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THE RIDDLE OF JUTLAND. By Lang- home Gibson and Vice-Admiral J. E. T. Harper, R. N. New York: Coward- McCann, Inc. 1934. 415 pages. $4.00.
“History today is a stream of mingled fact and theory, now clear, now muddied by passion and prejudices, and reaching through the shifting channels of individual minds. It is a science only in a small substratum of demonstrable truth."
The phrase "muddied by passion and prejudices," in this quotation from Geoffrey Parson's The Stream of History, well describes much of the already vast literature that has accumulated about the Battle of Jutland, of which more than a hundred sources, in English, German, and French, are listed in the bibliography of the present volume. With all these sources the authors of The Riddle of Jutland are thoroughly familiar—Mr. Langhorne Gibson as an ardent student and collector of Jutland material who is now in the unusual position of Naval Curator at Yale University; Admiral Harper as the chairman of the board of officers who prepared the long-suppressed "Official Record" of the battle, and the author also of The Truth about Jutland.
Not only are the authors masters of their material, but they have told the story of the battle with great vividness and power. There is plenty of the “sweetish reek of blood” and “the strangling stink of cordite gas,” plenty of the striking pictorial details that will hold the average reader. It is, in fact, a book directed to such readers, rather than to the plodding, pondering students of naval warfare who would like to have the riddles of Jutland solved. This is said, not so much because the book is warmly and sincerely pro-English and pro-Jellicoe, as because it passes lightly over situations and decisions that have caused endless discussion.
For instance, in the description of the opening phase of the battle, we read that “Beatty, who had been given ten vessels to pit against the Germans’ five, had left his battleships astern for the sake of a few moments’ time, and must be content to enter action with his battle-cruisers alone. Now it will be remembered that Beatty had six battle cruisers to five of the enemy. And it will also be remembered that Lord Nelson once said, “Five minutes may spell the difference between victory and defeat,” by which he did not mean five minutes spent in assembling an overwhelming superiority, but five minutes saved. Moreover, when the ten major units were properly concentrated, would Admiral Hipper, having 3 knots better speed, have been so accommodating as to steam within 16,000 yards’ range? These are matters on which one could wish more discussion of the pros and cons.
Beatty, it is true, did not realize as clearly as did Jellicoe that “in defensive construction the Germans were far better, and in offensive power, though they had guns of smaller calibre, they had better instruments for range-finding and fire control, better shells, and more thoroughly drilled guns’ crews.” But is it well for the man in the street—Englishman or American—to be told that, thanks to discretion, Anglo-Saxons again “blundered through,” and that “history in the most complete terms gave the palm of victory to Jellicoe and Britain,” without some discussion of the causes that brought about such a state of inferiority, the responsibility for it, and the remedy for it, so that such a condition may not occur again?
As for the question of victory at Jutland, discussion seems rather futile. The results, whatever name be applied to them, are well known. Though the Germans had fewer ships actually sunk or destroyed, their fleet probably suffered injuries which made an offensive strategy less feasible than before. A question of primary interest, however, in settling this matter of success or failure—and one that is neglected in the present volume—is not what would have happened if the British fleet (superior by something like 8 to 5) had been destroyed, but what would have happened if the German fleet had been swept off the seas. This surely should have been the British aim. If this had resulted, would not the allied powers have been able to wrest control of the Baltic and establish more direct communication with Russia? Would not the submarine campaign have been limited or prevented? Would not the effect upon German material and morale have shortened the war, which during the next two and a half years cost the Allies so heavily in blood and wealth and was so nearly won by the Central Powers?
Truly the destinies of nations rested upon Admiral Jellicoe's decisions, and particularly upon his decision to follow the conventional defense of turning away from the torpedo attack at the critical moment of the battle.
According to the authors of The Riddle of Jutland, destruction of Scheer's fleet might have been accomplished at this time had Jellicoe closed with the enemy. But in their view his primary object was command of the sea; destruction of the enemy fleet was secondary. "The price Jellicoe would have paid. . . would have been the reduction of his own fleet to a weakness such that it no longer dominated the broader seas."—Not with the aid of the French, Italian, and Japanese Navies, and the first-class fighting ships and numerous pre-dreadnoughts left at home? Domination of the broader seas against whom? Surely the statesmen of England, in their sagacity, did not counsel the Admiralty and the commander in chief to hold back the fleet at Jutland that it might retain "domination of the broader seas.''
The British tactics at Jutland were calculated to prevent their own destruction. But, as has been well stated by an American officer, "With the German 'offensive-defensive' pitted against the British 'cautious offensive' it would have taken some stroke of fortune to bring the forces together in decisive battle. History has taught—no matter what the weapons may be, whether sailing ships with smoothbores or dreadnoughts with high power rifles—that a cautious offensive never gives decisive results." (Commander C. C. Gill, U. S. Navy, What Happened at Jutland, 1921.)
There is only one other question, and that is as to the wisdom of the superlatives, employed in describing Admiral Jellicoe’s deployment at 6.15 as "the most remark able single evolution of ships the world has ever seen," which may be coupled with Mr. Archibald Hurd's remark in the Introduction that it was "the inspiration of genius" and "quickest bit of thinking since man became an intelligent creature"; whereas Admiral Scheer's second Gefechtskehrtwendung at 6.55 is spoken of as "defying every principle of sound strategy [tactics?]."
It is hardly fair, however, to end on such a note. A book should be judged by its accomplishment of its aim. The aim of this book is not to delve in grand strategy or tactics, but to tell a clear, vivid story of the course of the fighting in the North Sea from the beginning to the end of the war, and to present in a favorable light the service to the world of Lord Jellicoe and the British fleet. This aim it accomplishes admirably. It would be only a captious critic who would suggest that after reading the book Englishmen and Americans should also read Kipling's Recessional and should not forget the graver lessons of the battle.
THE SLIDE RULE FOR SHIPS' OFFICERS. A Treatise on Slide Rules for Cargo, Navigation, and General Use on Board a Ship Both in Port and at Sea. By J. C. Podmore. Glasgow: Brown, Son & Ferguson, Ltd. 1934. 2s. 6d.
REVIEWED BY COMMANDER JULES JAMES, U. S. NAVY
This is an excellent treatise which should help dispel the impression mentioned in the introduction that a slide rule is an engineer's instrument, hard to use, and one that requires continual practice for proficiency. It is true that as engineers many of our officers have learned to use this instrument, but subsequently many have used it extensively as an aid in solving their problems of navigation, piloting, and maneuvering.
In this treatise the author has extended the use of the rule to the complete solution of the general problems of the ship, including those which occur in port; and in so doing he forcibly illustrates how helpful this instrument is in the solution of all ordinary mathematical problems.
The author’s explanation of the principles of the slide rule, and his lessons in its use, are particularly clear. He describes the scientific method of placing the decimal point in slide rule answers, but perhaps many will prefer to use the simple method of so placing the decimal point that the answer is approximately equal to that obtained by a mental solution of the same problem with simple even numbers of approximately equal values substituted for those appearing in the original problem.
Of interest in this book are the formulas for determining the safe working loads of ropes, wires, and chains. The appendix contains convenient tables of weights, measures, and formulas, and also tables of gauge points for ready conversion when using the slide rule. _
There are included many interesting solutions of the ordinary coasting problems; and the author’s solutions of the problems of deep sea navigation extend to those of an astronomical nature. Whether or not the slide rule is used in the solution of the various problems presented, they themselves, and the formulas for their solution, will be found most interesting and of real assistance to seamen in their various problems which involve mathematics.
THE TANGIER PAPERS OF SAMUEL PEPYS. Transcribed, Edited, and Collated ... by Edwin Chappell. London: Navy Records Society. (Navy Records Society Publications, Vol. 73.) 1935. 25s. 6d.
Reviewed by Louis H. Bolander, Assistant Librarian, U. S. Naval Academy
This volume represents the consummation of a monumental task undertaken by an indefatigable scholar and sheds new light on the character and abilities of the famous English diarist, Samuel Pepys. Pepys, entrusted by his sovereign with a most important task, chronicled, as was his habit, his day-by-day experiences and impressions while on this mission. His chronicle, written for no man’s eye but his own, gives us a most illuminating picture of the British Navy in his day, and a vivid account of the historic incident in which he played so important a role. In 1662, Tangier had become the property of the English Crown. But the expense of its maintenance and its defense from the Moors had become so great that Charles II, in 1683, always in want of funds and handicapped by a frugal Parliament, who consistently refused to vote a shilling for its upkeep, decided to abandon the port. Pepys was sent with a naval expedition to appraise the value of the properties of English and foreign residents in Tangier, who must now abandon their holdings.
The volume is divided into five parts, three of which should prove of special interest to naval readers. Pepys quaintly describes them as “My Proceeding to & at Tanger, from my setting out from London, July 30, 1683; to my departure from Tanger toward Cadiz in ye Deer, following”; “My perticuler Informations & Observations, Good & Bad touching Tanger”; and “Observables Generali of the Navy, etc.” Under the latter head he discusses many questions that were perplexing naval authorities in his day, such as the practice of carrying merchandise in the King’s ships for the profit of the ship’s commander; the relative merits of gentlemen captains and “tarpaulins,” recalling Macaulay’s famous phrase, “The seamen were not gentlemen, and the gentlemen were not seamen”; a better system of training boys for naval service; his worries about errors in navigation and the unreliability of charts (there was no means known of determining longitude in Pepys’ time); the value of a vegetable diet in the treatment of scurvy; and the all-important question of discipline in the Navy.
The original Tangier Papers are in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. They are in Pepys’ shorthand, and their transcription into readable English represents a prodigious amount of exacting labor on the part of the editor. That his task has been ably done, there can be no doubt. An earlier version of the papers, transcribed by John Smith, appeared in 1841, and was reprinted in 1932. Unfortunately, Smith took many liberties with the original text, editing it so liberally that the reliability of his version is open to question.
ON THE BRIDGE. By Captain J. A. G. Troup, R. N. London: Rich & Cowan, Ltd. 1934. 7s. 6d.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander F. A. Slocum, R. N.
All those who may be faced with that great responsibility, the command of a ship at sea—be she warship, merchantman or private yacht—must owe a debt of gratitude to Captain J. A. G. Troup for this important contribution to the science of navigation. He is among the most experienced and authoritative of our contemporary navigators, and the attractive manner in which his information is presented awakens in the minds of past members of the profession the longing to experience once again that “private pleasure in the contemplation of a troublesome passage overcome.”
Captain Troup prefaces his book by a clear interpretation of that portion of the King’s Regulations referring to the responsibility of captains in navigation. We are told that the “essence—nay, more, the marrow of navigation” is to fix—then fix—then fix again; but after an example of the dire results arising from neglect of this maxim, the injunction is qualified with advice as to when not to fix, for
in days gone by, the writer has often taken a sight with a bad horizon, or a fix by a distant and doubtful summit, obtained a result differing widely from the estimated position, and then wondered what to do next.
On the subject of making the passage, we are bidden to prepare a plan beforehand and to analyze the passage afterwards, thereby accumulating wisdom for future occasions. We are reminded that attention to the deviation will enhance the usefulness of that faithful but oft-neglected friend, the magnetic compass. To that most dreaded enemy of seamen, fog, the author devotes three chapters. As we read, it is borne in on us that an iron nerve and a supreme and justifiable confidence, allied to skill and experience, are the necessary ingredients to a successful landfall. Nevertheless, Captain Troup shows us by virtue of a masterly analysis of the three main types of passage in fog, that “given enough fog, we lose entirely any unreasoning fear about ‘taking the ground.’”
Part 2 of this admirable work concerns the handling of ships, a subject to which the author tells us he turns with some apprehension, in view of its controversial character. He persuades us that a ship in the hands of a skilled and experienced husband is not the fickle jade supposed by some. His advice to the novice when making his “debut,” can only be described as a godsend, and we agree with him unreservedly when he tells us, that if the various steps necessary for bringing the ship safely to her harbor berth be thought out thoroughly beforehand, “the operation will not be found difficult even in the early days, and it will soon become an engrossing interest and delight.”
Coming to that oft discussed maneuver, “turning in the wake,” Captain Troup places his experience and advice at our disposal, but warns us that “another officer equally experienced” is aghast at his recommendations. Perhaps the pith of the author’s remarks on maneuvering in narrow and con jested waters is contained in the following observations,
(1) an alternative method should always be borne in mind,” and (2) “the principle that, whenever possible, the forces of nature should be summoned to our aid in handling ships is at the heart of seamanship.
In this latter connection we have the temerity to submit that, admitting a heavy ship may become obstinate and unmanageable in the face of the forces of nature unless coaxed and humored, the reserve of power in a destroyer is such that in the hands of an expert she can be coerced to his will whatever the conditions of wind and weather.
Finally, how many there are of us who will echo Capt. Troup’s concluding words:
Hope runs high at the prospect of a first command, and older people, critical as they may be of your early efforts, would fain beg a favour from Father Time and stand where you are today.