Aspects Of Future World Power

“Defense is of more importance than opulence—Adam Smith

WATT'S invention of the steam engine in 1775 marked the beginning of the pronounced shift from the use of muscular to that of mechanical energy. No other event in the past has so rapidly introduced such far-reaching social Consequences. Developments in the use of coal, oil, and water power by the assertive peoples have brought greater changes in living conditions in a single century than have characterized the whole of previously recorded history. These changes crowd on us with continuing acceleration. In the United States, by the year 1900, estimated energy in use was about twice as much mechanical as animal or 47.5-2.5 millions of horsepower. By 1928 it was nearly fifty times as much or 1,005.4-20.6.

While mechanical power has leaped ahead, social and political progress has dangerously lagged behind. Mechanical progress has brought with it huge population increases, new economic needs, and world-wide ease of exchange and communication. For lack of social and political adjustment, these changes have become a fertile source of both domestic and international strain wherein the impacts and conflicts of human society threaten to grow even more formidable and intense. Mechanical power not only has infinite possibilities of further increase but lies open for conversion into military power, a power which mechanics and science may raise to overwhelming magnitude. As a consequence our knowledge of power and our means of civilizing and controlling its use becomes of vital significance, both in the protection of individual civilizations and in the security of civilization collectively.

It will be the purpose of this inquiry to define the various phases of power; to briefly trace its evolution; to examine the nation-wide distribution of potential energy, to indicate its effects and possible changes in the balance of national influences in the near future; and to consider the changing and ultimate uses of power in its relation to world order.

Power is the means of controlling events. It is a combination of strength, capacity, ability to act, and endurance. It includes the forces by which man seeks to rise above his environment and by which civilizations have risen and progressed.

State power is organized political power. Formerly state power had to fight against control by church power. At present in some cases it is threatened by the influence of financial power.

Political power derives its strength from the development and utilization of social power. Its exercise is unthinkable without adequate economic resources. It is both supported and restricted by law. Usually it is buttressed by both military power and religious authority. It seeks to legitimize itself through intellectual and cultural forces. It is necessary as the only alternative to civil war and invasion.

Social power is joint human activity guided by a more or less explicitly agreed upon set of rules, converted into action by special organs which determine those rules.

Speaking broadly, man’s political organization has evolved through the caveman, family, clan, tribal, feudal, and national stages towards an attempt at some kind of international organization through the League of Nations.

In economic organization we can trace successive periods of hunting, of fishing, of pastoral or animal domestication, of agricultural and soil cultivation, and recently of ever growing trade and commercial enterprise expanding into world-wide interchange and interdependence.

From a scientific standpoint man has progressed from the use of primitive human strength, the employment of animal assistance and simple mechanical appliances, to the use of chemical, automotive, and electrical power.

In social evolution there have been three major steps. The greatest of all was the development of the power of speech, which opened the way for collective effort and gave supremacy over other animal species. The second step was the printed word which permitted the recording and preservation of experience. The third step, appearing in our time, is the power of distant transmission of thought. At some not very distant date a single voice will penetrate to every comer of the globe.

In the evolution of military power we shall first consider its changes as regards I surface area and space. In surface area, it was at first primarily on land; then under Phoenicia, Greece, and Rome it spread to the sea. For some twelve centuries afterwards its major use was by land, followed , by a combination of land and sea power. In space, the use of military power evolved I from land and sea to submarine and aerial; from natural boundaries of land to maritime restrictions, and finally to that of no boundary limitations in the use of the air.

In composition military forces have developed from tribal units through mercenaries, professionals, volunteers, and conscript organizations to a present system of universal mobilization. War now demands the use of the entire population. ;

Migration impulses have shown changes ' from the nomadic tribes of earlier man to settled occupations; thence to territorial expansion and emigration for political or religious freedom. Useful territory is now all nationally colored in our geographies.

The absolute and relative aspects of war as a result of military power should be mentioned. In primitive war, complete annihilation was oftentimes the objective. A second stage tended towards slavery. In later centuries a restriction of plunder and exemption for civil population was brought about. The advent of aerial, chemical, and bacteriological warfare may now well tend towards reversion to the absolute.

Modem civilization has shed many of the primitive objectives of military power, such as head hunting, blood revenge, women, human sacrifice and cannibalism, as well as personal and dynastic feuds. Religion is no longer a fundamental cause for war. The present dominant motives are and apparently will continue to be economic.

From a national aspect military power now has several purposes: security against invasion, colonial protection, bargaining power for diplomacy, protection of trade rights, prestige, and protection of national interests and citizens abroad. In these present days of domestic unrest there is also the necessity for the preservation of internal order.

International aspects of the use of power have now come into the picture in a manner that challenges the best thought of the I world. Civilization in all probability will come to depend upon the use of power in the prevention or limitation of war, in localizing it, and in bringing about its cessation prior to its spread to world areas. That has become the supreme task of modern statesmanship. If we have arrived at a point where the interval between world wars is less than the time required for recuperation, then civilization is headed downwards. Our main hope and perhaps our only hope lies in limitation. Spencer Wilkinson very concisely describes this condition as follows:

... War is the outcome of the growth of societies which can never be uniform, but varies with varying degrees of climate, land, race, religion, and I tradition. No superstate can prevent this diversity nor repress the expansion of a vigorous community. The establishment of a world-state would no doubt be the end of international wars, but they would reappear as civil wars. . . .

Ultimately power must be used for the support of law and not be left available for the unhindered use of a law breaker. This will be a long and painful affair resting upon social evolution. Its necessity is no longer in doubt. Its meaning will be embodied in future national patriotisms.

We shall now take up the factors which ' will tend to alter the future distribution of world power. For convenience we can divide them into four groups: military, economic, political, and social. Statistics given will represent the average of estimates derived from research in a large university library. For simplicity and clarity, references will not be footnoted. Some of the estimates must be taken with considerable latitude. They are intended to indicate only the general trends.

The first factor to be considered in the military group will be the strategic changes which will result from aviation. Those nations possessing a combination of large area and extensive resources for aircraft construction will have the greater incentive and capacity for the development of civil air transport services. These, due to military convertibility and to increased facilities for the manufacture of military aircraft, will have a most significant influence on the trend in military power. Russia, the United States, and ultimately China stand to have the greater increase in this regard. In the case of nations of small homeland area, and particularly so of insular areas like the United Kingdom and Japan, prospects are adverse. These nations will be doubly penalized in the future as their supply lines by sea and their concentrated industrial areas will be exposed to destruction by aircraft. Insular security may become insular peril.

In future wars, air control seems likely to be decisive. We may expect attempts at surprise attack to destroy enemy air bases and paralyze the centers of aircraft manufacture. Concentration of these centers in small national areas closely located to possible enemies will constitute a great handicap, particularly in the case of Western European powers. Control of the air will play a part almost parallel to the historic value of control of the sea.

The power of maritime blockade will also be weakened. To scouting and screening against 2-dimensional surface craft and even against submarine operations we will have to add that against 3-dimensional aircraft; a feat far more complex, and in many situations neither practicable nor possible. Sea blockade will probably lose much of its effectiveness. There may not be time for it to be brought into play. Those nations dependent upon blockade as one of their principal weapons may find that power discounted.

There is another possible future influence of air power. The personnel of governments and the personnel of industry are not going to be as immune from the hazards that were formerly borne by front-line fighting forces. In the crowded areas of Europe, for example, this factor should lend some psychological influence as a deterrent to conflict.

Table I
	Area (sq. mi.)	Population	Annual Increase	Man Power (Age 15-49)	Value of Chemical Industries (000,000 omitted)'
France	212,736	42,000,000	49,600	10,300,000	$360
Germany	180,986	66,000,000	460,000	16,000,000	$864
Italy	119,744	42,000,000	437,000	10,400,000	$175
Japan	147,462	69,000,000	1,007,000	16,000,000	$132
United Kingdom	94,281	48,000,000	221,600	11,500,000	$552
British Empire	13,671,902	480,000,000	4,400,000	17,000,000 (white)	$800
U.S.S.R.	8,244,000	168,000,000	3,400,000	40,000,000	$1,090
U. S.	2,973,000	125,000,000	797,000	31,000,000	$2,268
China	3,100,000	440,000,000	3,700,000	100,000,000

 

In the first of the tables (Table I) we shall bring out two of the factors making for change in military power—homeland area as affecting air developments and population increase. China is included as a long-range consideration to be discussed later. It is of interest to note that the population increase of Russia is slightly greater than that of the combined increase of all other powers listed except China, and that its area is more than twice their combined areas. This consideration is exclusive of dominions and colonies. As of related interest to potential air power we shall include relative estimates of national chemical industries.

Related to the consideration of man power there is the factor of climatic energy in determining national influence, which raises or depresses the energy and enterprise of the individual and the assertiveness of the group as a whole. The relationship of climate to the rise of modern civilizations, to health, and to power have been usefully compared. According to Huntington the factors most favorable to human energy are (1) temperatures varying between 55° and 72°, (2) an average humidity of 80 per cent, and (3) a maximum variation of cyclonic storm or barometric gradient. Combinations of these factors yield a rough table from his invests gations showing two groups, the first of which note the very favorable areas, and the second the moderately favorable areas.
TABLE II
Priority or Climatic Energy Areas
(Showing the relative intensity of combined physic*' and mental activity if these depended upon clim*te alone.)

I. (1) North Sea and Baltic Area

(a) Southern England
(b) Germany
(c) North and Central France
(d) Southern Scandinavia

(2) North and North Central United States
(3) New Zealand and Tasmania
(4) West Coast—United States

II. (1) Japan
(2) North Italy
(3) Western Russia
(4) Central Argentina and Chile
(5) Southern Australia
(6) Southern Canada
(7) Northwestern United States
(8) Southern Cape Colony
(9) Central Russia

We now pass to the actual sources of mechanical power, chiefly represented by coal, iron, and oil. The factors of change in economic power will lie, not so much in present production of these vital materials- as in the amount of geological reserves upon which production capacities may be increased and upon which nations will thereby be put in stronger position to exercise influence over others. In a table showing these reserves we shall include figures on present electric and estimated potential water power. The figures on minerals are in general based upon estimates of “known reserves.” It is not possible to present figures on total reserves with reliability.

Table III
	Iron Reserve (tons) (000,000 omitted)	Coal Reserve (tons) (000,000 omitted)	Oil Reserve (bbls.) (000,000 omitted)	Electric Power (kw. hrs.) (000,000 omitted)	Potential Water Power (hp.)
France	4,300	17,600	5	14,000	5,400,000
Germany	1,400	300,000	10	25,000	3,800,000
Italy	6	243	0	11,000	5,800,000
Japan	80	8,000	2,200	14,000	6,000,000
United Kingdom	2,300	189,000	0	16,000	850,000
British Empire	?	2,300,000	5,000	32,000	76,000,000
U.S.S.R.	4,000	1,100,000	18,000	19,000	10,000,000
U. S.	10,000	3,800,000	12,000	110,000	45,000,000
China	500	280,000	1,400	?	20,000,000

 

Under the head of economic factors contributing to a nation’s world influence must be included the future subsistence capacity of the national unit. This capacity is difficult to measure with any accuracy. In presenting available figures on arable land for example, the variables in temperature, soil fertility, crop rotation, and periodic droughts and floods must be kept in mind. Rough indicators may, however, be shown in a table giving the total arable land, the population pressure, forest areas, and present production figures in three of the most essential commodities: wheat, rice, and cotton. It is of interest to note that relative lack of subsistence power may express itself in armaments wherever assertive races are under pressure. Arable land in Russia is limited by low temperatures in the north and droughts in the south. England, Japan, and Italy are largely dependent upon imported food.

Some mention should be made of the factors of internal transportation. While these do not directly indicate any corresponding changes in power they are related to military power and show the relative room for an expansion which would provide incentive for increase in industrial power. Table V compares areas and populations with number of automobiles and with present motor road and railway mileage. There are many variables affected by physical features such as the permanently frozen soil areas of the Soviet Union, as a partial consequence of which the mileage of airways has now exceeded railway mileage.

Table IV
	Arable Land (acres) (000,000 omitted)	Population Increase per 1,000 Acres of Arable Land	Forest Reserves (acres) (000,000 omitted)	Wheat Production (bu.) (000,000 omitted)	Rice Production (bu.) (000,000 omitted)	Cotton Production (bales)
France	60	1	24	320	0	0
Germany	50	9	32	200	0	0
Italy	36	12	13	280	2	3,000
Japan	15	67	47	45	460	1,000
United Kingdom	45	5	8	60	0	0
British Empire	?	?	260	900	1,660	5,000,000
U.S.S.R.	700	4	1,520	1,0S0	0	1,960,000
u. s.	900	1	660	530	22	13,000,000
China	700	5	160	650	2,040	2,000,000

 

Table V
	Area	Population (flOO,000 omitted)	Autos (000 omitted)	Motor Roads (mi.) (000 omitted)	Railway (mi.) (000 omitted)
France	212,736	42	1,700	405	40
Germany	180,986	66	672	216	35
Italy	119,744	42	294	105	14
Japan United	147,462	69	101	43	13
Kingdom British	94,281	48	1,600	177	20
Empire	13,671,902	480	?	?	95
U.S.S.R.	8,244,000	168	140	70	55
U. S.	2,973,000	125	26,000	3,100	260
China	3,100,000	440	44	40	9.5

 

Intimately related to the economic factors just discussed are factors more definitely political and social. Consider for example the political results of economic pressure. Poor populations like poor individuals exert more effort to win a bare livelihood than rich populations to save their superfluities. These relatively stronger impulses of the former become reflected in governments which exert more discipline over their people, control their nationalistic impulses with more rigidity, and harden the national will. We may thus reach the paradox that a people in want is a people prepared for war.

Particularly significant in this respect is the present situation in Russia. The relatively low standard of living, the privation, and the hardships of the people of the Soviet Union augur strength and not weakness in the future. The ordeal of these people may well bring forth a hardened and virile type that will be able to compete with the rest of the world on highly favorable terms. And should their government solve the problem of production before the capitalist powers solve theirs of distribution we may witness an impact of tremendous significance upon proletariat groups among all the other powers. Moreover, the war power of these capitalistic powers is likely to be seriously impaired, in the event of hostilities, by threats of revolution. The “menace” of socialism over this shrinking world has already driven some governments into Fascism by way of defense.

On the other hand—and largely because of their economic structure—existing “empires” may prove a poor support to their component peoples. The tendency of colonial and dominion groups is to diverge, as they develop, towards industrial autonomy and political independence. This may mean ultimate disintegration and lessening of opportunities for amassing wealth through colonial exploitation. Besides this, in the event of war, the dispersion of colonial possessions is a source of strategic weakness. With the development of aircraft the protection of supply lines becomes a troublesome business.

Wealth that promoted ease and soft living has usually been the forerunner of decline and decay. At the present moment of world depression there are not many who are embarrassed by excessive wealth, but the consideration remains, however, that those races compelled to exist frugally are storing up a tougher resistance and a swarming power.

Table VI Relative Capacities for War Mobilization
	Man Power	Factories	Coal	Iron-Ore	Petroleum	Nitrate	Sulphur	Copper
Russia	I	II	I	I	I	I	II	ii
U. S. United	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
Kingdom	I	I	I	II	—	I	—	1
Japan	I	I	I	II	—	I	I
Germany	I	I	I	II	—	I	II	u
France	I	I	I	I	—	I	—
Italy	I	I	—	—	—	I	I	—
Poland	II	II	I	—	I	I	—

 

Our next step is to consider the special characteristics of potential power of individual nations. For a first succinct impression it is of interest to include a table prepared by Edwin C. Eckel.*

In this table, “I” denotes primary strength or an abundance that would permit a maximum mobilization without serious restriction of civilian industries. “II” indicates secondary strength or a condition where materials would have to be strictly rationed. A blank space denotes an inadequacy for war requirements in the home area. The order of priority should be noted, particularly where Russia appears at the head of the list.

For convenience we shall take up each nation in the order indicated in the table. The Soviet Union has the greatest advantage in area, man power, relative population increase, and probable development in air power. Its directive social control, singleness of purpose, and planned economy will afford tremendous endurance power. It will probably have the highest survival power of any nation in Eurasia. It is considered by some critics to be better organized to meet internal social problems than any nation on earth. Its strategic position is weaker than that of the United States but its exposures in this regard are somewhat offset by its tremendous area. While geological surveys have been carried on for a number of years there still remain chances of much undiscovered natural wealth. The climatic factors are not highly favorable because of frozen soil, long winters, and monotonous barometric conditions over large areas. Recent developments in the Soviet Union indicate, however, a tremendous urge towards economic and social progress. Its extent is shown in the following approximate figures, and in a table indicating the relative industrial progress of the Soviet Union.

Table VII Development Indicators of the Soviet Union
(1) National revenue	1926	5,700,000,000	1933	35,000,000,000
		gold rubles		gold rubles
(2) Index of industrial production	1928	100	1932	218.5
(3) Railway mileage	1913	35,000	1932	50,000
(4)  Total grain crops	1913	2,900,000,000	1933	3,300,000,000
(5) Wheat production			1933	1,000,000,000
U. S. and Canada (bu.)			1933	840,000,000
(6) Educational expenditures	1913	240,000,000	1932	6,410,000,000
(7) Health expenditures	1913	94,700,000	1932	2,100,000,000
(8) Books published	1912	133,000,000	1933	1,300,000,000
(9) Press circulation	1916	2,500,000	1933	40,000,000

 

With regard to the United States, historians pointed out some time ago that this nation should achieve first place in world power and that there would be a chance of retaining that power longer than any other nation in history. If this does prove true it will result from several factors. In arable land, natural resources, and strategic position we appear to stand first. We have a large favorable area for climatic energy. Such powers as are contiguous by land do not stand to threaten our position. We are the first nation in history to combine large area, a remarkable capacity for self-subsistence in actual necessities, and relative insularity. In social control we are apparently facing an indeterminate period of unrest which may, for a time, stand for internal weakness. This is transient, we hope. In natural resources in reserves of coal, iron, and oil, the sum total appears to be twice as large as all those of the Far East combined. In one year we consume almost as much iron as the total Japanese reserve. In one day we produce nearly as much as the annual consumption of oil in Japan. At the consumption rate of the United States it is claimed that Chinese and Japanese iron would last for only two years in those countries and that coal reserves would be expended in China in sixteen years, and in Japan in twenty-five years. More land is under cultivation for cereals in the one state of Iowa than in all Japan. The United States has about five times as much crop land per capita as the Chinese.

Japan stands high in strategic position for the time being and very high in homogeneous loyalty and power of national sacrifice. The climatic energy, the virility of the race, and the simplicity of living are strong factors of future advantage. But Russian air power, Russian need for warm water ports, and Russian and Chinese socialism do not augur well for the future stability and security of Japan. Her population pressure may force her into exhausting war. Her resources in arable land and in mineral wealth of the homeland are seriously deficient. They impose upon Japan a constant pressure to supplement these economic handicaps by seeking access to vitally needed raw materials. In peace time these can be obtained through purchase, providing Japan can maintain export markets to compensate for the cost. In war time, strategic control would be necessary. This condition sets up a form of economic magnetism towards certain near-by and important raw material areas. It is of interest to show, from the estimates available, where these materials lie.

Table VIII
	Population (000,000 omitted)	Arable I-and (acres) (000,000 omitted)	Coal (tons) (000,000 omitted)	Iron (Ions) (000,000 omitted)	Oil (bbls) (000,000 omitted)
Japan	69	15	8,000	100	2,200
Manchuria	34	75	2,800	770	5
Philippines	13.5	44	61	430	52
China	440	700	280,000	500	1,400
Dutch Indies	61	7.68	1.3	—	3,000

 

The United Kingdom derived much of its power from climatic energy, social adaptation, strategic insularity, iron, coal, seaports, and colonial wealth. Considerable change must be suffered in some of these in the future. Insularity has become strategic exposure from the continent, coal has a rival in oil of which practically none is possessed in the homeland, and colonial possessions will not be the sources of wealth as in former days. There is, however, a strategic interdependence among the mother country and the dominions and colonies, and an endurance and social wisdom of the people of the United Kingdom which has little if anything to surpass it in the world today. It should be added that new processes in the extraction of oil from coal may in an emergency ease the lack of oil in the home territory.

France and Germany will be considered together. If these two powers are going to continue their periodic wars, European civilization will have hard sledding. The situation tends to neutralize the potential power of both France and Germany. It imposes a constant drain on resources which might otherwise be used for furthering internal stability. A new generation is coming into power in France that was stripped in the war of almost 70 per cent of its most able men. The effect of the consequent loss of leadership throughout its entire population remains to be seen. The same handicap must be faced by all groups in Europe that suffered large losses in the war. The situation of the French is not a pleasant one as the recuperative power, expansive impulses, and virility of the German people is of a high order. A few characteristics can be brought out in a comparative table.

Table IX
	France	Germany
Population	42,000,000	66,000,000
Annual increase	49,600	460,000
Area	212,736	ISO,986
Arable land (acres) Merchant Marine	60,000,000	50,000,000
(tons) Value of chemical	3,557,000	4,165,000
industries	$360,000,000	$861,000,000

 

With regard to Italy, a study of previous tables shows unfortunate combinations. A paucity of vital natural resources and lack of free oceanic outlets is mixed with a high increase of population, high climatic energy in the northern area, and a strong nationalistic set-up. Further colonial expansion is restricted and emigration offers no solution. The strategic position is weak. Italy, Japan, and Germany constitute three precarious future impulses for economic readjustment. This readjustment can be made in the years to come by violence or by international amelioration of economic opportunity. The future of these three nations may well prove that the ultimate survival of human progress will not depend upon the survival of a single group as much as it will upon the development of economic security of the assertive groups as a collective unit.

China is put in a class by itself. Its endurance power throughout history is well known. Its resources in minerals have apparently been greatly overestimated. Its ingrained, age-old philosophies, its division into a considerable number of ethnic groups, and its great and diversified areas offer considerable barriers to any rapid unification. The climatic impulses are not I relatively favorable, and the racial characteristics have not yet indicated much capacity for organized and unified national assertiveness. Huntington remarks that the influence of the North China monsoon type of climate does much to render the average Chinese not one-tenth but perhaps not one-hundredth as influential in world affairs as the average Swiss or Dane. The population and culture of the Chinese are tremendous forces for endurance but it seems that a long time will be required for visible proof of unified material power. From examination of estimates of reserve mineral resources it does not appear that these exist in sufficient quantities for China to ever develop an advanced industrial civilization on a scale commensurate with that of the United States or the Soviet Union.

In a final table we can now roughly sum up the relative position of those nations potentially capable of disturbing the world order. It must necessarily be of a speculative nature. No one can prophesy the ultimate effect of all the variables with any assurance, nor can we foretell what new advances in science may alter the whole picture. We may have found some value in cautiously assessing the visible factors rather than by making no attempt at all. Human society will have to navigate in dangerous waters in the coming decades. Even rough charts will be better than none at all.

Table X
	Arable Land	Area	Reserve Mineral Resources	Relative Population Increase	Strategic Position	Climatic Energy
U.S.	1	3	1	4	1	2
U.S.S.R.	2	1	2	2	2	6
Japan	8	6	7	3	3	5
United Kingdom	6	8	6	7	4	1
Germany	5	5	5	5	6	3
France	4	4	4	8	5	4
Italy	7	7	8	6	7	7
China	3	2	3	1	—	8

 

In conclusion we shall consider some of the possible changes in the use of power. Civilization in human society has arrived at a point where the collective cost of world conflict has, to say the least, impaired its survival value. National security is due to merge with a collective international security against general war. The problem we face is that of limiting war, of localizing it, and of bringing about its earliest cessation when once it breaks out. The objective of military force must change from the present pursuit of national wealth to the protection of international order. Only by that means can international economy be improved. It is not so much a question of national military fortitude as political wisdom and maturity. Eventually it will mean the support of world law by moral, economic, and military force and not the free use of force at the unhindered disposal of the law breaker.

As the world shrinks in communicative time, as the impacts of expanding peoples and their economic needs become more intense, and as the penalties of war become more and more exhausting, we must find a new basis for the use of power if civilization is to be sustained. War will continue but probably in a new form. National war may, as has been pointed out, become international civil war.

The crux of the problem will lie in economic adjustment. In general we can classify national powers in two groups: the “have got” or abundance nations, such as the United States, Soviet Union, the British Empire, and France; and the “have not” or deficiency powers such as Japan, Italy, and Germany. The abundance of the fortunate powers provides a capacity for overproduction of necessities that surpasses the deficiencies of the “scarcity” powers.

At first thought it would seem that through self-interest some adjustment could be peaceably brought about. Under present competitive systems of world trade the problem seems utterly beyond solution. The differences are paid for in nationalism and armaments. An ultimate solution can only be brought about through international law and international planning sustained by a psychological foundation of international education. It is anything but an overnight affair, blocked by age-old differences of language, creed, culture, and social organization. According to our anthropologists these differences began over 500,000 years ago. It took about 600 years to progress from feudalism to nationalism. It may take even that long to reach a state of international order, even though its ultimate attainment appears inevitable. The use of power already shows signs of being directed against world disorder. Those nations such as France, the United States, Soviet Russia, and the British Empire having the least need and the least desire for conflict will have a strengthening common interest. Together they control about 94 per cent of coal reserves, 70 per cent of the iron, and 95 per cent of the oil of all the great powers. Though many serious obstacles are present it may be possible, indeed may be imperative, to use this advantage as a deterrent and as a suppressive sanction in limiting war. That in itself cannot be relied upon for the prevention of war, for some of the rapidly increasing populations have already outrun their domestic means of subsistence. There are scientists who boldly state that the future holds no solution except through eugenics and enlightened attitudes towards birth control. To obviate the suspicion of increasing populations for future wars these will become essential prerequisites for an effective world organization. They become ethical imperatives in the efforts of men and women to achieve a larger mastery of their destinies.

Here the crux of our future world problem cannot be too strongly emphasized. Japan, Italy, and Germany stand among the very highest in birth-rate and population pressure. At the same time their peoples are relatively under great economic restriction. It naturally follows that in their areas there is the greatest need for birth control. But in all reason and in all simple justice it would be senseless and futile to expect that their governments would consider any attempt at lowering birth rates until they are given some form of guarantee for their future economic security. Under present world organization they will have to fight for it in the end. The answer lies in international planning, and a choice between sacrifice in economic competition on the part of the fortunate “have got” powers or international war. It involves fundamental changes in the economic structure of all the capitalist nations as well as an attempt to reduce the extreme differences in political systems in order to allow adequate international cooperation.

Under adequate international organization there are brains in the world which can be used to eventually solve some or most of our problems. Without it there are no brains which can ever solve them. The assertive peoples under economic pressure must be fed or fought. It would seem cheaper to allow the former. Unrestrained economic aggression by the abundance powers will lead to the latter. It is the simple question of the whole before the part, where the larger the whole the better it will be for collective security and collective welfare.

The American people must make their choice. So far the emphasis has been upon isolation and self-dependency. As long as that policy predominates it must be supported in full by adequate national military defense. It will be perilously unfair to the people and to the military services to refuse international responsibility in maintaining order and at the same time weaken our military power to any degree where it cannot sustain the irresponsible and independent position the popular voice wrongly or rightly demands. We shall now summarize the results of our study.

(1) We have the acceleration of available power. At the World Power Conference in 1929 at London, an estimate was given for the output of energy producing materials for 1913 in the United States as 160,000,000 tons. By 1925 it had increased to 1,589,000,000 tons—nearly ten times as much. If this power represents even an approximate index of international industrial advance and if it is to be turned loose for destructive use in world conflict, no one can prophesy the disastrous consequences that lie ahead for the so-called civilized powers. Its control will be worth more than the sacrifice of any amount of trade profits.

(2) The dominant economic power of the United States will set an example in world affairs which carries extreme opportunity and responsibility. No international problem of collective concern can be met without our participation. It will be folly to expect that we can have interlocking economic problems without accepting commensurate political responsibility in meeting them.

(3) Our future patriotism and our future use of military power must have their rightful place in international evolution. Our Army and Navy stand more for national security than for mere increase in national wealth. If the meaning of that security must change to the collective form for all nations, it is difficult to see why there should be anything but gain in pride and prestige attaching to its use in that form.

(4) The time has come when the world cannot afford to deal with the Soviet Union on a basis of opposition and social prejudice. These people are attaining a power in world affairs that must be met through understanding and co-operation. They will have a survival power rivaling almost any nation on earth; a relatively greater control of their destiny; and will be better able to solve their internal social problems than any nation on the face of the globe. Their record also indicates a remarkably high capacity for peaceful solution of international problems.

(5) Co-operation at Geneva among the United States, the British Empire, France, and the Soviet Union will increase in significance; not in the old form of alliances for plunder and balance of power, but to promote collective security in the limitation of war. That collective security in the long run must come through international economic planning and the amelioration of economic extremes between the “have got” and the “have not” powers.

Retreat is not possible. Populations will increase, needs will increase, the tempo of society will increase, and world impacts will more and more intensify. Power is accelerating. If it is to be used for conflict instead of order the human species has had its best days. The secret of progress, prosperity, and security will lie in our social power of adaptation to changing environment on a scale never known before. Our ability to accept these changes and to withstand the internal stresses and strain they will set up may perhaps determine our place in the world of tomorrow.

In a long and painful interim we must get our own house in order and through unavoidable individual sacrifice lend our aid to the development of a social and economic structure that will be able to withstand the shocks and strains coming from a rapidly changing 'and bewildered world.

Formulated principles, however excellent, are by themselves too abstract to sustain convinced allegiance, the reasons for them, as manifested in concrete cases, are an imperative part of the process through which they really enter the mind and possess the will. On this account the study of Military History lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice. It is, therefore, the basis, the corner-stone; upon which the instruction of a War College rests. Historical occurrences, analyzed and critically studied, have been the curriculum through which great Captains have trained their natural capacity for supreme command.—Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration.