THE HISTORY of limitations of armament during the twentieth century has been one of progress, development, and accomplishment. In 1899, the Emperor of Russia issued a formal appeal for collective limitation when in his invitation to the First Hague Conference he stated in part as follows:
Moreover, in proportion as the armaments of each Power increase, so do they less and less fulfill the object which the Governments have set before themselves ... if this state of things were prolonged, it would inevitably lead to the very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the horrors of which make every thinking man shudder in advance. To put an end to these incessant armaments and to seek the means of warding off the calamities which are threatening the whole world—such is the supreme duty which is today imposed on all States.
Although this conference achieved definite results by providing means for settlement of international disputes by peaceful methods, the only response to the appeal of the Emperor of Russia for curbing expenditures for war materials was the adoption of a final resolution subscribing to the opinion “that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind,” and the utterance of the wish that the governments “may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of war budgets.”
In 1906 Secretary of State Root, in his reply to a note from the Russian Ambassador suggesting the agenda for the Second Hague Conference, stated:
The Government of the United States, therefore, feels it to be its duty to reserve for itself the liberty to propose to the Second Peace Conference, as one of the subjects of consideration, the reduction or limitation of armaments, in the hope that, if nothing further can be accomplished, some slight advance may be made toward the realization of the lofty conception which actuated the Emperor of Russia in calling the First Conference.
At this time the Imperial German Government expressed itself as absolutely opposed to the question of disarmament, and the Emperor of Germany threatened to decline to send delegates if the subject of disarmament was to be discussed.
Any action on arms limitation being foredoomed by this attitude of Germany, the Second Hague Conference of 1907 confined itself to the adoption of a resolution in the following general terms:
The Conference confirms the Resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 in regard to the limitation of military expenditure; and inasmuch as military expenditure has considerably increased in almost every country since that time, the Conference declares that it is eminently desirable that the Governments should resume the serious examination of this question.
A third Hague conference, which had been proposed for 1915, was of course never held because of the outbreak of the World War. In the meantime, however, the growth of Germany as a major naval power and the effort by Great Britain to maintain its two-power naval policy, had precipitated a tremendous competitive building race on the Continent. This race was enlarged and intensified by the development of new types of war vessels, such as the dreadnought, submarine, and airplane, which made their appearance during this period.
By the time the World War was finally brought to a conclusion the world seemingly realized the futility of huge and wasteful conflicts of this nature. Almost without exception the people of all lands had experienced untold suffering and sorrow, and were being almost crushed by the resulting tremendous economic and taxation burden. Post-war public opinion set the stage for the first real practical approach to the question of limitation of armament. The Covenant of the League of Nations had provided for steps toward “the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent for safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.” The Treaty of Versailles had curtailed to a minimum the naval power of Germany and thus had effectively eliminated, for the time being, the chief objector of 1906.
When, therefore, in 1921, the President of the United States took the initiative and transmitted invitations to the naval powers of the world to assemble at Washington for the purpose of discussing ways and means for reduction of naval armaments, there was immediate and favorable response from all quarters. Realizing that the elimination of possible sources of international controversy was a necessary corollary to any plan for reduction of armament, the President also wisely included in the agenda for this conference certain potentially controversial questions relating to the Pacific and Far East.
These thoughts were crystallized by President Harding in his opening address at the Conference, in which he stated in part:
I think I may say the call is not of the United States of America alone. It is rather the spoken word of a war-wearied world, struggling for restoration, hungering and thirsting for better relationship; of humanity crying for relief and craving assurance of lasting peace. ... A world staggering with debt needs its burden lifted. Humanity which has been shocked by wanton destruction would minimize the agencies of that destruction. Contemplating the measureless cost of war and the continuing burden of armament, all thoughtful peoples wish for real limitation of armament and would like war outlawed. . . . Our hundred millions frankly want less of armament and none of war. . . . The inclusion of the proposal for the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions was not for the purpose of embarrassing or delaying an agreement for limitation of armament, but rather to support that undertaking by availing ourselves of this meeting to endeavor to reach a common understanding as to the principles and policies to be followed in the Far East and thus greatly to diminish, and if possible wholly to remove, discernible sources of controversy.
The Secretary of State expressed a similar view when he stated:
The world looks to this Conference to relieve humanity of the crushing burden created by competition in armament, and it is the view of the American Government that we should meet that expectation without any unnecessary delay.
It must be borne in mind that at the time of this Conference, the United States had, under actual construction, a capital ship building program which would, when complete, have made our Navy the most powerful navy afloat. Other naval powers had construction programs under way but most of these had not progressed much beyond the blue-print stage. Therefore, when the Secretary of State, in his opening address, announced that the United States was willing, and prepared, to scrap new capital ship hulls upon which $330,000,000 had already been expended, the successful conclusion of the first naval limitations treaty was assured.
The results of the Washington conference are well known. Limitation in several types of naval vessels was established, and the ground broken for further agreements in the future. Treaties on matters relating to the Far East were signed, as well as one relating to the use of poison gases and submarines in warfare.
It may be of interest at this time to quote extracts from the statements of the representatives of the five signatory naval powers on the occasion of signing the naval treaty which indicate the views of their countries at that time regarding the future prospects of naval limitation.
England.—This Treaty ends—absolutely ends —the race in competition in naval armament. At the same time it leaves the relative security of the great naval Powers unimpaired. The significance of the Treaty is far more than that. In this Treaty we are talking of arms in the language of peace. In other words, we are taking the greatest forward step in history to establish the reign of peace.
Japan.—We knew that the Conference would do good, and it has done good. Competition in naval armament, ruinous to national welfare and harmful to international peace, is now a matter of the past. The relief from tension is provided by the agreements reached by the Conference for the limitation of naval armament. Freed from suspicion by frankness, assured of peace by good will, we may devoutly give thanks for the opportunity given by the Washington Conference, which, we believe, ushers into a troubled world a new spirit of international friendship and good understanding.
France.—Gentlemen, I firmly believe that each of us, with head held high and heart full of confidence, may face the great conclave of public opinion in his native land and defend without misgivings the great work in which we have collaborated for three months. Moreover, I firmly believe that all of us, united by our common labors, may confidently submit to the opinion of the world, that supreme court of humanity, the results of our deliberations as a pledge of a better future for humanity.
Italy.—No one would be justified in saying that this Conference has not marked the point of departure of a new era in international policy; that here has not been laid down the foundations of a new and more solid equilibrium of the world. The agreements for the Far East have enforced a new policy of common action of the various Powers concerned in contributing to the equality of conditions and progress of that great country, China, so rich in resources and in possibilities for the future. The other agreements, and especially the Naval Treaty, have ensured secure guaranties of peace where once existed dangers and menaces of war which kept the entire world in a state of serious apprehension.
United States.—It may be that the naval holiday here contracted will expire with the Treaties, but I do not believe it. Those of us who live another decade are more likely to witness a growth of public opinion, strengthened by the new experience, which will make nations more concerned with living to the fulfillment of God’s high intent than with agencies of warfare and destruction.
In spite of the notable success achieved at Washington in limiting and reducing naval armament, that treaty fell far short of the ultimate goal desired by this country. The keystone of this failure was the submarine. Certain countries had recommended complete abolition of the submarine, claiming that this was an offensive type of vessel and one whose method of operation was contrary to the accepted methods of civilized warfare. This view was opposed by other nations, who contended that the submarine was purely a defensive weapon and a necessary part of their fleets for the defense of their coast lines.
Failing in drastic limitation of the submarine, delegates to the Washington conference were unwilling to restrict the chief anti-submarine weapon, the destroyer. The cruiser was also unrestricted, except by inference from the definition of a capital ship as “a vessel of war, not an aircraft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons standard displacement, or which carries a gun with a caliber exceeding 8 inches.”
In the years following the Washington conference, further agreements for naval limitation, particularly of those classes of vessels unrestricted by the Washington conference, were actively sought by this and other governments of the world. Numerous conversations were held, and studies made, in the hope of finding a practical yardstick by which these types could be limited and yet assured to each nation full and adequate national security.
In 1927 a three-power conference was held at Geneva, after the President of the United States had suggested that the signatories to the Washington treaty empower their representatives attending the Preparatory Commission at Geneva “to initiate negotiations looking toward and providing for limitation in the classes of naval vessels not covered by the Washington treaty.”
The difficulties encountered in this conference, and its attendant failure, are summed up in the final paragraphs from the final Resolution of Adjournment of that Conference:
Various methods were considered of reconciling the divergent views indicated above, but, while material progress has been made and the points of divergence reduced, no mutually acceptable plan has been found to reconcile the claim of the British delegates for numbers of vessels, for the most part armed with 6-inch guns, with the desire of the American delegates for the lowest possible total tonnage limitation with freedom of armament within such limitation, subject to the restriction as to armament already set by the Washington treaty.
Faced with this difficulty, the delegates have deemed it wise to adjourn the present Conference with this frank statement of their respective views, and to submit the problem for the further consideration of their Governments, in the hope that consultation between them may lead to an early solution.
Subsequent to the failure of the Geneva conference in 1927, the London conference was convened in 1930 with a similarly narrow scope. In his opening address the King of England stated that efforts to advance beyond the limitations of the Washington treaty of capital ships and aircraft carriers had theretofore failed, and that to the delegates to this conference was entrusted “the high mission of continuing the task begun at Washington.” He trusted that the results of the conference would lighten the burden of armaments and “by facilitating the future work of the League Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, hasten the time when a general disarmament conference can deal with this problem in an even more comprehensive manner.”
This conference was successful in partially completing the Washington treaty, by prescribing limitations (to which three nations only were signatory) for cruisers, destroyers, and submarines; by prescribing a capital ship holiday; by defining exempt classes and designating special vessels; and by extending the definition of aircraft carriers to include vessels of this type of under 10,000 tons.
After the General Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments which met at Geneva in 1932, and which unsuccessfully undertook the broader field of limitation of all classes of armaments of all nations, political developments in various parts of the world caused a temporary setback to plans for accomplishment of further restrictions of armament. Certain nations reported that the limitations imposed by treaties already in effect were not satisfactory, and numerous conversations were held with a view to effecting a satisfactory solution for the continuance of limitation after the expiration of the Washington conference on December 31, 1936.
Under date of December 29, 1934, Japan announced her intention to terminate the Washington treaty. Despite this pronouncement on the part of Japan, conversations were continued between the naval powers, and in 1935 delegates of the five Washington treaty signatories again met in London for further discussion of the limitations question.
In his letter of instructions to the American delegation at this conference, President Roosevelt reiterated the instructions he had given the American delegates to the preliminary conversations in 1934, in part as follows:
I ask you, therefore, at the first opportunity to propose to the British and Japanese a substantial proportional reduction in the present naval levels. I suggest a total tonnage reduction of 20 per cent below existing treaty tonnage. If it is not possible to agree on this percentage, please seek from the British and Japanese a lesser reduction—15 per cent or 10 per cent, or 5 per cent. The United States must adhere to the high purpose of progressive reduction. It will be a heartening thing to the people of the world if you and your colleagues can attain this end.
Governments impelled by common sense and the good of humanity ought to seek treaties reducing armaments; they have no right to seek treaties increasing armaments.
Excessive armaments are in themselves conducive to those fears and suspicions which breed war. Competition in armament is a still greater menace. The world would rightly reproach Great Britain, Japan, and the United States if we moved against the current of progressive thought.
The results of this conference, known as “The London Conference of 1936,” are well known. Two nations found it impossible to participate in the proceedings and affix their signatures to the naval treaty. Signor Grandi outlined the Italian position in a speech quoted in part as follows:
It is with the most sincere regret that Italy finds herself prevented from being amongst the powers who are today signing the Navy Treaty, towards the technical elaboration of which the Italian Delegation have so willingly and actively co-operated.
An agreement for the limitation of armaments presumes a policy of mutual confidence and cooperation between the states concerned and not a regime of military agreements affecting one of the contracting parties.
At the present moment an unprecedented economic war is being waged against my country, and a potential naval menace exists in the Mediterranean. This is the first time in the history of united Italy that our people feel their life being imperiled in the Mediterranean, the sea which surrounds their shores and by which they receive their vital supplies. The very existence of 43 million Italians depends upon the sea. In the Mediterranean Italy wants peace and security for herself and for all.
Japan’s proposal for a plan for limitation was outlined by Admiral Nagano in a statement to the conference, parts of which are quoted:
I wish further to state—with all due deference to the lofty aims of the other Powers—that Japan is second to no country in her sincere and zealous desire for world peace.
In considering possible measures for attaining agreement upon disarmament, therefore, we have taken as our primary objective the elimination of the menace of war, and the assurance of an equality of security for all Powers concerned.
Having devised our plan with due consideration and careful thought to the three points I have just mentioned, I believe that the Japanese proposal is at once fair, just, and practical, and is characterised by a high degree of elasticity. So that if the Delegations will examine our proposal carefully and with sympathy, I feel that no serious difficulty will be encountered in discovering therein a reasonable basis for a new agreement on disarmament.
If two Powers are to conclude such an agreement on the strength of their naval forces as will give them equal standing and guarantee their mutual security, the most rational principle to be applied is that of equality of armaments. We believe, in fact, that there is no other method which would at once be fair and just, and this is especially true as between two Powers which are separated by oceans and whose defence is wholly dependent on their navies.
Moreover, when we consider the high degree of mobility of naval armaments and the peculiar character of naval warfare, the need of defensive equality for all Powers demands that there shall be equality of naval forces and especially for those categories which form the backbone of the fleet. It is for this reason that the Japanese proposal provides for equality, category by category, in “A” class cruisers and all larger types. But as regards categories whose use is exclusively defensive, suitable adjustments should be made to meet the special circumstances of each Power; hence the provision of the Japanese proposal that, as regards “B” class cruisers and all lesser types, limitation shall be effected globally.
Moreover, in order to establish as complete a state of non-aggression and non-menace as possible, we advocate the complete abolition or drastic reduction of offensive armaments. To explain more fully, we advocate the abolition of aircraft-carriers and a drastic reduction in capital ships and “A” class cruisers. But if there were a general sentiment in favour of the abolition of capital ships also, we should be ready to give our support thereto.
As regards armaments which are essentially defensive in character and purpose, we believe that each Power should be permitted to equip itself in the manner best suited to its conditions and circumstances.
When the delegates to the conference voted not to accept this plan, the Japanese delegation withdrew from further participation.
It is sincerely regretted that two nations found it necessary to withhold their approval of the London Naval Treaty of 1936. It is hoped that they may yet agree to the terms of that pact, which represented several months’ earnest effort by the participating delegations to produce an equitable and progressive solution of the problems under consideration.
Even though this should not come to pass, I believe there is still hope for the ultimate future of naval limitation. The past few years have seen increasing armaments in all parts of the world, but in my opinion, they are not a fair criterion. Internal strife, as well as aggressive national policies, have caused unusually large military expenditures. The mobilization in one state, regardless of its immediate objective, is regarded with uneasiness in adjacent states, and causes them in turn to create and concentrate military and naval units for the defense of their borders.
In addition, a new and untried weapon has come into the picture. All the major powers and a large majority of the lesser powers of the world are feverishly building great armadas of military aircraft with the stated purpose of using them offensively against the inhabitants of cities and towns or other thickly populated areas of a prospective enemy.
It was this situation which was recently discussed by Colonel Lindbergh, in part as follows:
Aviation has, I believe, created the most fundamental change ever made in war. It has abolished what we call the sense of warfare. It has turned defense into attack. We can no longer protect our families with an army. Our libraries, our museums—every institution which we value most is laid bare to bombardment.
Aviation has brought a revolutionary change to a world already staggering from changes. It is our responsibility to make sure that doing so we do not destroy the very things we wish to protect.
The last century’s solution for the armament race such as indicated above would have been war. Indeed, the present conditions of the world would indicate that we are now on the verge of a great war. But I sincerely trust that this enlightened age will seek a better solution. The World War proved that the victor, as well as the vanquished, was forced into economic and political bankruptcy. A war of the future, with its increased speed of movement and destructiveness of modern equipment, will be far more terrible in its after effects. Again I wish to quote from Colonel Lindbergh’s recent speech:
As I travel in Europe I am more than ever impressed with the seriousness of the situation which confronts us. When I see that within a day or two damage can be done which no time can ever replace, I begin to realize we must look for a new type of security—security which is dynamic, not static, security which rests in intelligence, not in forts.
Our responsibility in creating a great force for destruction may be somewhat relieved by knowing we have allied this force with intelligence and education and that we have moved power farther away from ignorance. I find some cause for hope in the belief that power which must be bound to knowledge is less dangerous to civilization than that which is barbaric.
It is aviation’s responsibility to justify the combination of strength and intelligence.
I would place the responsibility higher —it must be assumed by the governments of the major world powers. The control of this weapon is not unattainable. It can be, and must be, accomplished. It is therefore my sincere hope and expectation that, before the ultimate results of unlimited rearming of nations may be reached, public opinion, plus the tremendous economic pressure incident to such a program, will force nations to seek security under relatively reduced armaments as established by multilateral treaties.
The United States has taken the lead in advocating treaties of this nature. The people of this country have shown a willingness to make large sacrifices in order to attain this end. This country has no aggressive thought toward any nation. It sincerely desires peace. But above all it desires the assurance of security which comes only from multilateral agreements for the reduction of world armaments to the minimum consistent with needs for national defense.