Notes on International Affairs

EUROPEAN STABILIZATION SCHEMES

Reich Ponders Anglo-French Bid.— Briefly stated, Great Britain and France, supported by Italy and the Soviet Re­public, offered to Germany a choice early in February, either of facing an encircle­ment of nations banded against her, or of joining with them in a linked series of agreements, each tacitly aimed to prevent German expansion. The proposed agree­ments follow:

1. German entry into an air pact with Eng­land, France, Italy, and Belgium, providing for immediate assistance of their combined air forces against unprovoked aerial aggression by any one of the contracting parties.
2. German entry into the proposed mutual guarantee pact for Austria and her neighbors.
3. German entry into the proposed Eastern Locarno.
4. In return for these pledges, Germany would be offered a new approach to the arma­ment question, based on “equality of rights in a system of security,” but conditioned also upon Germany’s return to the League.

Faced with this difficult choice, Fuhrer Hitler concentrated for ten days on the problem and then in mid-February made a preliminary reply directed to the British Foreign Office. The reply viewed the air pact favorably, and on this pro­posal expressed a readiness for immediate negotiations, suggesting that British offi­cials visit Berlin for the purpose. In the note there was no direct reference to the other proposals, beyond the statement that they were “being closely studied,” and that a general arms agreement would require “prolonged discussion.” Unofficial comment in Berlin, however, suggested that although neither Germany nor Poland “wanted to be bound to Russia and get mixed up in a war between Russia and Japan, a mutual non-aggression pact might be possible.” As for Austria, Ger­many did not wish a guarantee of her independence that would disregard “the will of the Austrian people.”

Although the offer to confer with England was suspected as an attempt to drive a wedge between England and France, Sir John Simon announced on February 25 that he would make the Berlin visit, and might later extend his tour to Moscow and other capitals. He had previously been assured by Germany that the discussions, on a basis exclusively of information, would extend to the whole field covered by the Anglo-French proposals.

SOVIET WARNING.—Immediately after the German response, the Soviet government in a note of February 20 directed to England and France, took occasion to emphasize the point that the air pact, the Austrian guarantee, and the Easters Locarno were all parts of one indivisible whole, and that there could be no assurance of peace in Western Europe without simultaneous guarantees of the frontiers in the East. Behind this view expressed from Moscow was evidently the underlying fear of Nazi-Polish designs directed against the rich Ukraine grain country and also against Lithuania, the acquisition of which by Poland would give her a Baltic frontage and permit the return of the Polish Corridor to Germany along with Eastern Silesia. Hence the Russian insistence on a linking up of the Eastern and Western agreements—a view with which French sentiment is of course fully in accord.

ITALY AND ABYSSINIA

ITALIAN TROOP MOVEMENTS.—Throughout February, the Italian government poured a stream of troops, aircraft, and munitions of all types into its Northeast African colonies in preparation for threatened hostilities with Abyssinia. Two divisions numbering from 25,000 to 30,000 were brought to war strength and were reported as in readiness or in actual movement to Eritrea. Despite the magnitude of these preparations, they appeared justified by the difficulties of the country in which fighting might be expected and the lessons to be drawn from the Italian defeat in 1896. Since Italy can muster a total man power of from 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 between the ages of 18-55, Premier Mussolini felt able to give assurance that the African campaign would not leave the nation unable to cope with possible difficulties in Europe.

ITALY'S DEMANDS.—At the close of February it was an open question whether Abyssinia could meet Italy's demands fully and quickly enough to forestall the hostilities that seemed an almost certain sequence of the concentration of forces, the mutual grievances, and the juxtaposition of unruly tribes and troops on a disputed frontier. It was reported on February 10 that another clash between tribesmen and Italian forces had occurred on January 29 at Afdub, southwest of Ualual. This brought a renewed demand from Italy for apologies and indemnity. The Abyssinian representative in Italy de­clared his government ready to meet most of the Italian requirements, including the establishment of a neutral zone and the delimitation of the disputed frontier by a joint commission. Italy, however, ob­jected to the inclusion on this commission of European officers serving in the Abys­sinian army. Italy also declared that Abys­sinia, despite her peaceful professions, had made no definite and satisfactory reply to the Italian demands. Meantime the League and the European powers showed no eagerness to enter the dispute—a fact which gave some color to the theory that Italy had been given a free hand to extend her colonial holdings in this field. Atten­tion was drawn to the Anglo-Franco- Italian agreement of 1906 for the partition of Abyssinia, and to clauses of similar im­port in the secret Treaty of London in 1915.

EUROPEAN POLITICS

Arms Control Discussions.—In the midst of a somewhat distracted world, negotiations for control of arms produc­tion and traffic were peacefully opened at Geneva in the latter part of February, but with only slight prospect of ultimate agree­ment. The American draft treaty on the subject, a tripartite document providing for national control of manufacture and trade in munitions, publicity of budgets, and international supervision, was ac­cepted as a basis for discussion. Difficulties at once arose, however, when Earl Stan­hope as head of the British delegation pro­posed that the latter two-thirds of the draft treaty be scrapped as unnecessary, and in particular the part providing for international supervision. Here was dis­closed the wide gap between the British and the French points of view, for the British opposition was based largely in the feeling that, with the supervision clause included, Germany could never be drawn into the agreement, whereas France, also with an eye to Germany, has from the first regarded international supervision and inspection as of fundamental im­portance. Despite the British objections, Minister Hugh Gibson on February 24 in­dicated that the United States delegation still favored the supervisory articles and would even favor strengthening them by an amendment providing for inspection on the spot of completed arms and muni­tions in private or state establishments.

A second difficulty arose when the Italian delegation raised the question whether national control of the manu­facture and sale of arms might not mean that neutrals would forbid the export of arms to belligerents, in which case Italy, with inadequate munitions plants of her own, might feel called upon to oppose the whole plan. This question of the relation between neutrality and arms traffic was left for later discussion, and by some was regarded as outside the scope of the com­mittee’s work.

Soviet Political Changes.—One of the interesting developments of the an­nual meeting of All-Union Soviet Con­gress was the announcement that the Soviet constitution would be changed to provide for secret voting in elections and also to give the vote of Russian peasants an equal weight with that of factory work­ers. Up to the present the vote of one proletarian has equaled that of 5 peasants. A second change was the assumption by Dictator Stalin of a seat in the presidium or inner council of the Soviet Central Executive Committee, which, under the dictator, is the permanent administrative body in the Soviet organization. In addi­tion to this newly assumed official posi­tion, Stalin continues in his old post as general secretary of the Communist party.

Revolt in Greece.—On March 1 a sudden military revolt broke out in Greece in the naval arsenal at Salamis and also in the garrisons at Athens. In the Navy, two cruisers and three destroyers were taken over by the rebels and, despite bombing attacks by loyal aircraft, made their way to the island of Crete. Former Premier Venizelos, who has made his home in Crete since his withdrawal from politics, issued a strong statement in sup­port of the rebellion. Dispatches of March 3 stated that Crete was in rebel control and that the revolutionary movement had spread to parts of the Grecian mainland.

UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

PARAGUAY QUITS LEAGUE.-On February 23, just before the end of the three months' time allowed for acceptance of the League's peace proposals, Paraguay sent notice of her intention to leave the League of Nations at the end of the 2-year period which must elapse before final withdrawal. Prior to this notice, the League Council had already suggested that its members should apply the Chaco arms embargo to Paraguay alone, and it was reported that some 35 nations, including Britain, France, Italy, and Sweden, had agreed to adopt this course, the effectiveness of which will of course depend on whether this action is supported by Paraguay's Latin American neighbors. Early in March, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay all indicated that they were opposed to further punitive measures against either belligerent. As for the United States, a limitation of the embargo to one of the warring powers would require special action by Congress, and would probably be opposed as a violation of neutrality. Since the war began, Paraguay has received a considerable share of her munitions through Argentina, and it has been rumored that Argentina has an interest in the Bolivian oil fields, operated by the U. S. Standard Oil Co., which are apparently one of the goals of the Paraguayan operations.

In the field, following the failure of an offensive in the direction of Villa Montes, the Paraguayan army was reported at the close of February to be shifting its attacks northward against the Bolivian department of Santa Cruz.

FAR EAST

CHINO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS.—Further success of Japan's new policy of extending a "fraternal hand of assistance" to China, and at the same time isolating her from Western influence, was seen in the February visit to Japan of Judge Wang Chung-hui, Chinese member of the World Court. In his cordial conversations with Japanese statesmen, Judge Wang expressed agreement on the necessity of Chino-Japanese co-operation, though he thought that Japan should "drop her attitude of superiority." Similar results were said to have attended the negotiations between Chinese and Japanese representatives held at Nanking and Shanghai during February, in the opening of which the Chinese were accredited with having taken the initiative. In view of Japan's suggestion of economic assistance for China, and her objection to similar moves on the part of the Western powers, China would appear to be in the unique position of having other countries at odds over the privilege of extending her loans.

ANGLO-AMERICAN ACCORD URGED.—Much interest was aroused by the speech on February 9 of General Jan Smuts of South Africa which made a strong appeal for a unified approach to the Far Eastern problem on the part of Great Britain and the United States. In the same vein, the Marquess of Lothian, continuing his advocacy of a co-operative policy in the East, wrote in the London Times as follows:

There is, of course, no question of war. That is the strength of the Japanese position, as they well know. But there is all the difference between a policy of drift and vigorous use of such power and influence as the other signatories of the Nine Power Treaty possess.

China does not want to be absorbed by Japan. She wishes to stand on her own legs without any form of financial control. The United States, the British Empire, Russia, France, and Italy can give her more effective financial help than Japan, and if they make the most of their position they can probably not only keep China in the orbit of the League of Nations and Washington treaties but preserve their own legitimate rights as well.

I had thought consideration of these questions might be awaited until the jubilee meeting of Empire Prime Ministers, because Canada, Aus­tralia, and New Zealand are as vitally affected by Pacific questions as we ourselves. It is now clear we ought to take preliminary action to mobilize the other signatories of the Nine Power Treaty before that date.

Signs of movement in the direction in­dicated by the article just quoted were seen in the conversation held in Washing­ton on March 1 between Ambassador Sir Ronald Lindsay and Mr. William Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State. The conver­sation involved the question of joint ac­tion, should a situation develop contrary to the China consortium agreement of 1920, which pledges Britain, France, Japan, and the United States to act in concert in the matter of a Chinese loan.

Against such a policy is the view ex­pressed by Senator Borah, transforming co-operation into alliance: “The alliance, as I understand General Smuts, would be a military alliance to enforce peace in the Pacific. I see insuperable objections to such an alliance. In fact there are in­superable objections to any alliance, with any nation.” Whether the Senator speaks the sentiments of the American people, and particularly of his own Pacific states, is not known. At a time when our voice in Eastern affairs was more influential than at present, Senator Borah was among the most insistent that Japan give up Shan­tung.

Naval Power in the Orient.—In the March issue of Pacific Affairs, a quar­terly published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, there is an interesting study by a retired Dutch naval officer, H. Th. de Booy, on “The Naval Arm of Diplomacy in the Pacific.” As regards the function of the Japanese Navy, the article quotes the following passage which appeared in the Japan Chronicle ten years ago:

This great Navy is to be built solely that Japan may be able to do things on the Asiatic mainland and present them to the world as accomplished facts without running the risk of the Powers offering “advice” such as they offered in 1895 [after the Chino-Japanese War], The expansion of the Navy is not for the purpose of being ag­gressive, but for the purpose of deterring protests if aggressive action should be for any reason committed.

Among the Western powers England’s interests would be affected more than those of any other nation by a disturb­ance of the status quo in the East. Her eastern trade routes converge at Singa­pore, and 90 per cent of her rubber im­ports, 89 per cent of her wool imports, 86 per cent of her nitrates, and 71 per cent of her tin imports come from this part of the world. As Lord Grey said 12 years ago, the only reason for the Singapore naval base is the ultimate possibility of war with Japan.

American interests would be less dis­turbed, though the United States has an investment of $250,000,000 in China and a considerable concern in the maintenance of the open door in view of the present and future value of the Chinese market for American goods.

The future independence of the Philip­pines, involving some curtailment of American responsibilities in the East, is, according to the author of this article, “awaited with no small anxiety in Netherlands-India” (The Dutch East Indies). In this region, imports from Japan have already taken first place over imports from the mother country. In any Pacific con­flict the neutrality of Holland would be in imminent danger of violation.

It might be possible for Holland to solve the problem of furnishing oil fuel to belligerents in a Pacific war without abandoning political neutral­ity, but it has made preparations in advance for the timely destruction of the oil plants at Tarakan and Balik Papan in case of necessity.

The strength of the Dutch Navy is calcu­lated in terms of the difference between the naval strengths of the principal Pacific powers, so that

the reserve strength of the Dutch Far Eastern Squadron as a potential ally or enemy might serve I to deter belligerents from hostile acts against Netherlands-India.

Iron in Chahar.—The Far Eastern Survey, a fortnightly publication of the In­stitute of Pacific Relations, carries in its issue of February 13 an article on “The Iron Reserves of Chahar” which may throw some light on Japanese activities m this part of China. The article states that 39 per cent of China’s iron reserves are located in Chahar, and that these in fact constitute almost the only Chinese re­serves free from foreign control of one kind or another. In the recent past Japan has taken practically all of China’s iron ore exports, which have amounted to hah of her total production. Japan’s need for iron in the maintenance of her steel in­dustry is evident from the fact that her own production supplies only 9 per cent of the demand. In 1933 Japan imported 1,523,000 tons of ore, of which 573, tons came from China and 927,000 ton from Johore, in the Malay States.