The War in Spain
Frontier Patrol in Force.—By mid-March the international sea patrol of the Spanish coasts was in full effect, with French and British vessels placed along the coasts controlled by the insurgents, and German and Italian forces along those coasts under Leftist rule. Land patrols also were in operation before the close of March. The Dutch Admiral M. H. Van Dulm was appointed general director of nonintervention activities, with Admiral J. S. C. Oliver, also of the Netherlands, in charge of naval patrols and Colonel Christian Lunn of Denmark in charge of the land frontier guards. Inquiries were made to Italy by the British Foreign Office regarding charges that large Italian forces had entered Spain subsequent to March 8, but neither Britain nor the Nonintervention Committee felt inclined to question the Italian denial of these charges. The Italian government renewed its pledges against further transfer of forces to the war area, but Ambassador Dino Grande, the Italian representative on the Nonintervention Committee, refused even to consider the removal of Italian troops then in Spain and expressed his personal view that they would remain “for the duration of the war.”
At the close of March England and France were reported in complete accord on nonintervention policy. They were agreed, first, that no violation of the nonintervention policy had yet been clearly established, and second, that any future violation would be regarded as “of the gravest consequence” and would be met by concerted action. In other words neither Italy nor Germany will be permitted to undertake decisive intervention in Spanish affairs. At the same time events in Spain, including notable Leftist victories on the Guadalajara front and elsewhere, and the widespread reports of disaffection among foreign troops, were regarded in France as increasing the prospects of restricting the war in both space and time. Not only was disaffection reported among the foreign contingents, but also among the Spanish people themselves, plunged as they were into a conflict in which the outcome had become increasingly dependent on aid, support, and control from outside Spain.
Mar Cantabrico Captured.—The Spanish Loyalist freighter Mar Cantabrico, which caused a stir last January when she escaped from New York with a munitions cargo valued at $2,000,000 just before the closing down of the embargo, was captured on March 8 by the Spanish insurgent cruiser Canarias near the mouth of the Gironde River in the Bay of Biscay. The vessel was at first reported as sunk but was later said to have been taken into the rebel port of Ferrol. The capture of the ship was facilitated by the fact that in New York the Insurgents secured documents revealing radio communication codes and other data concerning her voyage to Mexico and thence to northern Spain. While this incident raised no international problem, the naval activities of both factions in Spain are limited by the fact that, since the Insurgents have not been recognized as belligerents, neither side can legitimately use blockade or visit and search against vessels of foreign register. France has given warning that such measures must be left to the international naval cordon.
European Politics
New Locarno Terms.—Having taken sufficient time, Germany and Italy replied in mid-March to the British note of last November requesting suggestions for the framing of a new Locarno agreement, or peace pact for Western Europe. The chief feature of both replies was their insistence that any new pact be limited strictly to Western Europe, and that the League of Nations be left entirely out of account. Germany suggested a non-aggression pact limited to France, Germany, and Belgium, with Italy and Britain as guarantors, and with these latter states responsible also for the decision as to when an act of aggression had been committed by a signatory power. Though evidently bent on excluding Russia from the agreement and securing a free hand on her eastern frontiers, Germany was reported as taking a less intransigent attitude toward the Franco-Soviet treaty and toward France’s commitments to her other eastern allies. The replies at least left the door ajar for further negotiations, although there is
little prospect of a settlement prior to a clearing up of the Spanish situation, and both France and England will be cooler than ever toward any proposal which aims at a revival of the Four Power Pact and exclusion of Russia from a part in European affairs.
Incidentally, in offering to guarantee Belgian neutrality, Germany called for similar guarantees from France and England, the effect of which—so far as such pledges can give security—would be to insure that Belgium would not be used as an avenue for invasion of the Ruhr and the Rhineland. With Switzerland similarly inviolable, this would limit Germany’s western exposure to a well-defended frontier of 280 miles, and would give her greater freedom in what is assumed to be her future plan of undertaking adventures to eastward.
Belgian Neutrality.—In a visit to England in the third week of March King Leopold of Belgium strongly reaffirmed his country’s decision to revert to her pre-war neutrality status and free herself from all obligations of consultation and assistance assumed under the old Locarno agreements. As a result of the conferences in London, it was understood that the King secured British approval of this new arrangement, with the understanding that Belgium would provide armament for her own self-defense up to the limits of her national strength, and would give warning of hostile air expeditions over her territory. Even though thus relieved of obligations, Belgium’s neutral status will differ considerably from that of the Scandinavian neutral states, since she still can rest assured that her safety must always be of vital concern to both England and France.
England and the Empire.—On the eve of the imperial conference to be held at the time of the Coronation, Mr. F. S. Amery, former British Colonial Minister, Presented in the April Foreign Affairs an unusually definite interpretation of present British foreign policy. England’s attitude, as Mr. Amery sees it, may be summed up on the following lines. England is definitely pledged to come to the defense of either France or Belgium, but will seek to remain neutral in any quarrel in Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Republic. The same applies to any difficulty that may arise between Japan and the Soviet Republic over North China and Mongolia. As Mr. Amery puts it, “If providence has placed three of the world’s most restless and potentially aggressive powers in juxtaposition, why should the rest of us wish to divert their attention from each other?” England will also avoid committing herself fully to a union with the Franco-Soviet alliance, since this would lead to the consolidation of a German-Japanese-Italian counter-alliance, and would thus bring about a naval combination with which Britain Would find it highly difficult to deal.
Friendship with Italy is a cardinal point in British policy. Only with her Singapore base completed and the bulk of her fleet in Eastern waters, could Britain maintain the security of her Eastern empire in a conflict with Japan. But such a movement of the fleet would be impossible if Italy were hostile, “with a geographical position astride the waist of the Mediterranean which would enable her splendid air force to participate actively in any naval war.” British freedom of action would be further handicapped by a hostile Germany, whose naval strength, though at present limited to 35 per cent of the British, would require the presence in home waters of at least half of the British fleet.
Thus very dangerously situated in the event of a hostile combination of the East with the West, England looks hopefully to the rest of the empire for assistance in her expensive program of rearmament. This, together with an extension of imperial trade agreements, and possible arrangements for shifts of population to the more sparsely settled parts of the empire, will be the business of the imperial conference. On all these points Mr. Amery is optimistic. A very different point of view, however, is presented by Professor F. R. Scott of McGill University in an article in the same magazine on “Canada’s Future in the British Commonwealth.” As regards imperial defense and dangers of European war, Professor Scott suggests that Canada is likely to take the purely self-centered attitude—“a plague on all your houses”—which has been adopted by the United States. In explanation of this attitude, he points out that Canada’s population is 30 per cent French Canadian, and nearly 52 per cent of non-British origin. In the matter of trade, he thinks Canada will oppose “a vague and somewhat mystical imperial commercial policy.” As regards immigration from England, he notes that in January, 1937, nearly a million Canadians were on the dole, and that of 3,000 English families recently settled on Canadian farms only 45 per cent were still on the farms at the beginning of this year.
Italian-Yugoslav Record.—As an outcome of the March visit of Foreign Minister Ciano to Belgrad, a politico- economic agreement was signed by Italy and Yugoslavia which guaranteed mutual respect for frontiers and for the status quo in the Adriatic during the next five years. This was accompanied by pledges for closer trade and economic relations and guarantees against permitting the territory of either nation to be used for propaganda or other subversive activities against the other. On the face of it little evil could be seen in this treaty between the two dictatorial governments providing for an “era of friendship and loyal co-operation,” though it was generally regarded as an entering wedge to weaken the solidarity of the Little Entente. At a subsequent meeting of the Entente this solidity was reaffirmed, but it was reported that Yugoslavia came in for sharp criticism for what was described as a falling away from her old allies.
United States and Latin America
Progress of Neutrality Act.—During March the Pitman neutrality resolution passed in the Senate by a vote of 63 to 6, and the McReynolds measure in the same field passed in the House by a vote of 374 to 12. The latter measure was adopted only after the addition of an amendment which limited its application to two years. The two neutrality bills were similar in general content, except that the House resolution gave the President a wider discretion in putting into effect the restriction of general trade with belligerents to a “cash and carry” basis. By its terms this restriction would be applied not necessarily at the outbreak of war, but only when the President deemed it necessary to preserve American peace and neutrality. The President would have similar discretion in applying the clause prohibiting American nationals from travel on vessels belonging to belligerent countries. There was a decided trend of congressional opinion in favor of broader powers for the President, and it therefore appeared probable that the final measure, following committee conferences, would approximate closely the provisions of the bill approved in the House.
The more radical advocates of peace by isolation, however, would like not only to make trade restriction mandatory, but to carry the non-intercourse policy much further. This was evidenced by a resolution, introduced in the Senate by Senator Gerald P. Nye and in the House by Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr., which would prohibit munitions exports in peace as well as in war, except to American states attacked by a non-American enemy. Still another resolution, introduced by Senator Schwellenbach of Washington, would forbid all export of scrap iron except under license from the President. Carried to its logical conclusion—for all kinds of exports can be hoarded for war-time use—such a policy might end by the closing up of American frontiers.
Move to Hasten Free Philippines.— In the course of his visit to this country to arrange for a trade and economic conference, President Manuel Quezon of the Philippine Republic has made it clear that he will bend every effort toward securing complete independence for the Philippines prior to the treaty date of 1945. Under the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, trade between the Islands and the United States has already suffered, and Philippine officials believe that by bargaining on terms of complete equality they could secure more favorable trade terms than are granted in the present arrangement. The gradual closing of the American market to Philippine products, as provided in the present act, will mean necessarily that the Philippines must cease purchasing American goods, and the loss thereby is indicated by the fact that in the period 1933-35 about 64 per cent of the total imports into the Islands came from this country.
Vitally connected with the independence of the Philippines is the question of defense, especially if no effective arrangement for their neutralization is made with other powers. On this score President Quezon professes to see no great danger. The American State Department is understood to have organized a committee of experts to consider this and other problems involved in a shortening of the transition period of divided sovereignty.
Far East
Soft Words for China.—During March the more cautious trend of Japanese Policy toward China was very evident in official pronouncements. “China,” declared Foreign Minister Sato in his first speech in the Diet,” must be treated on an equal footing.” “Japan,” he added, “has no territorial ambitions in China.” And to the British he gave assurance that their rights and interests in Central and South China would be treated with respect, likewise a Tokyo trade mission, returning after unproductive efforts to secure economic co-operation in China, decided to advise that for the present Japan should avoid conflict with British interests, limit economic penetration to North China, and work along with the British in stabilization of Chinese currency.
This new orientation of Japanese policy was highly approved in the press, and for the time being civilian and business influences appeared to have gained ascendancy over the more aggressive army leaders. In view of the changed attitude, it came as a surprise when at the end of March General Hayasha’s Cabinet decided to dissolve the Lower Chamber and call for new elections on April 30. This, it was said, was intended to discipline and put new life” into Japanese political Parties, but it would seem not unlikely that in the new Chamber the liberal element will be stronger than before. In China, relations with Japan were regarded as sufficiently eased up so that Marshal Chiang Kai-shek could depart early in March for a trip to the distant famine and communist troubled provinces of the Upper Yangtze Valley.
In North China Japan is actively consolidating her position. A recent number of the Far Eastern Survey indicates the progress made toward an aircraft network linking up Manchukuo and the five North China provinces. Over $5,000,000 has been invested in a Japanese controlled system which at present operates lines from Tientsin as a center to Dairen and Chinchow in Manchukuo, and through Peiping to Changpei in Chahar province and to Jehol. In 1936 Japanese exports to China showed only a slight increase, from 15.1 per cent to 16.26 per cent of China’s total imports, but this figure does not take into account the vast quantity of Japanese goods that have been smuggled into and through the northern provinces. In the same year American imports to China increased from 18.92 to 19.64 per cent, and German imports rose from 11 to nearly 16 per cent.
Japan Rejects Naval Curbs.—At the close of March Japan definitely informed Great Britain that she would make no pledges to limit battleship gun calibers to 14 inches or to observe a 35,000-ton limit on the size of battleships. This was justified on the broad grounds that qualitative as well as quantitative restrictions were contrary to Japan’s general policy of ending treaty limitations. In the Japanese press it was pointed out that Japan would gain nothing by accepting a tonnage limit to which the United States was already committed by the present size of the Panama Canal.