The general public chiefly remembers the name of Vice Admiral Sir George Tryon in connection with the loss of H.M.S. Victoria in 1893. Persons connected with disasters are chiefly recalled through their association with the event. Other accomplishments fade.
Tryon was born in 1832, the son of a Northampton country gentleman, who was the chairman of a local conservative political group. He followed the example of his uncle, Admiral Robert Tryon, and entered the Navy. He was wounded in the Crimean War while a member of the naval brigade before Sevastopol. During the next few years he served on the royal yacht and then gained his first experience on an ironclad as commander of the Warrior. In 1871 he became private secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty and when Mr. Gladstone was defeated in 1874, he returned to active service as captain of the Raleigh and in 1878, the Monarch. In 1879 he became naval aide de camp to Queen Victoria, and acted as permanent secretary to the Board of Admiralty.
In 1877-78 Tryon was on a committee for the revision of the signal book and the manual of fleet evolutions. One of the other members, Vice Admiral Colomb, had made a deep study of the subject of fleet tactics and ship maneuvers and had charted it all out on paper. Tryon had somewhat divergent views, representing the so-called practical side of the question, believing that the foundation of all successful fleet maneuvers was dependent on the training of the eye to judge distances and speeds.
After he left the Admiralty he was appointed to the command of the Australian station over the heads of twenty senior rear admirals. In 1887 he returned and was given command of one or another of the fleets in the naval maneuvers for three successive years. He also acted as admiral superintendent of the Naval Reserve.
He was known as a strict disciplinarian, but his justice always leaned to the side of kindness. He had a tactful manner of bringing a junior officer into line with him as a colleague rather than of directing him as a subordinate. Such loyalty downward could only be productive of the most loyal devotion upward. His ideas on punishment were humane without being weak, and he believed in the certainty of punishment rather than in its severity.
In January, 1893, he laid down the limits of obedience to orders, in a memorandum published to his command. After quoting some words of the Duke of Wellington, the memorandum stated:
Orders directing the movement of ships either collectively or singly are invariably accompanied as a matter of course with the paramount understood condition, with due regard to the safety of Her Majesty’s ships. . . . When the literal obedience to any order, however given, would entail a collision with a friend or endanger a ship by running on shore, or in any other way, paramount orders direct that the danger is to be avoided while the object of the order should be attained if possible.
In the experimental movements of & squadron, Admiral Tryon endeavored to make them more real by the introduction of the unexpected; thus it was that the captains of the fleet learned to place implicit confidence in his orders and in his ability, often, it would seem, without understanding what they were doing until it was revealed to them later in the Admiral’s cabin. This custom explains the seemingly blind acquiescence of his subordinates in spite of the above memorandum interpreting obedience to orders.
On Thursday, June 22, 1893, at ten o’clock in the forenoon, a British squadron weighed anchor in the harbor of Beirut, and proceeded north along the Syrian coast, steering for the Port of Tripoli. There were thirteen ships—eight battleships, the Victoria, Camperdown, Nile, Dreadnought, Inflexible, Collingwood, Edinburgh, and Sans Pareil, and five cruisers—the Edgar, Phaeton, Amphion, Fearless, and Barham. Very shortly after leaving the anchorage the squadron was formed in line abreast, and the rate of progress was fixed at 8.8 knots.
The commander in chief of this Mediterranean Fleet was Admiral Sir George Tryon, K.C.B., and his flag was hoisted on the Victoria, which was commanded by Captain Maurice Bourke. Originally christened the Renown, with the name Victoria an afterthought, the vessel had been launched at Elswick only five years before. Rear Admiral Markham was commander of the second division of the fleet with his flag on the Camperdown.
Sir George informed his subordinates that he intended to form the fleet in two columns, with the second column on the port side of that one led by himself as the guide of the squadron. He also settled that the distance between the two columns should be six cables or 1,200 yards. In this formation he proposed to steam on until the Victoria should be sufficiently past a certain spot of the coast known as the Tower of the Lions, by a compass bearing, on which it was intended to anchor. Then he would, by signal, invert the lines by turning the columns inwards 16 points, or face about, so that on reaching the line of bearing for turning up to the anchorage, the fleet should alter course together 8 points to port, which would bring the squadron into columns of divisions, and in this formation he intended anchoring (see Fig. 1).
When the Admiral had explained his intention, Staff Commander Hawkins-Smith suggested that 8 cables would be a better distance to form in 2 divisions than 6 cables; to which the Admiral replied: “Yes, it should be eight.” As a matter of fact even 8 cables or 1,600 yd. was no great space in which to turn 2 or more vessels in towards one another, since the tactical diameter of these ships was usually taken as 800 yd. A safer margin would have been 9 cables (1,800 yd.) and 10 cables (2,000 yd.) would have allowed the evolution to be carried out comfortably, and given the two cables or 400 yards’ distance between the lines which Tryon, by a second and following order, intended them to preserve. However, 8 cables was mentioned, and the staff commander left the cabin and went on deck.
Tryon’s orders were obeyed by Flag Lieutenant Lord Gillford; but at a quarter past two, just after the above conversation, he was ordered to make the signal: “Columns to be 6 cables apart,” and accordingly did so. Staff Commander Hawkins-Smith came aft to Lord Gillford and stated that the Admiral had agreed that the columns should be 8 cables apart Lord Gillford immediately went below to the Admiral's cabin and informed Tryone of what the staff commander had said. Tryon replied that he wished the columns to be left at 6 cables apart. Lord Gillford informed the staff commander of this, and the signal, which in the meantime had been answered by the other ships of the fleet, remained in force. At 3:15 P.M., Tryon came on deck and went up on the top of the fore charthouse.
According to the Camperdown's signal log, the following signal was hoisted in the Victoria: at the masthead 2 flag, 2 pendant, the compass pendant, 1 flag, and 6 flag, signifying that the second division was to alter course in succession 16 points, turning to starboard, and preserving the order of the fleet; at the yardarm was shown 2 flag, 1 pendant, 1 flag, 6 flag, and the compass pendant, signifying that the first division was to alter course in succession 16 points, turning to port, and preserving the order of the fleet.
Rear Admiral Markham was present on the bridge of the Camperdown when this signal was made and when it was repeated to him he thought the two columns were too close to execute the maneuver, so he kept the signal at the dip. He also ordered his flag lieutenant to make a signal to semaphore to Tryon: "Am I to understand that it is your wish for the columns I turn as indicated by the signal now flying?" If this signal had been made, it is possible that the accident might have been avoided, but before it could be made, the commander in chief semaphored: "What are you waiting for?" and he considered that he had no choice but to obey.
Thinking that Admiral Tryon wished him to turn 16 points in the Camperdown, and that with the Victoria he intended to take a wide sweep, leaving the second division on the port side, Admiral Markham later said:
Having the fullest confidence in the great ability Of the Admiral to maneuver the squadron without even the risk of collision, I ordered the signal to be hoisted right up as an indication that it was understood.
When the signal to turn inwards, 16 points was hauled down, the helm of the Victoria was put hard to starboard (35°), which corresponded to a tactical diameter of about 600 yd. At the same moment the holm of the Camperdown was put at 28° to port, which corresponded to a tactical diameter estimated at about 800 yd. Had the helm of the Camperdown been put hard to port, the tactical diameter would have been reduced about 20 per cent (see Fig. 2).
The two ships continued to turn under these conditions until they had each turned through about 8 points and were very nearly end-on to one another. Their distance apart at that instant was estimated at 2 to 2.5 cables (400-500 yd.). Both ships must then have acquired practically their full swing, corresponding to the conditions of speed and helm angle above stated. Apart from change of helm or alteration in speed and direction of the engines, the ships would have continued to turn in practically circular arcs from 8 points onwards.
Admiral Markham in the Camperdown saw that the Victoria was turning inwards instead of going under his stern as he anticipated she would do in spite of the signals. The order was given to go full speed astern with the starboard screw so as to decrease the circle of turning and when collision was seen to he inevitable, both engines were put full speed astern. At the same time Captain Bourke of the Victoria had asked permission to reverse the port screw and immediately afterwards both engines were put full speed astern. Reversing of the engines in both ships was undertaken too late to check the headway, and the Camperdown struck the Victoria about 20 ft. forward of her turret (65 ft. abaft the stem head) at about 3:34 p.m., the angle being about 80° (see Fig. 3, etc.). Orders were given to close the water-tight doors on the Victoria about one minute before the ships collided. Testimony in the court of inquiry which followed showed that the Camperdown’s speed was about 6.75 knots and the Victoria’s speed was somewhat less, being estimated at 5-6 knots. The Camperdown’s ram, moving at 16.9 ft. per second with 10,600 tons behind it, caused the fore end of the Victoria to move from 60 to 70 ft. to port when struck.
It was two minutes before the Camperdown was able, although going full speed astern with both engines, to get clear of the Victoria. The water-tight doors on the Camperdown were shut before the collision, but she had a jagged hole in her port bow extending from the stem 10 ft. aft and from 12 to 18 ft. below the upper deck. The stem was broken near the ram, which had penetrated far into the Victoria.
The width of the breach in the Victoria varied. At the upper deck it was about 12 ft.; at the original water line about ft; then it gradually diminished in general breadth towards the lower termination. The area of the breach below the original water line must have been over 100 sq. ft.
The bow of the Camperdown filled this breach to a large extent during the minutes the ships were locked together. When the Camperdown backed and got free, the full area of the breach was then open to the entry of water. The initial rate of inflow of water through an unobstructed aperture of this size was estimated at 3,000 tons per minute. The actual rate of inflow was governed by many circumstances. Compartments which were directly breached by the blow and put in free communication with the sea must have filled very quickly. These compartments required only about 500 tons to fill them, so that they were probably fully flooded before the Camperdown succeeded in freeing herself.
At four minutes after the collision the bow had dipped so much that water was coming through the hawse pipes on to the upper deck. The bow had sunk about 10 ft. in 4 minutes and the change of trim continued. About 2 minutes later so much water had risen on the forecastle that the men who had been working there with collision mats were ordered away. The water was washing into the open turret ports situated nearly at the middle line 100 ft. from the bow and at a height of 14 ft. above the original water line. The forward half of the ship was nearly submerged and the after portion of the ship was lifted considerably out of the water. The upper blades of the port screw were also showing above the water to a large extent, whereas their normal position was 11 ft. below water. In the meantime the Victoria was also listing to starboard and in 10 minutes a list of 20° was estimated. She then fell with increasing rapidity to the starboard and boats and other weights contributed to hasten the capsizing after the lurch had been felt.
Admiral Tryon did not believe that the Victoria was in serious danger. When it was reported to him the Dreadnought was lowering her boats, he directed that a message be sent: "Negative sending boats." Orders were given to drive full speed for the shore but, before a mile had been traversed, it was evident that the ship was doomed.
The attempt made to beach the ship with a helm hard to starboard tended to increase somewhat both the impression of the bow and the heel to starboard. The inflow of water through the turret ports was also accelerated. It was later shown by analysis that, had the doors and ports been closed, the Victoria would have remained afloat and under control and able to make port under her own steam. The men had been impressed with the thought that the ship was unsinkable and many refused to come on deck. The whole engine-room staff on watch, therefore, perished to a man, being busy driving the ship to shore and expecting to get there. The order was given for each one to save himself and many jumped overboard, but, while the majority were still below, the vessel suddenly heeled over and remained floating bottom up for about 3 minutes. Then she plunged bow foremost to the bottom.
The true cause of failure to close the doors, hatches, etc., in the forward part of the ship is to be found in the very short time before the collision that orders were given to make the attempt. Captain Bourke stated during the inquiry that under ordinary conditions 3 minutes were required to close the doors with a trained crew. It is also shown that the order to close doors was given only one minute before the collision and the men were not close to their stations.
Director of Naval Construction W. H. White stated in a report dated September 15, 1893:
- The flooded compartments would have been 12 in number, and would have involved a loss of buoyancy of 680 tons; of this loss 600 tons would have been below the protective deck.
- The moment producing change of trim corresponding to this loss of buoyancy would have been 90,000-foot tons. The change of trim resulting would have been 13.S ft., or less than half that observed before the lurch began.
- The heel to starboard would have been about 9°.
- The ship would have retained ample transverse stability, the metacentric height being 2.S ft.
- The forward 6-inch gun ports would have remained 4.5 ft. above water.
Under these circumstances the Victoria should have been under control and navigable.
The inquiry on the Victoria disaster resulted in a court-martial for Captain Bourke and other surviving officers of the ill-fated ship. It resulted in their acquittal, and the conclusions were that the commander in chief of the squadron, as the result of a temporary aberration, made a most inexplicable and fatal mistake for which he paid with his life.
Captain Bourke’s testimony before the court-martial pointed out:
That the commander in chief had never discussed or consulted anyone as to the maneuvers he intended to carry out. The flag lieutenant very seldom knew any of the intentions of the Admiral until the moment of the signal. . . . When the signal directing this maneuver was hoisted, the Camperdown did not hoist her signal close up. The Admiral asked what she was waiting for and went aft a little to see if she was waiting for any ship in the first division to answer. A semaphore was made to her: ‘What are you waiting for?” When the signal was hauled down, the commander in chief made the remark: “Go on.” It was very soon after this that I said to the Admiral: “We had better do something. We shall be too close to that ship.” Then I told Mr. Lanyon, midshipman, to take the distance of the Camperdown. I remembered being impatient with him, and he eventually said 3.5 cables, but I remember at the time thinking the distance was underestimated. It was then I asked the Admiral’s permission to reverse the port screw, which request I repeated two or three times; at last he said “yes,” and the port telegraph was immediately reversed and shortly after I reversed the starboard telegraph. ... I have two points to lay before the board: (1) that the commander in chief was there and on the chart-house absolutely beside me and in a certain degree conducting the maneuver of the Victoria. (2) That whenever he had been forward before, it had been his custom, going to anchorage with a squadron, to himself give directions about the engines.
I do not for a moment wish the court to suppose I am anxious to throw off any of the responsibility which rests with the captain of a ship.... The Camperdown, after the collision, backed out clear and it was at this moment I said to the commander in chief: “I think I had better go below to see about the doors,” and he said: “You go below to look after the doors; I will attend to the engines. ...” When I came up from below I went up on the aft bridge ladder and there I found some men in their stations for hoisting out boats. I saw Commander Jellicoe, although on the sick list, on the port side of the bridge with flags in his hands for the signals to the topping lift. . . . I then went along the fore and aft bridge to report to the Admiral and the ship appeared in turn straight over to starboard.
Some critics censured Admiral Markham in the light of Admiral Tryon's memorandum: "with due regard to the safety of Her Majesty's ships." There is no doubt that, had Admiral Markham refused to obey, it would have been better in this case, but he would undoubtedly have been severely reprimanded had he done so. It is doubtful if he could have proved that his refusal was justified. Further, Admiral Markham was somewhat used to the fact that Admiral Tryon often deliberately made his maneuvers more intricate by the introduction of the unexpected. Concluding that the commander in chief knew what he was about, Admiral Markham was forced to the conclusion that a refusal to carry out Tryon's orders might result is a collision.
Admiral Markham's testimony on this policy follows: Q. Do you not think you would have been justified in expecting some intimation from the commander in chief if he intended circling round you?
A. No, I did not expect it. There have been many evolutions in the Mediterranean Squadron of which, at the time, I must acknowledge I hardly knew the object. They were only after wards fully explained to us by the commander in chief in his cabin. It has not infrequently occurred to me that when I have gone aboard the flagship after anchoring the squadron, the commander in chief has said: "Do you know why I did so-and-so?" And I have said: "No sir, why?" Then it has been explained to me. I had some sort of idea in my mind at the time I ordered the signal to be answered that he was going to wheel round me, come out on the other side and reform the squadron.
Q. Has a signal ever before been made to you which, as in this case, caused doubt in your mind as to the possibility of executing it with due safety to your division?
A. Never, in my recollection.
Q. Did you not feel in this case, as you were acting on an assumption of what the commander in chief was going to do, that you ran a very great risk?
A. No, I felt no anxiety, having the fullest confidence in the commander in chief. It is interesting to note that the last reply coincides with the state of mind that every commander in chief should desire to inspire in his subordinates. It is obvious that any prevalent impression among subordinates that they are responsible for refusing and, if they think fit, reversing the explicit orders given, would be fatal to a fleet.
Captain Johnstone of the Camperdown justified the obedience rendered to Admiral Tryon's fatal order, and in ignoring the memorandum concerning literal obedience in his testimony before the court-martial as follows:
Q. Were you aware of the existence of Admiral Tryon's memorandum on the subject of discretion in obeying orders?
A. Yes, but I do not consider it has any bearing on a case such as the one in question.
Q. How do you account for that answer, bearing in mind the directions contained in the Act of Discipline?
A. I consider on the one hand, that when an order is delivered by an officer in command—naturally a competent officer—an order which he has probably carefully thought out, perhaps worked out, mathematically, there is extreme danger in anyone on the spur of the moment presuming to act contrary to the literal directions given. Had the commander in chief circled round the second division, which seemed the only reasonable interpretation of his signal, the power of avoiding the danger rested entirely with him, and not with the second division. In that case, had any other movement been made than the one carried out by the Camperdown, the commander in chief's intention must have been entirely frustrated and perhaps great danger of a collision incurred.
The Spectator, in its issue of July 22, 1893, pointed out that, while fatalities such as the Balaclava charge or the sinking of the Victoria might occur under a unified command, many more fatalities involving worse blunders would be the result of private judgment of a miscellaneous mass of subordinate officers superseding definite and responsible authority.
The court, while feeling strong regret that the commander of the Camperdown did not carry out his first intention to semaphore his doubts as to the signal, declared that it would be fatal to the best interests of the service to say he was to blame for carrying out the directions of his commander in chief, who was present in person.
The Review of Reviews, August, 1893, said:
This is a notable utterance, coming as it does on the top of Admiral Tryon’s memorandum in which he expressly laid down the duty of disobeying orders when they were manifestly fatal. At the same time there is a general concurrence in the findings of the court. You cannot maneuver a fleet on the principle of limited liability or qualified obedience.
The periodicals and naval men provided interesting side lights concerning the disaster. London Engineering in its issue of July 7, 1893, stated:
There is little doubt—in fact it may be said there is no doubt—that the catastrophe occurred through an error on the part of the late commander-in-chief, Sir George Tryon. Knowing the great ability of the late Admiral, it is difficult to understand how he could have given an order such as he did which must have resulted in the collision of the ships. The reports state that he had only that morning come off the sick list. What the nature of his illness was we are not aware, but we are compelled to think that he was in a state of weakness which incapacitated the proper functions of the brain. Most of us know that mental state in which physical weakness so reduces one that no effort of the will can compel the mind to fix itself on one object; when memory seems for the instant to fail, and facts lose their proper significance. Fortunately this mental paralysis which is the result of a sudden stress on a mind weakened from physical causes seldom happens to ordinary men when they are in a position to make the failure so terribly serious as in the case of the late Sir George Tryon. No doubt the late Admiral fell a victim of his own excessive zeal; and his desire not to spare himself has resulted in the loss of not only his own life, but that of 359 fellow sailors.
The Fortnightly Review stated in its issue of September 1, 1893:
Admiral Markham’s published letter can leave no doubt in anyone’s mind that the grievous loss was due to an ill-judged order. But that order was given by a man who had for years been celebrated for his good judgment. ... We are told he had lately been suffering from fever but that his medical attendants thought he had recovered, but is it not more reasonable to suppose that a slight mistake may have been made here rather than that he should suddenly falsify all the habits and ideas that he had held for years? By nature he was tenacious of his opinions; but a few minutes before he lost his life he was changeable and entirely forgot a principle that he had assiduously impressed on his subordinates, viz., the permanent necessity for keeping the columns of a fleet at their proper distance. It was the failure on this particular point that vitiated the movement he ordered. . . . Such casual failing can be attributed to nothing else than sudden illness.
Admiral Colomb supposed that Tryon believed he could maneuver his ship independently of the inexorable mathematical principles which governed her course. There is nothing recorded by Admiral Fitzgerald, Tryon’s biographer, that supports this view, but Tryon is described as holding that, though the exact determination of bearings and distances by compass and sextant was in the highest degree important to the beginner, the aim of all fleet exercises was to educate the eye, so that maneuvers could be performed with approximate and sufficient accuracy without the use of the sextant, which in battle or critical emergency would be impossible.
Admiral Colomb said:
I believe simply that Sir George Tryon thought he had much greater power of control over his ship than was really possible, and that, feeling this, he was not particular in any very accurate calculation of distances. Ordinary fleet maneuvers seldom give an officer any knowledge of the actual maneuvering powers of his ship. We become very intimately acquainted with her relative maneuvering powers as regards her immediate neighbors. In designing our systems of tactics, which I had the honor to do in 1865 and onwards for many years, I took a great deal of care to eliminate as far as I could all movements where ships’ maneuvering powers were thrown into opposition to one another as they were on this unhappy occasion.
It had been my duty for weeks to endeavor to induce Sir George Tryon to understand that it was so. I had for months endeavored to persuade Sir Geoffrey Hornby to agree with me in eliminating some of those tactical movements which brought maneuvering powers of ships into opposition, and which were not safe until we knew more exactly and familiarly what they were. In his happy way of meeting persistent advocates of measures he disliked, his joke against me was that I wanted to provide for the duffer captains. I cannot conceive any hypothesis so fair to the memory of Sir George Tryon as this is.
In my own mind I acquit him of all blame, as I only recognize his doing what I should have thought possible, if not likely. He was, in my judgment, the victim of the transition from sail maneuvering to steam maneuvering. His really splendid powers as a seaman of the sailing school misled him in his apprenticeship to the steam school.
Admiral Hornby was certain that, if the whole Navy were polled, they would prefer to stick to one admiral and one order notwithstanding the danger to which the policy of implicit obedience is liable.
The one question left, the real enigma—what was in the Admiral's mind when he gave the fatal signal—must remain unanswered. Did the Admiral, so remarkable for dealing with sudden emergencies with promptness and accuracy, make a huge mistake in mixing up the "diameter" with the "radius" of the "circle" in which the ships turned? Or was a temporary aberration of mind brought on by his illness responsible for the promulgation of the order in its original "6-cable" form after he had admitted "8 cables would be better?"
Thus it was that Admiral Tryon's system of maneuvering without signals; the very virtues of the man; his reputation as a brilliant tactician; his thorough knowledge of detail; and the perfect trust and confidence which he inspired in his subordinates; all contributed to make a certain disaster from one single blunder.
What a tragic end for an able man, standing on the deck of the Victoria saying "It is entirely my fault."