Attrition, like blockade, is a secondary method of warfare; a means to an end; a preliminary step in preparation for the vital thrust. Attrition is a logical prerequisite and may be exercised prior to the final test of strength of the battle line, but the only purpose of destroying two or three or four ships is that the advantage of concentration may be ensured for the battle line in the action to come. Concentration, therefore, is the first objective.
It is instinctively in our minds to seek the underlying reason—the cause—the ingredient of the victory. Such a study may be begun with the conscious theory that the superiority in numbers of ships is the controlling factor, or that the pure weight of numbers of men tells the tale, or the superiority of types of ships or guns or armament or tactics is the continuing factor in repeated successes.
Their influences are evident in the battles of history, but it is difficult to point out and prove that any one of these is a consistent or reliable guide to the repeated victories of any one admiral or navy, or war, or era.
We can but judge the future by the past, bearing in mind the constancy of principles, and variance of their applications.
The list of major naval battles shown in Table I has been compiled, looking toward the possibility of aligning some one factor on a strictly comparative basis, not from the purely dogmatic assertions of historians who may have been partial in their considerations, but from the actual occurrences and actual results of the battles themselves at first hand, as near as may be.
One hundred battles are listed from 497 B.C. to date, these being taken as they came, without exclusion of any, and it is believed that the list includes most naval battles commonly recognized as such.
Attempt has been made to list, according to the commonly accepted version, the widest known name of the battle, the year, the opponent ordinarily considered to have the advantage at the end of the affair, that opponent customarily considered to have originated the conflict (the tactical offensive), the number of battle line ships engaged, the outstanding feature of the event, the effect of the battle so far as could be discerned, the commander of the winning side and the war in which fought for further identification.
In the necessary study of the battles with the view to assigning these factors, it became overwhelmingly evident that the one really basic factor at work—the one single invariable factor which always brought success or failure—was concentration. If concentration was obtained by any means whatever, success followed.
For that reason, and to prevent any misconception of fundamental values, concentration is listed at the top of the column in Table II as the decisive factor applying to all battles. However this is not enough; having learned so much, it becomes interesting to discover how the battle was won, which appears to mean—how was the concentration effected? Table II lists the outstanding features of these battles in the order of frequency of their occurrence, with the names of the battles to which they are believed to apply.
It must be understood that, in the progress of any one battle, more than the one factor listed was in play-usually several. For example the second engagement of Hood and De Grasse mainly illustrated the strength of an anchored line of ships in those days when well handled, but the Nile and Porto Praya also were attacks unreadiness of Suffren for his attack at Porto Praya.
The combination of the three, studied jointly, illustrate the tremendous value of a flexible expertness in strategy by the officer in tactical command. It is so powerful as to determine in itself the success of the operation in many cases, for in large measures it determines the amount of concentration obtained. De Grasse filed past in line and conducted an artillery duel, leaving Hood comfortably anchored. Nelson attacked by breaking his line and anchoring his ships so as to concentrate two or three ships to one of the enemy. Had De Grasse done likewise, Hood would have been in a desperate position. Suffren came in to attack Johnstone before his guns were shifted into battery, consequently engaged a waiting enemy without the use of a majority of his battery, and was driven off.
The outstanding method of obtaining concentration in battle beyond doubt, was the aggressive attack. In itself, it generates and creates many of the other factors listed: breaks the opponents' line, surprise, pursuit, overpowers locally, confusion and disorder, threatens the leader, moral effect on unengaged force, destroys the doctrine of the enemy, desertion, local concentration of numbers enfilade, divides the enemy (interior lines), speed—and thus tends toward further success. The defensive on the other hand, gives no choice but to run, or accept action on the adversary's terms.
Summarizing the data of Table I, it is found that:
(a) Of the 80 victorious attackers, 33 were inferior; 27 were superior; and 20 were indeterminate.
(b) Of the 19 victorious defenders, 10 were inferior; 8 were superior; and 1 was indeterminate.
(c) Attack vs. defense—general. Of 99 battles, the victor was attacker in 80, and was defender in 19. This is a ratio of 80/19-4.211.
(d) Numerical superiority. Of the 99 battles, data are available in 78 cases showing reliably which side was numerically superior or inferior.
(1) Of these 78 battles, the victor was numerically superior in 35; numerically inferior in 44.
(e) Attack vs. defense. (Numerical superiority factor eliminated.)
(1)(A) Of the 35 victors who were numerically superior 27 were attackers; 7 were defenders.
(B) This is a ratio favoring the attack over the defense by 27/7 or 385.7 per cent.
(2) (A) Of the 44 victors who were numerically inferior, 33 were attackers; 10 were defenders.
(B) This is a ratio favoring the attack over the defense by 33/10 or 330 per cent.
(3) The average of these two figures is the average advantage of the attack over the defense having eliminated (or averaged) the effect of superiority and inferiority in numbers: 3.578 or 357.8 per cent.
(f) Numerical superiority (attack vs. defense factor eliminated).
(1) The quotient of these two figures is the average relative advantage of the numerical superiority over numerical inferiority on the part of the victors, having eliminated the effect of the advantage by attack.
Summarizing, the above analysis indicates that:
(1) The relative advantage of attack over defense is 3.578/1.
(2) The average advantage of numerical superiority is 1.169/1.
These ratios apparently hold as averages in actual battles as actually fought, the two factors being entirely separate and distinct, each having many variations. How far the advantage of attack would extend against numerical superiority on a theoretically increasing scale is an open question, and because of the many variables in the problem would be very difficult to evaluate. While the general average is believed to give a fair insight into the relative advantages, the comparison of individual battles is difficult. Yet that the advantage of attack can hold its own against overwhelming superiority of numbers is indicated in a shining example by the desperate counter-attack of the Greeks at Salamis, and the subsequent rout of the overwhelmingly superior Persians thereafter.
However, do not imagine that this ratio of the advantage of the offensive over the defensive of three to one indicates that you can necessarily go into the mêlée with one-third the strength of the enemy and come out on an even basis. Perhaps so and perhaps not. This ratio relates only to an offensive-defensive comparison without regard to numbers, and it is in fact independent of numbers, as the ratio is averaged to 3.578 when numbers are both superior and inferior.
It is understood that the mere numbers of ships tabulated for any one of the battles listed are not necessarily a true indication of strengths of opposing forces, but it is believed that over such a large average the figures will represent relative strengths generally.
Another view would indicate that the attacker evidently believed himself, and actually was the stronger, regardless of numerical inferiority, but a number of cases in which reliable data are at hand appear to contradict this theory generally.
It is probable that the attacker, even though inferior in numbers and strength, believed that he could, and actually did, succeed in obtaining concentration by means of the attack. This opinion seems substantiated by the results.
Particularly note that of 78 battles an apparently inferior force was victorious on 44 occasions, as against 35 battles in which the superior force won the battle. Offhand, then it would appear advantageous to go into battle with an inferior force, in the ratio of 44/35 but it must be borne in mind that 33 of these 44 won their battles by virtue of the aggressive, and that the advantage of the attack being so much greater than that of numerical superiority, must be eliminated from the figures before the smaller advantage of numerical inferiority can be calculated. When this is done, it is found that the average advantage resulting from superiority of numbers was about 16 per cent, a reasonable figure.
An examination of these battles individually and as a group discloses a peculiar psychology and resulting tactics. It has been more often the case that the superior force, feeling its superiority and control of the situation, has contented itself with patrolling the area in dispute. It has thereby exercised actual control of the area by its deterrent effect, or "fleet in being" theory, rather than by leaving the area to seek out its inferior foe. It has in fact appeared that the superior force faced the loss of its control by the miscarriage of an engagement, and therefore was seldom the attacker, having little to gain thereby. On the other hand, the inferior force was compelled to meet desperate situations with desperate remedies, and having everything to gain and only themselves to lose, normally attacked against superior force. By attacking they gained concentration and the victory.
It should be noted that, of the 19 defenders who were victors, 10 were inferior in numbers, apparently winning the battle without either the advantage of attack or numbers. In the majority of these cases, the so-called inferior defenders initiated such a vigorous counter-attack that, while originally the defenders, they were actually the aggressors in the mêlée, and reaped the benefit of the offensive. There is thus borne out the old theory that the only real benefit of the defensive is the counter-attack which transforms it into the offensive. The best example is Salamis, in which 385 Greek decisively defeated 1,207 Persian ships, and broke the power of the Persian invasion.
The value of attack is much more pronounced in naval battle than in the case of entrenched troops, where the fortifications themselves offer additional advantage by protection.
Relative numbers and gun power of opponents are, of course, the weapons of the opposing commanders prior to and during the battle. However, it does appear that it is the combination and disposition of these numbers and gun powers during the approach and battle that determines the final outcome of the struggle, and not the mere fact of their existence.
That the combination and disposition of gun power is advantageously facilitated by attack, and deleteriously affected by the tactical defensive, is the verdict of the ratios calculated above.
Deleted of the effects of fleet tactical concentration, the mathematical effect of pure relative gun power in actual battle is clearly shown in the following single ship actions.
Note the increase of enemy casualties with the increase of own gun power, and correspondingly, the decrease of own casualties.
To further show the mathematical effect of gun power, suppose all of the above ships are rearranged in the order of their casualties, regardless of opponents, and see in what order the weights of broadsides arrange themselves:
The weights of broadsides decrease in exact order as casualties increase, with the single exception of the Java. The curve (Fig. 1) shows opponents numbered correspondingly.
Note the regularity of the curve and that the casualties in the Java-Constitution engagement were higher on both sides than in the average battle of the times but that the curve represented thereby is probably parallel to the basic curve, indicating possibly bad weather or other unusual conditions.
The important consideration is this: how many of these guns can and will be brought to bear at the vital spot and time? In other words, the question is not how many guns are there but what concentration of these guns will be effected and how will it be done.
Nelson at Trafalgar violated the cardinal principle of modern tactics. In order to save the time required to assume the parallel formation he had intended, he deliberately drove in his attack in a double tee formation thus sacrificing his leading ships to enfilade fire on both sides from every enemy battery within gun range. The four leading ships, Victory, Royal Sovereign, Belleisle, and Temeraire sustained 30 per cent of the entire loss in a fleet of 27 sail.
It was a splendid example of opportunism. The aggressive attack and the principle of concentration gained upon the enemy's center and rear were the deciding factors of the great victory. A similar maneuver with present-day long range guns could only result in disaster. An example is the tee formation used against the Russians at Tsushima. Nelson, of course, knew and discounted this factor against the concentration to be gained by the attack. With the short range gunnery of that day, enfilade at long range was not as powerful an agent as it is at long ranges today.
The object, however, is concentration, and the notion must not be entertained that mere blind and unreasoning attack without consideration of concentration will be successful. A large part of the value of the attack lies in the advantage it offers in obtaining tactical concentration.
It is evident, over a period of nearly 3,000 years, during which the speed and size of ships and their gunnery range has constantly increased, that this principle has remained. Evaluated statistically, it seems probable that in 100 fleet engagements the likelihood of the attacking party attaining success over the defender is greater than three to one, and less than four to one.
The tactical offensive joins good concentration to fury of attack.
The average advantage of the attack is 3.578.
The average advantage of superior numbers is 1.169.
The average advantage of attack over superior numbers is:
3.578/1.169 or 3.069 to 1.
Finally, the guiding spirit of the principle is "The Nelson Touch." Numbers are provided by a superior fleet to control the sea, but aggressive attack obtaining concentration wins the victory.