ship. . . . The first American naval vessels to circumnavigate the globe were the ship Columbus and the sloop Washington. This trip occurred during 1789-90. . . . The Great Armada was not unusual in size. It consisted of only 150 vessels, whereas the Danes and Normans used to send out fleets of 200 to 600 vessels, and William the Conqueror came to England with over 1,000 vessels. In the early naval history of England, from 200 to 500 ships frequently sailed together; on several occasions Louis IX of France collected fleets of 1,700 vessels—as on his expedition to the Holy Land. . . . Icebergs have been known to be aground in 1,400 feet of water and yet rise to a height of 250 feet above the surface. . . . Sick-bay attendants were once called “Loblolly-boys.” . . . During the summer of 1813, our Navy had but three warships at sea: the President, the Essex, and the Congress. . . . Napoleon, after reviewing the marines of the Bellerophon, is said to have exclaimed: “What might not be done with 100,000 such men!” . . .
Before the invention of clocks, the flow of water through an orifice was used as a means of measuring time. Ctesibius made an instrument in which the flowing water took the form of tears dropping from the eyes of a small statue, bemoaning the flight of time. The teardrops were gathered in a container where they floated a figure which pointed out the hour on a vertical scale. The vessel automatically emptied itself daily by a siphon arrangement which operated machinery indicating the day and month. . . . The present rank of junior-grade lieutenant was formerly designated as “Master.” . . . R.H.I.P. Card playing was once forbidden aboard navy ships—except in the captain’s cabin. . . .