The story of the part played by Brazil in the World War, and especially that played by her Navy, is of interest for many reasons, one of the most outstanding of which is the fact that of the eight nations of Latin America which declared war on Germany, Brazil was the only one to attempt to take an active part in the great conflict. Lack of transport facilities and political unrest at home prevented her from sending to France anything more than a medical unit and a few aviators, but her Navy was more active and, had the war lasted longer, might have had an opportunity to engage the enemy. The narration of the Brazilian Navy's participation in the war should be especially interesting to American naval officers and to all Americans interested in naval history, for this country's relations with Brazil have always been most friendly, and the United States Navy, through its several missions to Brazil, has contributed largely to that nation's reorganization of its maritime forces. During the war American advice was freely given to Brazil and received with appreciation. The co-operation between the two navies was close. In 1917 Brazil placed a large order in this country for naval and air equipment, and in the following year sent the dreadnought Sao Paulo to New York for a thorough refit.
Of the even score of Central and South American republics, eight declared war against the Central Powers: Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Five broke off diplomatic relations: Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay, while seven remained neutral: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Salvador, and Venezuela.
The political causes which finally induced the Brazilian government to declare war on October 26, 1917, were quite complicated, and not unlike those which a few months earlier had drawn the United States in on the side of the Allies. Space does not permit this article's giving more than a brief review of these causes and of the events immediately preceding the breaking off of diplomatic relations (April 11, 1917) and of the later declaration of war.
On the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 the Brazilian government quite properly declared its neutrality. This, however, by no means indicated that Brazil was indifferent to the struggle. The sympathies of the great majority of Brazilians were with the Allies, and especially France, for which nation Brazil felt great love, for she had long been an admirer of French culture. She also had great esteem for several of the other Allied nations. Financial and commercial relations with Great Britain had been of long standing. The entry of Italy into the struggle in 1915 against the Central Powers naturally caused the large and influential Italian population to definitely espouse the cause of the Allies.
As the war progressed friction between Brazil and Germany increased steadily. Just as in the case of the United States, Germany's unlawful use of the submarine was one of the most important causes which finally brought Brazil to the point of declaring war.
The first of the long series of incidents which at last dragged Brazil into the war occurred May 2, 1916. On that date the Brazilian steamer Rio Branco was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine. Brazil promptly protested, but received little satisfaction. The incident aroused very strong anti-German feeling throughout the nation. Relations between Brazil and Germany continued to go from bad to worse until January 31,1917, on which date Germany announced to the world that her submarines would sink without warning all merchant vessels, enemy and neutral, within certain defined areas off the British Isles and the coasts of other Allied nations. On February 9 the Brazilian government made a forceful reply to Germany, setting forth its attitude regarding Germany's unlawful and inhumane decision. On April 5, one day before the United States declared war on Germany, a U-boat sank the Brazilian steamer Parana. No attempt was made to rescue the crew, of which three perished; the remainder were picked up by a British steamer and two French destroyers. This sinking aroused a violent storm of indignation throughout Brazil and Germany's suggestion that the ship had struck a French or British mine was received with derision. Events from then on moved with rapidity. On April 11 the German Minister, Herr von Pauli, was handed his passports. On May 20 another Brazilian ship, the Tijuca, was sunk off the French coast. On June 1 Brazil revoked her neutrality decree issued in 1914, and on the same day the president signed one authorizing the utilization of German steamers lying in Brazilian harbors. The next day the ships, 42 in number, were seized, the Brazilian government taking pains to state that the ships were not being confiscated but simply requisitioned for use. Thirty-three were so badly damaged that they could not have been repaired without foreign aid.
Although it has never been so stated officially, it seems likely that Brazil's revocation of her neutrality decree at this particular time was dictated, in part, at least, by the impending visit of Cruiser Division II, of our Pacific Squadron, which under the command of Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton was expected in two weeks. Under the provisions of The Hague Convention the stay of warships of a belligerent power in neutral ports was limited to 24 hours. Hence Brazil would not have been able to extend full hospitality to the visiting cruisers of the United States, with which nation she had enjoyed a long and firm friendship. Whether this supposition be correct or not, it is of interest to note that almost immediately after the revocation of the neutrality proclamation of 1914 President Wenceslau Braz issued orders to state and port authorities to show every hospitality to the visiting fleet.
On June 14 the armored cruisers Pittsburgh (flag), South Dakota, Pueblo, and Frederick arrived at Bahia, in northern Brazil, and Admiral Caperton was officially welcomed by Dr. J. J. Seabra, the governor of the state.
The next day the Frederick stood out for Rio. On the same day the United States embassy at Rio, in order to dissipate all misunderstandings concerning the presence of this naval force in Brazilian waters, issued the following statement:
It is not correct, as some papers have announced, that the American squadron arrived without the knowledge of the Brazilian government…The purpose of the squadron is to patrol the waters of the South Atlantic in order to guarantee the free passage of merchant ships. This difficult task has hitherto been fulfilled by the fleet of His Britannic Majesty, which now, with the arrival of the American squadron, will be able to take up other work.
On June 17 the U.S.S. Nereus, fuel ship, anchored at Bahia. On the 20th the Pittsburgh, South Dakota, and Pueblo left Bahia for Rio de Janeiro where they joined the Frederick on the 23d. The Nereus arrived three days later. On the 30th the U.S.S. Glacier, supply ship, joined the squadron.
On July 4 part of the crews of each of the armored cruisers took part in a big parade. Other units in this military display were Brazilian soldiers and sailors and detachments of British and French sailors. The populace of Rio turned out in large numbers to witness this demonstration and was very enthusiastic.
About the same time, as a result of a conference between Admiral Caperton and the Brazilian Minister of Marine, Vice Admiral Alexandrinode Alencar, an agreement was reached regarding the co-operation of the Brazilian Navy with the United States and British and French navies in patrolling the South Atlantic. According to the arrangement, Admiral Caperton's squadron was to patrol the high seas from Fernando de Noronha Island, near Pernambuco, to Rio de Janeiro; the British squadron from that point to the River Plata, and the French from Fernando de Noronha to the West Indies. The Brazilian Navy was to undertake the patrol of the coast, and for that purpose was organized into three divisions.
It was agreed that the patrol should commence as soon as the boiler and condenser tubes, which had been ordered in the United States for several of the units, were received. These were urgently needed for the scouts Bahia and Rio Grande do Sul, whose boilers were in such a deplorable condition that 18 knots was the best speed the ships could attain. The hulls and engines of a number of the destroyers were also in a very bad state.
It was expected that the necessary repairs to the ships could be completed in time to allow the patrol to begin operations about September 1. On account of delay in receiving material and of a coal shortage, this date was later extended to October 1.
It was considered probable that the merchant fleet of the Brazilian Lloyd, owned by the government, would co-operate in this patrol with the Brazilian Navy.
It is scarcely necessary to point out the importance of the arrangement outlined in the foregoing paragraphs and the effect which it might be expected to have in developing the political relations between the United States and Brazil; in checking the devastations of German surface raiders and submarines; preventing either from receiving supplies or aid of any kind from the shore; and in protecting the Brazilian coasts from attack.
Attention should be invited to the fact, however, that as Brazil was not yet a belligerent, she had no right of search outside of territorial waters and could not therefore take any action against raiders on the high seas. This naturally had a very deterring effect upon the value of the Brazilian naval patrol.
In the second week of August an administration leader stated in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies that the Brazilian Navy would only maintain a defensive coast patrol whose purpose would be to prevent the establishment of German submarine bases on the coast and to frustrate any attempts at communication between raiders and the shore. The Brazilian Navy it was stated, had no intention of patrolling the high seas, which task it was expected would be performed by the Allied navies.
At first thought the suggestion that German submarines could establish any sort of supply base along the Brazilian coast would sound quite preposterous indeed, but it must be remembered that Brazil has a very long coast line (some 4,000 miles); that the Brazilian Navy was small and consequently its capacity for efficient patrol limited; and that a not inconsiderable part of the population, especially in several of the southern states was strongly pro-German.
On August 8 Vice Admiral Alencar informed the United States naval attaché in Rio that, as from that date, a destroyer would patrol the outside entrance to the harbor of Rio de Janeiro from sunset to sunrise. Vessels leaving port and passing the forts at night would be required to have certain recognition signals which were to be arranged with the local port authorities.
On August 14 the American embassy in Rio, replying to an inquiry from the State Department in Washington, cabled that the Brazilian Lloyd had refused to part with any interned German vessels. Our government had desired to purchase a number of the largest of these for use in transporting troops and war material to France.
Brazil's seizure on June 2 of the German merchant vessels lying in her harbors naturally brought from Germany strong protests, to which the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the able Dr. Nilo Pecanha, a former president of the Republic, replied that the ships had been taken over as reprisals for the torpedoing of Brazilian merchant ships by German submarines. The uncertainty regarding the legal status of the former German ships was later to cause the Brazilian government much concern and greatly to embarrass her delegates to the Peace Conference. It may be of interest to mention in passing that one of these former German ships, the former SS. Valesia, is at present serving in the Brazilian Navy as fleet and destroyer flotilla repair ship.
Early in August the Brazilian Ministry of Marine placed a large naval order in the United States. This included, among other things, 6 military hydroplanes, 2 practice hydroplanes, four 90-hp. Curtiss motors (for hydroplanes already possessed by the Brazilian Navy), 6 Lewis machine guns (to be installed in the 6 planes ordered), anti-aircraft guns, fire-control apparatus, two 20-foot range finders for the dreadnoughts Sao Paulo and Minas Geraes, two 12-foot range finders for the scouts Bahia and Rio Grande do Sul, ten 80-cm. range finders for the half-score destroyers of the Para class, and material for a naval war game.
The period from June to October, 1917, was one filled with tension. With the Brazilian Merchant Marine, now augmented by the former German ships and guarded by national as well as United States and Allied warships, it was obvious that a single additional overt act on the part of Germany toward Brazil would in all probability bring the latter nation into the conflict as a full belligerent.
News was received in Brazil on October 23 that the steamer Macau (former German Palatia, one of the ships seized on June 2) had been sunk by a German submarine off the Spanish coast and her captain taken prisoner. The next day President Braz sent a special message to Congress, pointing out that four Brazilian steamers had been lost, and that in the latest sinking Brazilian national pride and sovereignty had suffered beyond measure by the capture of the Macau's captain. He added that the time had come when it only remained for Brazil to take such action as might be necessary "to maintain uninjured the dignity of the nation."
Two days later the Brazilian Congress passed the declaration of war against Germany. The Senate passed the resolution by a unanimous vote and the Chamber of Deputies by 149-1. Thus did Brazil, alone among all the nations of South America, enter the war on the side of the Allies. The declaration of war was received with demonstrations of enthusiasm by the Brazilians. Unfortunately, these were accompanied by attacks on German property in the southern states of Brazil, which, as has been seen, contained a large German element.
Brazil's first belligerent act was to attempt to seize the German gunboat Eber lying in the harbor of Bahia. This move, however, was frustrated by the crew, who scuttled the ship. They were "imprisoned" in the Naval Sanatorium, where they received excellent treatment throughout the war.
Before proceeding any further, it would be well to examine Brazil's military and naval situation at the time she entered the war.
Army.—In1914 the Brazilian Army wasorganized according to the law of 1908, which made military service obligatory for every Brazilian between the ages of 21 and 45. In effect, however, the law had never been strictly enforced, and the Army was largely recruited by voluntary enlistment. Its peace strength was roughly 25,000 officers and men of all arms. After Brazil's entrance into the war this force was deemed totally inadequate, and on December 17, 1917, Congress authorized the President to increase the number to 54,000. The additional recruits were selected by drawing lots. For a number of reasons the Brazilian Army was unable to take an active part in the war, save for a small aviation unit sent to France.
Navy.—Latein 1917 the Brazilian Navy possessed the following fighting ships: dreadnought battleships (encouraqados) Sao Paulo and Minas Geraes, laid down in 1907; displacement 19,280 tons; armament twelve 12-inch, twenty-two 4.7-inch; speed 21 knots. Coast defense battleships (encouraqados guardacostas) Deodoro and Floriano, laid down 1896 and 1897, respectively; 3,100 tons; two 9.4-inch and four 4.7-inch guns, two 18-inch T.T.; and 15 knots speed. Scout cruisers (cruzadores ligeiros) Bahia and Rio Grande do Sul, 1909, 3,100 tons, ten 4.7-inch guns and two 18-inch T.T.; 26 knots nominal speed (actually only good for about 18 knots in 1917). Old protected cruiser Barroso, 1897, 3,600 tons, six 6-inch and four 4.7–inch guns and three T.T.; 20 knots speed. Old cruiser Almirante Tamandare, 1887,4,500 tons, ten 6-inch, 17 knots. Mine layer Republica; torpedo gunboats Tamayo, Tupy, and Tymbira; 10 destroyers: Para, Piauhy, Amazonas, Matto Grosso, Rio Grande do Norte, Parahyba, Alagoas, Santa Catharina, Parana and Sergipe, all laid down 1908-10, 650 tons, two 4-inch guns and two 18-inch T.T., and 27 knots speed. There were also five small torpedo boats of 130-150 tons, three small submarines, F-1, F-3, and F-5, and a number of gunboats, transports, tugs, etc.
The two dreadnoughts were in fair condition, but had no director control. The two scout cruisers had their boilers and condensers in bad condition and could not reach more than 70 per cent of their designed speed. The pair of coast defense ships were old and of scant fighting value. The same applies to the two antiquated protected cruisers. Of the 10 destroyers and the Para class, several had their engines or hulls in bad condition.
The total personnel was 14,000 officers and men—a very large number in proportion to the total naval tonnage. The established scheme for the executive branch of the officers corps was as follows: 4 vice admirals, 8 rear admirals, 20 captains 40 commanders, 80 lieutenant commanders 200 lieutenants, and 200 lieutenants (j.g.). There were some excesses in each of these grades. The general efficiency of the naval personnel at that time was not all that it might have been; financial stringency had limited the amount of exercising the fleet had been able to carry out. But the spirit of the naval personnel as a whole was fairly good, for the Brazilian Navy could point with pride to its naval traditions created by such men as Admirals Saldanha, Tamandare, Abreu, and others.
In the meantime the Marine Ministry was pushing ahead with its preparations to place the Navy in a condition to undertake active operations, as naval assistance had been requested by Great Britain soon after Brazil entered the war. On December 21, 1917, the British government, on behalf of the Admiralty, and through the Brazilian legation in London, inquired of Rio if Brazil would send a force of light cruisers and destroyers to European waters to co-operate with the Allied naval forces. The Admiralty offered to supply coal, provisions, and repairs in return for payment. To this request the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister replied on December 31, 1917, with the following cable:
Brazilian Minister, London, No. 230.
In reply to your 228. Your Excellency may informthe Admiralty that the Federal Government, fulfilling its duty of giving a practical expression of Brazil's solidarity with the Allied Nations, has ordered a fleet to make ready, composed of the scouts Rio Grande do Sui and Bahia and the dest royers Parahyba, Rio Grande do Norte, Piauhy, and Santa Catharina, which will leave to take part in the operations, under the orders of the Single Naval Command in the port allotted to it.
The ships are getting ready and should arrive in European waters on the…next.
I should also inform Your Excellency that the Minister of the Navy stated to the President of the Republic that the Brazilian Navy received without hesitation and, indeed, with enthusiasm the order to leave for the seat of war.
Nilo Pecanha
This cable brings us to the end of 1917. On January 20, 1918, Admiral Sims, Commander in Chief of United States Naval Forces operating in European waters, sent the following cable, in regard to Brazilian co-operation, to Naval Operations in Washington:
To Opnav. Washington
Have taken matter up in advance [of meeting of Allied Council-not again until January 22] with British Admiralty and find them perfectly agreeable to the proposal that Brazilian vessels co-operate with ours at Gibraltar. Suggest that proposed arrangements be made by State Department. If no official communication is received on the subject before the adjournment of the Council, matter will be taken up unofficially with the members. Preliminary operation of Brazilian forces from Azores Islands would not appear to be essential to the execution of the proposed plan. Am informed vessels need boiler repairs which could best be made at Gibraltar.
Sims
In his General Report dated February 1, 1918, Admiral Sims said in reference to the operation of the Brazilian cruiser and destroyer squadron in co-operation with United States forces:
Referring to the disposition of the two cruisers and four destroyers that the Brazilian government proposes to send to Europe to co-operate with the Allies, the question of their operating with the American forces was taken up with the First Sea Lord and discussed in the presence of Admiral Browning and Admiral Grant, the former being the flag officer recently in command of British Naval Forces on the American coast, and the latter his relief who has left for his new station. The result of this discussion was that the First Sea Lord expressed the entire willingness of the Admiralty that the Brazilian forces should operate with the American forces, and advised that they be based upon Gibraltar.
The latter is desirable because it is understood that these vessels need to have some of their boilers re-tubed and this can best be done in a British port as the vessels were built in British shipyards.
For the next several months the Brazilian Marine Ministry busied itself with repairing (as best it could) and exercising the ships which were to be sent to cooperate with our naval forces in northwest African and European waters. Rear Admiral Pedro Max Fernando de Frontin, the former commander of the Southern Patrol Division, was appointed to command the naval force.
Finally, on May 6 the Minister of Marine, Vice Admiral Alencar, advised the Navy Department that on the following day the four destroyers would leave Rio for Gibraltar via Bahia and Rio Grande do Norte. The cruisers Bahia, Rio Grande do Sul, and Barroso were due to leave May 11. The last named ship was to continue to Europe only in case the Rio Grande do Sul was disabled by her condensers, which were then leaking (for various reasons, the condensers ordered in the United States were never delivered to the Brazilian Navy). The auxiliary cruiser Belmonte (former German steamer Valesia), detailed as tender to the destroyer division, was not quite ready, but was expected to leave Rio about May 15 to join the remainder of the squadron at Bahia.
This schedule, though not carried out to the letter, was fulfilled as nearly as was found possible. On May 11 the Bahiaand the four destroyers left Rio for Bahia, where they arrived on the 15th. On the 14th the Rio Grande do Sui, flying the flag of Rear Admiral Frontin, and accompanied by the Barroso, left Rio for Bahia to join the other units there. President Wenceslau Braz visited Admiral Frontin on board his flagship just before her departure. The two cruisers arrived at Bahia on the 18th. The Belmonte did not leave Rio to join the squadron until July 8.
While thus making arrangements to send this light force to the theater of operations, the Brazilian Naval Ministry was not neglecting the larger units of its Navy. As pointed out earlier, the two dreadnoughts lacked director fire-control. On May 25 the Ministry definitely decided to have both ships undergo a complete refit in the United States. It was determined to send first the Sao Paulo to this country. She was to arrive in time to take part in the Fourth of July celebrations, and then go to the Brooklyn Navy Yard to have the fire-control gear installed. It was estimated that about six months would be required to do this work, whereas, had it been done in the Rio Naval Arsenal, two years would have been required. It was at first expected that the Sao Paulo would leave Rio June 6 for New York via Barbadoes and Guantanamo. She did not leave on that date, however, and on June 11 Admiral Caperton notified the Navy Department that he had learned that the President of Brazil had refused to permit the Sao Paulo to proceed without both the U.S.S. Cincinnati and the U.S.S. Raleigh in company. The American Ambassador at Rio cabled the State Department requesting arrangement for the Cincinnati, then at Rio awaiting completion of repairs on the Raleigh, to accompany the Sao Paulo. This request granted, Admiral Caperton urged the Minister of Marine to permit the Sao Paulo to leave Rio June 12 in company with the Cincinnati, the Raleigh to follow as soon as repairs had been completed. This suggestion did not meet with Vice Admiral Alencar's entire approval, however and it was some time before the Sao Paulo was permitted to leave Rio for the United States.
Sometime during June or July (unfortunately it has not been possible to ascertain the exact date) the squadron under Rear Admiral Frontin's command left Bahia and proceeded either to a port in the state of Rio Grande do Norte or to Fernando de Noronha Island, lying about 125 miles off the coast. At all events on July 31, it sailed at sunset from Fernando de Noronha for Sierra Leone, a small British colonial possession on the west coast of Africa, lying between French Guinea and the Republic of Liberia. The ships in company were: the cruisers Rio Grande do Sui and Bahia, destroyers Parahyba, Santa Catharina, Piauhy, and Rio Grande do Norte, and the auxiliary cruiser Belmonte. It must indeed have been an inspiring sight to those fortunate enough to witness the departure of the squadron, as the sleek, dark gray cruisers and destroyers steamed out of port, their sharp bows cleaving the waters, raising clean, white bow waves, and heading eastward into the gathering darkness toward Africa, the setting sun slowly sinking astern of them.
After ten uneventful days of continuous cruising the squadron arrived at Sierra Leone August 9. Here it remained for several weeks. On September 8 all units, save the destroyer Piauhy, arrived at Dakar, that place having been selected as the operations base of the squadron. En route from Sierra Leone to Dakar the Piaulzy had been ordered to proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, where she arrived September 11. Rear Admiral Frontin and his force were given exclusive charge of the triangle St. Vincent-Dakar-Sierra Leone, one of the zones most frequently visited by German submarines which lay in wait for the passage of convoys of Allied merchantmen. It was the dutyof the Brazilian squadron to sweep up mines sowed by German U-boats and raiders and to guarantee the safe passage of the convoys. This arduous duty was faithfully performed by Frontin's command until early in November, when thesquadron was ordered to Gibraltar, it being intended that it should take part in Mediterranean operations.
During this 7-week period while the squadron was based upon Dakar the officers and crews of the ships suffered terribly from the ravages of influenza. On October 24 the destroyer Piauhy arrived at Dakar from St. Vincent and rejoined the squadron.
Let us leave for a moment Admiral Frontin and his ships at Dakar, and see what was going on at home during this time.
On September 21 Admiral Benson, Chief of Naval Operations, replying to an inquiry from Admiral Sims, notified the latter that the Navy Department had approved his suggestion that mine-sweeping facilities be placed at the disposal of the Brazilian Navy, presumably for use both by the coastal patrol squadrons in home, waters and Rear Admiral Frontin's overseas operations squadron. Admiral Benson added that, if the Navy Department received the request through the proper channels, it would detail an officer of experience to organize a mine-sweeping flotilla, as well as furnish Brazil with kites and other mine-sweeping material as required. The Chief of Naval Operations also pointed out to Admiral Sims that the Navy Department had assumed from his cable that Brazil could furnish the mine sweepers, otherwise the number that could be sent her would be limited in view of other demands.
Before any of these plans could be carried out the war came to an end. Early in October, while the Sao Paulowas at New York undergoing her refit, the British Admiralty requested that Brazil send the dreadnought to Europe on completion of her refit to co-operate with the British Navy. For a time it was expected that she might join the Grand Fleet and a large amount of material was sent out from England for this purpose.
Let us now return to the operations of the Brazilian squadron engaged in convoy patrol off the African coast. On November 3 Rear Admiral Frontin, in obedience to orders, left Dakar for Gibraltar with the Bahia, Piauhy, Parahyba, and Santa Catharina. He flew his flag on the Bahia, having transferred to her from the Rio Grande do Sul, which had to be left at Dakar on account of recurring trouble with her condensers. She and the destroyer Rio Grande do Norte remained at Dakar to continue the convoy patrol as best they could. The Belmonte also stayed there for a time.
Enthusiasm ran high among the officers and men of the Bahia and the three destroyers which steamed out of Dakar for Gibraltar; hopes were entertained that this would mean more active and exciting service—a chance to strike a real blow at the enemy. Alertness was the keynote, a sharp outlook was kept for lurking German U-boats and this eagerness to engage the enemy almost resulted in a most unfortunate disaster.
On November 10 the towering Rock of Gibraltar came into view and in a short time the four vessels were entering the famous Strait. Suddenly the lookouts raised the cry: "Submarines in sight!" At once "Action Stations" was sounded, and the eager crew of the flagship opened fire upon what were thought to be three German U-boats. Fortunately, before any hits were made, the grave mistake was discovered, and the Bahia ceased firing. The three "enemy submarines" were the American sub chasers 126, 190, and 330.
The Brazilian squadron cannot in fairness be censured for its hasty action, for mistaken attacks were a frequent occurrence in the naval operations of the 1914-18 conflict. Our own Navy was guilty of a number of these attacks on Allied warships and was the victim of others aside from the one just mentioned. Unfortunately, some of these did not end as happily as this one. A splendid article dealing with these mistaken attacks, "Mistaken Attacks in the World War," by Lieutenant Commander Leonard Doughty, Jr., U. S. Navy, was published in the December, 1934, issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings.
The day following the squadron's arrival at Gibraltar there was received, to the intense disappointment of the officers and crews, the news of the signing of the Armistice, for with it came to an abrupt end all hopes of further operations against the enemy. The Brazilians could only console themselves with the knowledge that they had done their best; it was not their fault that they had not had an opportunity to fight the enemy. Our own Navy saw very little fighting compared to the tremendous efforts it made to be prepared for that eventuality.
The repair ship Belmonte arrived at Gibraltar November 20, having left Dakar a week or so before.
The term of President Braz expired only four days after the Armistice was signed. He was succeeded by Rodrigues Alves. This change of government brought its inevitable shift in the naval administration; Vice Admiral Gomes Pereira took over the duties of Minister of Marine from Vice Admiral Alencar, who had discharged them throughout Brazil's participation in the war.
Brazil sent a delegation headed by Senator Epitacio Pessoa, later to be President of the Republic, to the Versailles Peace Conference. There were seven other members, including Captain Armando Burlamaqui as technical naval counselor, and Major Malan d'Argrogne as technical military counselor. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the Brazilian delegation was considerably embarrassed by the uncertain legal status of the former German ships which had been confiscated or requisitioned June 2, 1917, in Brazilian ports by the government. Space does not permit this article's discussing the interesting aspects of this matter; it must suffice to say that after lengthy discussions and negotiation, Brazil's claim to ownership of the vessels was fully recognized and she did not turn them over to be divided among all the Allied nations in proportion to their maritime losses, as a number of nations, especially France, had desired.
As a reward for her naval activity in the war, Brazil was ceded the former German torpedo-boat V 105, but having no use for this boat she handed it over to Poland as replacement for the former German torpedo-boat A69. A sister-ship, the V 106, also assigned to Brazil, was sold to England. The V 105 now renamed the Mazur still serves in the Polish Navy as tender to the gunnery school.
The Armistice found the dreadnought Sao Paulo in New York, completing her refit, so of course she did not go to Europe as had been planned. In 1919, before returning to Brazil, she carried out exercises with our fleet at Guantanamo.
The above is the story of the Brazilian Navy's participation in the World War. Accurate and detailed information concerning it has been very difficult to obtain but much of the material contained in this paper has been gathered from official sources, and should be thoroughly reliable.
Rear Admiral Frontin is (as of May, 1936) a vice admiral and the senior naval member of the Supreme Military Tribunal.