Service Opinion Upon Promotion By Selection

During the latter part of June, 1934, there were mailed to 1,001 naval officers reprints of an article of mine, entitled “Promotion By Selection,” from the June issue of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. This article suggested that each officer in the grade above the candidates eligible for promotion be required to submit a list to the Navy Department °t the names of those candidates who, in his opinion, should be promoted; these lists to be transmitted to the selection hoard for its information only. A slip accompanying the reprints requested an opinion as to whether or not the recipient was in general agreement with the plan suggested in the article, and this slip gave the assurance that no names would be Quoted by me in connection with any opinions that might be expressed.

The names of the 1,001 officers on the active list were taken in their regular order from the 1933 Register, the latest available at the time. I should have liked to send the reprints to all officers, had that been practicable. However, it was my belief that a reasonable number of replies from the 700-odd senior officers of the Navy and from the senior 280 lieutenant commanders would provide a reliable cross section of service opinion.

The large majority of the officers who have replied have thanked me for the opportunity of expressing their opinions, being apparently under the impression that I had selected those from whom I wished to have replies. I made no such selections, but included all in the lists within the limits specified. From the replies received I learned that a few of the captains, commanders, and lieutenant commanders to whom I had sent the reprints had recently been placed on the retired list. Reprints were, however, sent to practically all retired flag officers as being those who had had the widest experience of general service duties and of the working of the present method of promotion. In all, the reprints were sent to 98 flag officers, active and retired, and to 260 captains, 359 commanders, and 284 lieutenant commanders. The statistical result is shown by the following tabulation:

	Reprints Sent to:	Replies Received	Number in Agreement	Number in Disagreement	Per cent in Agreement
Flag Officers	98	53	38	15	71.7
Captains	260	103	80	23	77.67
Commanders	359	126	94	32	74.6
Lieutenant Commanders	284	85	68	17	79.99
	1,001	367	280	87	76.29

It will be noted that the higher the grade the greater the interest shown— the greater the proportion of replies received. Roughly 54 per cent of the flag officers replied, 40 per cent of the captains, 35 per cent of the commanders, and 30 per cent of the lieutenant commanders.

Those who are in agreement with the suggested plan are of course opposed to certain features of the present system of selection which I have criticized. But as many of those who are in disagreement are also more or less severe critics of this system, it follows that the percentage of those who are not satisfied with the present system is considerably greater than the percentage of those in agreement with the proposed plan. This is shown later.

In a number of the letters received, the writers stated that they had discussed the subject with a certain number of officers who had agreed with them. Those whose names and opinions were given in writing are included in the above tabulation, but those not named were excluded. Had the latter been included, the percentage of agreements would be considerably increased.

In my ignorance of the usual result of such polls, I had expected a greater proportion of replies, but I am now informed that over 35 per cent is quite unusually large. Also, from many of the replies it appears that more would have written had there not been apprehension lest the opinions of the writers become known to their seniors.

For example, one young officer stated:

Since I am so junior, I would prefer not to have my name appear in connection with these views since some of my senior officers might think I was trying to reform the Navy.

A captain also stated:

Whether justified or not, I received the impression that there is an air of fear abroad, with reluctance to express opinions.

A flag officer said:

I note that you say in your letter that in no case will the name of any officer be quoted in connection with his opinion, and under these conditions I am very glad to say that I thoroughly agree with the suggested plan proposed by you.

As regards the general attitude of the service with respect to the effort to improve selection, one of the first replies I received was from a retired flag officer who informed me quite plainly that in his opinion the method of promotion was the exclusive business of officers in active service. This, however, turned out to be an isolated opinion, as I could easily show, were I willing to violate my well-known modesty by quoting some of the numerous expressions of gratitude for and commendation of my efforts in this matter.

Because of the information which their peculiar position enables them to present, I have included in the tabulation those who had been passed over before their letters to me were written, but of course not those who have been passed over since that time. Of the former, 16 captains, 6 commanders, and 9 lieutenant commanders are included in the tabulation, or about 8 per cent of the officers who replied; and one cannot fail to be impressed by the judicial temper in which, with few exceptions, these officers have discussed this subject.

Summary of Comments

Concerning the general result of the poll, the figures given in the table above speak for themselves. These figures give, however, only a general idea of service opinion, which, though valuable in itself, is of less value, or at least less convincing, than the comments, criticisms, and suggestions contained in the letters themselves. These letters give a cross section of service opinion that is really of extraordinary interest. A comprehensive and reliable summary of the letters would of course be very desirable, and I shall attempt to make one. The diversity of comments and suggested recommendations, not to mention misapprehensions, render this a puzzling task.

I shall of course attempt to answer the principal objections, and I may add my own conclusions in regard to certain propositions not heretofore brought up for discussion; but in case I do not specifically do so, it is not to be assumed that I agree with all such propositions, some of which are more or less radical and quite beyond the scope of the discussion based upon my first paper.

However, as the author of the article which became the basis of the discussion, 1 am of course aware that I am very likely to be suspected, and reasonably enough, of having been influenced, even in spite of the best intentions, in favor of approval and against criticism in summarizing the various comments. I can only assure the reader that I have earnestly tried to be fair to both sides in reporting the various arguments.

It would of course be a great advantage if it were permitted to give the names of officers in connection with the opinions quoted, but this can be done only in the case of those officers who have contributed discussions on the subject to the Proceedings. Among those who have done so, the comments of Admiral Taussig are fuller and perhaps more authoritative than the others because of his high position and doubtless more up-to-date information on this subject.

I have listed Admiral Taussig among the flag officers in disagreement. However, this is a typical border-line case, for it Will be observed by those reading his discussion that he is not only more than half in agreement, but also that some of his criticisms of the workings of the present system are quite severe. For example, in reference to the latter, the Admiral states, pages 1427 and 1428:

It is my understanding, from casual conversation with officers who have been members of selection hoards, that no board as yet has taken a stand on the very important point as to whether or not the “efficiency of the service” warrants the board in placing a definite limit on the point in each grade below which no selections will be made that year, and also that no board has ever reconsidered their votes even after a majority of the members feel that what has been done is not for the best efficiency of the service. . . .

I am quite convinced from my experience on the selection board that some of those who were passed over were the victims of this lack of policy on the part of selection boards which resulted in many scattering votes below the line to which selection could reasonably be limited to the advantage of the “efficiency of the service,” thereby depriving some of those higher up with excellent records and who were undoubtedly worthy of selection from getting the sixth vote necessary for selection. Some of these mistakes or injustices or whatever we choose to call them are certainly within the province of selection boards to remedy without any further legislation or instructions. . . .

With the great increase in officer personnel in recent years, I am convinced that most of these predicaments which face the members of boards would also face the officers who would send in their opinions to the boards, whether or not these officers are voting for contemporaries or for those in the grade or grades below them. In fact, I doubt very much if their knowledge for the purpose of aiding in making correct selections and preventing injustices is any wider or better, and in general may not be so good as that of the members of the board. [That is to say, nine admirals who happen to be selected as members of a board, would have as wide a knowledge of the candidates as the combined knowledge of the other 50 admirals!] I can see no objection, however, to the plan being tried, excepting perhaps that of practicability, in that it will probably be difficult to get many officers to send in their lists, and that it will be impossible to get some members of the boards to pay any attention to those that are sent in.

Value of Service Reputation

On the other hand, Admiral Taussig lends very strong support to my contention that the service estimate of candidates should be ascertained and taken into serious consideration in making selections and, quite significantly, he believes that the selection boards should make every effort to get this information for themselves. He states:

My own idea is that when an officer knows that he is to be designated as a member of a selection board, well understanding that the records are not infallible, he should make every endeavor to learn all he can about the character and fitness of the officers on whom he will be required to pass judgment. On the other hand, some officers appointed members of boards religiously refrain from any attempt to learn service opinion with respect to the officers under consideration, preferring to base their judgment of relative fitness entirely on the written records. I believe that only by frequent exchange of views and opinions can the service reputation of officers be ascertained and that if this became the general practice most of the injustices of that character, where the board selects an officer in whom the service at large has no confidence, would be eliminated.

The object of the Admiral’s recommendation—for the board itself to ascertain and make use of the service reputation of the candidates—is precisely the object of my suggested plan; but how a member of the board can get this information after he has been appointed is not explained. Manifestly, his opportunity for doing so is very limited in time, and is also limited chiefly to his own particular environment at the time. Barring such personal knowledge as he may have of some of the candidates, his only source of information is the opinion of those he has the limited opportunity to consult within the time before the board meets. These opinions may have been derived from the opinions, or reports of opinions, of others. Much of this information, therefore, must be derived from reports of hearsay opinions, once or more removed, or worse, and very little of it can be based on personal knowledge.

If all of the admirals on the active list could be assembled and if each member of the board could fully consult with each of them as to the merits of the candidates, Admiral Taussig’s scheme would be admirable. But this of course is impracticable. Rather than rely upon the very limited information the board of nine could obtain, how much more reliable would be the combined opinions of all the admirals as to the relative merit of the captains. If, as the Admiral contends, knowledge of service reputation is information of such value to the selection board that he advises the members to seek it and make use of it, why not go directly to the service and get all of it that is easily available? In fact, the Admiral approves of this in saying: “I would be glad to see your suggestion carried out  and know that I myself would use the information obtained therebv.”

Some Arguments

Not only are there a considerable number of border-line cases somewhat similar to that of Admiral Taussig’s, that I have listed among those expressing disapproval, but there are not a few where disapproval is based upon a misunderstanding of my plan. For example, that it advocates basing selections upon popularity alone; that it requires those in the grade above to vote for officers they do not know; that it is a substitute for fitness reports; that the vote of the grade above should be mandatory, etc. Incidentally, in a good many cases I answered the objections of officers who disapproved my plan, but in only one case, that of a rear admiral, did any officer change his opinion. The following are samples of many of the arguments and statements presented in justification of disapproval.

Many state that each year they make out their own lists of probable selections and that they agree very closely with those chosen by the selection boards; and then they say that they really know so few of the grade below that they could not recommend the proposed plan of votes from the grade above to assist the board. One officer objects because, as he assumes, I advocate basing selections “primarily on service opinion,” regardless of fitness reports. One officer makes the statement that,

The members of the selection board may not know the candidates, but undoubtedly they do know the marking seniors and know how much weight to give the marks and comments, either favorable or otherwise, of that marking senior.

A captain states:

I hear very little criticism of selection in the lower grades. It is only the selections to the grade of admiral that come in for very much criticism in the service. It would appear, therefore, that the selections are better where the candidates are not so well known personally to the board as when 4e selections are based on general service report and fitness reports,

a conclusion apparently resulting from the assumption that a captain high on the list Would be as likely to hear as much of the criticism of selections in the lower grades, with the officers of which his association is relatively small and not intimate, as he Would of the criticisms of the selections of the officers in or near his own grade.

Don't Know Many in the Grade Below

One of the commonest arguments is expressed by one officer as follows:

I was one of those who was called upon to give a list of the officers to be selected in the order in which I would select them, and I recall that in an effort to do this I found that I knew personally such a comparatively few of the officers to be selected that I realized any selection I might put 'u could only be of value as to those officers with Whom I had served. In order to include in the list those officers with whom I was not personally acquainted I could only use service opinion and service reputation. I realized that the list of every officer who reported in this manner would be just as valueless as mine and for that reason I oppose your scheme of selection.

This officer’s argument entirely misses the point; in fact misses the very reason for my suggested plan. His predicament is the same, as regards personal knowledge of the candidates, as that of each member of a selection board, except that the board’s predicament is much worse. The board has available, in this respect, only the combined personal knowledge of nine men, whereas the votes of the grade above Would provide many more reliable lists of preference when selecting from captain to rear admiral, and still more reliable lists of preference when selecting from commander to captain. In other words, the officer whose letter is quoted would be asked to list only the officers that he knows personally or through reliable reputation. Such an individual list would, of course, be of little value to the board, but a combination of such lists from all members of the grade above would not only cover the whole field, but would surely indicate the officers that the service believed to be of outstanding ability, and thus save the board and the department from the present criticism that not a few such officers are now passed over and much less efficient ones promoted. It was precisely to remedy the board’s unavoidably deficient personal knowledge of candidates that I have advanced my suggestion of assisting the board by supplying all of the carefully considered estimates from the grade above. It is of course common knowledge that the selection boards have usually considered only the relatively few candidates at the upper ends of the lists. This doubtless because of the value the boards give to the somewhat longer experience of these candidates in their grade. Acting upon this knowledge, the officers of the grade above would not need to consider as candidates all officers of the grade below, but only such a number near the top of the lists as the results of former selections indicate would be the limit to which the board would go in their recommendations for promotion.

Approval and Disapproval

In all cases where an officer’s opinion or conclusion is doubtful, I have listed his letter among those disapproving, even where disapproval is based upon a misunderstanding of my plan or upon arguments that are based upon manifestly mistaken information or seem of questionable soundness.

Not a few officers think my plan would be helpful to the selection board but that it is not a cure-all. For example, a commander states:

I have read your article on selection with great interest. What you propose I feel may be helpful to a selection board but I feel that it comes far from solving the selection problem.

Of course it does not solve the problem (of this more later); it is intended only to supply information the selection board sadly lacks, inspire confidence in the system, and relieve the board from the burden of shouldering all the present criticism, some of it of course unjustified. The misapprehension of this commander is a common one. His letter, like other similar ones, has been listed with those disapproving.

In not a few cases officers have expressed disapproval unless there are applied certain modifications which they suggest that are mere matters of detail and are readily acceptable. These are listed with those disapproving. There are also those who, while disapproving of the method suggested, criticize the present fitness reports, the procedure of selection boards, the influence of assignments to duty and of the nature of the duty upon selections, and who therefore state that something should be done to remedy these alleged defects.

The attitude toward the present system of selection may therefore be stated as follows:

(1) All those who approve of my plan of course criticize various features of the present method and procedure of selection that my plan criticized.
(2) The majority of those who disapprove of my plan also criticize the present method and procedure.

This means that the number who disapprove of the present method is considerably greater than those who approve of my plan. There are very few who approve of the present system without modification or criticism. From this it is evident that if the misapprehensions and dubious arguments were cleared away, the statistical tabulation above given would show a considerably greater percentage of approvals.

Fitness Reports

Though it would not be practicable to tabulate the many different points of view above indicated, it may be well to attempt to evaluate the arguments for and against basing selections principally or wholly upon fitness reports. Of the few who take the latter point of view, the following is an extreme example from one of the letters: “I am still of the opinion that the officer’s record of service as put forth in his reports of fitness over a period of years is the best and only method of making selections.” One officer of high rank states that “fitness reports show service reputation.” Few will agree with this. These are, however, extreme cases. Nearly all who comment upon this subject believe that fitness reports could be and should be somewhat improved, both by amplifying and improving the form and by enjoining upon reporting seniors a more rigid compliance with the principle that the object of all marks and comments should be exclusively the efficiency of the service as a whole.

Those who advocate placing the principal reliance upon these reports, very properly claim that the reporting seniors, having had their subordinates under constant observation, know or should know them better than any others less intimately associated with them. This argument would be unanswerable only if it could be shown that the reports could really be so improved, and especially that the reporting officers could be so influenced that the reports would really show gradations of character and relative merit. Those who criticize the fitness reports claim that they do not now show this; that, barring the occasional “bad egg,” they are so nearly uniform that the establishment of relative merit is very difficult, and that therefore selections are necessarily made chiefly upon the very limited personal knowledge of the candidates possessed by the board; and it is claimed by the large majority of the replies that this condition is the chief cause of the alleged injustices—the service belief that this inevitably results in the Posing over of some outstanding men and promotion of some undesirables.

This criticism is, however, made without a single accusation or implication of conscious unfairness on the part of selection boards. With the limited information possessed by a member of the board, he cannot, in all honesty, after he has got all help he can from the fitness reports, otherwise than vote for those candidates he knows personally or who are known personally by other members of board.

Suggested Test of Fitness Reports

As concerns the influence of the selection board’s personal knowledge of the candidates, the feeling is so strong that many recommend that the boards be applied only with numbered copies of the candidates’ fitness reports from which their names have been omitted. Those who advocate basing selections solely upon fitness reports could hardly object to this filing done. It would, however, be very easy to test the value of the “marks” and comments” on nameless fitness reports as follows:

(1) Take, say, 50 copies of fitness reports from which the names of the reporting seniors and the names of the candidates are omitted. Have each of, say, a dozen officers make out his list in order of relative merit as he sees it, judging only from the reports.
(2) Insert in the same copies the names of the reporting seniors, but not those of the candidates, and have them graded according to relative merit by a different bunch of one dozen seniors.
(3) Insert the names of both the reporting seniors and candidates and submit to a third dozen officers.

The first test will show what the naked Sports are worth in establishing relative merit. The second test will show the influence of the board’s incidental knowledge of the service reputation and personal peculiarities of the reporting seniors; and the third test will show the influence of both the service reputations and personal peculiarities of the reporting seniors and the board’s personal acquaintance, if any, with the candidates and their knowledge of the candidates’ service reputations.

If, as one flag officer states, fitness reports are “the best and only method of making selections,” then the order of relative merit of the three lists would closely resemble each other. Very few would claim that they would do so, but they would show that the more names you put in the fitness reports, the less the “3.8’s” and the “above the average” count and the more personal acquaintance and service reputation count. These latter—personal acquaintance and service reputation—are the real determining factors in making selections. A board of any nine flag officers has quite insufficient knowledge of either.

The Proposed Plan

My scheme is quite simply to supply them with all of the reliable information that exists among those who really know and have served with the candidates; or who, although they have not served with an officer, still have a very sound and definite reason for including him in their list, such as a very high recommendation from an officer whom the maker of the list does know and whose judgment he values very highly. I cannot believe that there would be difficulty in making out such lists of preference. A commanding officer, for example, would not need to pass on the whole of the grade below him. His attention would be confined to those near the top of the list, just as the attention of the selection boards themselves is confined to those near the top, as is very well known. The job of the maker of a list would then be only to pick from the top of the grade below in the order of his preference, basing his judgment on personal knowledge of and service with the candidates or occasionally on some other justifiable ground. If he felt that he could not make a list of as many as 10 captains, for example, he could submit a list of 7, 8, or 9. There should certainly be no difficulty in applying the suggested plan to the selection of captains and commanders, but whether it would be better to have selection out instead of selection up throughout the lower grades is a question.

The Motive in Making Fitness Reports

But, concerning the possibility of improving fitness reports to any useful extent, and the practicability of bringing about relative uniformity of marking by reporting seniors, it may be well to consider the various motives that may influence these seniors. The principal motives may be either (1) the interests of the subordinate, due to personal friendship or influence in his behalf; (2) the influence of the marks and comments given subordinates upon the efficiency of the ship or organization; and (3) a desire to mark his subordinates with absolute justness according to his estimate of their relative efficiency, which would, of course, tend to promote the efficiency of the service as a whole by indicating those of superior merit.

The third is admittedly the one desired by the department, but it is very doubtful that it is achieved in many cases because of the much more immediate and powerful motives of the first and second, particularly the second. A commanding officer may even honestly believe that he best promotes the efficiency of the service as a whole by marking his subordinates unduly high and thus hoping to secure their earnest and loyal co-operation; or he may be more strongly influenced by more selfish motives, by the knowledge that his personal fortunes, his promotion, may depend chiefly upon the success of his ship. This latter is a very powerful human motive and it is extremely doubtful whether all reporting seniors could be induced by any departmental admonition to act in a more altruistic manner.

The importance of these motives is illustrated by comments in many of the letters. One officer’s opinion is that fitness reports are unsatisfactory because of the “shortsightedness of commanding officers,” and that “the bureau should take such steps as are necessary to widen their horizon, to broaden their viewpoint…unfortunately, it would be very difficult to put this into effect. ...” Some officers state that many, if not all, commanding officers make fitness reports with an eye principally to the success of their ships or organizations. One captain remarks: “It is admitted that this is selfish, but yet a natural reaction, because a commanding officer’s success and promotion are primarily dependent on how his subordinates will extend themselves in making his la command efficient.” It has been said that at a fitness report is as much an indication of the character of the officer who makes it out as it is an expression of the qualifications of the subject.

Incidentally, it is worthy of remark that those reporting seniors who do act from unselfish motives—who do not curry favor with subordinates by marking them up—may thereby place some of them in unfair competition with subordinates a: whose commanders, actuated by selfish motives, do mark uniformly high.

The powerful influence of the personal motive upon the marking of fitness reports is recognized by officers of all grades. For example, a flag officer points out that the trouble with fitness reports is not the nature of the blank form supplied by t the department, but the human nature of  the commanding officers who fill them in. In this connection he states that “You can beat any old game but human nature.” Also, “If you haven’t got the gang with you, you might as well quit.” That is, a commanding officer knows that the success of his organization depends chiefly Upon the devotion of his subordinates; that if he gives low marks and “below the average” comments in all cases where they are deserved, “he might as well quit”; and all in the organization who are concerned in making the reports, including the heads of departments, naturally do so with an eye more to their own interests than to grading their subordinates according to merit. Hence the comment most frequently made is that these reports are generally too high and monotonously uniform, except of course in the case of the occasional “bad egg.” Even these are said sometimes to be “bucked up” as they pass through the cabin.

Quite a few of the officers believe that the fitness reports, the service, and the subordinates themselves, would automatically be somewhat improved if the latter were always shown their reports and thus given an opportunity to correct defects of which they might otherwise be unaware. A few officers state that this is their habitual practice.

“Greasing” and Popularity

Practically all those who are in disagreement, as well as many who are in agreement, are greatly concerned over what has come to be known as “greasing,” an activity practiced by officers variously designated as “socialites,” “bootlickers,” ‘Popularity Jacks,” “bridge and golf hounds,” “expert cocktail shakers,” and the like. Their fear is lest these attractive individuals would, under my plan, make such use of their entertaining and endearing qualities as to acquire a popularity that would insure their always receiving the votes of the grade above. The theory is that the resulting mad scramble for the precious votes would develop all the latent greasing qualities in otherwise modest and deserving officers and thus create semipolitical, vote-getting campaigns and, incidentally, a more pleasant service atmosphere at the expense of military efficiency.

I doubt very much whether those who have expressed these fears have ever taken the trouble to make an analysis of their arguments and thus recognize that the basic premise must necessarily be: “I, myself, am of course always able to recognize the greasing type and would not for a moment be influenced by their activities, but I think the great majority of officers are not sufficiently astute to avoid being ‘taken in’ by them.” They also necessarily assume that the integrity and character of the personnel is so low that officers would readily become “political vote- getters,” and that intelligence and decency are of such a low order that officers would not resent such evident attempts to influence them.

Comments upon this are more numerous than upon any other one subject, though many disagree with the forebodings about greasing quoted above. For example, one lieutenant commander states:

Your remarks on popularity are interesting. The officer who resorts to popularity with his seniors also subjects himself to a most critical and honest scrutiny which will make his defects as well as his merits known. I frankly feel that the big majority of the officers of the Navy have too good judgment to be misled by any popularity except that based on real competence and ability to handle personnel with justice and consideration. I quite agree with what you say as to the popularity of an officer among his subordinates and feel that as to its effect on selection it is an advantage.

Another lieutenant commander states:

I have concluded that the method suggested by you would decrease the selection of such officers (“Popularity Jacks”) because there would be bound to be more seniors who, from a distance, could truly judge this type of officer.

A commander states:

As to the possibility that your proposed system might result in practices similar to electioneering, the exertion of improper influences and logrolling, I think that the service itself can be confidently counted upon to reject such practices, which would have to be widespread to be at all effective. Moreover, the weight that the selection board would give to these recommendations would be directly proportional to the board’s confidence in their unbiased character. I think that the precept of the board should include a statement that the board will consider the compilation of these recommendations, but that the weight accorded them must be left entirely to the judgment of the board.

Even assuming that some officers have such a poor opinion of the service as to believe that officers would be political vote-getters and that the average officers would be favorable toward, or would be “taken in” by, such methods, they could not in any case be effective. For even if all hands attempted such electioneering, and all hands submitted to this influence —an absurd assumption—there would be no chance for an unworthy candidate, the favorite of a few. On the principle of chances he would be eliminated. I have confidence that the intelligence and integrity of our officers is such that unanimity would be shown only in the case of officers of outstanding service reputation for character and ability; that the votes of their seniors would be based upon “service esteem,” which is the sense in which I used the term “service reputation” as indicating both character and ability—the kind of men that responsible commanders select for important positions; men who have a reputation in the service for initiative and willingness to accept responsibility.

Some officers have apparently assumed that, in pointing out the value of popularity in military life, I have recommended promotion for that quality alone. One commander recommends the term “service esteem” in place of “popularity,” and I have suggested substituting that. Certainly I would not expect any officers of the grade above to vote for even the most entertaining yarn-spinner if he did not esteem him for his solid qualities of character and ability. The ranks of the passed over are strewn with the wrecks of the solely popular.

In further consideration of the probability of a “greaser” of even the most apparently efficient type securing promotion, one flag officer, very much concerned, cites the case of the advancement of one of the service’s most brilliant entertainers and yarn-spinners. He was not aware that the gentleman in question had been passed over and safely headed for the retired list. Another senior officer of unusual experience states that:

One officer who was passed over told me one time that he was known to every member of the board, had given cocktail parties to each one of them, and yet did not get six votes. He could not understand it as he had considered that all nine admirals had been his personal golfing and drinking friends. In any event, this same officer was picked up by the next selection board, few of whom knew him as well as the previous board. It therefore appears that there is such a thing as being known too well.

It is manifestly not right to assume that if an officer cannot successfully “grease” nine admirals of a board, he can succeed in so influencing the other 50 admirals on the list. The point is that nothing is more apparent than the bootlick. He displays at all times a danger flag. Naval officers are not good enough actors to get away with it; and senior officers are really brighter than has been assumed by those who fear greasing. As a matter of fact, unless backed up by real ability and character, the “Popularity Jacks” and entertainers have not been successful in reaching the higher grades. No one can reasonably claim that there are many of our flag officers who are particularly entertaining.

Yes Men

A good many officers claim that any plan of promotion by selection tends somewhat to restrict initiative and develop what they call “yes men.” Though this is undoubtedly true to a certain extent, it is up to the critics of this feature to suggest means by which this influence can be avoided or diminished. As far as at present known there is no alternative except to return to the personally comfortable system of promotion by seniority. There are practically none who advocate this. I also believe that there are very few of those whose service does not extend back far enough to include adult experience of the former system, who realize the evils we got rid of when we abandoned promotion by seniority. That is, they do not realize that, undesirable as the yes- man complex may be in the case of individuals inclined that way, it is, upon the whole, greatly to be preferred to some of the evils of the former relationship between seniors and juniors.

Under the former system there was relatively little desire and even less personal necessity for seniors and juniors to be agreeable and helpful to each other or for the latter to exert themselves in the interest of the former. That was in the days of “I order, you obey; it’s not your business to think!” The promotion of all officers at that time depended wholly upon passing an examination when they reached the top of each grade. With a month’s study, you could prepare your sister to pass it. Almost none failed of promotion except the physically defective, the court-martialled, and the notoriously intemperate.

Under these circumstances, the spirit of co-operation, the team spirit, except in rare and isolated cases, was nonexistent. On the contrary, there was almost habitual ill-feeling and antagonism. Criticism was rife in wardroom messes. The disaffection sometimes extended to the crews, who in some cases beat up pointers for forgetting their agreement to miss the target.

How many officers on the active list today have had experience with the type of ship called a “Mad House?” How many have been shipmates with these words painted on a turret during the night? How many can recall the names of certain officers who enjoyed reputations for their ability to mimic to their faces the personal peculiarities and mannerisms of executive officers and captains? How many have heard a captain, on deck and in the presence of his officers, denounce the admiral of the fleet?

Even if all officers were deliberate yes men, conditions would be infinitely better than they were under promotion by seniority. But the real yes man is such because he was born that way; he is very seldom “smart” enough to make compliance seem convincing; he is simply a potential greaser too timid to go the whole route. To assume that all officers are of the yes-man type is to besmirch our own cloth. The critics who greatly fear the greasers and yes men need to cheer up. The bulk of the Navy is of solid material.

Juniors’ Opinions of Seniors

A considerable number of officers have, upon their own initiative, expressed their views as to the value of the opinions of juniors of the grade below upon the efficiency of the seniors with whom they have served. Certainly, such opinions are freely expressed among the juniors themselves, and very favorable ones in successful commands. There is practically unanimity of opinion that in this respect the juniors’ association with and observation of their immediate seniors are necessarily much more intimate and continuous than that of those who are of the grade above the latter, and that therefore their judgment would be much more likely to be of value than that of the grade above. In this connection, the following incident illustrates the point. A flag officer showed his own fitness report to a junior with whom his personal association was very intimate and congratulated him upon his excellent record. The junior thanked him and remarked: “We juniors know much more about you than you do about us.” The admiral flushed angrily, then laughed and replied: “Well, I guess that’s true.” All who referred to this subject recognized its radical nature. Only one, I believe, recommended that, if the opinion of juniors should be sought, they be given a certain less weight than the votes of the grade above.

Medical Judgment by Selection Boards

Many officers have recommended that selection boards should not exercise medical judgment but should pass upon professional qualifications only; that medical boards should examine those selected by the board; and that if rejected, they should be retired in the next higher grade. One officer states:

I contend that a selection board should not consider the medical records of officers concerned. I was retired for physical disability not instigated by the medical staff but by others. Routine physical examinations had found me qualified. The point is this: that once the question of physical disability is raised, and letters pertaining to such were included in my jacket, all chance of my selection by the board was eliminated.

Influence of Duly upon Selections

Many officers comment upon the influence that assignment to different kinds of duty has upon selections, and to the influence of the kind of duty being performed at the time the board meets. For example, a captain states:

Your system would assist greatly in helping to take away the unfairness of the fact that the duty of an officer at the time he is selected has much to do with the chances of selection. A fine officer at sea at the time the selection board meets has a much better chance of selection than a fine officer ashore who has made good but not under the eyes of most of the members of the selection board. Most of the board comes from the fleet, and those on sea duty in the fleet have their chances enhanced by a large percentage.

The alleged injustice likely to be done by assignment to inconspicuous duty, no matter how important to the service, is the subject of a great deal of comment. Manifestly, those assigned to such duty have less chances of selection by a board of flag officers from the fleet than those serving in the fleet. It is also well known that there is a great deal of unfavorable comment because important commands are sometimes given to officers whose record and reputation are such that, in the opinion of the service, they are “sure to be passed over”—and almost always are. This is regarded as a waste of valuable experience which should have been accorded to more promising officers.

Commander C. M. Cooke, Jr., in discussing this subject in his excellent article in the Proceedings of May, 1931, pp. 651-52, suggests the possibility of an administrative hook-up between the Navy Department personnel bureau and the selection process that would tend to avoid such undesirable assignments. In this connection, Commander Cooke states:

I believe our selection process, as regards assignments to duty, which would further have an important bearing on selection for promotion, will bear considerable improvement. The assignment to duty should be made by an authoritative personnel board, a continuous administrative agency, and their action would in certain cases result in real selection up, and would permit perhaps selection boards to go below the so-called blocs in selections.

This is surely worthy of serious consideration when the time comes for a thorough re-examination of the whole problem of selection.

Procedure of Selection Boards

According to Bureau of Navigation Bulletin No. 172, the procedure of selection boards is as follows:

At the first meeting of the board officers’ records are distributed to the individual members of the board for scrutiny as follows: The President of the Board takes the record of the officer whose name appears first on the eligible list, the next senior member that of the second officer on the list and so on, so that the President reviews thoroughly in detail the first, tenth, nineteenth, twenty-eighth, thirty-seventh, etc., records from the list. The next senior member reviews the second, eleventh, twentieth, etc.

After all members have signified that they have completed examination of the records, the members are called together and each record is presented in the order of rank by the member to whom his case was assigned. First, a brief of his record and service is given, followed by a free discussion in which all the members may join. The case of the next officer is then taken up. This procedure is continued until all of the members are satisfied that sufficient names have been considered to cover the vacancies.

Some officers invite attention to the fact that this procedure requires each member of selection boards to examine personally only one-ninth of the fitness reports and records of the candidates; that consequently each member’s knowledge of the records of eight-ninths of the candidates is derived only from verbal “briefs” supplied by the eight other members ; and that under these conditions it is not easy, to say the least, for any one member, or for all of the members, to establish the relative merit upon which selections should admittedly be based. One officer points out that the member of the board who examined the records that included his name did not recommend to the other members a single officer for promotion. Another officer states that: “The service as a whole holds selection boards responsible for their decisions.” Of course no responsibility can be fixed upon the individual members of a group acting under a secret ballot. In the absence of any assistance from the votes of the grade above, the full tide of the criticism of the service must be borne by the board as a whole. Such criticisms, for example, as that referred to by Admiral Taussig in his discussion in the Proceedings, namely, that “no board has ever reconsidered their votes even after a majority of the members feel that what has been done is not for the best efficiency of the service.”

War Leaders

Though the recommendation made under this heading is not strictly a part of the specific plan I have suggested, still it is a feature of selection of the greatest importance to the efficiency of our Navy as a whole, and consequently to the safety of the country.

It is assumed in all consideration of this subject that confidence in our leaders is wholly essential to the maximum efficiency both in peace and in war. We can have this confidence only in those whom we know the best, or rather in those that the service knows best and believes in the most. There is considerable criticism to the effect that the present system of promotion has resulted in the advancement to flag rank of a number of officers not fully qualified; that there should be selection from the lower to the upper half of the rear admiral’s list in order to advance the ablest leaders to high command; and that the frequent shifting of commanders in chief is a danger and should be avoided.

Many of the comments from officers of all grades, from flag officers to lieutenant commanders, show very interesting emphasis not only upon the general efficiency of the Navy, but particularly upon its efficiency in time of war—the vital necessity of a system not only for the promotion of the most fit, but a system of selections for command that will insure leaders in the key positions upon the outbreak of war in whom the service has confidence.

The Navy Department has of course the responsibility of selecting officers for assignment to these key positions of our entire naval forces, especially the commander in chief of the fleet and the chief of Naval Operations, positions in which the occupants are responsible for the training of the Navy for war and for its successful conduct in war.

Unfortunately, the service has been acutely aware at times that the officers assigned to these positions were very far from having the confidence of the service. Upon certain occasions the commanders in chief of the fleet were so manifestly unfit for their positions that I characterized in the press the action of the Navy Department in appointing them as “a crime against the people of the United States.” These officers had not taken advantage of the Naval War College training. Some others of the same untrained class were appointed to very important positions in the fleet and on shore. Some of them justified their neglect of the essential training supplied by our War College by saying: “What’s the use of going to the college when it isn’t necessary in order to get the best jobs?” One such flag officer spent the last few years of his active service in ridiculing the War College and all its works. Nothing could possibly be more detrimental to the morale and the efficiency of the service than the appointment of such “leaders.”

Though such assignments may have been secured through personal and other influence brought to bear upon Secretaries of the Navy, the latter should not be blamed for them. It is not a criticism of the Secretaries to state that neither their training nor their knowledge of the personnel of the Navy qualifies them for making such a purely military decision as the selection of the commander in chief of the battle fleet. It is upon the Navy itself that the responsibility rests for such a dangerous practice—dangerous because of the great risk that, in case of an unexpected and sudden declaration of war, the Navy might find itself under the direction, both on shore and in the fleet, of incompetent leaders—leaders who lacked completely the confidence of the service.

Since the selection of competent leaders is a purely military function, the responsibility rests squarely upon the chief of Naval Operations who is responsible not only to the Secretary for the fighting efficiency of the Navy, but who is equally responsible to the personnel of the Navy that they shall at all times be under leaders not only capable of adequate preparation for war in time of peace, but capable of inspiring confidence in their leadership in case of war. If, in the absence of any law or regulation or established custom on the subject, it were understood that, as a matter of course, the chief of Naval Operations would at once resign, in case high commands were given to incompetent ^ officers, stating that he could no longer be responsible to the Secretary for the efficiency of the Navy, the dangerous practice would cease. One such example would be sufficient. Unfortunately, this military responsibility has not always been realized. For example, on one occasion when a chief of Naval Operations differed fundamentally from a decision of the Secretary’s in a purely military matter, the former announced that he conceived it to be his duty to be “loyal” to and support his chief. He was loyal to the latter, all right, but at the expense of betraying the Navy and the people.

In other important countries the civilian head of the Navy is relieved of the responsibility of making such purely military decisions. In the British Navy every such decision must be acceded to by at least two of the Secretary’s (First Lord’s) military advisers (Sea Lords).

In the French Navy, by decree of July 17, 1934, the chief of the naval general staff becomes, on the outbreak of war, the commander in chief of all French naval forces; and the two vice admirals serving in time of peace as inspectors general of the naval forces based on Brest and the naval forces based on Toulon take over in time of war the command of these forces respectively. The business of these officers is the intellectual preparation of themselves and of their immediate subordinates for the instant readiness of all the naval forces on the outbreak of war. The contrast between this preparation and training for war and our happy-go-lucky practice makes clear the danger of the latter. Even our best flag officer would be relatively unprepared if he had been appointed to the battle fleet but a week or so before war was declared.

If the Secretary of the Navy should ask the advice of all active flag officers as to the officers they would prefer to train them in peace and lead them in war, he t would be assured of the best selections of which the Navy was capable at the time; and his responsibility would be fully covered. And I believe that this practice Would do more to promote the morale of the service than any other one measure; for an essential quality of leadership is ability to inspire loyalty, devotion, and confidence in subordinates.

Captains Retire as Rear Admirals

It is pointed out by a number of officers that captains who have been finally passed over should not be continued in active service. Also that these captains should be promoted to rear admiral on the retired list in order to better their standing in retirement and thereby diminish the bitterness of their disappointment.

Importance of Experience in Command

In a number of replies, attention has been invited to the fact that many of our younger officers are showing a disposition to avoid command duty for fear that they may not measure up to the responsibility or may get into difficulties that would affect their chances of promotion. They point out that avoidance of command duty seems justified from a personal point of view because selection boards seem to give little weight or not sufficient weight to such experience; that many cases are known where the large majority of a group promoted to command rank had had no command experience and that many who had had such experience were passed over. It would appear that willingness to accept the responsibility of command and successful experience therein should rank very high among the qualities justifying promotion to command rank; and that all training should, as far as possible, be in the direction of acquiring this essential qualification.

Necessity for an Estimate of the Situation

From all that has been said in this and in the preceding paper, it should be fully realized that the plan suggested was not at any time, and is not now, assumed to be in any way a cure-all for the illogical inequalities of the present system of selection for promotion. As previously stated, the first paper was written upon the assumption that a very large majority of the service had insufficient confidence in the justice of the present system. The 1,000 reprints were sent out in order to ascertain whether or not this assumption was justified. If it be assumed that the replies from the four upper grades of the Navy constitute a reasonable cross section of service opinion, it means that at least three-quarters of the service are dissatisfied with the present system of promotion; and it is therefore evident that something should be done about it. The only alternative is to abandon the principle that, as stated in the original article, “The system employed must have the confidence of the service and produce results that are in accord with general service opinion.”

The solution of the problem requires the application of all the information, experience, and talent that the Navy can bring to bear upon it. It demands an authoritative estimate of the situation. But in the meantime, and until such a definite solution can be reached, and in view of the fact that three-fourths of the replies approve the suggested plan, it would seem that it would be well to lessen the present feeling of injustice and the criticisms now leveled at the system and at the selection boards, by temporarily adopting the plan with such modifications as may seen desirable.

While, perhaps, the majority of the letters are a record of opinions based upon personal experience, still it is true that many contain very thoughtful discussions of the subject. And though of course none attempt a complete solution, they do give a broad outline of the complexities of the problem and their influence upon the morale of the personnel and upon the general efficiency of the service. In this connection it will, I am sure, be noted with interest that many of the most thoughtful discussions are by some of the younger officers.

For example, one letter invited attention to what the writer believes to be a very unsatisfactory condition of the commissioned personnel. Briefly, he notes the fact that there is something wrong with a scheme that discards 40 or 50 per cent of whole classes; that wholesale retirement of expensively trained and able-bodied officers is undesirable; that it places the retired list in jeopardy; that reasonable security is obviously a necessity for the naval profession; that major upheavals every seven years or so make a naval officer’s position only a “job”; that under these conditions the most desirable boys will not apply for the Academy; that the system, tending to create yes men, will produce intellectual inbreeding at the Academy; that fitness reports are unsatisfactory; that they should be made comparative by a service standard established by the department; that selection boards are free to make their own standards; that no standards govern the boards as to the kinds of duty and experience that should justify selection; that all fitness reports should be referred privately to each officer; that officer’s jackets should be legally safeguarded; that entries thereon should not depend upon the department’s opinion as to what is unfavorable; that there is little excuse for a system or policy which forces officers to martyr their careers by accepting inconspicuous assignments under the guise of helping the service; that the net effect of the present system is principally bad; that no single “nostrum” would affect the whole result very much; that the real dissatisfaction is with the whole aspect of the situation rather than with any one phase; that

We will not get anywhere until we go at the whole thing basically; make a genuine estimate of the situation, derive the courses of action required and obtain the necessary legislation and administrative measures to carry them out; and that there are many ways of attacking the problem that are no more radical than the present system of promotion, and its attendant evils.

It is hardly necessary to state that I entirely agree with the suggestion that the whole subject be gone into basically; that a thorough estimate of the situation be made and the necessary action be taken to remedy the defects indicated.