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THE AMERICAN ARMY IN FRANCE 1917-1919. By Major General James G. Harbord, U. S. Army (Retired). Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1936. 576 pages. $5.00.
Reviewed by Brigadier General George Richards, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)
This authoritative history of the formation, organization, and accomplishments of the American Expeditionary Force in France has been anxiously awaited for many years. General Harbord’s qualifications for the task he has undertaken are universally recognized. A soldier of superior merit, a keen observer of events, a writer of ability, he, from the viewpoint of one in intimate touch with the commander in chief of our armies in France, and honored by his confidence in all the more important aspects of America’s effort there, has given to the public a story of absorbing interest. In dramatic word pictures we are carried through all phases of that titanic struggle—from the day the American public first recognized that our country’s interests demanded that we should actively resist, and by force, the efforts of the Central Powers; then through our dark and perilous hours of early 1918 when, with General Gough’s British Fifth Army almost destroyed, success seemed almost within their reach; thence to the dawn at Belleau Wood and the brighter sunrise in mid-July of that year, when the tide turned in our favor. Concerning this, a strictly American offensive, von Hertling, the German Chancellor, wrote: “On the 18th (July, 1918) even the most optimistic among us understood that all was lost. The history of the world was played out in three days.”
General Harbord joined General Pershing in Washington in May of 1917; he sailed with him for France via England as Chief of Staff; by his side he labored in that most important period, perfecting the plans for the organization and combat training of a distinctive American Army. His story of their struggle to preserve such a force, an Army indoctrinated with American ideals, of the influences arrayed against them, brings to mind that oft- quoted remark: “We can ofttimes protect ourselves against our enemies—but God alone must save us from our friends.” General Harbord has this to say on this subject:
No history of the American participation in the World War would be complete if it omitted or minimized the hard-fought differences of opinion between the Allied chieftains and the American Commander-in-Chief on the two subjects:
Training of troops.
Their amalgamation in French and British units.
If given in terms of the demands it made on the time of General Pershing and the number of various and devious angles from which approach was made, a reader fifty years hence might well conclude that this struggle between Allies was more important than much of the fighting that went on in quiet sectors on the Western Front.
And concerning our methods of training for combat service, this may be quoted:
The authentic story of an Allied soldier with a rifle strapped on his back, chasing an enemy to get close enough to throw a hand grenade would never have been true of any American. Nor were Americans willing to sit down in trenches and permanently exchange “dirty looks” with an enemy in another trench but a few yards away.
There is no doubt that the firm insistence of General Pershing on training for open warfare had a certain gradual influence on French methods. It quickened the French spirit when the tide turned, supported by their confidence in the energetic intentness of the Americans. In January, 1918, they revised their instruction book to bring back the rifle to its rightful prestige.
General Harbord’s service with troops began in late May of 1918 when he was assigned to the command of the Fourth Brigade of Marines, relieving Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, U. S. Marine Corps, invalided home. In July of 1918, General Harbord was promoted to the command of the Second Division, of which the Fourth Brigade was a part. That he had some misgivings as to how he would be accepted by the Marines of the Fourth Brigade he mentions, but he modestly refrains from writing how soon and in what manner these misgivings were dispelled— a story that deserves to be repeated. A few days after General Harbord had taken over the command, the Fourth Brigade was thrown into the front line, standing alone before Belleau Wood as the sole obstacle between the Germans and Paris. It was then that Colonel (later Major General) Wendell C. Neville of the Marine Corps came to him with two collar ornaments, the Marine Corps emblems or devices. “Here,” he said, “we Marines think it is time you were wearing these.” General Harbord does say this much concerning these emblems:
... I loved the Marine Brigade, and the Globe and Anchor on my collar meant more to me than any other insignia that has ever belonged there, except the crossed sabers of the Cavalry. . . .
That affection kindled a like sentiment that soon pervaded the whole Marine Corps. It prompted us at home to perpetuate its memory. This was done by placing the life-sized portrait of the General in the Army and Navy Club at Washington. The President of the United States at the time wrote this reviewer touching this incident, in part, as follows:
. . . This portrait being the gift of the Marine Corps conveys not only a fine and thoroughly deserved compliment to General Harbord, but beyond that it suggests the particularly commendable amiability which marks the relationship among the different branches of the service. It recalls the fact that this very sentiment of generous cooperation and mutual helpfulness was precisely the factor which so greatly increased the efficiency of all branches of the service during the World War. . . .
It is this fact that he, General Harbord, in battle commanded an organization in which the three elements of our national defense were represented that makes his work of value to all of us of the naval service—whether Marine or Navy.
General Harbord’s later and more important, but less glorious work, in command of the Service of Supply, is all accurately and understanding^ portrayed. It has been said that it “paralleled in detail and difficulty the building of the Panama Canal,” and that General Harbord’s accomplishments there might be called “one of the outstanding pieces of service rendered by any officer of any army.” It is this phase of his activities in France that this reviewer would recommend for the study of his associates of the naval service. Though his problems were different from ours in the building of efficient lines of communications—that the front lines as they wavered and varied in their advance into the territory of the enemy might at all times be replenished in men and material for combat—the underlying principles are the same. There is much here that we may study with profit to ourselves and for the advantage of the naval service.
General Harbord’s work as a historian has exceeded the fondest expectations of those who have anxiously awaited its publication for these many years. He has given to us by his talent in temperament and judicial appraisal and analysis an understanding we never had before of the many controversial points connected with America’s effort in France. And his fine tribute to his commander and friend, John J. Pershing, will live in the memory of this reviewer forever.
The publication, The American Army in France, is, in fine spirit, dedicated by the author “To those who also served”—a thought once uttered by David the Israelite when faced with the problem of recognizing the services of and apportioning the spoils of war between those who served in the front line of battle and those who remained behind but also served:
But as his part is that goeth down to the battle, so shall his part be that tarrieth by the stuff: they shall part alike (I Samuel, 31:24).
THE REALITIES OF NAVAL HISTORY. By Brian Tunstall. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1936. 224 pages. 65.
Reviewed by Professor Allan Westcott, U. S. Naval Academy
The author of the present volume is Lecturer in History at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. In his book he has compressed what he terms the “realities” of British naval history from the fifteenth century to the close of the nineteenth century into 207 pages of text, with never a picture, map, or diagram. Much of his treatment is illuminating and all of it well informed. Indeed it is good to see the work of Laughton, Leyland, Clowes, and Corbett in the field of naval research thus worthily carried on.
How is such compression accomplished? Naturally it is by the shift of emphasis suggested in the title. Mr. Tunstall presumably would not deny reality to the battles and bloodshed, the tactical developments and the “glorious traditions” which are the predominant elements in most naval history. Navies, after all, are built for fighting, and their battles, like the births and marriages in a family record, stand out as the most striking evidence of what they have done. But the author is quite right in his view that there are other important and somewhat neglected aspects of naval history, involving especially the Navy’s peace-time activities, its financing and shore administration, its interrelation with domestic politics, the health and discipline of its crews and the upkeep of its material, and its influence in furthering national aims both in peace and in war—an influence which is often brought to bear without great fleet combats at sea.
It is with these aspects that the present volume is chiefly concerned. It emphasizes, for example, the fact that the attitude of the fleet and its officers was an important factor in the “Bloodless Revolution” of 1688, and that “by a piece of masterly inaction the English Navy secured the Protestant Succession, an event of far greater consequence than the Battle of Trafalgar.” Thus also the author can dismiss the famous battle of the Saints’ Passage in half a page, with no reference to its noteworthy tactical aspects, and yet find space for an interesting account of naval health problems in the West Indies, where in one year the fleet had 1,177 deaths from sickness to 59 from injuries in action, and where during the combined operations against Havana in 1762 the British lost only 560 in battle but 4,700 from disease.
In general, there is little on the tactics of naval battles but a good deal on their contribution to strategic and political aims. Along with this change of emphasis, there is little also of what the author condemns as the “patriotic mysticism” of naval history, and little of that sentimental glorification of national heroes which often defeats its own purpose and ceases to be history at all.
NAVAL RANK—Its Inception and Development. By Chief Gunner Lawrence Fasano, U. S. Navy. New York: Horizon House. 228 pp., 31 illustrations. 1936. $3.00.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Walter Ansel, U. S. Navy
Chief Gunner Fasano, who is at present on duty in the Third Naval District, has in this book contributed much to the store of historical knowledge of the origin and evolution of the various naval ranks and branches. He traces the development of the naval officer from earliest times and in so doing uncovers many new and entertaining side lights on our present-day traditions and practises, together with some lively anecdotes of early officers.
The warrant branches he regards as the progenitors of all officer branches and ranks save two ranks, those of captain and lieutenant, which were military titles introduced from shore at a time when the boatswain and master had already long held sway afloat. Apparently the military captain and his assistant, the lieutenant, worked themselves into billets aboard ship; they were often aboard with troops and it was only natural that the captain should concern himself with the working of the vessel in which he was being transported, until eventually he was designated to command one.
In the early days of our own Navy these two officers were the only commissioned ones; all others, the master, boatswain, gunner, carpenter and the civil officers (surgeon, chaplain, and purser) being warranted. The distinction between commission and warrant itself harks back to the British origin of the two types: the military courtier type of captain and lieutenant were commissioned by the sovereign, whereas the others were warranted by the Admiralty.
The old warrant officers the author holds to be the forerunners of our heads of departments. One fine old character among them, the sailing master, has disappeared, but he still has his counterpart as a head of department in the navigator of today. He was an indispensable jack of all trades whose responsibilities seemed to touch on all activities of the ship except her armament.
After logically developing the history of each rank and branch, including the old Engineer Corps, the author devotes interesting sections to the messes and to uniforms. The term wardroom is shown to have come from wardrobe, which was a small compartment aft on the main deck set aside to accommodate booty taken from prizes. A final chapter which discusses a variety of subjects such as precedence, pay, and honors, includes a table regulating prize money allocation for the year 1800. We find that the unit of division was the twentieth, the captain receiving three twentieths, the wardroom officers together two twentieths for distribution, the warrants another two twentieths, and so on until seven twentieths finally remained for distribution among the seamen, ordinary seamen, and marines.
LEARNING TO RACE; LEARNING TO SAIL; LEARNING TO CRUISE. By H. A. Calahan. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1935. $3.50, $2.50, and $2.50 per copy, respectively—$7.50 per set.
Reviewed by Lieutenant K. R. Belch, U. S. Navy
Only a complete master of his subject could condense as much valuable information into as little space as Mr. Calahan has used in his three volumes on the art of sailing. The author has given his readers the benefit of his 37 years’ experience and to anyone with the slightest love of the sea his books are of increasing interest from beginning to end.
He reveals a vast knowledge of the art to the initiated but since he ostensibly is talking to the novice, he uses the plainest of language, and modestly assumes the level of the average reader by drawing some of his most instructive lessons from his own failures. It all makes for very pleasant reading.
He considers sailing an art and a sport. He is loath to make the game a slave to science and where of necessity science has been reluctantly introduced, the facts are clearly explained in understandable language. He wastes no time on academic discussions but is concerned only with making the boat go.
Learning to Sail quite naturally starts with a description of types of boats, nomenclature, and vocabulary. He confines himself to the small sloop suitable to the beginner and carefully and minutely describes her preparation from ballasting to the bending on and hoisting of the sails. Nothing is taken for granted and every step is explained in detail with numerous illustrations. The theory of sailing is here very clearly presented. He casts off and instructs in all points of sailing—beating, reaching, and running.
He rightly considers “helmsmanship” the soul of the art and nowhere will one find that vague but very essential thing called “feel of the boat” so simply and articulately described.
Ways to get in and out of trouble, how to moor, care of sails and hull, and many little-known wrinkles connected with sailing are described with illustrations and personal experiences.
The author would be the last to say that one could learn to win races by reading a book, but for the man who has learned to sail, Learning to Race forms an extremely good guide. He sticks first to principles— the boat must go as fast as possible. He tells how to prepare the hull, tune up, and care for the sails and then proceeds to the actual sailing of her. Racing strategy and tactics, starting, zones of interference, all the fundamentals are fully covered. He divulges the sly cunning and tricks wherein, as always, man may prove himself superior to his tools and beat the inherently faster boat. His diagrams are simple and easy to remember when in a jam at the start or in a tight place at the turning buoy.
The author believes that cruising is done for pleasure and devotes the more important part of Learning to Cruise to showing how it can be done.
He, of course, describes the various rigs and types of cruisers, how to sail them, and their relative merits, but he considers the trim of the sheets of less importance than comfortable living conditions. He explains in great detail how this highly desirable condition may be obtained by proper stowage of gear, preparation of food, choice of clothing and, last but not least, cruising companions. His discussion of mooring and wrinkles in seamanship could be read with profit by any seaman.
Yachting etiquette and sea manners are not learned ashore but must be passed on from one gentleman sailor to another. The author has done this ably and easily.
To one who would like to sail; to one who would like to increase his skill or to one who just likes the sea and boats, these books are instructive and delightful.
DE GENGIS-KHAN A STALINE ou Les vicissitudes d’une manoeuvre strategique (1205-1935). By Admiral Castex. Paris: Société D’Editions Géographiques Maritimes Et Coloniales. 1935. 200 pages. Fr. 10.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Charles Moran, U. S. Naval Reserve
Seven centuries may seem a long time for a strategic problem to persist, yet in his latest work Admiral Castex takes as his theme the fact that the vicissitudes to which the original plan of conquest conceived by Gengis-Khan was subjected have their counterpart in the military difficulties of Soviet Russia. The situation involved is the time-honored one arising from the choice of two widely separated fronts. Gengis-Khan chose the Western sphere of operations as the more promising. Before launching an offensive in that direction, however, security demanded that his far-eastern neighbors be reduced. The task proved more difficult than its originator had anticipated, an attack on Japan in 1281 ending in disaster. The eastern or secondary front thereupon became the more vital and the successors of Gengis-Khan found themselves compelled to modify their strategy accordingly. Czarist Russia continued to pursue the eastern objectives, especially after the Crimean War and the disappointing peace of San Stephano barred the way to further European expansion.
With the advent of the Soviets the historic plan of Gengis-Kahn assumes new life. Russia responds to “an impulse, not only nationalistic but revolutionary as well, imbued with a mystical faith that takes hold of the soul.” The West again becomes the principal objective. To quote the declaration of one of the apostles of this new creed, Russia burns with “a desire to drive into the worm-eaten edifice of the bourgeois system the steel wedge of the proletarian dictatorship in arms.” Asia, however, refuses to yield to Bolshevik propaganda and in 1931 Japan enters upon the scene with seven divisions thrown into Manchuria. Faced by the possibility of a second Japanese war, Russia abandons her proselyting and concludes a series of non-aggression pacts with the capitalistic nations. The security thus obtained is short-lived. The sudden rise of Hitler in 1934 changes the outlook radically and, with the Fuehrer’s openly proclaimed threat of expansion to the East, Russia is frankly on the defensive on both fronts. With an inadequate transportation system and an imperfect industrial development Russia seems mired, but only momentarily.
This is the thesis the author expounds with his usual skill and erudition. Of special interest to Americans is the frank avowal of the debt Europe owes to Japan for having called a halt on the dangerous menace of Bolshevik propaganda, “a service to the cause of Western civilization that entitles her to be forgiven the trouble she occasions by her economic competition and her somewhat turbulent appetite.” As for any renewal of the Franco-Russian alliance, suggestive of the unholy treaty between Francis I and the Sultan, it would be “playing with fire” and “inviting a return to the days of 1241.”
For France to remain passive in the presence of the threat to her position would be “an inadmissible and degrading intellectual abdication.” Statesmanship demands “a persistent and continual adaptation of the will to an ever changing situation.” In discussing the importance of the reasoning faculties Admiral Castex transcends the bounds of strategy; his theme becomes inspiring philosophy, his text superlative literature.