Quotable Principles Of War

The very simplicity of the fundamental principles of war has, upon occasion, led to their neglect, with ultimately disastrous results. By the simplicity of these principles is meant, of course, the axiomatic nature of their appeal to common sense; certainly no one would wittingly imply that any inherent ease exists in their application to the changing situations of war. Although Jomini recognized the importance of a study of principles in his statement, “One must know little, but well, and above all steep oneself in ruling principles,” the commentary of Mahan is more accurate:

Formulated principles, however excellent, are by themselves too abstract to sustain convinced allegiance; the reasons for them, as manifested in concrete cases, are an imperative part of the process through which they really enter the mind and possess the will.

Therefore, in an effort to provide midshipmen with a brief and elementary, but sound, background of principles for their intelligent study of the course in naval history, a few apt quotations have been selected which not only explain each principle, but also illustrate its historic truth and acceptance. As the limited time available does not permit elaboration, the quotations are restricted to a small number; but each has the merit of being a definite, practical illustration that contains the vital truth of the principle with which it is associated. In correlation, a consecutive statement of the principles was prepared in such a way that it forms a progression of thought, rather than a lifeless tabulation of vague terms.

All of the historic examples used in corroboration of the principles are requoted from Command and Discipline, by Sir Herbert W. Richmond, K.C.B., and published in 1927 by Edward Stanford, Ltd., London. This admirable book consists entirely of military quotations from innumerable sources. It is a pocket-size compendium of concise and cogent military thought, in itself almost the equivalent of a library. The chapter headings are not organized with respect to the subject of this paper, but are more general in nature, such as, “The Character of a Commander,” “Preparation for Command,” “Orders and Obedience,” “Counsel and Confidence in Subordinates,” “Responsibility.” For my particular purpose I have therefore taken the liberty of wide selection and arbitrary regrouping of certain pertinent quotations, which bear out, in a striking way, the truth of the recognized principles of war, and I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the convenient completeness of Admiral Richmond’s book.

The Statement of Principles

Isolate the objective definitely. Make the plan of such simplicity that it will be understood easily, thus facilitating perfect co-ordination, the proper timing of all effort, through familiarity with the objective and the intentions. Surprise the enemy if possible, at the same time taking steps to ensure security, the preparation and protection against surprise by the enemy. Keeping in mind the important single aim, take the offensive, forcing the enemy to act on the defensive, a situation in which every advantage must be pursued by the aggressor. In accordance with the principle of movement, “get there first,” using an economy of force (but without stinting), in order to guarantee concentration, superiority at the point of contact, the most vital principle of all.

Supporting Quotations

The principle of the “objective.”—“One must not fight for the sake of fighting. ‘Battles concerning which one cannot say why and to what purpose they have been delivered are commonly the resource of ignorant men.’ (Marshal Saxe.) However obvious these points may be, they seem to have been overlooked during the tragic periods of our history.”—Marshal Foch, Precepts and Judgments.

“No obstacles stopped him [Caesar] when he had a definite end in view.”— Froude, Caesar.

The principle of “simplicity—“His [a general’s] instructions should be short and simple. ‘The first line will attack, the second will support.’”—Marshal Saxe, The Art of War.

“. . . a skilful officer always resolves that his orders shall be as few in number as possible, that they shall be simple, and so distinct that they cannot be mistaken.” —Admiral Patton, Strictures on Naval Discipline.

“In the war of 1866, the more important of his [Moltke’s] orders are distinguished by a simplicity and brevity which avoided any cramping of the action of the recipients.”—Colonel Whitton, Moltke.

“Stonewall Jackson’s orders for battle were in every essential respect a model. They were very short, not to say abrupt: but they were exceedingly clear. They left no doubt whatever as to the intentions of the General-in-Chief. They entered into no details, except where details were absolutely necessary. . . —Colonel Henderson.

The principle of “co-ordination.“—No signals [from Hood] were needed except to correct irregularities in the order, for the Captains knew what they had to do.”— Mahan, Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence.

“Nelson ought to be held up as a pattern for Admirals on account of the extreme Pains he took to impress upon the Flag Officers and Captains the spirit of the enterprises which he proposed to undertake. He unfolded to them his general plan of operations, and the modifications which the weather or the enemy’s movements might oblige him to qualify his original design. When once he had explained his system to the Flag or Superior Officers of his fleet, he confided to them the care of acting according to circumstances, and to place themselves in the most favourable positions for the execution of the enterprises thus planned. . . they learnt, in action, to supply what had escaped his forethought, and in success to surpass even his hopes.”—James, History of the Navy, vol. Ill, quoting Dupins’ Voyages, vol. IV.

The principle of “surprise.”—“His [Napoleon’s] opponents moved their men on the chess-board according to the rules which they took for immutable principles, and the game went on so long as their antagonists were also guided by them; but when an adversary appeared who only awaited the development of their methodical movements to play his own secret, profound and decisive game, all equality of chances disappeared, and the only variety in the result was in the mode of defeat.”— Sir E. Hamley, Operations of War.

The principle of “security.”—“Marlborough was always resourceful, always ready for the unexpected. . .—Cambridge Modern History, vol. V.

“. . . no accident took him [Caesar] so unexpectedly but he had a remedy prepared for it. . .    —Bacon, “Imago civilis Julii Caesaris.”

[If] “there are six cases to be considered which cover all the possible hypotheses, [concerning the action of the enemy]: in his calculations Napoleon provides for what he should do in each of the cases.... [He] neglects nothing. . . .

“The hypotheses having all been considered, Napoleon makes his dispositions in such a way as to be able to manoeuvre in every direction.”—Colin, Transformations of War.

“A great Captain ought to say to himself several times a day: ‘If the enemy appears in front, on my right, or on my left, how shall I act?’ If he finds himself in want of an answer he is ill-prepared.”—Napoleon, Military Maxims.

The principle of the “offensive.”—“The trouble was that the commanders never went out to lick anybody, but always thought first of keeping from getting licked.” (General Sheridan, on the Army of the Potomac.)

“He [Suffren] now knows that nothing but illusions and disappointments lie in not trying, before everything else, to crush the enemy’s armed force, and to do so by battle, battle completed by pursuit. .. . He knows that it is the offensive only which counts.”—Castex, “Les idles mili- taires de la Marine du XVIII Siècle.”

The principle of “movement.”—“His [Caesar’s] greatest successes were due to the rapidity of his movements which brought him on the enemy before they heard of his approach.”—Froude, Caesar.

“When chance is offered he [a general] must seize it with the utmost swiftness, take the first troops he finds to the critical spot, advance them rapidly, exposing his own person without fear. That is what decides and wins battles.”—Marshal Saxe, The Art of War.

The principle of “economy of force.”— “Lastly, he [Suffren] knows, or rather anticipates, that a means does exist, as yet unnamed (later to be designated ‘economy of force’) to create superior numbers at the chosen point, even with a fleet equal or inferior to that of the enemy.”—Castex, “Les idles militaires de la Marine du XVIII Siècle.”

“He [a general] knows not only how to draw from a situation all its inherent advantages, but how to produce the situation.”—Hamley, Operations of War.

The principle of “concentration.”—“He [Suffren] knows that a decisive result is to be obtained only by crushing a part of the enemy’s force, ... by a concentrated effort. He knows that while it is right to make the most of opportunities for concentration when they arise, it is better still to create them, ... to bring them into being by manoeuvre.”—Castex, “Les idles militaires de la Marine du XVIII Siècle.”