“In Hoc Signo Vinces”
The results of the Battle of Jutland, the only action between the British Grand Fleet and German High Seas Fleet during the World War, may be classed under the three general heads of technical, strategical, and political. In order to understand more fully the results of this one great modem naval battle before going into a detailed examination, it is well to realize that in a strictly military sense, Jutland was not a victory for either side. The indecisiveness of the action resulted in controversy among naval critics that is likely to continue indefinitely; but in view of the magnitude of the forces engaged and the fact that it was the one fleet battle fought with weapons approaching those of today, any discussion of modern tactics must be based on Jutland for some time to come. The critics are almost unanimously agreed that the Battle of Jutland, although deciding certain issues and sustaining the general strategical scheme, was not in itself far-reaching in the immediate results achieved. Winston Churchill in his World Crisis remarks on the battle:
The ponderous, poignant responsibilities borne successfully, if not triumphantly, by Sir John Jellicoe during two years of faithful command, constitute unanswerable claims to the lasting respect of the nation. But the Royal Navy must find in other personalities and in other episodes the golden links which carried forward through the Great War the audacious and conquering traditions of the past.
With an understanding of the attitude of contemporary naval critics that called forth such a statement, we can proceed with a clearer appreciation of the situation in studying the results at hand.
The Battle of Jutland taught many new lessons in naval design and the innovations resulting are now common practice in present-day warship construction. Three British battle cruisers were lost during the engagement, and on each of these occasions a German salvo struck the ship, causing it to disappear instantly in the cloud of an explosion. Three theories were advanced concerning how such sudden destruction could overtake a first-line armored ship in the space of a few seconds. The shells might have penetrated the turrets and the flash roared down the hoists into the magazines; the magazines themselves might have been pierced by the plunging character of the fire; or the ships might not have been properly subdivided into water-tight compartments. It is still not known exactly what caused the loss of these ships, but changes have since been incorporated in modern men-of-war to protect against each of these contingencies. Naval constructors are now cognizant of the principles of flame-proof scuttles in the powder train, heavier protective decks and turret roofs, and proper water-tight integrity and under-water protection. In regard to other material Admiral Jellicoe remarked the superiority of the Germans in range finders, searchlights, smoke screens, armor-piercing shells, and star shells—hitherto unknown to the British. The greatest superiority of all, however, lay in the structural features of the German ships, and it is possible that Jellicoe assumed an inferiority of the British armor-piercing shell because of this power of the German ships to stay afloat. Moreover, all the German ships were equipped with systems of director firing, while all the British ships were not. Such technical discoveries at the Battle of Jutland brought widespread changes in modern naval construction.
In tactics, too, new principles developed. The account of the destroyer actions at Jutland is chosen here for closest perusal as being representative of how the tactical principles of all types were applied during the battle. The dominating feature of the story was the influence of the torpedo on Jellicoe’s tactics. At every crisis of the battle it was either what the German destroyers did or did not do that governed the British commander’s maneuvers. At the time of deployment he formed on the farthest rather than on the nearest division because of what German destroyers might do. When the Grand Fleet swung away to the east and lost all contact with the enemy for the rest of the battle, it was because of a destroyer attack. At this time 11 destroyers accomplished the feat of turning 27 dreadnoughts from their targets. Again, the pursuit was called off at nightfall because of the peril of destroyer attacks under the cover of darkness, and finally Admiral Jellicoe decided not to risk an action the following morning because his capital ships had no screening forces against torpedoes. In short, the danger of under-water damage by mine or torpedo, the old fear of “losing half a fleet before the first shot is fired,” was shown to be greatly over-emphasized.
At this point it is interesting to consider the tactical organization and dispositions of the German and English flotillas and the theory of each command as to their use. The German torpedo boats at Jutland were organized into flotillas of about ten boats each, though the tactical unit appeared to be the half-flotilla. They were not intended to act singly and had been so constantly drilled together that their tactical performance was in a state of high efficiency and they operated together in a polished and finished manner. The German cruising dispositions did not differ materially from the English, the light craft of both being employed as antisubmarine screens. But upon approach and deployment, the German flotillas concentrated on the unengaged side of their battle line, this position allowing them to exploit the distinctive traits of the German boats: high speed and a heavy torpedo armament. It was evidently the intention of the German staff to make tactical use of the torpedo boat in a manner radically different from that of the British. The Germans believed that the mission of the flotillas was primarily to cover the maneuvers of their own battle line, rather than to launch a decisive attack against the enemy. Their deployment disposition allowed them to cover a turn away or to take advantage of an opportunity to cross the “T.” It is not a question of the execution of their tactics that is open to criticism, but rather the German interpretation of the mission of the torpedo boat.
The British on the other hand had larger and more unwieldy flotillas. Owing to the demands of anti-submarine warfare, they were undergoing constant change in the organization of units and did not approach in performance the tactical polish of the Germans. The British ships, however, were built for the offensive, being individually larger, carrying heavier guns, and were quite capable of operating and attacking singly. They were the typical destroyers as differentiated from the torpedo boat, possessing in a slightly less degree the torpedo threat of the torpedo boat. The British destroyers were stationed on the flanks during approach and in the van and rear on deployment. In such a disposition their mission was entirely offensive and they were favorably situated to counter enemy torpedo attacks on their battle line’s engaged bow or quarter. At the same time they were in a position to move to an attack station on the enemy’s engaged bow and were placed at a distance from the battle line so proportioned to the expected battle range that they would not come between the lines of fire of the opposing battle lines, and where target foreshortening and rate of change of range would be at a maximum when attacking. The British dispositions provided for a co-ordinated, powerful, and simultaneous attack on the German battle line with gun and torpedo, the true tactical offensive. The only disadvantage was that it did not provide for a counter against torpedo boats moving to attack the center or rear squadrons of their own battle line if the line were a long one.
The German and British dispositions were equally mobile in meeting a countermarch but, when factors of gunfire are considered, it is apparent that the Germans contemplated defensive flotilla tactics. Under normal conditions, the attack move of the German destroyers to the firing position would involve a maximum rate of change of range of only about 350 yards a minute and practicably negligible foreshortening. The same move by the British would involve a rate of change of range over three times as great and nearly maximum foreshortening. It is obvious that the dispositions of the German and English flotillas were made with antipodal intentions and that a contrary opinion existed concerning the function of torpedo boats.
Let us examine the conditions that led to the development of the German flotilla tactical theory and see why the smaller boat and their standard tactical dispositions were adopted. On account of the later development of the German Navy and its relative inferiority in numbers and because of geographical limitations, Germany found that the torpedo represented a cheap means of obtaining equality in the shortest time, and there resulted a close tactical relationship between the German battleship and torpedo boat. The characteristics of the German torpedo boats were their small size, 50 per cent being about 500 tons, their high speed of over 33 knots, their heavy torpedo armament (3-2 ratio over British), and their light gun armament. From one to two thirds of their ready torpedoes could be fired on the bow, such construction seemingly indicative of the offensive. Considering the material, personnel, and esprit of the German flotilla, it was essentially an attack unit, but on further investigation of German maneuvers and characteristics of other types, facts are found which belie the design of the torpedo boats. The German dreadnoughts were built to develop maximum volume of fire astern. Studying the “break through” maneuver of the German flotilla, it is manifest that the primary intention of the maneuver was to afford a counter against an enemy closing and punishing the German battle line, and the “break through” was almost invariably followed by a turn away. Therefore, the intended offensive tactics of the German flotilla can only be considered as a spasmodic blow delivered by a fleet in retreat, and not as a powerful blow to be pushed home with the support of gunfire to crush the enemy completely. This conception of the German theory was borne out at Jutland, where the actual offensive tactics of these ships were carried out to a large extent while the German battle line was retiring.
The British fleet was built around the gun, for the gun is the weapon of offense and does not expend its usefulness at one blow. Such were the contemplated tactics of the two flotillas in battle and the spirit behind these tactics, but a study of the destroyer actions at Jutland finds a slightly different story. The Germans delivered six main destroyer attacks during the day action and the British only two. At first glance it appears that the English flotillas were not utilized dynamically, but subsequent investigation reveals that they were really held in leash not by defensive tactical indoctrination, but by the British high command. Of the six destroyer attacks made by the Germans only one was pressed home and only two and part of another gained good firing positions. Both of the British attacks were pressed home and attained good firing positions, although the volume of fire developed was poor and one attack was disjoined and was made on the initiative of the destroyer captains. Though the actions of the two flotillas were only obscurely parallel with their training, a study of the battle seems to vindicate the British theory. Two of the German attacks covered important turns away, but they apparently did not try to choose converging tracks or target angles less than 90° as long as their threat accomplished its purpose. The general conclusion to be drawn is that the Germans had the less powerful theory but applied it skillfully, whereas the British had the better theory but did not apply it. During the night action, Jellicoe employed his destroyers to extend northward the cordon of the Grand Fleet between the Germans and their bases to shoulder them off to the westward if they tried to break through on that end. He cannot be blamed for not foreseeing that the Germans could break through almost unscathed, and this is to the credit of Admiral von Scheer’s determination. The splendid torpedo defense organization of the German ships, the lack of information furnished the English destroyers, and the utter inadequacy of the individual English ships to meet the night fighting conditions contributed materially to the German escape.
Recapitulating, the British destroyer actions at Jutland bore out the individual dash, initiative, and courage of the men, but the effectiveness of the British flotillas was weakened by an imperfect and over- rigid tactical organization. Results show that torpedo-boat tactics require a much greater volume of fire than was developed at Jutland, that the best position for them is at closest possible range with target angles between 30° and 60° on the engaged bow of the enemy battle line. There should be more than one firing point with a convergence of spreads, and co-ordination must be developed to the highest efficiency. The only conclusion that can be drawn regarding the value of torpedo attack is that Jutland did not give a true indication of the offensive qualities of the destroyer because of a disinclination of the British high command to order an attack or to encourage zealous initiative to do so on the part of subordinates. The destroyers at Jutland indicated their ability to cover a maneuver, in fact the escape of the High Seas Fleet can be attributed directly to the admirable manner in which the German torpedo boats covered the last turn away just before nightfall. At any rate it was the torpedo threat that caused the Grand Fleet to lose contact and allowed the Germans to retire. As a threat, we know that destroyers can be invaluable in naval war operations; as a powerful offensive weapon, Jutland did not prove their ability, but undoubtedly a more audacious interpretation of their tactics would disclose the mighty destructive power of the flotilla as a co-ordinate unit of the fleet.
The attempt of the British to centralize in a single hand the whole conduct in action of so large a fleet failed in the case of the destroyers. The same might be said of the light cruiser squadrons, which were not used as they might have been to parry and rupture hostile torpedo attacks, but such attacks were dealt with by the passive turn away of the whole fleet. A fine application of tactical principles was displayed, however, by the British Second Light Cruiser Squadron attached to Beatty’s Battle Cruiser Fleet, Commodore Goodenough commanding. This squadron was the first to make contact with the German fleet and, although communications proved disappointing, Commodore Goodenough carried out in commendable fashion his mission of obtaining information of the enemy. When Beatty turned to the north, Commodore Goodenough without orders kept to the south to establish contact with the German Battle Fleet and hung on its flank near enough to report its position to the commander in chief. He underwent a heavy fire but handled his frail ships so skillfully as to avoid serious loss. At the same time either the constant maneuvering he was forced to perform or a defect in the British communications system made his reports seriously inaccurate. Whatever the cause, this error created a difficulty for the commander in chief, who 50 miles away was trying to locate the enemy for attack by the Grand Fleet. After the battle joined, little opportunity was given to the Second Light Cruiser Squadron to scout until the Germans disappeared about nightfall, when Goodenough drew out from the battle line to the south to reconnoiter. At seven o’clock he again reported the position and course of the High Seas Fleet.
In commenting on the manner in which Commodore Goodenough’s force carried out its mission, it can only be said that it was unfortunate his early contact reports were not received correctly, for they were certainly most daringly obtained. The squadron carried out its mission in admirable fashion in locating the High Seas Fleet, the purpose of scouts being to obtain as much information as possible for the commander in chief, without which he is helpless properly to deploy his forces. It may well be said that proper disposition at the beginning of battle saves time and time is half the battle. The British Second Light Cruiser Squadron performed its mission thoroughly in scouting ahead to locate the German Battle Fleet and clinging to its flank to report its position and dispositions. The squadron also made a valuable reconnaissance from the battle line just before the night action and throughout the battle held steadfastly to its purpose of tracking the enemy and furnishing invaluable movement and contact reports of his positions and courses. The armored cruisers, however, were not as lucky and were found to serve only as good targets and death traps. Concerning the operations of the battleships, the fast division of Queen Elizabeths should have been used to engage the enemy on the opposite side and hold him up to battle, but all the varied applications of modern tactical principles are very difficult to analyze with so little historical precedent. Suffice it to say that after the battle these new, more flexible principles were recognized, and another step forward in the evolution of naval tactics was the result.
With the retirement of the Germans after Jutland, the Allies gained in some measure a definite strategical and economic advantage. The control of the sea did remain in the hands of the English. The “blockade” had been successfully maintained, and on this factor depended the ultimate outcome of the war, because Germany was slowly strangled by the denial of the materials and supplies which were the lifeblood she so sorely needed. With the subsequent relief of the vigilance of the Grand Fleet, important men and materials were diverted to the Army in France. These results were tangible enough it would seem, but let us consider what would have been the outcome if the German fleet had been completely destroyed. Such a victory would have been priceless. The spring of 1916 was an ebb point in the fortunes of the Allies: the Verdun offensive was not halted, the Somme drive had not yet begun, the Russians were beaten far back in their own territory, the Italians had retreated, and there was rebellion in Ireland. The annihilation of the High Seas Fleet would have reversed the situation with dramatic suddenness and would have at least marked the turning point of the war. Without a German Battle Fleet, the British could have forced the fighting almost to the very harbors of the German coast, bottling up every exit with a barrage of mines. The blockade could have been drawn close to the coast defenses. As it was, entry to the Baltic and consequent aid to Russia was still denied, the U-boat menace of 1917 which came so near to winning the war was still threatening, and the possible policy of more aggressive action on the part of the Admiralty was discouraged by Jutland. It is interesting to conjecture what might have happened to the United States had the British at Jutland vitally smashed the sea power of Germany. Would there then have been any submarine campaign? Is it possible that such a victory would have kept the United States out of the World War?
However, Jutland did react favorably for the Allies. It was a victory for the British in that they had forced the Germans to return to their bases. Although the German press proclaimed a great victory, the people soon saw through this propaganda when their bread supply dropped still lower and lower. The morale of the British fleet went up and that of the German down. The Germans saw that a superior force opposed them, their spirit drooped, and the first seeds of the German naval mutiny were sown. The “victory at sea” wrought an immense psychological influence and the Allies were encouraged to fight with renewed vigor on the field; they knew the sea was theirs. While the German claim to a triumph is ridiculous, it is equally so to argue that there was no need of a British victory at Jutland, that all the fruits of victory were gained as it was. The subsequent history of the war tells a different tale. The important advantages that might have accrued from the annihilation of the German fleet must, however, be compared with the consequences to Britain and her Allies that would have immediately followed from a decisive British defeat. The trade and food supply of the British Isles would have been paralyzed, her armies on the Continent cut off from their bases by a superior naval force. All the transportation of the Allies would have been jeopardized and hampered. The United States could not have intervened and starvation and invasion would have descended upon the British people. Ruin utter and final would have overwhelmed the Allied cause. Although the Germans might claim that they won at Jutland by comparison of material losses, and although the British might claim every kind of strategical victory, it is nevertheless true that Jutland derives its importance not because it wrought tremendous and vital immediate results, but because it was the greatest naval battle of history and the only modern one of any consequence. It is the only index by which we can judge what may happen in future naval battles. If for this reason alone, the results of Jutland deserve careful consideration.