Before 1900, promotion in the Navy was solely by seniority. The requirements were: Keep your digestion in order and refrain from striking your superior officer. The result was inevitable; all were promoted except those who were notoriously too bad, and they had to be really bad. Some few failed of promotion because of poor health, but even that had to be pretty hopeless. Once a critic protested to the "Bull Doctor" of a medical examining board that a certain commander should not have been promoted to captain because his health was so bad that he would not be able to come on deck. The doctor replied: "That's the kind captain I should like to serve with." Few officers are old enough to remember the case of a perfectly healthy captain who was turned down by the examining board because he was notoriously a detriment to efficiency. It nearly caused a riot. The board was in danger. The sacred system of seniority was imperiled. This system was, of course, very popular with the service. From the point of view of the greatest good to the greatest number its advantages were many. First of all, it assured security. With fair health and reasonable subordination all were certain of reaching the highest grade. It was the paradise of the beefeater.
But perhaps the worst feature of the old system was that officers promoted to flag rank necessarily had but a short time to serve—anywhere from a week to three or four years. One captain hustled his promotion through the Congress the day before he was retired.
A press campaign against the absurdities of the system forced action. The so-called "plucking board" was inaugurated in 1899, a board of admirals to "select out" a certain number of officers each year. Those not thus eliminated were promoted by seniority. This was a brutal measure as it pilloried before the public those selected out. However, it did much good as it eliminated some of the most unfit, increased promotion, provided flag officers having longer to serve, and placed some premium on merit, or at least on lack of unfitness.
This was followed in 1916 by the initiation of promotion by selection. With certain modifications, this is our present system. Though it has greatly increased the efficiency of the service, and though the principle of selection is generally approved, it has certain inherent defects that are inseparable from the method as now constituted. The service does not doubt the entire integrity and conscientiousness of selection boards, but believes nevertheless that the system makes many injustices inevitable. Not only does the service believe this, but some admirals, including several who have been members of more than one selection board, recognize this to be true.
Needless to say, this belief is very detrimental to the morale of the service, and its cause should be removed if possible; and there seems to be no reason why this could not and should not be done. The purpose of this article is to recommend a means to this end. The following are the reasons upon which this recommendation is based.
Fundamental defect of present method.—The fundamental defect of the present method is that, with the information at present available, it is wholly impossible for a board of nine admirals, or even for two boards of nine admirals, to select from the large number (many hundreds) of candidates in the various grades those best fitted to perform the duties of the next higher grade, i.e., it is impossible with this information alone to determine the relative merits of the candidates.
Practically, the only information upon which the judgment of the board can be based is the usual reports of fitness, an occasional letter, and personal acquaintance with a small proportion of the candidates.
Reports of fitness do not enable the board to determine the relative merits of the officers, and for the following reasons:
- They are individual reports, made by relatively a very few of the numerous officers in the grades above the candidates, and, consequently, they do not express the service reputation of these candidates.
- Moreover, as these reports extend from the beginning of an officer’s career up to date, only a small proportion of them concern an officer’s present abilities, and, from this very small number of reports, it is almost impossible to arrive at a candidate’s service reputation—upon which alone his relative merit can be established.
- Not only is it impossible from a consideration of a certain officer’s fitness reports to determine his service reputation, but it is equally impossible to determine his fitness as compared with that of the other officers of his grade.
- This impossibility of determining the relative fitness of officers is due to the well-known fact that reports of fitness are practically uniform, and are generally much too favorable.
An admiral who had been a member of several selection boards states that the average marks in the fitness reports are between 3.4 and 4.0, the latter expressing perfection. He also points out that, in answer to the question as to whether an officer is above the average, about half the reports rate the officers as “average” and the other half as “above the average” which, being a mathematical impossibility, sufficiently illustrates both the unreliability of the reports and the impossibility of establishing relative merit. As the establishment of relative merit is wholly essential in determining those best qualified for promotion, relative merit being, in fact, the fundamental basis of selection, it follows that the reports of fitness fail of their object. Consequently, selections for promotion based upon them must necessarily result in many cases of grave injustice and consequent injury to the service.
All these facts are well known to the service. Every officer has a reputation which extends some distance both above and below his grade, but particularly above, as officers are naturally more interested in the abilities of those below them, since it is upon these abilities that their own success largely depends.
Fitness reports misleading.—The value of officers' service reputations is acknowledged by all. It is upon these reputations that officers are assigned by the Navy Department to important duties ashore and afloat. Admirals know the abilities of many of the 240 captains because they have served with many, though by no means all, of them; but they know less about the 460 commanders, and less still about the 800 lieutenant commanders. In fact, in these latter grades they necessarily know the relative merits of but very few. This is both because they are farther away from them in rank and because there are so many of them. Consequently, as the reports of fitness are admittedly nearly uniform, not to say misleading, it is simply impossible for the board to determine the wholly essential basis of just of even useful selections, i.e., the relative merit of the candidates.
This being the case, a member of the board when required to vote upon, say, a certain captain, commander, or lieutenant commander, often finds himself in the following predicament:
- He does not know the candidate.
- He does not know his service reputation.
- He has never even heard his name before.
- The candidate's report of fitness is practically the same as that of hundreds of other reports.
- Of the great majority of the hundreds of other candidates, he has no knowledge either personal or by reputation.
It is manifestly clear from the above that a vote of either "yes" or "no" must necessarily, in the great majority of cases, be a grave injustice either to the candidate or to many better men on the list, and consequently a grave injury to the service.
This grave injury has been inflicted throughout many years. Consequently, the present system is thoroughly discredited throughout all grades. As a matter of fact, the present system is exceedingly unsatisfactory and is undermining the morale of the service by diminishing confidence in the senior officers. This lack of confidence is, I believe, increasing.
A previous suggestion discussed.—To remedy this situation, a further modification has been proposed. The merits of this modification should be considered before proceeding to the main recommendation which this paper urges. The modification just mentioned would require that selections from each grade be made by the officers of the next grade above. For the reasons above indicated, this would doubtless decrease somewhat the inevitable injustice of the present system, but only very slightly in degree, if the boards were composed of but nine officers.
The defect of this plan is that the number of members of a selection board (nine) is too small to make possible just decisions. For example, no nine of the admirals could know personally all of the 240 captains (or at least could not know them all equally well); no nine captains could know personally all of the 460 commanders; and no nine commanders could know personally of the 800 lieutenant commanders. However, each admiral, captain, and commander knows personally many of the grade below him, and each of them knows others by reputation as the so-called "crackajacks" of their grade, and they not infrequently apply for them as assistants.
Improved method proposed.—But (and this is the gist of the matter) though none of the admirals, captains, or commanders know all of the members of the grade below, still their combined knowledge (personal and by reputation) includes all members of the grade below, or at least all of the upper half.
This points the way to the improved method urged in this paper.
Therefore, if we should obtain the opinions (votes) of all members of the grades above those to be selected, we would be able to bring to bear upon the problem of promotion by selection the maximum possible information as to the relative merits of the candidates, that is, the composite opinion of the service as to the men they believe to be the most efficient, the men they would like to have as assistants.
It, therefore, follows that this essential information should be supplied by all of the officers of the grade above, for the guidance of the selection board. To accomplish this would require no change in the law, any more than it would require an act of the Congress to change the form of the present fitness report.
All the department needs to do is to send each admiral, captain, and commander a list of the officers eligible for selection from the grade next below, and require each of them to submit a list of those whom he believes to be best fitted for promotion. For example, if 10 promotions of captains were to be made, each of the 60 admirals’ lists would contain 10 names, and all these lists would be submitted to the board on selection for its information only, that is to enable the members to judge of the relative merits of the captains.
It can readily be determined from these lists which officer has the highest standing (in the combined opinion of all the grade above), and which has the second highest, and so on. It is a question of simple arithmetic.
The final list of captains derived from the lists submitted by the 60 admirals would, therefore, be based upon the combined opinions of the 60 admirals, and these opinions would be based upon both their personal knowledge of these men, and upon the reputations of the men for ability to perform the duties of the next higher grade—qualities that are continuously under discussion in the grade above.
Of course, even if it were assumed that some of the 60 admirals might be influenced, in the case of one or more officers, by personal preference or prejudice, it could not be assumed that many admirals would be similarly influenced in favor of the same candidate. It follows, therefore, that all such cases would cancel each other. That is, there would be little chance of the purely personal favorites of individual admirals being included in the final list of ten.
Popularity a valuable military quality.—It is often objected that personal popularity would cause an officer to be selected by this method, whereas unpopularity would prevent an able officer’s selection. This is, of course, true, but this is as it should be, because popularity is a very valuable military quality, and the opposite quality not only often renders an able officer quite useless in many important positions, but sometimes positively harmful—as all know who have borne responsibility for the success of subordinates.
It should be noted that the method proposed simply provides wholly essential information that is not now available to the board, and that cannot be got in any other way. This would in no sense diminish the authority of the board. For example, some of the officers on the final list of 10, derived from the votes of the 60 admirals, might have to be eliminated because of physical defects not known to the service, or for other reasons.
The merit of the proposed method is that it not only provides positive evidence, and all possible evidence, of the relative service standing of the candidates, but it is such that no charge of unfairness can be brought against it. No officer could reasonably complain of injustice because he had not been placed on the list of 10 by the composite vote of the 60 admirals.
It is true that the service opinion (derived from the vote of the grade above those selected) may not in some cases result in selection of the very ablest men, but it should be especially noted that it is of great importance that the men advanced should be those that the service believes to be the best.
It may even be stated that the importance of the service belief in the men who may eventually be their leaders cannot be exaggerated. In fact, so great is the influence of service confidence in, and loyalty to, the leader that it may be confidently stated that such a leader would be able to render more efficient service than a somewhat abler man who did not enjoy this confidence.
Fair selection not opposed.—No arguments have been advanced herein as to the desirability of fair selection, that is, of the principle of selection. It is assumed that selection is necessary for military efficiency for the same reason that it is the basis of success in all considerable organizations, both civil and military, throughout the world.
It is further assumed that, human nature being what it is, the majority of any service will always be opposed to selection in any form and strongly in favor of promotion by seniority, because the latter practically assures each officer reaching flag rank if his health holds out and he commits no grave errors either official or personal.
This human motive may well be lustrated by supposing that the employees of a great railroad were asked to decide by vote as to whether they would prefer to retain their system of promotion by selection or adopt a promotion by seniority that would insure each employee retiring at sixty-four with the rank and three-quarters of the pay of a general manager.
The plan above suggested was presented officially to the Navy Department in 1919. It was approved by the Secretary of the Navy. The lists by the officers of the grades above those to be selected were called for, were received, and were transmitted to the next board on selection, but only for the information of the board. The majority of this board (of which I was a member) proposed to destroy these lists, finally decided to allow them to be tabulated, but declined to consider them. Some of the members declined to look at them.
It is, however, believed that since that time there has grown up in the service a greater sense of responsibility in such matters, and that boards would now welcome this essential information. This can be derived in no other way than by obtaining the combined opinions of the officers of the grades above those to be selected. In fact, I have been assured by an officer who has been a member of more than one board in his opinion the scheme, if the lists were kept confidential and were properly handled, would be of great assistance to the boards.
Moreover, such a scheme would entirely remove the conviction now prevalent in the service that many very able officers have been passed over because they did not happen to be known by even a single member of the selection boards, and many less able officers have been promoted because they happened to be known by one or more of the members.
No officer could reasonably claim that he had been treated with injustice if he knew that the board in making its decisions had considered the officially expressed opinions of all of the officers of the grade above his grade.
Incidentally, the scheme outlined above would automatically silence the criticisms of the department and the boards now current in the service to the great detriment of its morale; criticisms sufficiently indicated by such expressions as the following: “Steam-roller methods,” “Close corporation,” “White-haired boy,” “A seat next the dealer,” “The inner circle,” “It’s ruining the Navy,” “Congress should abolish it,” etc.
In conclusion, it may be well to point out that perfection cannot be claimed for any method of selection; but it is submitted that selection will be justified if the method employed proves of greater benefit to the service, all things considered, than any other system. To do this the system employed must (1) have the confidence of the service, and (2) produce results that are in accord with general service opinion.