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Middle of the Road in Promotion

By Lieutenant Commander A. O. R. Bergesen, U. S. Navy
June 1936
Proceedings
Vol. 62/6/400
Article
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Body

AS THE war to end war has seemingly- led only to further friction and rumors of war, so has the last promotion legislation led to more discussion, disappointment, and even bitterness than previous laws. Since 1931 an increasingly large number of magazine articles, letters to the editor, and wardroom discussions have appeared. Even a book has been written on the subject. In 1934 the subject reached the lower ranks with a vengeance, so that in some cases otherwise levelheaded friends of long standing cannot discuss it together. There is a basic error both in our laws and our discussions of them that has not been brought to the attention of the service as a whole. Before stating this basic condition, let us mention two causes of dissatisfaction which could be corrected by additional legislation of a patchwork nature.

(1) Let us consider a rather minor point, but one that looms large to officers passed over in the grade of lieutenant. Under the Act of February 28, 1931, a non-Naval Academy graduate in the line may at any time on his own request retire with per cent of his base pay per year of service counting for pay purposes. Naval Academy graduates are not accorded this privilege and under the somewhat temporary provisions of recent legislation must complete 21 years’ commissioned service even though passed over in the grade of lieutenant. Some of these officers, prior to passage of these recent laws, had made definite arrangements for employment in civil life. As opportunities appear, others would also like to retire and still salvage something from their naval service: the retired pay and the privilege of placing U.S.N. (Ret.) after their names. This particular problem could be corrected by extending the Act of February, 1931, to include all line officers who have been passed over so that the junior Naval Academy graduates will not feel they have been discriminated against.

(2) Beginning with the class of 1917 and including all subsequent classes, Naval Academy service does not count for pay or retirement purposes, with the result that eventually officers not selected will be placed on the retired list as lieutenants with 14 years’ service, as lieutenant commanders with 21 years’ service, or as commanders with 28 years’ service. Not only do these officers lose the corresponding 10 per cent for 4 years’ service as midshipmen but what is more important they miss the big pay jumps that come at the end of 17, 23, and 30 years’ commissioned service in the respective grades. This has caused an endless amount of discussion because the classes senior to 1917 have not been and will not be so handicapped, and what is more to the point, the non-graduate running mates of these officers all have sufficient prior service of various sorts that they can count, so that in any grade they will “get by” these pay jumps.

There are two possible remedies for this defect: (a) revision of present pay laws to make these pay jumps coincide with the Britten Bill, that is, pay jumps for lieutenant at end of 14 years instead of 17 years, for lieutenant commander at end of 21 instead of 23 years, and for commander at end of 28 instead of 30 years; or (6) a basic change in the pay law to make pay and rank go hand in hand instead of the present system, which is largely a matter of time.

Generally a pay law is discussed independently of a promotion law, but to the individual officer they are very closely related, in fact they cannot even be considered apart. An unsatisfactory law in one case might be more than compensated for by a very satisfactory law in the other case. Conversely a perfect promotion law could prove very unsatisfactory if the laws relating to pay, active and retired, were not devised to fit together. We thus come to the basic fact that pay, promotion, and retirement must be considered together, not separately. To do so successfully we must realize a point that the writer does not remember ever having seen formulated into words, and which must be recognized, that is that there are two separate and distinct classifications of officers.

These classifications are not Academy graduates and non-graduates, they are not line and staff corps, they are not those with and those without dependents, they are not specialists and non-specialists, they are not even selectees and those passed over. The thing that divides these two diverse groups is a date, or rather two dates. One group can count all kinds of service toward pay and retirement, the other group consists of those who entered the Naval Academy subsequent to March 4, 1913, together with staff corps officers who have been commissioned directly from civil life subsequent to that date, and it further includes all officers commissioned from the ranks subsequent to July 1, 1922. The officers of the second group have a common problem which is different from all the rest of the officers in the Navy. This group already includes over half the commissioned personnel and will, in the not distant future, include all the officers. Any pay or promotion legislation should therefore have the problems of this group clearly in view. Any legislation which does not do so will continue to be unsatisfactory.

Before we proceed to Utopia let us look into present conditions further. A study of the Naval Institute Proceedings since 1932 shows a very large number of articles and resultant discussions on the subject of promotion by selection. These articles were written by active and retired officers and a civilian who was formerly an officer. They were written by officers varying in rank and experience from Admiral Sims down to very junior lieutenants. The writers vary in opinion from the most favorable to rather strong condemnation of the present selection law. Present legislation has effectually closed the door to any enlisted man’s obtaining a commission via the rank of warrant officer. He would be somewhat older than his running mates and so under a terrific handicap at each seven year selection and would face elimination with only a few years’ service counting for retirement purposes. Reasonable security and tenure of office are desirable for morale. Younger men in training for high command is a feature strongly advocated for efficiency. The young officer in command of a submarine, destroyer, or even a tug has more in common with, and is receiving better training for, the position of battleship command than any officer, regardless of rank, in a non-command status. A division commander of any type of vessel is receiving the best training for flag rank. The Bureau of Navigation has stated this to be the case in several of its bulletins. Large shipping concerns do not promote the first mate in their largest ship to be that ship’s commander. The up and coming man who is to command their biggest vessel, after working up to first mate in some ship or other, comparatively early in his career becomes the master of one of the smaller vessels and gradually works up to the pride of the fleet, but always in command of successively bigger and better vessels.

Can most defects be corrected, can we have reasonable tenure of office with a chance for younger men in high places? Or shall we admit defeat and let “efficiency” and competition send “Brother Officer” to Davy Jones’s locker to keep company with “Shipmate” who was lost in the Tuscarora? The Army insists on promotion by seniority up to and including colonel. There must be some virtue in it. They do have the General Staff Corps eligibility list which confers certain advantages and prestige which officers can strive for. The Navy has gone the whole way in selection. All compromises are not failures. The middle of the road may at times be a lonely place, but at least one doesn’t run off the road. Hence promotion by a combination of selection and seniority as follows:

(a) There will be selection from each grade except ensign. The selection board is directed by law to cover the whole list of eligibles. As an evidence of this, at least one of the officers selected by each board for each grade shall have had less than a total of five years service in grade plus service while on the promotion list to that grade as of the 30th of June following the meeting of that board.

(b) The number so selected shall be one half the number that would be selected under present laws. As vacancies occur in the next higher grade they shall be filled alternately by an officer from this selection list and the officer who would be otherwise eligible for such promotion by seniority.

In other words, it is proposed that promotion be one half by seniority and one half by drastic selection through the whole list of eligibles. It is suggested that the proposed law include provisions that either the selection board concerned or the Bureau of Navigation, immediately after the above selection list has been named, make up a promotion list which will amount to alternating the names of selectees and the senior members of that grade. This promotion list would remain in effect, be governed in size, and its members be protected against forced retirement in the same manner as the present promotion list under the Britten Bill of August 3, 1931. The only exception to such alternating could be covered by a clause to the effect that no one shall be promoted by seniority prior to the promotion of all those selected at the time such senior was first passed over. This provision would probably be applicable only in the grade of lieutenant (j.g). The outstanding and promising officer can then reach the grade of lieutenant after 5-6 years’ service, lieutenant commander after 11 years, commander after 16 years, and it will even be possible to reach the grade of captain after 21 years and rear admiral after 26 years. With the Bureau of Navigation favoring such selectees with ship and division commands we have at last paved the way for real efficiency in training for high command. The selectee who cannot stand prosperity will later be passed over.

(c) Officers whose original dates of entry are prior to March 4, 1913 become ineligible for promotion and are retired with 2 ½ per cent of their base pay per year’s service not to exceed 75 per cent when they shall have had 21 years, 28 years, and 35 years’ service from the nominal graduating dates of their classes (as at present) and are in the grades of lieutenant commander, commander, and captain, respectively, and their names do not appear on the promotion list.

(d) Officers whose original dates of entry are on or subsequent to March 4, 1913 and whose names do not appear on the promotion list will be retired, after having been passed over at least once in their present or the preceding grade, with 2 ½ per cent of their base pay per year of service counting for pay purposes, not to exceed 75 per cent when they shall have reached the grade of lieutenant commander and have 25 years’ service counting for pay purposes, have reached the grade of commander and have 30 years’ service counting for pay purposes, or have reached the grade of captain and have 35 years’ service counting for pay purposes.

In general, it is suggested that a new system be inaugurated for the class of 1917 and all officers junior thereto. No forced retirements from the grade of lieutenant and lieutenant (j.g.) are provided for and there are no limits attached to the number that may be retired in any one year from any grade. Retirements would take place, as at present, at the end of the month in which the requirements become effective. It might be considered advisable to retain the Britten Bill for those senior to 1917 but it is feared that the retention clause would eventually defeat the purpose of selection.

This article is already too long to build up all possible objections and then to answer them, but some of the outstanding advantages cannot be omitted. The unfortunate position of the class of 1917 and juniors has been discussed. This proposed law has manifestly been written around the present pay law, but pay laws must be considered and are infinitely harder to change than promotion laws.

The probationary status of ensigns, the Naval Examining Board, and General Courts can easily remove the unfit. Others who have started out to make the Navy their career should be entitled to reach the rank of lieutenant commander and retire with the benefit of 25 years’ service. Civilian criticism of the retired list would be considerably reduced if retirement for non-selection be only after 25 years’ service. This corresponds to the requirements for voluntary retirement from the police and fire departments of some of our larger cities and to the plans of many of our large commercial concerns. It would again open the doors to outstanding enlisted men who today are infinitely better off in the warrant grade. It would largely restore security and contentment to junior officers.

The expression “years service counting for pay purposes” is used advisedly, as that is what counts. It would in an orderly and equitable manner reduce the war-time hump, in that Naval Academy classes in that group had varying length of time at the Academy and the non-graduates have an enormous range of service. The proviso “after having been passed over in present or the preceding grade” not only protects the individual, but again spreads the time of retirement. The drastic selection of some and promotion by seniority of others will eventually spread large classes, give more nearly equal opportunity and make a more flexible and uniformly spaced list.

The feature of some promotion by seniority will give a sense of security, independence, and satisfaction to the top of each grade. It should largely remove the strain of “being under the guns”—up or out—from the most valuable and experienced officer in each grade. An officer who has been selected from lieutenant (j.g.), from lieutenant, from lieutenant commander, and even from commander to the next higher grade would certainly be of a caliber that could safely and creditably be promoted one additional grade by seniority, a seniority he could only have attained by repeated selection.

The mandatory selection through the whole list of eligibles would partially if not completely remove the often mentioned stigma of non-selection. It would remove one of the best founded criticisms of the present system, as the outstanding officers in each grade would reach the higher grades at a younger age. It should make it easier for the selection boards to pick fewer, but more outstanding, officers. The new law could provide, or proper authority could direct each board to leave sealed lists, with comments, of those in the grade who are next in merit; these lists to be purely advisory, but of immense value to succeeding boards.

In the Proceedings for May, 1935, Lieut. A. E. Becker, Jr., has given an analysis with curves for various systems of promotion based on 5,499 line officers. This data can be used because the proportions will remain about the same. It is shown that with forced retirement from and above lieutenant commander only an average of 114 lieutenant commanders will be retired annually. Under present arrangements (except for temporary retention of lieutenants) an average of 48 lieutenants (j.g.), 95 lieutenants, and 44 lieutenant commanders will retire annually—a total of 187, which number, together with their shorter service to the government and their greater youth, will be more of a stumbling block to the continuation of the retired list than may be overcome by showing a possible financial saving.

Further, under the present somewhat temporary legislation keeping passed-over lieutenants until they shall have completed 21 years’ commissioned service, no saving can be shown, as they will receive the same retired pay as a passed-over lieutenant commander. It is suggested that these officers with a total of 25 years’ creditable service, counting Naval Academy service, could very justly be allowed to reach the grade of lieutenant commander by seniority. Suppose some officers become eligible for retirement immediately upon being confirmed in the rank of lieutenant commander, there is nothing new or wrong with that. Practically all systems of graduated retirement concur in such an arrangement. One often hears of someone’s temporarily stepping out of a position to allow an old-timer to step in and qualify for a higher retired pay.

If the outlined plan of promotion by a combination of selection and seniority has any merit and is worthy of consideration it could easily and equitably be made applicable to the various staff corps. Determine the percentage of officers in each grade required for the peculiar problems of each corps, which are different from those of the line. Thus would be removed the involved question of running mates and staff corps eligibility and proportions in selection. Lost, also, would be the involved, and to the junior officer often inexplicable, manner in which promotion in line and staff are different but dependent upon each other. A good many pages of the Revised Statutes could be eliminated instead of being constantly revised.

The will to conquer; such is victory’s first condition, and therefore every soldier’s first duty; but it also amounts to a supreme resolve which the commander must, if need be, impart to the soldier’s soul.

If the will to conquer is necessary to offering battle with any chance of success, it is criminal in the Commander-in-Chief to deliver or accept battle without possessing that superior will which must provide direction and impulsion for all.—Marshal Foch, Precepts and Judgments.

Digital Proceedings content made possible by a gift from CAPT Roger Ekman, USN (Ret.)

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