GERMAN REARMAMENT
The Stresa Conference.—The Stresa inference of April 10-13 was significant not so much for definite accomplishments as for its evidence of some degree of Franco-Anglo-Italian solidarity in the face of German rearmament. The British delegation entered the conference pledged against any further Continental commitments, and still hoping against hope that Europe might not fall back into a system °f “two hostile camps”—or, more truly, a coalition of the other European states against Germany. England, in other words, attempted her old role of mediator between the opposing Continental powers, ft was to strengthen her in this position that Herr Hitler, in the midst of the Stresa deliberations, came out with a modification of his earlier stand regarding an Eastern European agreement, declaring that Germany would consider a non- aggressive pact though still opposed to any pledges of mutual assistance.
In the end, England joined with Italy in supporting the French protest against Germany’s treaty scrapping, and came in for bitter criticism from Germany for her alleged betrayal of German interests. The effect of the action planned at Stresa and carried out at Geneva, according to Germany, was to slam the door on her return into the League or into the European concert of powers. This protest was conveyed orally to Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador at Berlin.
More definitely, the agreements at Stresa may be summarized as follows:
(1) United support of the French appeal to the League against German rearmament.
(2) United support of Austrian independence, and a decision to call an early conference at Rome in order to conclude a general Central European arrangement. This conference was subsequently set for the first week in June.
(3) Agreement to continue the study of an air pact among the five powers—France, Italy, England, Belgium, and Germany—and of any bilateral air pact related thereto.
(4) Approval in principle of Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian rearmament, but postponement of the question until after the conference at Rome.
(5) Finally, a declaration that the three powers were “in complete agreement in opposing, by all practicable means, any unilateral repudiation of treaties which may endanger the peace of Europe, and would act in close and cordial co-operation for that purpose.”
League Condemnation.—Carrying out their pledge at Stresa to support the French policy in the extraordinary session of the League Council at the close of April, the major powers pushed through a resolution condemning German treaty violations, in virtually the phrasing which France originally proposed. This was chiefly, however, because none of the smaller states could be inveigled into the dangerous task of framing a new resolution, in view of warnings from Germany that it would be regarded as an unfriendly service. Yet in the end all the states represented in the Council—France, England, Italy, U.S.S.R., Poland, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Mexico, Australia, and Argentina—plucked up sufficient courage to make the resolution unanimous. Only Denmark abstained from voting, for reasons which she knew all would understand. Poland’s support came at the last moment as something of a surprise.
The resolution declared: (1) that Germany had failed in her duty to respect contractual undertakings and was to be condemned for unilateral repudiation of international obligations; (2) that the Council should appoint a committee to propose measures to make the covenant more effective and in particular “to define the particular economic and financial measures which might be applied” in case of similar repudiations in the future.
The committee appointed included representatives of the first nine nations named above, and two additional members from Yugoslavia and Canada.
Germany’s only immediate retort to the League action was a “short but determined” note to all the signatories of the resolution denying their right to set themselves up as judges over Germany and viewing the deliberations of the Council as an attempt at “a new discrimination.” The German government reserved the right to set forth its position more fully at a later date.
Plans for Rome Conference.—As decided at Stresa, the conference at Rome on Austria and Central Europe was set to meet on June 3, under the presidency of Premier Mussolini. First on the agenda would be a general convention pledging Austria and all her neighbor states to a policy of strict non-intervention in each other’s internal affairs. Bilateral pacts would provide sanctions, within the frame-work of the League, against any violation of this general agreement.
According to preliminary plans, invitations were to be extended to Germany) Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy, France, and Austria. The original idea was to include Poland and Rumania, but at Poland’s desire the list was subsequently limited to France and the Austrian border states. There was no prospect that Germany would attend, but England was expected to be present as a friendly observer.
If possible, the question of rearmament for Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria was to be left for subsequent consideration by the League of Nations. Premier Mussolini at the Stresa conference strongly advocated consent to Austrian rearmament, but was as strongly opposed by Foreign Minister Laval, who in this matter was obviously carrying out his obligations to France’s Little Entente allies. Even earlier than the Stresa meeting, Austria herself had declared that the granting of arms equality was “a self-evident proposition,” though, unlike Germany, she was hardly in a position to carry it out without sanction from the Western powers.
Franco-Soviet Agreement.—Just prior to the Stresa conference in April, the French and Soviet governments gave definite notice of their intention to join in a mutual assistance pact, the effect of which would be to put teeth into the nonaggression clauses of the League Covenant for their mutual protection against other European powers. After many delays, chiefly due to the hesitancy of both governments about dangerous pledges, and the desire of France to keep the agreement within the machinery of the League, the pact was finally signed on May 2. Despite its circumlocutory phrasing, it would seem to go a long way toward a revival of the Franco-German alliance of pre-war years. Even at the moment of its signature, plans were on foot for conferences between the army general staffs of the two nations and, for French financial assistance in the construction of strategic railways and roads on the Soviet Western frontier. Negotiations were under way also for a similar linking up of the Soviet Republic with Czechoslovakia and perhaps other nations the Little Entente, the whole scheme taking the place of the Eastern European agreement, which had to be scrapped because of the opposition of Germany and Poland. The terms of the Franco-Soviet treaty may be summarized as follows:
Article 1 provides that if either nation is threatened with aggression by a European state, they shall “proceed to immediate consultation” for enforcement of Art. X of the League Covenant.
Article 2 provides that if either nation is actually subjected to unprovoked aggression, as specified in Art. XV of the Covenant, they shall "immediately come to each other’s aid”; and Art. 3 provides for similar immediate aid in application of Arts. XVI and XVII of the Covenant.
Article 4 stipulates that the present treaty shall not in any way restrict either nation in fulfilling its League obligations; and Art. 5 fixes , the term of the treaty as five years, and indefinitely thereafter unless a year’s notice of its denunciation is given.
An added protocol states that aggression must be understood as “against either of the parties’ own territory”—a point over which there was some haggling when the treaty was in preparation. It is also stated that in circumstances envisaged by the treaty, the two nations will first endeavor to have the League Council issue recommendations “with all speed required,” but that if the Council for any reason fails to act "the obligation of assistance shall apply nonetheless.”
Finally it is pointed out that the treaty is an outcome of negotiations first entered into in order to complete a security agreement comprising all countries of Northeastern Europe—the U.S.S.R., Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic states bordering on the U.S.S.R., as well as a mutual assistance pact between the U.S.S.R., France, and Germany. Such agreements the two parties “still look upon as desirable.”
German Naval Threat.—Far more serious in its effect on British public and official opinion than any other aspect of Germany’s treaty violations, was the news published in April that the German scheme of naval rearmament included submarine construction, and that the building of several small coastal submarines was already under way. Though this new development was probably not unexpected, and not altogether unknown, it appeared quite likely to upset the plans for Anglo-German naval conversations broached by Sir John Simon during his March visit in Berlin.
As regards Germany’s new air forces, Premier MacDonald, speaking in Parliament on May 2, gave assurances that, to meet German expansion, the British government was ready to go beyond its air program of last November. “In no circumstances,” he declared, “will we accept any position of inferiority with regard to whatever air force may be raised by Germany in the future.” To equal the German strength, the present British home defense force of 560 planes would need to be increased to at least 1,000.
EASTERN EUROPE
Danzig Elections.—The results of the Danzig elections of April 7 were a severe disappointment to the National Socialist party, which had hoped to secure a two- thirds majority in order to scrap the present constitution and set up a one-party Nazi regime. Despite strenuous electioneering, with visits by Air Minister Goering, Rudolph Hess, Propaganda Minister Goebbels, and other lights of Nazidom, the party secured only about 60 per cent of the total vote, the rest going to Catholic, Communist, Socialist, and Polish candidates. Since in preceding elections the Nazis have had majorities of from 80 to 90 per cent, the vote showed some decline in Nazi popularity in Danzig and perhaps elsewhere.
The elections were followed by racial disturbances in the Polish Corridor, which, though minimized in both the Polish and the German press, indicated the artificial quality of the Polish-German entente.
New Polish Constitution.—The new Polish Constitution which went into effect on April 24 sets a somewhat novel pattern in European dictatorships. Under it, one-third of the Upper House or “Assembly of Elders” is named by the President and the other two-thirds will consist of military men who have won decorations in war. The Lower House is elective but its powers are limited by the President’s absolute veto. The President can also make and ratify treaties, dissolve Parliament at will, and name one of two candidates to succeed himself. As in other dictatorships, the aim is to thwart futile parliamentarianism by enlargement of the executive power.
Arbitration for Abyssinia.—Despite repeated efforts of the Abyssinian delegate to secure a League edict against Italian troop movements in Africa, the League Council declined to take up the matter at its April meeting, but expressed the hope that the two nations might set up the arbitration machinery, already agreed upon, before its next meeting in May. It was pointed out, however, that the Council was tacitly sanctioning a dangerous principle in thus allowing troop movements to continue after arbitration had been accepted. To quote one observer, “it remains to be seen whether this new doctrine would still be followed if Italy should ever complain that Germany was massing troops on the Austrian frontier.”
UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
The Chaco Deadlock.—The United States early in April accepted the invitation of Argentina and Chile to join in another effort to bring peace in the Chaco, but in view of the suspicions and jealousies of the conciliators it appeared highly unlikely that anything would be accomplished before the special session of the League Assembly set for May 20. Brazil at the close of April was still hesitant as to joining in the new scheme of mediation although urged thereto not only by Chile and Argentina but also by the United States and Peru.
In the meantime, operations in the field have raised the possibility that Paraguay may view mediation more favorably. After having pushed her lines far to the northward in the direction of Santa Clara, her positions farther south were threatened by a vigorous Bolivian counter-offensive. Charagua, chief town in Cordillera province, and about midway between Villa Montes and Santa Clara, was recaptured by the Bolivians after continuous fighting through the latter half of April.
Protest on German Debts.—On April 15 the German Reichbank again announced that Dawes Loan payments due on that date would be made in foreign exchange only to holders whose governments had entered into special trade agreements with Germany. This meant that American holders, not thus benefited, would get their payments in German marks good only for purchases in Germany. The American government sent a protest against this discriminatory treatment of American creditors, but with slight prospect of a modification of the German policy, especially in view of the present difficulty of the German government in raising funds for payments abroad.
Experts on Neutrality.—In view of its present importance in American foreign relations, the question of neutrality policies was made the chief theme of the 3-day session of the American Society of International Law held at Washington in April. In his presidential address, Dr. James Brown Scott advocated emphasis on neutral duties rather than neutral rights as a means of avoiding war. Other speakers pointed out that renunciation of rights and prohibition of trade with belligerents might themselves assume the aspect of a violation of neutrality. Former Secretary of State Stimson rejected the theory that war can be escaped by a policy of isolation, and stressed “unselfish co-operation of the nations of the world” as the only promising road to peace. “The nub of the question,” he said, “lies in the fact that in the modern world a nation does not have to be actually drawn into war in order to suffer from it.”
The same question, “American Neutrality in a Future War,” is taken up by H. W. Briggs and R. L. Buell in a Foreign Policy Report of April 10. The authors, after an extended survey of our neutrality policy in the past, point out three objections to the “new isolation”: (1) that an embargo on exports will work to the advantage of one belligerent against another; (2) that prohibition of the sale of munitions abroad will “result in every nation becoming an armed camp”; (3) that if the United States declined to defend its rights abroad, American lives and property would suffer such injury as to force a shift of policy. Their conclusion is similar to that of Mr. Stimson, but they add that there are “no signs that the United States or any other nation is willing to make the sacrifices necessary to develop a policy of international conciliation” which will insure prevention of war.
Consideration of the question by the American State Department has evidently continued, as shown by a conference of the President and Secretary Hull on this subject on April 10, though the government is not yet ready to recommend such policies as bans on exportation of munitions, foreign loans, and trade in contraband.
FAR EAST
Manchukuo Oil Problem.—A Japanese note replying to American protests on the new Manchukuo oil law was received on April 12. In contents it was similar to the previous reply to Great Britain, denying responsibility for Manchukuo’s actions, and asserting that nonrecognition had relieved the puppet state of any responsibility for maintaining the open door. Japan, however, offered her services as a mediator. Meanwhile the American, British, and Dutch oil companies, being ousted from the retail field, are reported to have made some arrangement with the Mukden Wholesale Oil Co., a Japanese concern, to retain a share of the wholesale trade.
Japanese Cotton Competition.—Fear of increasing competition with Japanese cotton goods, such as has injured British sales in India and elsewhere, led American manufacturers in April to raise the question of higher duties on Japanese goods entering the United States. The actual imports of Japanese cotton products have until recently been small, amounting in 1933 to only .4 per cent of the total American consumption, but the quantity has been rapidly increasing, and in January of this year was 7,000,000 yds., or nearly as much as the total for 1934; and the effect, even of small importations, has been to keep prices at a lower level.
Prohibitory duties on Japanese goods are, however, a dangerous measure, in that Japan imports from this country far more than she exports to us, and is thus in an excellent position for retaliation. Thus last year Japan took $111,000,000 worth of American raw cotton, or 30 per cent of our total cotton exports. To look into the whole question of the American cotton industry and the effect of the tariff upon it, the President has appointed a cabinet committee including the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.