During the past ten years or more there has been a much discussed demand for greater breadth of training at engineering schools. At the Naval Academy also there has been a similar demand for more cultural training. The Naval Academy and some engineering schools have caught this drift of the times and in their present curriculums are evidently striving to provide the student with a larger and richer grounding.
With respect to engineering schools, an editorial in a recent issue of the Engineering News Record, under the heading of the title of this article, considers these developments gratifying, stating that under the influence of this broadening of view which has begun, engineers should become almost as competent in the domains of policy, finance, and of organizational methods, whether public or corporate, as they now are in the domain of measurements, forces, and powers, thus becoming better qualified to contribute toward a more stable and better future.
This editorial, however, goes on to warn that while we strive for breadth and look ahead to larger opportunity for service, it is well to remember with care that the technical ability and thoroughness of the engineer will always remain his chief strength and value. The world asks of him first that he be a skillful and resource-engineer, informed in materials, structures, and actions of a physical kind and competent to adapt them effectively and economically to the satisfaction of the world's wants. Let him first be an engineer, skilled and trained in creative utilization of resources by scientific method before he may venture to become something more.
In a general sense the foregoing warning is applicable to the aspirant for proficiency in any profession, military as well as civil, but particularly to the construction corps and civil engineer corps of the Navy at this time of renewed discussion of what formerly was called “amalgamation” of the technical staff officers with the line.
The present trend of thought appears to be more along the line of deferred specialization rather than abolition of distinctive corps. The motive, however, apparently is the same desire for greater homogeneity and adaptability for general service of the entire commissioned personnel of the Navy.
So far as the means proposed contribute to a wider understanding by the staff specialist of the problems of the Navy as a whole and a better appreciation of his proper function and relation to the line in serving the primary purpose of the Navy, i.e., success in battle, they are undoubtedly valuable.
This end is, however, to a large degree achieved by constant association with line officers and their needs, by War College courses, and by individual study, without involving the danger of producing an indifferent line officer and a rubber-stamp specialist.
In this age of progress and multiplied demands in every profession it requires the full effort of an individual to keep abreast of the times in any one field, particularly so with respect to the wide range covered by naval construction and public works in the Navy. The staff specialist who aspires to leadership in these fields can of necessity be only secondarily a naval officer.
Why then commission him at all? The answer is inherent in the organization; the heads of departments of any organization are officers and in a military organization its officers of comparable responsibility are commissioned. The obvious answer is not always the best although in this case much argument might be adduced, among the more cogent reasons being the need for proper weight of representation on boards, discipline, a common understanding and basic indoctrination, and that outward evidence of equality with his peers in the organization which leadership in any profession demands.
If then the Navy does and should require the naval constructor and civil engineer to be in the forefront in their respective fields, can it be legitimately expected that they will obtain an adequate background of training and experience by maturity if their complete concentration on these professions is delayed until they are thirty and more years of age? Will not the loss of ten of the most formative years of an officer’s professional life seriously handicap him throughout his naval career?
It may be said that these years are not lost, that the young officer is in constant contact with the ships, machinery, and public works which he will later design and construct, and that this experience with the practical aspects of operation of such equipment will later help him realize the shortcomings of existing material which should be improved. That is undoubtedly true and after assignment to the field of naval architecture or naval civil engineering he will no doubt at once apply himself particularly to the defects which have come to his notice, but will not this very concern tend to fog his vision to the deeper and broader understanding of the fundamentals of his new profession?
It may also be said that the elements of leadership in most honorable vocations are much alike, elements of character, disposition, application, etc., which are at least as well developed by service in the line as in the staff. That is also undoubtedly true in regard to three-fourths of the qualifications for leadership, but the other fourth accounts for the difference between a Dewey of Manila and a Mayo of Rochester.
In summary is there not danger in too long deferred specialization for Naval Academy graduates, that much of the essence of what makes a competent technical staff officer of real proficiency and vision be lost?
Is there not also danger that some of the essence of a first-class line officer be lost if many of the Naval Academy graduates are not certain, for approximately a quarter of their service life, in which direction they are headed?
What will be the effect on the line of the Navy twenty years later as well as on the technical staff corps of the service?