THE DEVELOPMENT AND NEEDS of naval aviation from its earliest beginnings have been carried on with a view to making it an effective arm of the fleet.
The experimental stage of naval aviation started with the Navy’s first official cognizance of aviation in 1908 and extended through the World War. The experience gained during the World War proved the great value of planes with the fleet, and the Navy proceeded with confidence and energy to provide means for taking aircraft to sea on ships of the fleet.
In 1922, the Langley introduced carrier plane operations into the fleet and at the same time the patrol planes participated in fleet exercises at Panama and in the Caribbean. Shortly thereafter planes and catapults became regular equipment in all battleships and cruisers, and have operated continuously to an ever increasing extent in the fleet.
I would like to cover the work in naval aviation under the three correlated fields of material, operations, and personnel. The ultimate success or failure of naval aviation depends to a high degree on its material equipment. To insure success, you must demand and obtain the best aircraft in the world. Anything short of this goal is hazardous.
The science of aviation has been subject to more startling developments in its comparatively short life than have been evidenced in many older scientific fields, and naval aviation has played an important role in this field, contributing materially to the safety, speed, reliability, and economy of operation, not only of its own craft but of aviation as a whole.
To be efficient for their purposes naval aircraft must be specially designed to carry out very definite missions. This specialization vitally effects almost every design detail. The first step in the adaptation to naval uses is to find the operating difficulties of existing types; the second step is to find means for eliminating obvious difficulties; and the third step is to apply this knowledge to the design of new types. This type of development is slow but sure and we cannot depend on it alone. Intensive research in the governmental and private laboratories accelerates the service development.
It is impossible to overestimate the importance of research for naval aviation. Chemical and metallurgical laboratories develop new alloys of greater strength and less weight, of improved resistance to corrosion, with special properties for ease in manufacture. Testing laboratories develop new structural combinations that give more efficient use of materials. Wind tunnels develop new wing sections and new methods of reducing drag and of increasing lift. Model basins develop improved floats and hulls. Engine laboratories develop new engines of greater power and lower fuel consumption with improved reliability. Many other laboratories work on details such as radio, instruments, ordnance, fuels, oil, protective finishes, and safety devices.
The Bureau of Aeronautics correlates all of the research findings and applies this new information to advance designs specially adapted to our operating needs. Since there is an unavoidable lag between the inception of a research and the application of its findings in service aircraft, it is essential that research be vigorous and ahead of current development.
The most striking change in naval aircraft has been the substitution of metal for wood. Of great importance has been the development of corrosion resisting alloys in aluminum and in steel. Structural strength and safety have been greatly increased in spite of increased loads. Speeds have been more than doubled by the reduction in drag and the increase in power. Ranges have been tremendously increased by reduced fuel consumption, improved reliability, and improved aerodynamic efficiency. All these can be definitely measured. The most important item is something that cannot very well be evaluated in time of peace except by naval personnel: this we may call “service adaptability” and we feel that here the most important progress has been made in the material field.
The planes of the Navy differ from those of land forces to as great an extent as do the missions of the two. They must be built with the smallest practicable wing span to allow stowage aboard ships. They must be structurally stronger than normal planes to stand the strains incident to landing into the arresting gear of the carriers or launching via the catapult, later to be hoisted aboard by cranes. They must carry radio equipment, navigational instruments, and the additional weight of flotation gear for both the planes and the personnel, without sacrificing speed or range.
The gratifying results obtained with materials attest the soundness of our policies and practices. Although much is still desired in material development, the airplanes and aviation equipment now supplied meet the particular needs of the fleet to a very satisfactory degree and make possible an extent and reliability of aircraft operation not obtainable in other navies.
The heavier-than-air operations of naval aviation embrace three distinct fields widely separated as to material and functions but closely related in that each depends on the other and on the Navy as a whole for its support and effectiveness: (1) the patrol plane or flying boat; (2) the seaplanes carried on battleships and cruisers and catapulted; and (3) the landplanes of our airplane carriers.
Our major patrol forces are based at the Fleet Air Bases at Coco Solo, Canal Zone, and Pearl Harbor, Hawaiian Islands, and on the tenders Wright, Owl, and Thrush, normally based at San Diego, Norfolk, and Seattle, respectively. Training is continuous and from these bases periodic advance base exercises are initiated, simulating as nearly as practicable the possible requirements of war. Typical examples of these exercises are the operation of 43 Pearl Harbor patrol planes from Midway during Fleet Problem XVI, the operation of the West Coast squadrons in the Caribbean and of the Coco Solo squadrons from the east coast of the United States in previous exercises. These operations have also taken patrol squadrons to Alaska.
Adequate shore bases with sheltered operating waters or suitable tenders are necessary for the operation of patrol planes. The Navy is responsible for protecting our commerce in our sea lanes and for giving timely warning of enemy forces approaching our coast. The only practical means of accomplishing these important naval functions is an adequate combined force of surface vessels and patrol planes. Recognizing this, the Navy is now engaged in building up strategically located bases and in increasing the number of patrol planes. A critical shortage of seaplane tenders still exists. Although the seriousness of this deficiency is recognized, the delay in providing adequate additional tenders is resulting in an undesirable limitation on patrol plane operations. The continuous increase in the number of patrol planes and seaplane tenders and the building-up of our bases may be pointed out as a critical need of naval aviation.
The functions of patrol planes are well defined: Ability to operate over great distances at sea, to be self-sustaining, to be powerful offensively and defensively, and primarily to be capable of independently joining the fleet at any time and place, ready to take part in whatever action may be required.
The seaplanes of observation and scouting types employed on the battleships and cruisers of the fleet may be considered as service machines; that is, their function is to be of direct assistance to individual ships from which they are flown. It is of paramount importance that they be able to land and to be picked up at sea in rough water. To cruiser-based planes speed also becomes a desirable factor. It would be impossible to take full advantage of the great range of the guns of the fleet unless aircraft were available to direct and correct the fire of these guns. In the case of cruisers, the effective area which they can cover is vastly increased by the use of planes and at the same time they are protected to a greater degree from the possibility of encountering at destructive ranges superior forces of the enemy.
Because these planes compare unfavorably in performance with other types of naval aircraft and their operations appear less impressive, there is sometimes a tendency to underestimate their relative value to the fleet. Probably no type of aircraft contributes more to the effectiveness of the fleet than does this type of plane.
Carrier aircraft are probably the best- known class of naval aviation. In the fleet they carry on an independent offensive, exactly like that of the guns and torpedoes of the fleet. Carrier aircraft have a single major function, the offensive, to strike the enemy both on the surface and in the air.
Much has been learned of carrier aircraft operations in the past ten years and many changes have been conceived in their tactical and strategical employment. These developments have generally increased the offensive power of carrier air craft and decreased the vulnerability of their carriers and have appreciably enhanced the effectiveness of this type.
The tasks of laying smoke screens, maintaining inner or outer anti-submarine screens, tactical scouting, and protecting our scouting planes or destroying enemy planes can all be performed by carrier aircraft but it would generally be desirable to have these tasks, with the exception of the latter, performed by cruiser-based planes where practicable.
Aviation shore bases are required for the training, maintenance, and overhaul of our fleet aircraft. The fleet is shore- based in that it obtains sustenance of all kinds from its shore bases, and ships must return to their bases periodically for repairs and dry-docking. In the same manner aircraft have need for shore bases and, in addition, need them for the large amount of training necessary to be conducted ashore. As practically all forms of aircraft tactical and gunnery training can be conducted more expeditiously, thoroughly, safely, and economically ashore, the squadrons are shore-based a large part of the year. Although there was a somewhat prevalent feeling at one time that squadrons should conduct more of their training aboard ship to insure the necessary fleet background, it is now generally conceded that this training ashore is beneficial and that participation in all fleet tactical exercises provides the necessary fleet training to render the basic training of these squadrons most effective to the fleet. As the fleet may appear to be more dependent on bases than was our fleet before the advent of steam, so aircraft may appear to be dependent on bases to a greater degree than our ships. This appears to be the price we pay for speed and mechanization and paradoxically the more use we make of mechanical developments the more dependent we become on external service. The failure to provide adequate operating and repair facilities ashore has handicapped naval aviation and has increased appreciably the training and maintenance problems. These problems become more acute as aircraft operating forces increase without a corresponding increase in supporting shore facilities and a marked and immediate increase in facilities appears essential to avoid a reduction in aircraft operating plans.
It has long been recognized that the ability to fly an airplane, no matter how excellent that ability may be, is insufficient to meet the demands of naval aviation. An efficient naval pilot must have a thorough knowledge of the Navy, its doctrine, its traditions and customs, and its needs, for only one so indoctrinated may fully discharge his duties in the absence of specific directions.
It has, therefore, been the policy of the Navy Department that the aviation organization be manned entirely by officers and men drawn from the regular Navy. This policy is undoubtedly largely responsible for the outstanding co-operation and understanding which exist within the service today and it has been one of the principal contributing factors in making our naval aviation forces so effective.
We take four years to ground a naval officer in his profession. We also require years to train the crews of our fleet today, as seamen and petty officers are increasingly specialists and technicians and their education must be painstaking and laborious. From this highly trained group men are selected for additional training in the science of aviation. The performance of the regular duties of a line officer aboard ship required of the naval aviator when not engaged in flying is effective in insuring that he never loses contact with his basic profession and keeps constantly in touch with the developments and advancements aboard ship.
A shortage of naval aviators exists which it will be impossible to overcome for several years from regular naval personnel. To relieve this personnel situation the Navy Department has inaugurated a program consisting (1) of training non-flying officers to replace pilots wherever possible and (2) to take into the service reserve personnel with the designation of aviation cadets for three years of active duty after receiving their training. Although the second is a deviation from the long-established policy, there is reason to believe that this group will be assimilated satisfactorily into the naval aeronautic organization. The Navy has for several years selected and trained reserve aviators from among those college graduates who possessed the necessary physical and other requirements. These men, upon completion of training, were sent to the fleet for one year. Their work has been very satisfactory and their presence has enabled the squadrons to operate nearer a full complement than would otherwise have been possible and has helped to build up the nucleus of a very essential reserve of naval aviators. With the selection of aviation cadets from the same group of college men, it is expected that satisfactory naval aviators will be forthcoming and as this large number of reserves terminate their active fleet duty three years from now, an adequate reserve of well-trained naval aviators will begin to be realized.
In concluding, I would like to emphasize once more the principles that have governed the development of naval aviation, namely, that its functions are derived directly from the functions of the Navy and that all its capabilities and endeavors should be directed toward the promotion of naval efficiency and should be designed to enable the Navy better to perform its functions. Aircraft have not supplanted ships but have added much to their power and effectiveness and constitute a striking force that has gone far toward increasing the value of our naval forces.