MAN’S EARLIEST weapon was his fist. Two men faced one another and victory went to him who best combined strength and skill. We need only recall our “little-boy” days to understand the contempt our earliest ancestors must have felt for the sly fellow who threw rocks at the opponent he feared to meet in hand-to-hand combat. But rocks proved effective and talking against them did not make the weaker man stop using them. So gradually everyone accepted the rock as a legitimate weapon and before long a David was being highly acclaimed for his skill in throwing one.
Staves, swords, and lances made their appearance without adverse criticism. They again brought man into individual combat. But the genius who invented the bow, and the knave who from a safe hiding place first discharged an arrow at a distant foe, found few admirers. The knights and gentlemen grudgingly included the bow and arrow as a weapon of war but disdainfully placed it in the hands of serfs and yeomen while they proudly held to their swords and lances. Not until after the feats of the British long bowmen at the Battle of Cressy was the archer given a place of honor in the armies of his world.
By that time man’s mind was sufficiently pliant so that he could approve in a nation what he condemned in an individual. Ganging-up, trickery, and robbery were dignified as tactics, strategy, and conquest as long as they were national undertakings. But pliant as his mind might be, man was not prepared to accept the next weapon—the musket. Contempt and indignation met the soldier who advocated a cowardly lying-in-safety while discharging a deadly piece of metal at a far distant foe. What chance had a man against this invisible thing which struck him unawares, tore great holes in him, and neither gave him an opportunity to defend himself nor his comrades an opportunity to rescue him. But all to no avail, musketry had come to stay and there came a day when the world applauded the machine gunner who from his concrete pill box wiped out whole companies of unprotected attacking men.
At the close of the last century, tales were heard of another weapon. Poisonous gases were to be used which would sweep not only over armies but over cities and seats of government and leave dying, strangling men and women in their wake. This was inhuman and barbarous! Gas was mysterious and dreadful and associated in men’s minds with eerie magicians of the evil East.
Rulers, statesmen, and soldiers joined in the general protest. At The Hague in 1889 and again in 1907 vigorous efforts were made to prohibit gas as a weapon of war. But they came to naught. A few practical delegates to these conventions, among them our Admiral Mahan, recalled the history of previous weapons and refused to pledge their countries not to use this newly talked of one.
But the protests continued. Few of the protestants knew anything about gas. Fewer still recalled that gas was not entirely new but that in its cruder forms of smudges, stinkpots, and Greek fire it had been used since time immemorial whenever hunter or soldier found it useful. But they pressed their case, and printing presses and every modern means of communication carried their arguments. Soon they developed such a propaganda against gas that even wise men began to believe that it would not be used. Propaganda forbade even experimentation with a weapon that lay available in a hundred commercial plants. But, as usual, history repeated itself. War came and men turned to the new weapon, used it, found it effective, and continued to use it. Propaganda had to its credit only a delay in the development of a defense.
It is reasonable to expect that nations will continue to use this new weapon. A knowledge of gas warfare, therefore, becomes essential.
In our country, the Chemical Warfare Service of the U. S. Army is charged among other functions with that of instructing the armed services in gas warfare. The major post of this service is Edgewood Arsenal, about 40 miles north of Baltimore on Chesapeake Bay. At the arsenal are the Chemical Warfare School, laboratories for chemical and medical research, plants for the manufacture of gas masks, the preparation of protective clothing, the filling of chemical and artillery weapons, and the manufacture of chemicals. A battalion of Chemical Warfare troops, an aviation unit, a Navy Eagle boat, and a regiment of Field Artillery from adjacent Fort Hoyle furnish the personnel and material for experimental work.
The School gives a number of courses each year to officers and men of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and National Guard. About 500 naval officers have taken one or another of these courses in the last 10 years. Most of these officers were of the junior grades. About 50 lieutenant commanders, 20 commanders, 6 captains, and 1 rear admiral have completed a course at the school.
The “Field Officer’s Course,” held during the four weeks of each July, is designed primarily for senior officers interested in gaining a general knowledge of chemical warfare. The School endeavors to inform them as to what has actually been done with chemicals, what can be done now, and what may probably be done in the future. The story of the past is primarily a military one. The stories of the present and the future are naval and military. Where, heretofore, the Navy has had to contend with chemical agents only in the form of gases and smokes from funnels, muzzles, and exploding shells, today airplanes lay chemical smoke screens over the seas and tomorrow chemical smokes, clouds, shells, and bombs may well be a part of every naval battle and the concern of every naval officer.
The School starts with an elementary refresher course in chemistry. The students are told of the 92 elements or basic forms of matter of which science has so far succeeded in segregating and identifying only 82. They are shown how nature and chemistry have made hundreds of thousands of mixtures and substances from these elements. Numerous examples are given of how slight changes in compounding radically alter the appearance and characteristics of substances and turn poisonous ones into harmless ones and vice versa.
It all seems mystifying and somewhat dismaying, particularly when one hears that chemistry is daily making new discoveries, new mixtures, and new compounds. The student gains the impression that the next war will be practically a battle of chemists, a series of meetings with new and unsuspected poison gases for which the soldier is unprepared and against which he has no defense.
But as the studies progress it is apparent that the picture is not quite so black. Through ancient, medieval, and modern times, scholars have been delving into the secrets of chemistry, determining its laws, and delineating its possibilities. Shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century and when only 38 elements were known, Mendelyeev was able to determine that there were 92 and to tabulate certain properties which the unknown ones would have when discovered. Since his time chemists have taken advantage of the extensive spread of educational and scientific institutions and the advances in other sciences to further increase their knowledge of their own. During the same period chemistry has taken a constantly increasing part in industry with a resultant additional impetus to knowledge and progress. Consequently the chemist of today knows the possibilities and the limitations of his subject. He admits that new chemical agents can and will be developed, but he feels reasonably certain that he can name the types which are practicable today and those which studies and experiments indicate are so close to practical use that we must be prepared to defend ourselves against them.
A chemical agent is defined by the Chemical Warfare Service as a substance useful in war which, by its ordinary and direct chemical action, produces a powerful physiological effect, a screening smoke, or an incendiary action.
To have a value as a war agent a chemical compound must be very toxic; or very irritant; or produce a large volume of smoke; or have incendiary properties. It must be capable of vaporization or other means of dissemination, in sufficient concentration under field conditions to produce the designed effects. And when disseminated its molecular weight must be greater than that of air so that it will not dissipate too quickly.
These are the primary considerations. But it is apparent that an agent must have certain other characteristics. It must be suitable for loading into munitions. Therefore, it must be a solid, or a liquid, or a gas which can be readily compressed to a liquid. It must be stable in storage and should be stable in contact with moisture if it is to be effective at all times, in rain, shine, or fog.
It must be an agent which can be manufactured on a large scale. Preferably it should be an agent which can be produced in existing plants. It is important that the raw materials for production should be available in this country.
The Chemical Warfare Service has found that only a limited number of agents meet these specifications. There are about 12 practical war gases, 6 screening smokes, and 3 or 4 incendiaries.
The gases are divided into three classifications: lung irritants, vesicants, and lacrimators. A lung irritant is an agent which when breathed causes irritation and inflammation of the interior of the bronchial tubes and lungs. Inflammation of the lungs causes a swelling of the lung tissue, accompanied by a secretion of fluid from the blood. This results in a shutting off of oxygen from the blood and a filling up of the lungs with fluid.
A vesicant is an agent which as a liquid or a vapor is readily absorbed by the exposed exterior or internal parts of the body, resulting in inflammation, burns, and the destruction of tissue.
A lacrimator is an agent whose vapor causes a copious flow of tears and intense eye pains.
The smokes are divided into two classifications; irritant smokes and screening smokes. Both differ from gases in that they are clouds of extremely small solid particles rather than vapor. Both serve as screens but the irritant smokes produce a physiological action which causes sternutation or sneezing, coughing, nausea, and temporary disability. Incendiaries all produce heat and burning.
In addition to the foregoing, gases are classified as casualty agents and harassing agents. All gases and smokes will cause death if breathed in sufficiently high concentration for a reasonable period of time, the effect of any gas or smoke being measured by the formula “concentration multiplied by time.” From this it follows that a low concentration for a long period of time can be equally as effective as a high concentration for a short period. Under field conditions we naturally never attain an extremely high concentration as gas begins to expand as soon as released. So we define as casualty agents those gases with which we can set up a dangerous or killing concentration in the field. Their primary purpose is to cause casualties. Their secondary purpose is to force men to mask and thus retard operations. A harassing agent is one which exerts a profound irritating or warning action at a concentration far below that required to cause death or serious injury. Its primary purpose is to cause men to mask.
Chemical agents are also classified as persistent and non-persistent. If, under conditions favorable for the use of an agent, the remaining concentration at the point of release is sufficiently great at the end of 10 minutes to require protection of any kind, the agent is said to be persistent. When under the above conditions no protection is needed after 10 minutes, the agent is said to be non-persistent.
Chlorine is a greenish yellow gas. Phosgene is a thin white one. Practically all other serviceable gases are invisible. Every gas has, however, a distinctive odor and it is upon this characteristic that one must depend for the detection of a gas, for no instrument has been devised which can promptly and definitely detect or measure the concentration of war gases under field conditions.
Any man with a normal sense of smell can detect the presence of a gas. A trained man can identify the gas by its distinctive odor. Mustard gas smells like garlic and chloropicrin like licorice. Unfortunately all the gases progressively dull the sense of smell. So it is easier to note the presence of a gas than to determine when one is no longer in a concentration. This characteristic should be kept in mind by the soldier when attempting to determine whether he is clear of a gas danger zone.
The irritant smokes cannot be so readily distinguished by odor. Adamsite has practically none. Others have odors very much alike. But the soldier can identify the smoke he is encountering by noting one or a combination of characteristics such as color, immediate physiological effects, and odor or lack of odor.
All gases, except mustard and phosgene, and all irritant smokes cause an immediate irritation with a resultant effect. With some agents the irritation and the effect are the primary and sole physiological result of contact with the agent under field conditions. Tear gas causes irritation of the eyes which produces tears and this effect is simply aggravated as the concentration grows stronger or one remains in it for a longer period. With other agents the initial noticeable irritation and effect are resultants of a secondary and less dangerous physiological action, for many gases have a primary and one or more secondary actions. The immediate effect of a chloropicrin concentration is an intense lacrimatory action while the full effects of its primary lung irritant action are usually delayed.
Under average field conditions phosgene produces no immediate irritation or effect. Unprotected men can pass through the gas apparently unharmed. Thirty minutes to an hour will go by before the effects of its lung irritant action become evident.
Mustard is even more insidious. Few field concentrations will produce any immediate effect. An hour or more will elapse before the unmasked man begins to feel the eye irritation of mustard’s lacrimatory action. It may be even longer before he begins to feel the first indications of the powerful though also secondary lung irritant action. From 4 to 24 hours may pass before he notes the signs of the primary vesicant action in the forming of blisters on all parts of the body which were exposed to the liquid or its fumes.
These delayed actions of some of the agents are very dangerous. A man who has breathed a delayed action lung irritant or vesicant is already like a consumptive patient with part of his lungs gone, though, due to the over-generous supply of lungs with which we are all endowed, he may not feel the effects of what is happening within him. Any exertion lessens his chance for recovery. He must be immediately treated as a stretcher case no matter how well he feels. We have instances in the recent war where men and their commanders were misled by the apparently excellent condition in which they passed through concentrations such as phosgene. They continued fighting or working. An hour or so later they began to drop like flies. In one case nearly 90 per cent of casualties resulted with a high percentage of deaths.
Similarly the man whose body has been touched by the liquid or fumes of a vesicant needs the promptest attention. It does not take the poison long to seep in. Once in it will run its course. The only chance for safety lies in promptly ridding oneself of contaminated clothing and scrubbing the exposed parts with soap and water or with gasoline and then soap and water. Unfortunately this, while practicable aboard ship, is rarely practicable in the field.
Practically all the chemicals now considered as acceptable war agents were used during the World War. Some few are modifications and improvements of World War agents while some agents used in the war have been discarded as unsuitable. The World War effort to use hydrocyanic acid as a chemical agent is still unsuccessful and the use of carbon monoxide is a thing of the future.
The first authenticated World War use of gas occurred at Ypres in April, 1915. Some German reports state that gas was used at an earlier date by the French. However, it is possible that these reports were based on the effects noted when high explosive shells burst in dugouts or other confined spaces. High explosive shells give off large concentrations of toxic gases including carbon monoxide. When the shells burst in the open this highly volatile gas promptly disappears but in confined spaces it may remain for several minutes in sufficient concentration to exert severe physiological action. This fact gave rise to charges of using gas shells as early as the Russo-Japanese War and the fact that high explosive shells are in effect gas shells under certain conditions is one reason why purely gas shells will probably never be eliminated as a weapon of war.
But the German action in using gas was based on something more vital than retaliation. Her High Command had counted on winning the war quickly. They expected to overwhelm the enemy with an enormous superiority of artillery fire and had built up their pre-war stocks of high explosive and shrapnel with this aim in view.
Their plans went awry and the winter of 1914 found the opposing armies dug in all along the important Western Front. If Germany was to advance in the spring she must regain that artillery superiority or find some better way of driving the enemy from his trenches.
At this stage certain advocates of the use of gas approached the German High Command. They pointed out that while the munitions factories on which the Allies could call were equal to those of Germany, only Germany had great gas factories. Her dye industry was supreme and the dye industry, in the process of making dyes, produces as intermediate steps a number of toxic gases. High explosive bursts on contact and expends most of its energy upward. A heavy toxic gas will sweep along the ground, dip into the trenches, and drive men out of them.
Germany had signed the 1907 agreement against the use of gas. But that agreement had not been ratified by all the contracting powers so was held to be not legally in effect. Primarily, the question that bothered the German High Command was not a justification for the use of gas but whether it would prove as effective as its proponents claimed. With some doubt on this point they authorized the experiment.
Chlorine was the gas chosen and commercial cylinders as the means of projecting it, with the wind as motive power. All through that winter of 1914-15, the dye industry bent to its task. From information leaks and external evidence of the work that was going on in these large dye plants, the British Intelligence Service learned of what was proposed and transmitted the information to their military authorities.
We have attributed to propaganda and popular opinion the failure of the military of all nations to experiment with gases in time of peace. It is hard to understand why in time of war, the British military did nothing on receipt of this information. They simply chose to believe that the Germans would not violate the 1907 agreement. The prompt formation of a group of military men and chemists should have been able to quickly develop a defense against gas, for British chemists, though not as numerous as those of chemically industrial Germany, were far from unschooled in their profession. Phosgene, chloropicrin, and even mustard gas were original British compounds or well known in England many years before the war. And of course every chemist knew the elements such as chlorine.
But nothing was done and as a result an army without the slightest defense against gas faced the Germans in the spring of 1915. On the morning of April 22, 1915, just as dawn broke and with a light wind blowing towards the British trenches at Ypres, the Germans opened the valves of 1,500 chlorine cylinders set up along a 3-mile front. The greenish yellow haze drifted across “No Man’s Land” into the trenches and beyond them to a depth of 3 miles. Forty thousand coughing, choking, blinded men were helpless in its grip. They covered their faces with rags and mud in a vain attempt to shut out the poisonous fumes. Helplessly they gave way. Twenty thousand went to the hospitals as casualties, of whom 5,000 died.
Military writers have criticized the German strategy in not being prepared to follow up this initial success with attacks in force along the whole line. The answer is that the military leaders were as surprised by the success of gas as the naval leaders were by the successes of the early U-boats.
However, though unprepared to attack in force, the Germans had gas available and continued their attacks at various points along the line. Some were effective, some less so, due to unfavorable conditions for the use of gas or ineffective tactical handling of the new weapon.
The allied casualties continued to be high. Not until two weeks after the first gas attack were the allied armies supplied with cotton cloth pads soaked in defensive chemicals similar to those being used by the Germans. Later, veils and hoods similarly treated made their appearance. None of these defensive coverings were completely effective. The amount of defensive chemical in the fabric was not sufficient to keep out considerable quantities of the toxic fumes. However, the hoods and helmets did reduce casualties and help the morale of the men.
In July, 1915, the British Intelligence Service learned that the Germans were about to use another gas, phosgene, and a new type of hood or helmet soaked in different defensive chemicals was issued. It was credited with saving many lives in the heavy phosgene attack on the British in December, 1915.
By the end of September, 1915, both sides were using gas. First chlorine and phosgene; then chloropicrin, tear gas, sneeze gas, and a vast number of variants and mixtures. Slowly the defense was developing. In the fall of 1915 in the German Army, and in 1916 in the allied armies, the gas mask, in somewhat the form we know it, made its appearance. The principle of the mask is that the man’s face is completely shut off from air except such as he breathes through a canister containing defensive chemicals which adsorb or neutralize the toxic gases in the air. The canister has a life sufficient to take a man through any expected attack. Of course the first masks had many defects. They did not all fit perfectly and permitted gases to seep in around the edges, the materials used in the face piece were not always gas proof, and the eyepieces did not give wide vision and were subject to frequent breaking. The men had to wear clips over their noses and hold the end of the breathing tubes in their mouths. As the war wore on the masks were improved still further and the contents and make-up of the canisters were altered to eliminate all the gases and smokes encountered. Nevertheless, the mask continued to be clumsy and cumbersome and to slow the movements and reduce the effectiveness and endurance of the men wearing them. In each army the mask differed somewhat in shape, features, and appearance.
In 1917, the Germans introduced vesicants beginning with mustard gas, and shortly afterwards the Allies were using vesicants. The mask was then no longer a complete protection against gas, for vesicants attack every exposed part of the body. In liquid form or in heavy concentration they seep through the clothing. They took a heavy toll in both armies and no adequate defense for the parts of the body except the face was devised during the war. The men bundled up as well as they could and whenever possible after a heavy contamination promptly stripped off all clothing and washed the body.
In 1917, new gas weapons began to appear. The gas cloud attack projected from cylinders had been very effective but it had the disadvantages of being dependent on a favorable wind, of losing much of its strength by the time it reached its objective, of having a short range except under very favorable conditions, and of giving warning of its coming either from the visibility of the cloud or the sound of gas escaping from the cylinders. The first weapon to appear was the projector, a cylinder open at one end and similar to though of lighter construction than a mortar. The projectors were aligned in batteries of 25 or more and embedded in the earth on the lips of trenches or in small mounds. They fired a thin walled bomb containing a high percentage of gas to weight. They had a range of from 500 to 1,500 yards, dependent upon the propellent charge, and permitted of a heavy gas concentration being suddenly placed on an enemy position. The projectors were displaced from their earthen bed by the shock of discharge and, therefore, were good for only one salvo for each emplacement, but despite this defect they were superior to the cylinder and practically displaced it as the primary gas weapon.
Both cylinders and projectors were a heavy burden on the front supply lines and considerable time and effort were consumed in bringing them in to position and emplacing them. In order to provide greater mobility, gas shells and shells loaded partly with gas and partly with high explosive were furnished to the mortar batteries. Later they were furnished to the artillery’ batteries to permit of gassing rear areas and moving bodies of troops.
We entered the war in 1917 and by the fall of that year our troops were arriving in France. They were neither instructed in nor organized for gas warfare and had no weapons of gas offense or defense. Our military heads had not made use of the two years since gas made its appearance on the Western Front. We who lived through those two years of neutrality can recall the determination of the President, the Congress, and the majority of our people to keep us out of war and their opposition to every form of preparedness. This influenced and hampered the military but it does seem as if, in spite of all opposition and lack of appropriations, we might have done something more than we did. Plans might have been laid, civilian investigation encouraged, and the small regular army organized and instructed for gas warfare.
Our troops in France adopted the gas weapons and gas protection of our Allies. The British gas mask was made the standard. The troops received their instruction and training in gas warfare from foreign officers. There was so much to do that this was not always thorough and many units went to the front not only deficient in gas discipline but in some cases ignorantly disdainful of gas.
Experience proved an efficient but a hard teacher. One well-known organization suffered nearly 90 per cent of casualties in its first meeting with the new weapon. Those men learned that while the rifle might be safely laid aside for a few moments the gas mask must be always at hand. The officers learned that knowledge and discipline and not bravery alone were necessary to save men’s lives and keep a unit at combat strength.
Our chemical organization was soon strengthened. Our gas discipline improved. Nevertheless, gas caused more casualties in the American Army than any other single weapon. Out of 260,000 casualties, 71,000 were caused by gas. Yet deaths from gas were only 2 per cent of the casualties as compared with 25 per cent of deaths of the casualties from all other weapons combined. Of the gas casualties 27 per cent were caused by mustard gas.
At the end of the war there was a renewal of the effort to prohibit the use of gas. This was partly a resultant of the pre-war propaganda and partly an echo of the allied war propaganda which condemned anything primarily German such as submarines and gas even though they and we had made ample use of both.
Gas had proved itself too effective to warrant any military commander relinquishing its use. Its low percentage of deaths to casualties refuted the charges of barbarism which had been hurled against it. It left no such shattered pitiful wrecks in its wake as did high explosive.
Nevertheless, popular prejudice prevailed to the extent that prohibitions against the use of gas warfare were included in several post-war pacts. Most of these remain unratified or have been violated too often to be considered binding. We can expect that every nation will use gas whenever the exigencies of war make such use desirable. All are working on the problem, though some, in deference to prejudice, are carrying out their work unobtrusively and under the handicaps which such a method entails.
The years of research, experiment, and development since the World War have brought about improvements in chemical agents, though, as said before, they are still mainly the agents which proved effective in the last war. There have also been improvements in chemical weapons— the projector, the mortar, the field piece, the cylinder, the grenade, the bomb, and the shell. One new weapon, the airplane, has been added to the gas list. In the next war, planes will carry grenades and small bombs containing gas for use against moving and entrenched troops. They will carry large gas bombs for use in high altitude bombing. They will be equipped with tanks for the laying of screening smokes, irritant smokes, and gas clouds.
Just what the gas tactics of the next war will be depends to a great extent on the character of the war. If it should be a war of entrenchment, the tactics will be somewhat like those we witnessed from 1915 to 1918. Planes will be used more. Quite probably there will be more gassing of the rear areas than heretofore. A combined gas and high explosive aerial attack on a munitions dump or a supply or railroad center will prove much more effective than the former attack using high explosive alone. The high explosive can damage a railway center. The vesicant gas will delay repairs by forcing all workers to mask. If the gas is a persistent vesicant it may even force the permanent abandonment of a center or its operation under continued handicaps.
If the next war is one of movement, the main gas efforts against the front line troops will probably be made through the medium of artillery and airplanes. In such case the smokes and the non-persistent irritant gases may be used rather than the persistent and vesicant types, for when one side lays down a persistent vesicant in a certain area then that area is barred to them as much as to the foe.
Whatever the tactics, they should be superior to those of the World War, for the experiences of that war have been collated and every army has devoted considerable time and effort to the formulation of gas tactics. Some armies have not devoted as much time to gas training and instruction as would appear beneficial, but this condition will probably improve as an enlightened popular and official opinion makes for generous appropriations for chemical agents and chemical warfare training.
Increased knowledge of chemical warfare agents and tactics, improved agents, and improved and more numerous weapons do not, however, necessarily mean that gas will cause a greater percentage of casualties. The defense has also improved. Gas masks are more efficient in protecting the individual. They are less restricting to his movements. They reduce his endurance to a less extent. The masked soldier will be able to operate more efficiently and for a longer period than heretofore. Chemically treated clothing will give him better protection from the vesicants. Chemical canteens may contain salves or liquids to assist him in decontaminating himself. The large canisters of what is known as collective protection will permit him the occasional enjoyment of a gas proof shelter even in a gassed area. He will be better instructed, better outfitted, and better disciplined. He should be a far less easy prey to gas.
But gases and smokes will still be effective for contaminating or neutralizing supplies, buildings, and areas, slowing down troop movements by forcing the enemy to mask, covering the advance of troops, shielding movements, etc.
One vital question concerning the next war is the extent to which gas will be used against the civilian population and particularly inhabitants of large cities. In considering this, one must take into account that when a nation diverts part of its forces to attack the civilian population, it weakens the force available for the attack on its primary objective, the enemy army. Moreover, history has taught that acts of violence against the civilian population are rarely effective. They usually arouse the attacked people to a more energetic support of their own cause and forces. History has, however, taught that continued pressure on a civilian population, such as that exerted through a blockade and an interruption of supplies, can break the morale of the people and result in a weakening of their army.
It would be impossible for an enemy air force to lay down enough gas to completely contaminate a large city. But it is possible to gas certain areas or certain designated points in a city. Combined high explosive and persistent vesicant gas attacks on terminals might seriously interfere with the supply of a city as well as interrupt the flow of supplies from an industrial city to an army.
The military of European nations foresee attacks of this kind. They are preparing to furnish the adult population with gas masks. This is simply a question of manufacturing facilities and money. The question of the supply of masks to infants and children of every degree and size is, however, more difficult of solution. So also is the protection of the sick and feeble, who could not very well put forth the additional effort of breathing through a canister. Collective protection, which involves the forcing or drawing of air through large size canisters into an otherwise sealed room, apparently offers the only solution for hospital cases but such protection involves not only great expense but takes considerable time for installation. There has been talk of providing large gas proof chambers or halls to which the people could flock in case of attack. These also would involve great expense and time for preparation. If below ground they would have to contend with the heaviest gas concentrations. If in the upper stories of buildings they would be most exposed to artillery fire and bombing attacks. In any circumstances they would involve the undesirable massing of frightened people which breeds mob hysteria and frenzy. The British Government has only recently stated that it will not attempt to provide these large gas shelters. It has urged the individual householder to make one room as air-tight as possible and to endeavor to prevent the admission of gas by providing the only entrance with two or three doors. This is the method of the trench dugout where two or three blankets are hung at intervals along the entrance passageway and only one is parted at a time. Not a perfect defense but a useful makeshift.
In our country we have done nothing towards instructing or providing for the defense of our civilian population. Under present conditions nothing seems necessary except perhaps the formulation of a plan for organization, instruction, and outfitting of the people if war and gas attacks should become imminent.
The navies of the world expect that chemical agents will play an important part in the naval battles of the future. Destroyers and light cruisers will use chemical smokes for their battle screens. Heavy cruisers, carriers, and battleships will probably be fitted to lay irritant smoke screens in retreating tactics. Planes will lay clouds of screening smokes, irritant smokes, and gases. They will be fitted to spray exposed personnel and the upper works of vessels with vesicants.
It is not probable that heavy caliber shells and large bombs will be filled with gas. A filling of high explosive will do more damage when such a missile hits a ship. But, shells and bombs will probably be “salted” with persistent gas to make the repair of hits more difficult. Small gas bombs will be used by the fighting and dive bombing planes.
We can expect the enemy air squadrons to attempt to drift clouds of persistent gases on to a fleet at anchor. Enemy planes will endeavor to attack the carrier decks and the planes thereon with vesicants. Such attacks, if delivered shortly before a battle, could seriously interfere with carrier operations.
War on the sea, with its flat surfaces, its fast moving units, and its relatively high winds, makes the offensive use of gas more difficult than on land. The Navy that is best prepared with offensive gas weapons, best trained to efficiently launch its gas clouds, and best equipped for gas defense will have an enormous advantage, well worth the expenditures of time, effort, and money by which it was attained.