Failure of the league.—Impartial critics of the League of Nations have pointed out that it was doomed to failure because it made no provision for growth and development of peoples and nations. The flexible principle of “self-determination” was indeed utilized to serve the interests of the Versailles Treaty makers, but that principle was reworked and crystallized into one suitable for the maintenance of the international situation created by the treaty. The purpose of the League in the words of its High Contracting Parties Was “to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security.” There was little in that Presentation of purpose of more fundamental things—international understanding, amity, welfare, and evolution. The League’s agencies for accomplishing its purpose were, moreover, controlled by a bloc of nations with common interests, which soon revealed other ideas as to its purpose and demonstrated an unwillingness to deal with fundamental matters— to guarantee justice or assure normal welfare and development of peoples. Repeated failures, coupled with a growing consciousness that the League is doomed Unless rule of reasonable consideration and not of selfishness, mutual accommodation and not of force, be permitted to prevail, have been influential in modifying League procedure in recent years, enabling it to preserve its organization, but on a less ambitious basis.
To reinstate itself fully as a world influence, the League will have to reconstitute itself as a non-political agency, disavowing sovereignty and sanctions. Its field should be, primarily, that of abstract world policy and international relations, justice and international law, political economy, commercial relations, and social welfare. Such a League might well devise basic methods for anticipating and adjusting questions which may threaten the peace of the world and the security of peoples. Its function might include the formulation and sponsorship of treaties to cover regional and other international situations; but the responsibility for and initiation of action to preserve the treaty status must be, for the present, the sole concern of the nations directly involved. Supported by the growing international consciousness that civilization will end without co-operation and world accord, we may expect the League, or whatever it may be called, to develop slowly and progressively from such a beginning into an acceptable, unbiased, and trustworthy administrative power. It could not be created perfect out of the chaos of a war settlement over night and so must remain open to constructive change.
Despite the stoutness of our opposition to and the soundness of our reasons for not entering the existing League of Nations, there is not in the world a nation better intentioned than the United States nor, I believe, a people more willing to participate in an international community which may, under the aegis of true purpose and sound policy, develop slowly into a world federation. In the meantime we must remain a free agent, the unrestricted guardian of our national welfare.
Safeguarding welfare.—Our national civilization, culture, and standards, our political, religious, and social structures and patterns, with their evolutionary progeny, seem to be the fundamentals of national welfare, if we regard as included with them the necessary physical area, conditions, materials, and outlets for development. Economic organization and life, commerce, international relations, welfare of dependencies, and development of the national type or individual, are details of the picture. To go about safeguarding those things, we must begin with a development and statement of fundamental policy in regard thereto; a simple determination “to guard the national interest in order to assure the security necessary for the development of national welfare” is a fair beginning. From that a statement of the interests to be guarded and the means and methods of protecting them readily evolves. A partial list of those interests has been given, to indicate their scope and nature. Means and methods include all available forces: legislative, executive, and judiciary groups; political, religious, social, ethnological, commercial, and other agencies operating with sanction or acquiescence of government; economic and financial power; diplomatic representation; and finally military organizations. Those agencies will normally operate to stimulate and develop the elements of national welfare and assist in world welfare by bridging the gaps between nations, bringing about co-operative action and mutual understanding; but military force in the hands of executive authority is the final resort capable of obtaining a decision in case of a diplomatic impasse. However, it is to be feared that, in recent years, an erroneous idea has arisen as to the ability of financial power to coerce foreign governments or to sustain policy. And lest that fallacy remain with us let us take note of the billions of public and private funds that have gone over the dam in bolstering worthy and unworthy causes and let us consider how much of power, of influence, and of security remains to us as a result of their use. And let us recall how maneuvering to obtain payment of debts has led us to weaken our national, commercial, and military position in the world. We permit our armaments to deteriorate during the prosperous years, hoping other8 will follow and thereby be enabled eventually to pay their debts; whereas they fee' that they may lose more than national capital if they succumb to our argument' The threat of withholding financial support has a tendency to force independence and self-reliance upon the country refused. Pressure for repayment results in repudiation of obligations, resentment, and a decision to remain an armed if not a just nation. Financial strength may be a powerful factor in an orderly economic universe, but it is a poor substitute for the coercive force of military strength.
On the other hand, the present day sees us spending money in lean years in a naval building program designed to restore our standing, prestige, and vanishing margin of security, and at the same time to assist in our economic rehabilitation.
It is trite to say that security is essential to national welfare and progress as well as to the maintenance of a position of influence in the world of today; and yet many, to whom it would sound most familiar, are not aware of its implications. Many such, inlanders mostly, think of security as a matter of residing snugly within our continental borders, content with home and family, self-contained and self-sustaining, the world well lost. Their vision of security is satisfied by “armed force such that no enemy may cross our border.” Many more with militant souls and instincts but with hearts overflowing with altruism are eager to maintain our influence and prestige under their own guidance for the good of all humanity. Armed force enters not at all into the range of their vision; their power and hoped for leadership come through force of example, the voluntary abolition of armed force. In these two groupings, including those who, having no considered views, respond to the influence of the most vociferous, are the great majority of our people.
There is also a strong, perhaps unconscious, tendency on the part of rank and file of democratic government to subordinate and undermine national policy and plan, devised for the good of all, in favor of political expediency and the benefit of minorities and special interests. Policy is a remote and abstract consideration to most of us, and the visible details of the supporting plan may involve personal sacrifice or be apparently opposed to local interest.
Unless something happens to release American Public opinion from the miasma of parochial Politics, to substitute hard common sense for sentimental “crusades,” to suggest that virility and honor have a place in international as well as a national life, the next great war will find America a Mass of corporations, boards of directors, committees and commissions, but no citizens and no clear idea of what is the duty of citizenship.— Man Is War, John Carter, 1926.
Great national leadership, indeed, is Necessary to formulate a policy of national security that will receive the enduring, sustained support of the body politic. The shaping of that policy is handicapped, among other things, by the frequent and often deliberate misuse of the term “national defense.” Frequently offered as a bogus form of national security, it means ho more than “defense,” of the kind that Would always keep the country on the defensive, attractive because it promises to be cheap. In that same sense the term !s dangerous in that it may be used by special interests to argue for unnecessary specialized strength and duplication of home defense elements to the detriment of the sounder more mobile forms which hold enemies far away from our shores. The interrelationship of the land, sea, and air elements of force must be most carefully considered by those who are responsible for the security of the nation, regardless of self and special interests. ‘National defense” can never clearly con note that national security which means defense of homeland, outlying territory and dependencies from invasion; protection of citizens abroad, of commerce and of merchant marine; the guarding of national policies and interests against foreign encroachment or abuse; the maintenance, without offense to other nations, of our prestige and international stature.
Relation of policy to security.—A “new naval policy” heralded by the press on June 30, 1933, justly merited the notice given it and deserves careful study by all American citizens. To be sure it is not a “new naval policy”; it is, what is much better, a new edition of “naval policy” which was originally promulgated by the Navy Department, December 1, 1922, and which has since been the effective guide for naval administrative and operative planning and effort. At intervals as deemed necessary, this naval policy is resurveyed by the Secretary’s advisory General Board, assisted by other agencies of the department, with the result that it is maintained in accord with existing national policy including the limitations of ratified treaties. Each revision results in a clearer, broader, and more comprehensive expression of Navy Department relation to and responsibility toward national defense and national security.
It would be difficult to over-value the utility, present and prospective, of this consistent continuing naval policy. Year after year it becomes more and more effective as a basis for naval legislation; it is the common ground where “small navy” and “large navy” proponents must eventually meet; it sustains and turns back the attacks of special interestists, pacifists, and internationalists.
That policy states that the fundamental naval policy of the United States is:
To maintain the Navy in sufficient strength to support the national policies and commerce, and to guard the continental and over-seas possessions of the United States.
All other provisions of the naval policy flow from, elaborate, and sustain the fundamental idea expressed in the quoted sentence. They provide for planning, building, maintaining, and operating all weapons, arms, facilities, agencies, types, units, and bases of the fleet in the proper proportions and relationship to assure to us that fleet which our needs require. They assure ability to operate in accordance with the purpose of the policy, and provide also for the provision and maintenance of a loyal, trained, and efficient personnel.
This statement of naval policy is unique in that, so far as the writer is aware, it is the only complete and logical exposition of its kind in our national governmental set-up. The National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, supported and supplemented by subsequent legislation, does not contain a line which indicates the fundamental purpose of the act or the national policy in respect to the purpose and use of the military forces which are authorized therein, presumably to fulfill requirements of “national defense.” The act provides, in comprehensive detail, for the composition, organization, administration, and maintenance of the War Department and of the U. S. Military Forces and, in more general terms, prescribes functions and duties of departmental officials and agencies. Fortunately, however, those brief provisions grant authority, in anticipation of their need, for the preparation of plans and the formulation of legislative acts essential to national defense, well beyond that normal to a single department of the government. It would seem logical to assume that legislation as broad in scope and vital in import as a “national defense act” should be in accordance with and responsive to some broad national policy or purpose. To be sure, the Constitution contains a statement of purpose in its Preamble and gives general authority to the Congress, “To raise and support armies . . .”; “To provide and maintain a Navy,” and “To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,” but what is the specific, continuing purpose which underlies that act? What would have been the nature and scope of a true national defense ad had it been written to accord with a carefully developed and stated policy? The title of the act, itself, is misleading in that the scope of the acts falls far short of its implication and fails to satisfy in reality the full requirements of national defense- Nor is that title broad enough to present properly the import, place, and scope in our national administration of an act which should provide security of national interests.
One frequently hears criticism to the effect that the Navy Department attempts to dictate and that naval commanders, in their diplomatic-naval relations abroad, presume to interpret or even formulate national policy. Their justification has always been that, lacking an available statement of such policy, they must attempt interpretation in order that their acts may have sound basis and be consistent. Naval policy loyally attempts to follow national policy when that has been determined or when a course of action has been indicated by the administration in questions where no policy exists.
One might well generalize on this subject and state a basic conclusion that much of the hesitation and confusion of mind displayed by our government over a long period of years, in fact throughout its history, when in contact with national and international affairs and with political opponents or representatives of foreign governments, has been due to the lack of considered and stated policy. An unstated policy is capable of any interpretation or misrepresentation. The very fact of stating a policy forces one back into fundamentals and is instrumental in trimming away accumulations of parasitical—even though apparently related— growths and in revealing basic truths, the foundation of sound growth and development. This does not imply that policy must be defined to the point where it is indistinguishable from the courses of action which must be adopted in its support in any given situation. In general, politico-diplomats dealing in the ephemeral expediencies of statesmanship would feel themselves bound or hampered if committed to stated principles and policies; on the other hand statesmen-diplomats Would make slow but evolutionary progress in adhering to their guidance. There Would be, to be sure, no series of pacts and treaties bearing the names of the leading statesmen of the day into the Hall of Fame; instead, simple, almost imperceptible movement toward a better state of affairs and international welfare.
Democratic government and policy.—Our form of government does not necessarily make impossible the formulation and deliberate statement of policy; but the bipartisan political machinery which we hold necessary to a proper, honest functioning of government appears to be a detriment to the evolution of national policy and to ascertaining the will of the majority. Party platforms presume to present statements of party principles upon which approval of a majority of the electorate is sought. When the approval of the majority gives sanction, party principles are the material out of which policies presumably evolve. But, with the approach of another election, each party presents a platform in which principles are presented, designed, and phrased to catch votes to return “party” to “office.” What happens to real principles and to policies in that turmoil? How can policy be shaped when parties attempt to make it appear to mean this or that? It is enough to contemplate the “noble experiment” or “horrible example” involved in our national action toward an accepted policy (or ideal, at least) of national temperance-—anti-prohibition and prohibition fanaticisms with all their attendant evils, ranged against each other, each attempting to coerce the body politic into something resembling its own self-satisfied or self-interested pattern.
Likewise there are internal questions of economic and social regulation, conservation and exploitation of national resources, and financial budgeting; also external questions, such as World Court and League, tariff and economic barriers and relations, finance, commerce and transportation, and reduction of armaments, which cannot be solved definitely or immediately and upon which the nation’s will cannot be evolved and expressed in short order; nor under present conditions can some of these problems be solved at all, apparently, unless and until they become such an evident menace to our national welfare as to require desperate and almost unprecedented efforts at solution, as became necessary in the cases of slavery and prohibition.
Incidentally, however, the leadership which is now piloting the country gives assurance to her citizens that democratic government, with strong central authority, may survive. Though in this year, or next year, we may not have a clear view of or complete reassurance as to what is “around the corner,” there is evidence, in the present scheme of administrative things, that a complete survey of the fundamental requirements for national welfare is under way and that a reasoned and determined effort is being made to bring into harmonious balance all the antagonistic forces which unrestrained “individualisms” or “special interests” inevitably breed. Our President may frankly admit that he will experiment—“try things out”; but the things being tried are only methods, agencies, and elements in accomplishing an administration of government according to a broad plan for the benefit of all the people. Would that someone could clearly and completely reveal that broad national policy and its purpose and state the legislative and administrative acts deemed necessary to accomplish the purpose, in their proper relationship and value, in order that our people might visualize them clearly and that no one of them might be mistakenly stressed as representing in itself the sum of all. It should not be very difficult, because, fundamentally, national policy is an interpretation of the trend, the ideals, of our national civilization and a decision as to the fundamental effort which we should make to carry us toward the finest and highest manifestation of our destiny. The principal danger in such procedure lies in a proneness to regard the measures to support a policy as part and parcel of the policy itself. Measures may be only expedients, though they should relate to and support policies, they may change from day to day; but policies are fundamental things, slow of development and not subject to changes of weather or politics.
Deficiencies in policy and plan.—The participation of the United States in the World War is cited as a practical example of national effort, which should be conducted in accordance with policy and sound plan. It was notable for the strength and flexibility of government revealed in the steps taken to wage war effectively. It was notorious for the lack of foresight and preparation and for the tremendous waste which resulted. The former is traceable to the realization by Congress that in time of emergency unlimited executive power alone can break through the tangled web of legislative limitation and administrative detail. The latter feature is attributable to lack of leadership and pertinent suggestion on the part of many successive administrations and to the jealousy with which the Congress guards its prerogatives in peace time; perhaps also to a proneness to detail which, innate in most of us, causes us to lose sight of basic considerations.
The fact remains that there is in out governmental set-up a neutral neglected zone including the area between national policy and administrative action; and this fact is but emphasized by the various commissions, boards, and committees which have been established or sanctioned by Congress at times when the need for expedient action, long overdue, became only too apparent. Of these, certain ones which relate to our military establishment will be surveyed briefly as to their purpose and adequacy, in illustration of this point. The Joint Army and Navy Board and the Aeronautical Board are active, indispensable links in joint Army and Navy action, though the latter board in the course of time may and probably should have its functions absorbed in the former. The National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics has broad and comprehensive functions and undoubtedly should continue its usefulness. But the Congressional Joint Committee on Aerial Coast Defense, on the basis of its title alone, becomes a detrimental influence and power inasmuch as its concern seems to be solely in the interest of a special element of coast defense and not of national defense as a whole. If is almost impossible to make sound logical determination of the armed force necessary for coast defense or national security while special committees or interests lay undue stress on particular elements of the whole. There would seem to be a broad and useful field for the Joint Committee on Aeronautics to complement the work of the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics and outline appropriate legislation.
These examples, typical of many which exist in all branches of our administrative establishment, indicate that a zone of distinct function in our administration is now imperfectly occupied by committees or agencies of limited authority which confuse the issue and serve to prevent a clean-cut fulfillment of specific need. That zone is a “no man’s land” which exists within a triangle of legislative, executive- administrative, and military-directive authorities.
A brief and illuminating study, “A System for the Conduct of War,” of this “no man’s land” in public affairs was presented by General Sir Frederick Maurice in the Atlantic Monthly about seven years ago. In it appears the following paragraph:
On the outbreak of the Great War our fleet and our small army were as well prepared as we can reasonably expect to find them in another like case. The Committee of Imperial Defense had elaborated a War Book which set forth the emergency legislation needed and the action required of every governmental department. All this stood well the test of experience. But no one had thought out the most important preparation of all—a System for the Conduct of War!
The picture here presented of the British situation in 1914 is an almost exact counterpart of that which exists today in the United States.
Protection of national interests.—High among the important duties of any national security organization would be the determination of the general character of security measures and of possible war methods and activities involving all available elements of national strength and force. That study is not entirely germane to the purpose of this paper, nor is its breadth within the capacity of an individual to treat in detail, but brief consideration of some of the political, economic, and military aspects of security and of the basic methods of conducting war is quite in order.
History pictures colonial developments of all nations and the eventual building of empire as a result of trade seeking and extension. In fact, aside from direct occupation and absorption of conquered nations, trading companies were responsible for centers and facilities in newly discovered countries and for trade lanes to them which eventually made them indispensable to the mother country. From such beginnings, the recognized empires of the world have been built up. But with the commercial development of the United States in a later period we have seen another type of empire arise, a more intangible one of trade, finance, and commerce that has colonized, but not in the material way that carries its physical protection with it. It depends upon good will and mutual benefit; upon recognition on the part of the world, or most of it, of the sanctity of interests and property; but its security depends ultimately upon the remote armed and potential strength of national government.
By the Versailles Treaty the principal victorious powers, with the single exception of the United States, added to their physical empires. The latter, however, did not relinquish hope of building up its commercial empire through the medium of open trade and financial channels. Is it reasonable to expect that these channels will be held open by the present holders of such physical empires to the other covictors? Is this commercial domain of the United States subject to destruction by the direct action of other nations, induced by self-preservation, self-interest, or ill- will, without resort to the agencies of national security? Economic warfare always exists, but what happens when it disregards the unwritten “laws of economic warfare?” Here is a study worthy of the attention of a security agency.
A study of national means of exercising power has been published recently by Captain Liddell-Hart, The British Way in Warfare. His criticism of the British way in the late war, wherein the British main effort consisted in placing her man power shoulder to shoulder with that of the French to sustain and return the frontal attack of Germany, brings to mind Mahan’s exposition of the use of sea power against communications and, conjointly with land forces, in balance-upsetting operations—the historic method of Great Britain. In addition to advocating such strategy, Liddell-Hart draws as lessons from the war that “the economic target has proportionately outgrown the military target”; that motorization and mechanization have become essential to modern requirement of mobility and to conservation of man power; “rarely has anyone taken time by the forelock and assured victory by anticipating the trend of warfare.” But he anticipates almost too readily, for, by broadening the basis for air attack, accepting as a fact that air power will disregard the laws of war and citing as a conclusive example its rather indiscriminate use as a controller of peoples and tribes in Afghanistan and Africa, he elevates air power to a place high above land and sea. No thinking, reasoning man will be foolish enough to deny the future of air power; but it must be established, as have all other arms and forces, through sound appreciation of its practical, not its possible or conjectured, worth and to its relation to the other arms.
It appears that Britain did abandon her traditional method of exerting national pressure during the late war; but it cannot be conclusively proved that she was not correct in so doing. As a matter of fact the British historic method was a development, of necessity and opportunity, over a period of 300 years, fitting naturally into the situations in which she found herself. It would not appear that much abstract thought was given to “method” until Mahan began publishing the results of analysis. But there can be no doubt of the tremendous accomplishment of British statesmanship and consistent national policy during that long period.
A survey of the diplomatic, political, and military courses persistently followed by Japan during the past forty years discloses, despite temporary failures and setbacks, and psychological and tactical errors, a national or governmental knowledge of the end in view, of way and of method that is remarkable and worth of the closest study. When to advance and when to retreat; when to risk and when to rest secure; when to show the gloved hand and when the mailed fist; how to mingle with friends and how with enemies; when to stress the military and when the political power—these thing5 are worthy of examination. They may not all be the result of conscious planning and well-knit central control, but the summation has been tremendous. It proves that the legislative, executive, military triangle is well occupied by a policy-forming and plan-executing intelligence.
Military, political, and economic factors.—We have seen that our military departments and forces, Army and Navy> are well prepared as to policies, joint and individual planning measures, steps in procurement and preparation of material and personnel, and operational doctrines adequate to fulfill any assigned part in any complete security plan. In actual provision of force, however, both Army and Navy have been permitted to deteriorate since the hope of success in attaining reduction of armaments became an obsession with successive administrations since 1921.
Our present-day Army is ridiculously small; not so much that we require greater force in normal times, but that the present force is inadequate to carry the overhead of preparation and training for the needs of war. It is not adequate as a framework for expansion or as a source of supply of the necessary personnel for organizing and training the Army which national emergency might require on short notice. Particularly should the Army Air Force be maintained at great strength, both the element necessary for service with ground forces and that designed for more independent operations or operations as part of joint forces, under the designated high command.
The Navy is now well below the strength which we are permitted to retain by the Washington and London treaties; and that permitted and relative strength is actually far less than its numerical summation would indicate because of political, strategic, and logistic bonds accepted by us in our eagerness to obtain bargains in limitation and reduction. It is apparent, however, that our body politic, in view of the events of recent years, is becoming Navy conscious and willing to give full support to its upbuilding and maintenance; the evidence in that respect, as regards the present administration, is quite concrete and reassuring.
It is pertinent to quote here, as bearing on the essential character and strength of our Navy, with or without treaty limitations, two other items of the U. S. Naval Policy, referred to earlier in this study: “To create, maintain, and operate a Navy second to none and in conformity with Treaty provisions” and “To develop the Navy to a maximum in battle strength and ability to control the sea in defense of the Nation and its interests.” It may be noted further that the policy contains a statement that “A system of outlying naval and commercial bases suitably distributed, developed and defended, is one of the most important elements of national strength.” However, it does not prescribe as essential anything more than “to further development of outlying bases in the Hawaiian Islands and the Canal Zone”; to do so would conflict, unfortunately, with hampering treaty provisions as to our status in the Pacific, where the defense of sovereign territory and vital interests is greatly handicapped by lack of developed and defended bases. It may be that by our own action we shall lose sovereignty over the Philippines. Those who have worked for separation see only their small commodity sector of the commercial cycle without considering that the opposite side of the wheel is bringing back more than they seem to have lost. What of the Philippines as an intrepot to the immensity of Asia, as a link with 12,000,000 receptive and friendly people interested in our civilization and culture, and as a base in support of our Far Eastern policies? Our complete withdrawal from the Western Pacific will mark a decline in national virility.
The Merchant Marine, including our developing aero-marine, is another element of our economic cosmos which has been sedulously fostered since its value as a factor in our national welfare was clearly demonstrated. Subsidies and mail contracts have been utilized to assist in maintaining it. On the other hand, such means of sustenance have been attacked in Congress, by certain elements of our populace and by rivals abroad, for various reasons-—some of honest nature, others inimical and unfriendly. There is no question that an adequate merchant marine is an essential part of national welfare. Can there be any question as to the fairness of an arrangement whereby this government assures itself that 50 per cent of all passengers and freight transported between this country and any other shall be carried in American bottoms? Such an arrangement would stabilize our Merchant Marine and assure its successful continuance. How and in what form the legal enactment of such provision is to be accomplished we must leave to the recommendation of the security agency hereinafter suggested and congressional action.
As a further factor toward attainment of national welfare and security, some results of a brief study of the use and cost of military man power will be added. Annual expenditures by the War and Navy Departments through certain of the critical periods of our national existence and their percentage of total national expenditure have been developed graphically and are here appended. The graphs are simple and self-explanatory as to recorded facts. Let us note particularly several features. Military expenditures are not, normally, a large proportion of total national expenditure. The expenses of the Navy Department increase greatly during war periods, but the percentage falls because the War Department expenses increase prodigiously and absorb a high percentage of total expenditure. No specific criticism of the War Department is here intended as those expenditures were deemed necessary for the situation coped with. Note that after each war the Army and Navy expenditures do not fall to previous levels though percentages of total expenditure fall below previous levels. This fact is neither to the credit or discredit of the departments concerned and is due solely to greatly increased total national expenditure. The tremendous increase fa Army expenditures during war is the price of man power. The sustained high level of total expenditure for years following war is the “pay off” to man power in rehabilitation and maintenance of veterans, in pensions and bonuses, and to increase in governmental standards and bureaucracy. The lesson we should learn is not to be harsh and ungrateful to veterans, but to establish and maintain competent authority that will make the basic decisions as to our way in warfare, and devise methods and means with a view to economy of force. If the character of an impending war is such that prodigal use of military man power is not necessary to the attainment of purpose the “rush to the colors’ should be well controlled. The appropriate way and the most effective means of carrying the war to successful conclusion should be chosen.
Security with minimum of armament.—Between the present time, notification of termination of the Washington treaty having been given by Japan, and December 31, 1936, the entire question of limitation by treaty will be reconsidered. Further reduction may be possible, but not by recession from the principles and standards now in existence. Eventual success in obtaining gradual reduction of armaments can only be obtained if the international delegations will continue to stress the fundamentals of their problem. Surely, if we are an advancing civilization, the laws of war can be strengthened, rather than weakened, and made more comprehensive and humanitarian. The threat of unrestricted use of airplanes in indiscriminate bombing and gas attack against civil populations presents a great menace and prospective horror. Independent, or would-be independent, air forces seeking expansion and development to the greatest possible degree, insist that no limitation or restriction be placed on them. They believe, or profess to believe, that they are not subject to existing international law—as technically they are not—ignoring the principles which the law merely attempts to apply. The threat of this method of warfare constitutes the greatest present menace to international accord and sense of security. The urge for more and more air power would be lessened if bombardment from the air be held within the present implications of the laws of war. All new methods of warfare must be brought within the basic code before there will be any real assurance or hope of uniting the nations in a concerted and effective move toward understanding and reduction. This holds as to poisonous gases and analogous substances—if nations do not consider it right to poison wells why should they poison the atmosphere ! The restrictions placed on submarines by the London and Washington treaties “In Relation to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare” are in accord with the principles of existing laws of war and must be universally accepted before general reduction or abolishment of submarines can become a practical consideration. Such acceptance, by restricting their use in warfare, would automatically limit their numbers.
Reduction, including limitation, of armaments still has possibilities; it is an idea that will not and should not be downed. But basic considerations only, freed from horse-trading tactics, will be effective in securing it. Understanding and agreement as to the application of the laws of war to all new weapons will go far toward obtaining conditions under which reduction may be accomplished. This field seems to be the one of greatest promise in re-establishing confidence and good relations among the nations of the world. It is the one most appropriate for and worthy of diplomatic effort; it is the one abandoned by statesmen when they took over “technical” limitation problems from the military men whom they “could not trust.” Having failed completely there, they should again return to their former more fundamental line of effort whereby technical limitation will be simplified and facilitated.
National governments must restore international morality and honor by actually establishing the validity in war as well as in peace of freely given commitments. Peoples will then not only begin to trust each other but, having emerged from the cloud of fear and suspicion by living in the assurance of security in peace time, will insist that governments keep faith. International law, security, and accord can be built up only on such a basis.
A national security council.—So far we have seen that the United States is not able, under its present governmental setup, to make up its national mind without difficulty, confusion, and delay, to say the least. It cannot evolve definitely its fundamental policies or plan and execute, confidently and efficiently, appropriate measures to support policy. It is obvious also that, by reason of the same deficiency, we are ill-prepared to participate in international councils striving for understanding and accord, despite our superabundance of altruism and good intention. The tragic failure of President Wilson at Paris, in the United States, and in Washington and the subsequent irreparable division of our people over League and Court demonstrate this fact. How can we then best make good this missing element in our administrative set-up and correct the existing deficiency in prevision and preparation? Fortunately we have certain legislative acts of Congress, notably the previously mentioned National Defense Act, which suggest the course that should be followed. Details of this act, which should be carefully studied by anyone interested in security, will not be set down here. The pertinent matter appears in the Words of Assistant Secretary Payne in a statement to the War Policies Commission May 13, 1931:
The law also imposes on my office the responsibility of evolving plans designed to assist a wartime President in mobilizing our economic resources and in unifying our national industrial effort. This task is obviously one that cannot be carried out by the War Department alone. The Navy Department in particular must share equally with us this duty. Through co-operative effort, the two departments, assisted by many other agencies and individuals, are developing plans that we believe are adequate to the purpose.
The final result of this responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of War appears in a comprehensive series of determinations, plans, organizations, and proposed bills prepared, with the close co-operation of the Navy Department, for presentation to and approval by Congress on the inception of war. This method has the great advantage of not being static as would be the case if formulated into approved acts of Congress; the responsible agency subjects the entire set-up to constant supervision and maintains it abreast of the time and situation ready for congressional approval.
This act, comprehensive and farseeing as it is, was developed out of the lessons of the war to fill an obvious need and to avoid having to learn those lessons again through future bitter experience. We should note that here, as was the case in the development of naval policy, the War Department is developing policy and plan, not in accord with clear-cut higher national policy and purpose but in fulfillment of its own interpretation of what national policy would require. This act is but one bright, clearly detailed spot on a national security map which has many notations of “unexplored territory” and “position doubtful.”
There are in existence, however, two agencies which, but for limitations of function, of authority, of personnel, and of time, would be capable of rounding out that map.
The War Policies Commission comes nearest to fulfilling the need for an authoritative agency which, under the President and the Congress, will determine the policies and fundamental steps requisite for national security. It is composed of six departmental heads (the Secretaries of War, Navy, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, and the Attorney General), four Senators and four Representatives, and its purpose, as indicated at the head of its printed hearings, is “to promote peace and to equalize the burdens and to remove the profits of war.” If the commission’s title were changed to “National Security Commission,” its purpose simply to the “promotion of effective national security,” and its membership broadened slightly, especially to include the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, its set-up would be practically ideal; and through the medium of a planning committee and of subcommittees its policies could be hooked up with the present efficient war-planning and war-conducting agencies without interference with their existing functions. It is obvious that such a commission, per se, is cumbersome and of value only as a policy-shaping organization. It would not form directly part of an executive agency, of civil administration or conduct of war.
The present United States Council of National Defense composed of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor is almost identical with the Cabinet bloc of the War Policies Commission. Its principal functions are stated as the “co-ordination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare” and the “creation of relations which will render possible in time of need the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the Nation.” This Council with appropriate membership and broadened functions of a nature advisory to the President under the title Council of National Security would fully accord with and be complementary to the suggested national security commission; in it are the elements of an effective executive agency under the President.
Authority to represent and responsibility to the Executive and Legislative branches of the government are the prime essentials of membership of the suggested security commission; no other group could be named that would be more competent to serve its purpose. Continuity should be furnished by an executive secretaryship of long tenure. The executive secretary should also be a member of the council and chairman of a planning committee which will function under the commission and which will in turn supervise and co-ordinate the work of subcommittees and boards. The essence of the scheme is in the commission, the council, and that all-important cog—the executive secretary. There is an obvious relationship between this proposed set-up and the agencies created to cope with the present emergency. As normal conditions are restored the security organization might well undertake the absorption of the latter within the fabric of permanent administrative organization.
Summary.—This study has revealed an obvious weakness in the machinery of our government and has suggested a means .of repairing that weakness. There may be other satisfactory methods of considering) reviewing, shaping, and stating national policy, but the one under discussion is assuredly the method that is best suited to the development of policies that will meet the approval of legislative and executive authority. It would be applicable to the treatment of internal as well as external security—especially as the two are inseparably related—having due regard to the commission, planning committee, and subcommittee memberships. Out studies in national security must, furthermore, take into consideration the aspirations and interests of other nations and groupings in order that policies may bring about mutual welfare rather than conflict of interest. Thus in seeking our own national security along rational lines we shall also be discovering the way of international co-operation and of eventual accord. As previously stated, the League of Nations must, perforce, become a lesser before it can be developed into a greater condominium. The trail for the League down hill and up to a new height may then be found to coincide with our own as we move, confidently and considerately, toward national security. It would seem therefore that our immediate task includes much self-enlightenment and training. We must have a disciplined and understanding citizenry that will support well-founded and well-defined national and administrative policies; we must devise ways and means for attaining security that will best assure national welfare and international understanding. If we are to make the most of our national heritage we must have farseeing and enduring policies and administrative agencies fully competent to guard and develop them.