Seamanship, according to the dictionary, is the skill of a good seaman. It is a common experience of mariners to be more or less familiar with the Rules of the Road for many years without discovering that there is a working definition of good seamanship in Art. 29, International and Inland Rules. The definition is simply this: any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen. It is one of those things which the mariner may not neglect with impunity, along with the carrying of proper lights and maintaining a sufficient lookout. The rule says in effect that nothing in the rules shall exonerate any vessel or the owner or master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect of good seamanship.
To the careful student of the Rules of the Road it is apparent that the lawmakers who formulated the International Rules—and they included the leading professional seamen of their day—were at great pains to make them definite, specific, and comprehensive. Every possible situation was considered, and what was m the opinion of the delegates the most effective course of action to prevent collision in each case was prescribed. Thus certain crossing, overtaken, and other vessels were designated as having the right of way, and vessels encountering them were directed to take all the action necessary to avoid them, with the understanding that such action should be based on the assurance that the privileged vessel would maintain course and speed. Two vessels meeting end on were both specifically directed to avoid collision by turning to the right. Vessels in fog were required to go at moderate speed, to sound fog signals regularly, and to stop their engines on hearing fog signals forward of the beam. It follows that obedience to these rules, which represent the lawmakers’ ideas of what is the proper procedure under given circumstances, constitutes the first test of good seamanship; and conversely, disregard of the rules is always prima-facie evidence of bad seamanship. The ordinary rules, including the rule of privilege and burden, might be modified or even temporarily abrogated, when special circumstances made this necessary, as when a situation was in extremis, or when physical conditions apparent to both vessels prevented compliance, or when more than two vessels were present, or when a situation arose not specifically covered by the rules, or when action contrary to the rules was proposed by signal by one vessel and accepted by the other. In a sense, the ordinary rules may be said to apply where the lawmakers intended the mariner to have his action laid out for him with little or no discretion in the manner of performance, while the rule of special circumstances represents par excellence the cases where, as long as he avoids collision, he is given almost complete discretion in the method used.
If the rule of special circumstances is the first modification of the general rules, the rule of good seamanship is the second. For just as it was recognized in the rules that special circumstances might arise in which a departure would be desirable and necessary to avoid immediate danger, so it was recognized that whether the mariner was operating under a specific rule or under the rule of special circumstances it was proper to put upon him in all cases the obligation of good seamanship, i.e., the obligation to act in accordance with the recognized practice of skilled seamen. This obligation might refer to his conduct leading up to, and perhaps even bringing about, the actual collision situation, or to his conduct in avoiding a collision thrust upon him by the fault of the other vessel, or to his conduct in maneuvering to lessen or to aggravate the damage of a collision after it had become inevitable.
A recent collision which occurred between two high-powered ferries in the channel approaching Puget Sound Navy Yard offers a good illustration of both bad and excellent seamanship in the sense contemplated by the rule. The Chippewa on a course westward through Rich’s Passage was heading to cut inside the turning buoy at Orchard Rocks, while the larger, streamlined ferry Kalakala, having rounded Glover Point, was steering an approximate mid-channel course between Orchard Rocks Buoy and Middle Point, with Orchard Point light a little on her starboard bow. The courses of the two vessels were perhaps three points less than opposite, though the fact that they were following the windings of the channel probably made them technically meeting, rather than crossing, vessels. The Chippewa, in charge of her first officer, elected to hold on across the bow of the Kalakala, and signified her intention by a 2-blast signal. This maneuver was, of course, wrong, whether she regarded herself as a burdened crossing vessel or as a meeting vessel, and was made even less excusable by the fact that she was passing between the buoy and the rocks, and could have started the turn before getting past the buoy into the channel. The justification urged by the officer on watch was that he was afraid to try to veer toward the other vessel because to do so he would be turning against a strong ebb tide. With a handy, full-powered vessel and only a moderate tide, this fear was probably groundless, but even if it were not, putting his vessel in such a situation by cutting inside a buoy would still lay him open to a charge of faulty seamanship. The 2-blast signal was misunderstood by the Kalakala, also in charge of her first officer, as a 1-blast signal, which she would expect, either as a privileged crossing vessel or as a meeting vessel, to indicate a port to port passing. As the two ferries were approaching each other at a combined speed of more than 30 knots, matters developed very rapidly. As soon as the Chippewa heard the one blast of the Kalakala she blew the danger signal and reversed full speed; the Kalakala followed suit, and a few seconds before the collision, both skippers arrived on their respective bridges.
The writer, attending the official investigation, was impressed with the steps taken almost instantly by the two seasoned veterans of the ferry line, both arriving on the scene in the jaws of a collision which by that time was inevitable. Their testimony agreed on one point: that the two vessels, both backing to port and so preserving the angle of attack, would have struck at an angle of 30 to 40 degrees at a speed of not less than 10 knots, with the result that the Kalakala would have cut the Chippewa in two. However, the skipper of the Chippewa ordered hard right and half speed ahead, and the skipper of the Kalakala hard left and half ahead, with the fortunate result that at the moment of impact, when both engines were again reversed, the vessels were crossing at a finer angle, and the high bow of the Kalakala merely raked the house of the Chippewa for a few feet, with the consequent destruction of 3 or 4 automobiles, but no injuries to passengers or hull. This was clearly an instance on the part of both captains of the best practice of seamen under difficult circumstances— a case where seasoned and promptly applied judgment prevented a major casualty.
One of the most obvious requirements of good seamanship in a vessel under way is the maintenance of a proper lookout. In a very early case, which for reasons difficult to determine was carried up to the United States Supreme Court, a schooner was lying at anchor in a proper place one- half mile off the New Jersey shore, on a clear, moonlit night, with an efficient anchor light and the mate on deck as lookout; and another schooner, under full sail, rammed her and cut right through her at the main chains, so that she sank within 15 minutes. The district court, Circuit Court of Appeals, and finally the Supreme Court, were unanimous in finding the colliding vessel at fault for her failure to discover the anchored vessel in time to avoid her. The matter of a proper lookout may perhaps be considered the first rule of good seamanship inasmuch as it is a necessary prerequisite to the observance of all the steering and sailing rules. As said by the Supreme Court:
The duty of the lookout is of the highest importance. Upon nothing else does the safety of those concerned so much depend. A moment’s negligence on his part may involve the loss of his vessel with all the property and the lives of all on board. The same consequence may ensue to the vessel with which his shall collide. In the performance of this duty the law requires indefatigable care and sleepless vigilance … It is the duty of all courts charged with the administration of this branch of our jurisprudence to give it the fullest effect whenever the circumstances are such as to call for its application. Every doubt as to the performance of the duty, and the effect of non-performance, should be resolved against the vessel sought to be inculpated until she vindicates herself by testimony to the contrary.
The case of the Commander-in-Chief also brings out another rule of good seamanship, often recognized by our courts, which is that there is a definite presumption in favor of a vessel moored or at anchor, as against the vessel which collides with her; and quite properly, of course, because of the relative helplessness of the fixed vessel to avoid collision. In foggy weather, as previously pointed out, a vessel striking another at anchor is practically self-convicted of excessive speed, since she has conclusively demonstrated her inability to stop within the distance of visibility. In clear weather, with lights on the anchored vessel at night, the other vessel is equally self-convicted of faulty seamanship, either through improper lookout or bad maneuvering. As frequently held in collision cases:
A moving vessel is prima facie in fault for a collision with one which is moored. Where a collision occurs between a vessel moored to the wharf and another steamer which is under way and susceptible of control and management, the presumptions sustained are in favor of the moored vessel, and against the one under way.
So strong is this presumption of fault against the moving vessel that rare indeed is the case where all the liability is put upon the vessel moored or at anchor. Such an exception was the case of the Jumping Jack and the Pinta, two fishing vessels which collided in the Promised Land Channel near New York, under the following circumstances. The Jumping Jack, a sea skiff 32 feet long, with a dark-varnished stern, was at anchor in the middle of the channel and her electric riding light had gone out. The moon had set, it was two hours before daylight, and the Pinta, a 60-foot oyster schooner, was proceeding down the channel at 6 knots, with her captain at the wheel, a seaman on lookout in the bow, and a second seaman outside the wheelhouse to relay signals from the lookout to the captain because of a noisy Diesel engine, when the Jumping Jack was sighted almost under foot. The Pinta reversed full speed, and put her rudder hard over, but was unable to avoid sinking the Jumping Jack. Flagrant as was the fault of the latter in obstructing a narrow channel without lights, the district court divided the damages, but the Circuit Court, on appeal, exonerated the Pinta, finding that she infringed none of the rules and took all reasonable precaution to avoid the collision.
In another case a barge moored to the end of a New York pier was damaged by a Cunard liner attempting to make a landing at an adjacent pier. An hour before the steamship’s arrival, the barge was given notice to move out of her dangerous position while the liner landed, and was offered the free services of a tug to aid her in moving out of the way and back again. The court held that she refused to move at her peril and dismissed her libel against the steamship.
These cases are almost unique, however, and ordinarily the best that can be hoped for by the vessel unfortunate enough to strike an anchored or moored vessel in clear weather is an equal division of damages, on one of four grounds: (1) improper position of the anchored vessel; (2) no lights, or improper lights, on the anchored vessel at night; (3) failure of the anchored vessel to maintain anchor watch where circumstances required; (4) failure of the anchored vessel to take proper steps to avoid the collision.
(1) Improper position of anchored vessel.— In a very early case of some interest, the Supreme Court emphasized the obligation of a moving vessel to keep clear of an anchored vessel regardless of whether or not the latter lay in a proper anchorage. It seems that on August 1, 1870, the salvage tug Clara Clarita saw a fire break out on a ferryboat moored on the Jersey side of New York Harbor and promptly set out to her rescue. After vainly trying to extinguish the flames the tug was engaged by the ferryboat’s master to tow the ferry clear of the wharf to prevent the spread of the fire, which she undertook to do with a Manila towline. Shortly after getting under way the flames spread to the towline, the ferry went adrift, and struck the schooner Clara which lay at anchor in her path, injuring her by the collision and setting her on fire. The tug extinguished the flames on the schooner and sought to defend the subsequent libel by arguing that the schooner, which had a proper anchor light and a man on deck, was anchored in a wrongful place. While the schooner was able to satisfy the courts that she was not obstructing the channel and was exonerated, the Supreme Court, agreeing with the lower courts, held that
Undoubtedly, if a vessel anchors in an improper place, she must take the consequences of her own improper act; but whether she be in an improper place or not, and whether properly or improperly anchored, the other vessel must avoid her if it be reasonably practicable and consistent with her own safety.
In another early case, a 28-ton oyster schooner was improperly anchored in a harbor channel some 500 yards from a wharf and directly in the path of a side- wheel steamer approaching to make her regular landing, anchorage in this locality being forbidden by a law of the state of Maryland. The evidence showed the schooner’s anchor light was burning. The steamer was proceeding at about 7 knots, and did not discover the schooner until too late, though she attempted to avoid collision by reversing. The damage was slight, but the court held the side-wheeler at fault for excessive speed in a crowded harbor, declaring that:
Where a steamer collides with a vessel unlawfully anchored in an improper and dangerous place, while negligently maintaining too high a rate of speed, the damages will be equally divided.
In a more recent case a launch moored outboard of two other launches was struck by a passenger ship attempting to land at the city dock in the harbor of Juneau, Alaska. It was shown that the launch projected at least half her width outside a line drawn from the corner of the pier to a dolphin against which the stern of incoming steamers was expected to swing, but nevertheless the court found the steamship fully liable for the damage, holding that the launch’s position was not legally improper, and that the steamer must be treated as a moving vessel colliding with a vessel at anchor and without fault.
In the case of the Westernland, that steamer was in collision with a schooner in New York Harbor which was anchored in an improper place too close to the wharf where the steamer had been lying. The steamer notified the schooner to move, but did not offer to provide a tug or to assist her. The schooner refused, and instead of calling on the harbor master to enforce the regulations and compel the schooner to move, the steamer attempted to back out of her slip in a strong ebb tide, and was carried against the schooner. Both vessels were held at fault, the schooner for being in an improper place and refusing to move, and the steamer for Proceeding into obvious danger, a violation of good seamanship.
(2) No lights, or improper lights, on an anchored vessel at night.—A vessel at anchor at night without lights is prima facie at fault; nevertheless, there have been some decisions inculpating the moving vessel with the anchored vessel, the courts finding that even an unlighted vessel would have been discovered by a vigilant lookout in time to avoid her. If a steamer maintaining a proper lookout and otherwise navigating properly reverses as soon as she picks up the unlighted vessel she would not be at fault, and in most cases the unlighted vessel at anchor has been held solely liable for the collision. Where the anchored vessel has lights, but they do not conform to the specific requirements for vessels of her class, she will share the liability for a collision unless it can be proved the faulty lights could not have misled the approaching vessel or have been a contributing factor. Reference has been made to several such cases in another article. In one case, a steamship at anchor at New Orleans, following a fire, with makeshift oil lanterns and electric cargo cluster lights, was struck by an oil tanker coming down the river, and both were at fault; and in another case of mutual liability, a 75-foot dredge wrongfully exhibiting two white lights at anchor was mistaken by a tug with tow for a tug being overtaken.
(3) Failure of anchored vessel to maintain an anchor watch where circumstances required.—As said by the court in a very old case:
A small vessel at anchor in a safe harbor in ordinary weather is not required by any rule or custom of navigation to set an anchor watch
and in the case of the Clara Clarita, already cited, the Supreme Court, in absolving the anchored schooner from fault, made the comment that the statute does not require a watch on a vessel at anchor. A vessel in the naval service is required by regulations to have an anchor watch, and in many harbors such a watch is specified for all vessels at anchor by harbor ordinance, which has the full force of law. However, despite the absence of any specific provision in the International, Inland, or Pilot Rules, the courts have found that an anchor watch is sometimes required under the rule of good seamanship. Thus it was held in the Supreme Court that a schooner at anchor inside the Delaware breakwater during a storm, when numerous vessels were seeking shelter, was in fault for not having a watch on deck, and when sunk by another vessel which was properly navigated and on her way to anchor could not recover damages. Again, in a Massachusetts case it was held that when a vessel is at anchor in a place where other vessels are frequently passing, and where navigation is difficult and dangerous because of shoals and a channel only miles wide, special care and vigilance are required, including not only a watch on deck but someone on lookout to warn off an approaching vessel. In foggy weather, there is, of course, a special reason for requiring an anchor watch on a vessel in a busy harbor; but even in clear weather, if the night is dark and the anchored vessel is in the way of traffic, good seamanship demands it. As said by the court when a schooner barge at anchor in the middle of the Elizabeth River below Norfolk, with an anchor light but no anchor watch, was run down and sunk by a steamship bound down the river,
Anchored where she was on such a night, she was bound to take every precaution to warn approaching vessels of her presence. A vigilant watch on her deck might by shouting and swinging a lantern have attracted the attention of those on the steamboat to her presence in the locality where she lay at anchor in time to have enabled the steamship to have avoided her. . . . Both vessels being found in fault the damages will be apportioned.
Finally, inasmuch as a vessel is liable for any damage she may do to another vessel by dragging, whenever weather, current conditions, or poor holding ground are such as to indicate that possibility, a competent anchor watch becomes essential to prevent it.
(4) Failure of anchored vessel to take proper steps to avoid the collision.—While a vessel at anchor is relatively unable to maneuver, there are two acts which may be required of her under certain circumstances, and omission of either of them may involve her in fault for a collision under the rule of good seamanship. In the first place she must not anchor too close to another vessel, the legal presumption being that the vessel anchored first has a right to ample swinging room, upon which the later arrival must not infringe. She must anchor securely, that is with sufficient chain out, and if heavy weather or a strong current makes it necessary, she must drop a second anchor to prevent dragging into another vessel. Failure to do this has resulted in numerous decisions holding the dragging vessel at fault for collision. In one such case, the steamship Bragdo, at anchor off Staten Island in a December gale with 45 fathoms out, dragged across the chain of the steamship British Isles and set her adrift. In finding the Bragdo at fault, despite the fact that the gale reached the hurricane strength of 88 miles an hour, the Circuit Court of Appeals cited the rule from Knight’s Seamanship, recommending a length of cable equal to 7 times the depth of water for ordinary circumstances with more if weather conditions cause the vessel to put excessive strain on the chain. This is a particularly interesting decision in view of the widespread modern practice of anchoring with only 3 or 4 times the depth in scope of chain.
Another step sometimes required of an anchored vessel to avoid collision is to move out of the way of the vessel threatening her by paying out her chain. While ordinarily this is a futile maneuver and in most collisions the courts have recognized that the need for veering chain becomes apparent too late for the anchored vessel to avert the collision by doing it, two old cases will serve to illustrate its occasional requirement. In one instance a tug and helper were going up the Hudson River at night in a flood tide, with a tow 1,600 feet in length consisting of 9 tiers of canal boats, when a steamship was discovered half a mile ahead and anchored somewhat outside the anchorage prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. The tug and her helper ported somewhat, but not promptly enough to avoid collision between the last tier in the tow and the steamship, and one of the canal boats was sunk. The anchor watch on the steamship saw the flotilla approaching in ample time so that if he had given her chain the tide would have carried his vessel back and out of danger. He failed to do this, and on that point, and not because she was technically in an unlawful anchorage, the Circuit Court of Appeals found the steamship liable for half the damages.
In another somewhat different case of Mutual fault, which is of particular interest because of the emphasis laid by the court on good seamanship in its comments to both parties, the 3-masted steamer Cochico, lying at anchor near the outer entrance to Hampton Roads in a strong ebb tide, was in the act of heaving up her anchor, preparatory to getting under way. The day was fair, and a large fleet of perhaps 150 vessels, which had put in for shelter the day before and anchored from 1 to 7 miles above the Cochico, was proceeding to sea en masse, impelled by a light following breeze and a 1 or 2 knot tide. The Cochico was in the middle of a 2-mile channel, and the fleet was so numerous that the colliding vessel, the Kelsey, did not see her until within 250 yards, when an intervening vessel hauled out of line. The Kelsey changed course about a point, enough barely to clear the Cochico, but the latter sheered slightly and the Kelsey, striking her at a fine angle, knocked off her bowsprit and did some other damage. Just before the impact, the master of the Kelsey hailed the Cochico to starboard her helm and pay out chain, but she did neither. In finding both vessels liable, the Kelsey for not avoiding the Cochico which on evidence she might easily have done by prompt and effective measures, and the Cochico for her entire lack of prudence, attention, and assistance in avoiding danger, while voluntarily remaining as an obstruction in the midst of a fleet of moving vessels, Judge Brown made the following significant observations:
To the Kelsey: Such a sheer should have been expected: hence her master was at fault for not allowing a sufficient margin of safety, amid the contingencies of navigation, and not taking in time the decisive measures at his easy command. As I must find that the master had sufficient time and space to keep out of the way had he acted with the promptness and decision that reasonable prudence demanded, and as there was no other vessel that prevented his doing so, the Kelsey must be found in fault.
To the Cochico: Ordinarily a vessel anchored in a proper place in the daytime and in fair weather, is not expected, or legally required, to be on the watch, and to stand prepared to take measures to avoid vessels under way, and having control of their motions. But under exceptional circumstances, where the vessel under way is subject to special difficulties or embarrassments in her navigation, some care and precautions on the part of the vessel at anchor may become obviously prudent and necessary that would not otherwise be obligatory. Such I think is plainly this case.
The same line of reasoning which presumes it bad seamanship to hit a vessel that is moored or at anchor, applies when a collision occurs between a vessel with way upon her and one which is lying dead in the water. Thus, when a steamship which had stopped off the quarantine station on the Delaware River for examination, but was not at anchor, was approached so closely by a passing tug that the two heavy scows in her tow both struck and injured the steamship, the court held the tug solely liable for the damage. As said in another case,
The obligation on the part of free vessels to avoid risk of collision with those incumbered, or at rest, is imperative, and one that the admiralty courts must enforce, having regard to the perils of navigation and the importance of the rule of the road in respect thereto.
One of the important applications of the rule of good seamanship as interpreted by the courts is in the restriction of speed. While moderate speed in foggy weather is a very definite requirement of the rules, they are silent on the subject of speed in clear weather. It is true that in most canals and in many rivers and harbors a specific speed limit is fixed by local statute or ordinance, and such a regulation has unquestionably the force of law. When a speed regulation exists, it invariably means speed over the ground and allowance must therefore be made when the rate is accelerated by a favorable current. However, an examination of the cases shows numerous decisions holding vessels at fault for excessive speed in inland waters in the absence of any specific speed limit, these speeds ranging all the way from 4 to 17 knots. It may be stated as a general rule that any speed in a harbor or narrow channel is excessive (1) if it causes damage to other property by the vessel’s swell, or (2) if it renders the vessel herself unmanageable in maneuvering to avoid collision.
(1) Damage caused by vessel’s swell.—In one of the earliest cases decided on this point, the Circuit Court of New York declined to find a steamer at fault for damage to a number of canal boats in a tow, caused by the steamer’s swells when she passed the tow on the Hudson River. The court held that, there being at that time no rule of law prescribing the speed a boat might use or the swell it might make or how near it might pass to another, any reasonable speed was justifiable, and 17 knots, the steamer’s regular speed, was proper. But in a case a few years later, court interpretation changed this rule considerably, and for nearly 50 years now the opposite view has prevailed, namely, that a large steamer which proceeds at such speed as to create a swell causing injury to another vessel of a kind properly in the waters which she is navigating, and which is properly handled, is liable for such injury, even if that speed is only 5 or 6 miles an hour. In the case referred to, the offending steamer, which passed within a few feet of a scow loading at an icehouse, with her engines on dead slow ahead, was held for failure to stop her wheel entirely. In another case two or three years later an ocean liner passed a river tug with a scow in tow on each side in upper New York Bay, and her swells caused the tug seriously to damage one of the scows. She passed the tow within half a mile at a speed of about 11 knots; but notwithstanding the steamship’s argument that the tug contributed to the damage by failure to present her stern to the swell of the overtaking vessel the latter was found fully liable. (Incidentally, while a meeting vessel is under obligation to head into a swell with her tow if it will lessen damage, the courts have steadfastly refused to require an overtaken vessel, which is privileged, thus to alter her course.) The opinion of the court included the following excellent statement of the rule, which still holds:
Such waters are not to be appropriated to the exclusive use of any one class of vessels. We do not mean to hold that ocean steamers are to accommodate their movements to craft unfit to navigate the bay, either from inherent weakness, or overloading, or improper handling, or which are carelessly navigated. But of none of these is there any proof here, and in the absence of such proof we do hold that craft such as the libelant’s nave the right to navigate there without anticipation of any abnormal dangerous condition, produced solely by the wish of the owners of exceptionally large craft to run them at such a rate of speed as will insure the quickest passage. To hold otherwise would be virtually to exclude smaller vessels, engaged in a legitimate commerce, from navigating the same waters.
Even in lower New York Bay, substantially the same rule has been applied. As said by the Circuit Court of Appeals when a Cunard liner, coming in at night, caused a swell which damaged two scows in a tow by making one scow override the other:
The rule that large vessels navigating New York Bay must so regulate their speed as not to injure by their swells small craft, which are seaworthy and properly loaded and navigated, is also applicable to the lower bay, though not with the same strictness. Owing to its less crowded condition and nearer proximity to the sea, incoming steamers may there proceed at greater speed, provided the channel is free, but not when it is full of boats, at night, or in a fog.
In this case the tug was found contributorily negligent in having towlines only 6 feet in length between the scows, and only half damages were allowed.
In a more recent case a barge loading on the St. Lawrence River just west of Quebec was injured by pounding on the bottom when she was struck by a heavy swell from the Cunard steamer Andania, which passed her at a speed over the ground of about 17 knots, though there is a legal speed limit in that part of the river of 9 knots. Ascertaining the extent of the damage after the barge had completed a voyage to New York, the owner sued the Cunard Line in personam, and was met with the interesting defense that the steamship was in charge of a compulsory pilot, and that the company through its agent, the master, was therefore not liable. However, the court held that the master, who was also on the bridge, was negligent in not exercising his superior authority and ordering the pilot to slow down in conformity with the government speed regulation.
As a matter of practical seamanship it is well to remember that to reduce the swell of a speeding steamship it is necessary to slow down a considerable distance before reaching the vessel it is intended to protect. In a New York case where the passing steamer in a narrow channel did not slow sufficiently or in time, it is reported that the tow was actually broken up by the swell which piled up ahead before the steamer had come abeam.
Commanding officers of naval vessels who find themselves under the necessity of making high-speed trial or post-repair runs in more or less confined waters will be interested in cases where the following defenses have not been accepted by the courts: (1) that a vessel’s waves did not render navigation more perilous than would a high wind; (2) that a vessel was navigating at a speed customary for ships of her class; (3) that other vessels passed on that or other similar occasions were not injured; (4) that the vessel injured did not sound a warning signal to the other vessel to slow down; (5) that the vessel injured might have saved herself by taking unusual precautions.
(2) Speed excessive under particular conditions.—It has long been held by the Supreme Court that a steam vessel in a crowded harbor or river should not be operated at a higher speed than will keep her under perfect control. This is, of course, merely a rule of common sense. In a collision between two early steamships off the Battery, with numerous other vessels in the immediate vicinity either under way or at anchor, a speed of 6 knots was held excessive; and in another collision the next year between a steamship and a schooner, near the same spot under like conditions, 7 knots was held excessive. In the latter case, the schooner was standing over to the Jersey shore to anchor and await a fair tide up the East River; and the old steamship City of Paris, bound out at 7 or 8 knots, headed to pass through a 300-foot opening between a brig and a sailing ship, and did not see the schooner until the latter passed at right angles under the stern of the brig. The steamship immediately reversed, but although the schooner luffed slightly in a futile effort to escape, she was almost cut in two by the impact and sank so quickly as to imperil the lives of all her crew. In upholding both lower courts in their condemnation of the steamship, the Supreme Court said:
She ought not to have entered upon the narrow track between the ship and the brig without being very careful first to see that her passage would involve no danger to any approaching vessel in its transit. The results proved that the speed of the steamer was higher than was consistent with the safety of other vessels in so crowded a thoroughfare and hence higher than she was warranted to assume.
The high court dismissed the argument that the schooner contributed to the disaster by luffing, in the following brief but pointed comment:
The acts complained of were done in the excitement of the moment and in extremis. Whether they were wise it is not material to inquire. If unwise they were errors and not faults. In such cases the law in its wisdom gives absolution.
Similarly, in numerous other decisions vessels in collision have been held liable for excessive speed where it was found that they approached other vessels in restricted waters at speeds which the results showed were imprudent. In a collision between two steamships on the Patapsco River, near Baltimore, on a clear day, one of them, the A cilia, attempted to blow 2 blasts for a starboard to starboard meeting, and the whistle cord stuck, causing a single whistle of 5 or 6 minutes duration. The other vessel, the Crathorne, which was making about 6 knots, tried to pass port to port; the Acilia executed left rudder, both vessels reversed, and they came together with some $50,000 damage to the Crathorne. The Acilia was found solely liable for the damage for going at her ordinary cruising speed of 10 knots, the Circuit Court of Appeals remarking that
Full speed in these dredged channels when about to pass other vessels is undeniably a fault which increases every risk of navigation.
It is a well-known fact that vessels in shallow water have a tendency to sheer and become unmanageable; and that if they attempt to pass too closely they are likely to be brought into collision by suction. Hence, vessels colliding from either of these causes are often convicted of excessive speed. A typical case occurred at Horseshoe Bend on the Delaware River between the steamship Saratoga, going down light, and the steamship Taunton coming up from sea. It was a clear day; the vessels saw each other 2 miles apart, signaled a port to port meeting when a mile apart, and were about to clear each other in the usual manner, when the Saratoga touched a mud bank at the side of the channel, the existence of which was well known and marked, and sheered into the other vessel before she could be stopped. On a showing that the Taunton was Properly navigated on her own side of the channel, but that the Saratoga's speed of not less than 8 knots caused her to smell the bottom” as she rounded the buoy, the latter was found solely liable for the collision.
In another case a steamship 314 feet long anchored for the night in Brewerton channel below Baltimore, at a point where the channel is 600 feet wide, so that when she swung around her stern was about 100 feet from one side and her anchor chain extended toward the other. Another steamship, heavily loaded with iron, coming up from sea, attempted to pass under her stern at 8 knots, and as she reached the shallow edge of the channel, took an uncontrollable sheer toward the anchored vessel. While the anchored steamship was held liable for unnecessarily obstructing a navigable channel, in violation of the Act of March 3, 1899, the colliding vessel was held equally at fault or a speed that prevented her overcoming the effects of a sheer which might reasonably have been expected.
The question of good seamanship is also involved when vessels make their way at too great speed along a city water front and fail to keep a safe distance off the Pierheads. Many harbors have local regulations prohibiting such movements within a specific distance of the piers, and in New York a statute requires vessels navigating the East River to go up and down in midchannel. But regardless of such local rules, the courts have again and again held vessels at fault which collided with vessels properly emerging from their slips. As explained in an earlier article, vessels maneuvering around piers are under the rule of special circumstances, and the greatest caution must be observed when there is a possibility of encountering them. This doctrine was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court as long ago as 1873, when a case was carried up involving a collision between a side-wheel excursion steamer hugging the Brooklyn piers to avoid a tug with tow, at a speed of 8 knots, and a ferry which emerged from her slip, saw the steamer bearing down from port, and reversed in a frantic, though perhaps mistaken, attempt to escape disaster. The decision of the Supreme Court, condemning the excursion vessel and exonerating the ferry, included much that would apply in greater or less degree to any busy harbor:
In the East River, vessels cannot with safety run across the mouths of ferry slips in going to or from their wharves, but they should occupy as near as possible the middle of the river. ... If the middle of the river be previously occupied and the ship is obliged to go nearer to shore in order to avoid other vessels pursuing the same track she must run at such a slow rate of speed as to be easily stopped, so as not to endanger boats pursuing their regular and accustomed occupation.
And in clearing the ferry on the charge of failure to hold her course and speed, the court reiterated the opinion expressed 3 years earlier:
In a moment of sudden danger, caused by the misconduct of the colliding vessel, the law will not hold the pilot of the injured vessel, acting in good faith, guilty of a fault, if it should turn out after the event that he chose the wrong means to avoid the collision, unless his seamanship was clearly unskillful.
In concluding this point it may perhaps be unnecessary to point out that it is no defense to a collision a few feet off the piers to argue that the speed was less than the statutory limit. As said by the court in finding a side-wheel steamer solely liable for a collision while navigating within a ship length of the piers at 9 knots:
A statute imposing a penalty for running along the piers of the East River at a speed exceeding 10 knots does not necessarily render a less rate of speed prudent. The speed must be regulated by the dangers attending the navigation under the particular circumstances of the case.
Among other decisions inculpating vessels for excessive speed under the rule of good seamanship may be mentioned the case of a steamer, about to meet a sailing vessel beating through a 300-foot channel in the Penobscot River, which failed to anticipate the sailing vessel’s tack and held to a speed of 8 knots; the case of a steam yacht which approached the blind bend at Horn’s Hook, near New York, at 15 knots and was in collision with a tow coming down the river; the case of a steamship which approached a confusion of lights, part of them improper, which turned out to be a single tow of 2 tugs and 7 barges, off Governor’s Island, and in trying to go through them at more than 4 knots, sank two of them; the case of a government lighthouse tender coming down the East River at night which approached at 10 knots a group of 3 vessels crossing the river both ways ahead of her; and the case of a Puget Sound steamer which entered Port Townsend Harbor at full speed, and in approaching her wharf, failed to distinguish the flickering lantern of an anchored bark, with its background of bright city lights, until collision was inevitable.
In the discussion of special circumstances it was pointed out that it sometimes happens that one of two vessels in an approaching situation, given the right of way by the rules, must surrender this right of way, with its attendant obligation to maintain course and speed, because of adverse physical conditions, as, for example, a steamer otherwise privileged crossing a tug coming down a current with a tow. The rule of good seamanship sometimes goes a step farther, and creates a right of way in one of two vessels where neither would ordinarily be privileged. Thus, in a narrow channel with a swift current in one direction, it has been held in several cases that when vessels meet, the one moving with the current is the favored vessel. This rule was applied in a collision between a tug and tow on a long hawser coming down the Hudson River and rounding the sharp bend at West Point, where the current sweeps rapidly toward the opposite bank, and a similar tug and tow coming up the river, in favor of the former and against the latter. It was applied when two steamships met in the Delaware River, in the narrow channel above Horseshoe Buoy, when one of them, running light and stemming the tide, tried to cross the bow of the other, deeply laden, and coming with the tide. The former was held solely liable. The Supreme Court, applying it to a collision between a steamer and 3 barges in a tow which the steamer sank in Hell Gate with the tide running 7 knots, thus definitely stated the rule:
Where two steamers about to meet are running one with and the other against the tide, if it be necessary that one or the other should stop in order to avoid a collision, the one proceeding against the tide should stop.
The obligation of good seamanship requires that a vessel should be properly manned and properly steered. When a small schooner moored at New Orleans in a gale sought to change her position in the absence of the captain, with only a man and a boy to handle her, she was held responsible for her own injuries when impaled on the bow of a steamer and sunk. In a collision at sea between a schooner and a steamer, off Sea Girt, New Jersey, at night in clear weather, the erratic actions of the former were adjudged due to the incompetence of her helmsman, who managed to display on the witness stand a profound ignorance of the duties of a seaman, and the schooner was held solely at fault for the collision. And similarly when a vessel in a tow on the Saint Mary’s River turned toward an approaching steamer because the helmsman made a mistake in executing the master’s orders, putting the wheel hard right instead of hard left, she was found liable for the resulting damage.
As final evidence of the legal importance of good seamanship, at least two illustrations may be cited in which this factor has caused the statutory rules to be distinctly modified by court interpretation. It will be remembered that in the crossing situation no whistle signal is provided in either the International or the Inland Rules for the privileged vessel, which is under the requirement to hold course and speed, but that in inland waters one short blast is authorized in the signal section of the Pilot Rules. On the east coast the Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that this signal is permissive only, finding in at least 2 cases, 20 years apart, that the inspectors cannot compel a vessel required by the Inland Rules to hold course and speed to sound her whistle as a condition to obeying the statute. But on the Pacific coast, in a crossing collision between 2 steamships in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, at night in clear weather, the privileged vessel was held at fault for not sounding one blast in a timely manner, the line of reasoning being that since such a signal is authorized, good seamanship makes its use a requirement. This decision was upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals and is therefore the law on the west coast.
A second illustration is found in decisions involving the requirement of Art. 28, International and Inland Rules, that when vessels are in sight of one another a steam vessel under way whose engines are going at full speed astern shall indicate that fact by 3 short blasts on the whistle. Because of the value of the information given by this signal in close situations, the courts have extended its use to cases where engines are reversed less than full speed, notwithstanding the wording of the statute. In the case of the Sicilian Prince, that vessel was maneuvering to turn around in upper New York Bay, and sighting the steamer Jefferson approaching at a distance of a mile or less, blew 3 blasts to indicate her engines were going full speed astern. Immediately after signaling, the Sicilian Prince stopped her engines, but continued to move slowly astern; then, seeing the Jefferson approaching rapidly and hearing her blow one blast, she went full ahead, though too late to avoid being struck. The Jefferson contended that the Sicilian Prince’s stem was for the moment her bow and that she was therefore a burdened crossing vessel, but this was denied by the court, which found the Jefferson at fault as an overtaking vessel for not keeping clear. The Sicilian Prince, however, was also held for failure to repeat the 3-blast signal later when it was evident the Jefferson had not heard the first signal, although the engines were no longer reversing. In another New York case an ocean steamship maneuvering to turn around, with one engine full ahead and the other partly astern, but with the ship, because of a strong tide, actually making some sternboard, was in collision with a small sailing vessel; again the steamship was held at fault for failure to use the backing signal, and this decision, like the one preceding, was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. In a third case, the Harry Luckenbach, a 14,000-ton freighter, was maneuvering with the aid of 2 tugs in Los Angeles inner harbor. Backing slowly out of her slip with one prolonged blast, she sighted the steamer San Juan in a turning basin f mile away, and blew 3 blasts, although one engine was actually going ahead to check her way astern. The San Juan, coming down at full speed, rammed her, and was held solely at fault, the court upholding the 3-blast signal of the Harry Luckenbach as proper under the circumstances to indicate slow movement astern.
In the final analysis, good seamanship becomes a factor in collision prevention insofar as it influences the navigator, in observing the Rules of the Road, to conduct his vessel where it is safe, when it is safe, and in the manner of a prudent seaman. Such is the test placed upon him by the courts, as typically expressed by the Circuit Court of Appeals:
No man is infallible, and there are certain errors for which the law does not hold a navigator liable; but he is liable for an error of judgment which a careful and prudent navigator would not have made.