BRITAIN AND COMMONWEALTHS
Baldwin Succeeds MacDonald.—The long expected reorganization of the British coalition ministry took place on June 9, with some strengthening of the already dominant Conservative element in the Cabinet. In the new ministry Stanley Baldwin succeeded Ramsay MacDonald as Premier, and MacDonald took over the sinecure post of President of the Council. In the Foreign Office, Sir Samuel Hoar replaced Sir John Simon, but with the understanding that Anthony Eden as “minister for League of Nations Affairs” would do most of the negotiations in foreign capitals. It was anticipated that the change of leadership would tend toward a somewhat stronger line in British foreign policy, as was soon evidenced in the bilateral naval agreement with Germany. Both Premier Baldwin and Mr. Eden have also strongly emphasized in recent speeches the desire to work in close co-operation with America. “I have always believed,” declared Mr. Baldwin in a speech in the House of Commons, “that the greatest security against war in any part of the world whatsoever, in Europe, in the East, anywhere, would be in the close collaboration of the British Empire with the United States.”
In the new British Cabinet there are 16 Conservatives, 3 National Liberals, and 3 National Laborites.
Commonwealths Free of British Law.—A decision of the British Privy Council on June 6 confirmed the right of Canada to bar appeals to the British Privy Council in all civil cases, and also the right of the Irish Free State to deny appeal in all cases civil or criminal. By this action is severed almost the last legal tie linking the government at London with the associated free states.
ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREEMENT
The London Pact.—Anglo-German naval conversations opened in London on June 4 under favorable auspices, with Herr Joachim Ribbentrop, the German Envoy, raised for the occasion to the rank of Ambassador. Full agreement was reached a few days later, after the German delegates had returned to Berlin for consultation, and the complete text of the resultant agreement (see Professional Notes in this issue of the Proceedings) appeared in the press on June 18. As will be noted in this text, Germany agrees that “ the German fleet shall never exceed” 35 per cent of the total treaty-authorized naval forces of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and that this ratio shall not be affected by the construction of other powers, though Germany reserves the right to invite an examination of the new situation incase “the general equilibrium of naval armaments . . . should be violently upset.” By a further provision the 35 per cent ratio is to apply not merely to global tonnage but to each category, though here again Germany reserves the right, while not exceeding the ratio in total tonnage, to build up to 45 per cent of the British tonnage in submarines, and in certain circumstances to bargain for even more.
Both in England and Germany the agreement was hailed as a move toward peace. In England it was felt that the sanction thus given to German rearmament and violation of the Versailles Treaty was a small price to pay for an agreement pinning the Reich down to a naval force too small ever to menace England on the seas.
The Rift With France.—Although England gave assurances that the German pact was designed to further the general aim of European security, she was quickly made to feel that a step toward Germany was a step away from her former allies. France immediately informed the British government that she no longer regarded herself bound by naval treaty ratios, that she did not consider England authorized to condone German treaty violation, and that in the new conditions France might feel called upon to consider naval increases. The situation was not improved when, during his subsequent visit to Paris, Minister Anthony Eden found himself obliged to deny France information as to the details of the future German naval program. These had been indicated to the British Admiralty, but with the understanding that they should not be given to France until that nation came forward with her own plans. In these circumstances, Mr. Eden made little progress during his tour of late June, either at Rome in his efforts to ease the Ethiopian tension or at Paris in his brief • conversations with M. Laval. With the latter he was reported to have agreed that neither France nor England should sign a separate air pact with Germany, but whether France was ready to enter into an “air Locarno” outside any scheme of general security remained to be seen. Another unfortunate result of England’s naval rapprochement with Germany was to bring Italy and France closer together, and to prevent French collaboration in England’s moves to check Italy in Africa.
Among the Baltic states, particularly Poland and Russia, there was also talk of naval increases necessitated by the new German Navy. This gave added interest to the announcement that, following the London agreement, England had invited these nations as well as Italy to send delegates to London for a series of bilateral consultations on naval problems.
ITALY AND ABYSSINIA
The African War Menace.—The Italo-Ethiopian conciliation commission held a preliminary session at Milan on June 5 and then shifted its meeting place to Scheveningen in the Netherlands, where on June 25 the commission began consideration of the documents in the eight to a dozen border disputes to which its authority was limited. Italy had previously stipulated that the arbitrators should not go into the disputed frontier questions or other wider issues, though these are closely bound up with the clashes on the frontier. International interest centered far less in the arbitrators, within their narrowly limited field, than in the efforts of British mediation to prevent a conflict in North Africa. However, during his visit to Rome for this purpose in late June, Minister Anthony Eden was thwarted by a strong anti-British sentiment in the Italian press, and by a feeling expressed by Premier Mussolini himself, that Italian claims in Africa were not to be interfered with by the influence of other powers. To quote the Premier in a speech at Cagliari on June 8, such influences had not deterred these same powers in an earlier period, “when they were creating a colonial empire and defending it,” and they would not be allowed to deter Italy today. Mr. Eden, as revealed later, had Proposed to give Ethiopia a strip of British Somaliland and thus compensate her for concessions made to Italy.
Should Italy insist on strong measures m Africa—and some critics have ventured the opinion that it is in line with Italian governmental policy to divert attention from problems at home—the League of Nations will face another dangerous crisis. Italian withdrawal would mean the end of the League as a factor in European or World affairs. On the other hand, nonintervention by the League would be almost a final indication of its failure as a means of preserving peace. In this situation European diplomacy will need to summon its best resources.
EUROPEAN POLITICS
Benes at Moscow.—Considerable diplomatic interest attached to the visit which Dr. Eduard Benes, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, paid to Moscow during the second week of June. The ulterior purpose of the visit was to ratify certain trade agreements and particularly to complete the mutual assistance pact which links Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Republic and thus with the Fran co-Russian scheme for safeguarding Eastern Europe. During his visit Dr. Benes also pledged his assistance in effecting a renewal of diplomatic relations between Russia and Yugoslavia, the only remaining member of the Little Entente that has not resumed cordial intercourse with the Soviet government.
In an interview at Moscow, Dr. Benes declared that 1936-37 would be critical years in European politics, but that if these were safely weathered the Continent might look forward to a long period of peace.
Reich Army as Peace Factor.—A report on German foreign policy, published by the Foreign Policy Association on June 9, emphasizes the point that the attitude of the leaders of the Wehrmacht, or new army organization, in Germany is certain to play an important part in determining her choice of future peace or war. These leaders, it is pointed out, still feel the smart of ultimate failure in 1914—18, and they will oppose embarking on another war adventure until there is at least an even chance of success.
The restoration of conscription, moreover must be viewed as a remedy for domestic problems as well as a preparation for offense or defense against foreign foes. According to the report:
Hitler’s sudden reintroduction of conscription was undoubtedly motivated in large measure by domestic considerations. Universal service solves the problem of the Storm Troops and settles the longstanding jealousy between the Nazi private army and the Reichswehr, which became public in the June 30 blood purge.
For the moment at least, Hitler’s action not only raises his prestige at home but gives the government endless new opportunities for the mass spectacles and parades which are necessary to occupy a people whose standard of living is rapidly deteriorating.
UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
Chaco Peace Conference.—In accordance with previous pledges, the Bolivian and Paraguayan representatives meeting with the conciliation committee of American neutrals at Buenos Aires signed on June 12 a Chaco truce agreement to take effect at noon on June 14. The terms of the truce provided that, preliminary to the convening of a peace conference, a 12-day truce should be established during which a neutral military commission would set up and maintain a line of separation between the forces in the field. Each belligerent further agreed to demobilize its forces within 90 days, reduce effectives to a maximum of 5,000, and refrain from purchase of war materials other than indispensable for replacement. Both belligerents recognized the Declaration of August 3, 1932, in which most of the American neutral states expressed the intention not to approve acquisitions of territory by war.
On July 1 the peace conference provided for by the truce agreement convened at Buenos Aires to attempt a settlement by direct negotiations. Should these fail, both Bolivia and Paraguay have pledged themselves to submit their dispute to juridical arbitration by the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. One of the first acts of Buenos Aires delegates was to extend sine die the Chaco truce of June 12, thus definitely ending the war which has lasted three years and cost more than 100,000 lives.
Calles Out in Mexico.—After a split with General Plutarco Elias Calles, the “strong man” of Mexican politics, precipitated by the latter’s sharp criticism of the government’s pro-labor policy, President Cardenas on June 15 reorganized his cabinet in order to secure a group of ministers more closely in sympathy with his liberal tendency in the handling of labor and church problems. In the crisis the majority blocs in both the Senate and Chamber gave the President their full support. General Calles subsequently expressed his intention to retire from an active part in politics, though it was generally assumed that he would merely await a favorable opportunity to renew his attacks on the Cardenas administration.
FAR EAST
Russo-Japanese Friction.—While the extension of Japanese control in Northern China and particularly in Chahar province might appear as a direct threat to Russian interests in Mongolia and also as a well-considered means of improving Japan’s position for a prospective war with the Soviet Republic, official relations between the two countries have seemingly been much easier following the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Friction along the frontiers, however, has still continued and especially along the Amur River. In a sharp protest presented at Tokyo in early July, the Soviet government called attention to a long series of violations of Soviet territory in this region by Manchukuoan gunboats and soldiers. In making the protest the Russian Ambassador took pains to insist that responsibility for the conduct of the local “Japanese Manchukuoan” authorities fell directly on the Japanese government. Indications were that the Japanese reply would be equally sharp, with criticism of Russia for publication of the protest before its receipt in Japan.
Demands in North China.—Throughout June there was a continuation of the strong pressure of Japanese military leaders, acting apparently without much regard to the Foreign Office, to extend Japanese control in the North China area. Though the full text of the Japanese demands was not made public, their general purport was well known and they were summarized as follows in the New York Times of June 14:
(1) Suppression of the Kuomintang (Nationalist party) throughout Hopei Province.
(2) Suppression of the Fascist-like Blue Shirts and all other similar anti-Japanese secret terroristic organizations.
(3) Abolition of the Peiping Political Council and the Peiping Military Council.
(4) Eradication of all anti-Japanese education and all anti-Japanese agitation in Hopei.
(5) Withdrawal of all former Manchurian troops and all Nanking troops from Hopei to south of the Yellow River.
(6) Removal of almost all the present provincial and Peiping and Tientsin officials and replacement with appointees friendly to Japan.
(7) Removal of the Peiping gendarmerie and their commander, Chiang Hsiao-hsien, a direct subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek.
(8) Closure of the Peiping Political Training Institute.
(9) Arrest and punishment of the assassins of two pro-Japanese Tientsin Chinese editors who I Were murdered a month ago in the Japanese concession.
By the close of June these demands had been so far complied with or accepted as to make possible a considerable reduction of Japanese forces in the Tientsin and Peiping areas. It is obvious, however, that with the weakening of Chinese authority in North China, disorder and banditry are certain to increase, thus affording excuse for a further extension of Japanese control. In the reported settlement reached between the Japanese and Chinese authorities the demilitarized zone was extended to include a considerable area in Chahar province and it was rumored also that the Japanese had secured the privilege of establishing an airdrome and wireless station at Kalgan.
Abandoning the Philippines.—Of chief interest from the naval standpoint in the July Foreign Affairs is the article by Mr. Nicholas Roosevelt on “Laying Down the White Man’s Burden.” Though he had opposed abandoning the Philippines, Mr. Roosevelt now feels that we should get out, bag and baggage, as soon as possible. The transition period to the end of 1941, during which the United States is pledged to defend the islands and yet cannot prevent Filipino politicians from “taking steps which might be highly distasteful to one or another of the great Asiatic powers, ” is certain to be a dangerous one. Mr. Roosevelt doubts whether a guaranteed neutrality would insure the safety of the islands." Japan’s long-range overseas policy seems for some time to have had the Dutch East Indies as its ultimate objective. The Philippines are in her path. . .
He continues:
It is one of the ironies of Oriental psychology that withdrawal from the Philippines, whether after a transition period of ten years or at once, will be interpreted in the Far East as final proof of the timidity of the United States and of its unwillingness to protect its own interests. It goes without saying that to leave the Philippines means to abandon the open-door policy in China and definitely to surrender American hopes of winning a dominant commercial position in the Far East. It is questionable if these hopes were ever soundly based. Certainly there is no likelihood that America’s China Trade within the next few decades can reach such proportions as to be worth fighting for. But whatever the correct estimate of China’s commerical potentialities, the United States will have to adjust itself to the idea of complete Japanese domination of Chinese markets.
The foregoing means, in brief, adopting a “little America” policy.... If, on the other hand, America congratulates itself that it has completed its Philippine task satisfactorily and that it can henceforth live without fear of war in Asia, it will risk inviting the ultimate challenge of more virile nations.
Another article of interest in the July issue of this periodical is Secretary Wallace’s analysis of “The World Cotton Drama,” in which he argues convincingly that falling off of our cotton sales abroad is not due to the Agricultural Adjustment program. We still have plenty of cotton to sell. The trouble is that the foreign buyer can neither export goods nor find dollar exchange with which to pay for it.
The American people are strong believers in the sacredness of exports and the hellishness of imports. . . . Looking toward the future, the United States must make an effort to understand the necessity of a continuing adjustment between the needs of its export industries and the development of increased imports.
In this connection, there is an excellent critique by Mr. Herbert Feis, in this same issue, of Professor Beard’s much praised volume The Open Door at Home. Mr. Feis, who is the economic adviser of the State Department, is inclined to believe that, in the actual economic conditions of today, Professor Beard’s policy of controlled foreign trade would produce “not a newer and better type of nationalism but one given over even more to excitement and hostility” with foreign nations.