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CAN WE LIMIT WAR? By Hoffman Nickerson. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1934. 317 pages. $2.75.
Mr. Nickerson is a talented American writer and man of affairs who has also had considerable military experience, having served on General Pershing's staff in the World War and in the American section of the Armistice Commission. As an acknowledged disciple of Mr. Hilaire Belloc, one is not surprised to find in his writings certain unpopular or at least unconventional points of view, such as his belief that a reunited church is essential to the salvation of society, and his antipathy toward the whole democratic, equalitarian trend of the modern world. By the same token, one finds also a refreshing ability to look at realities without rose-colored glasses, and an ability to state his views in pungent terms.
Thus he points out the weakness of the economic argument against war—that it never pays—(1) by pointing out that even from this low standpoint many wars actually have paid, such as the wars of 1864-71 Which brought about German unification, or the wars that established white domination in the New World; and (2) by showing that, regardless of the costs involved, there are many conditions, such as domination by aliens, aggressions from abroad, or even stifling restrictions on a nation's life and growth, which in the common opinion of mankind still justify war. He sees the obvious shortcomings of a diplomacy that would prevent war by limiting its instruments, armaments, without attacking its fundamental causes suggested above. He is also skeptical of the view that war has become impossible by its very horrors, or that future wars will be more destructive than those of the past.
This brings us to his main thesis: Can we limit war, i.e., limit its frequency, extent, and destructiveness? On this point, some encouragement may be drawn from the fact that a survey of history through the Christian Era reveals seventeen centuries of limited as opposed to only about three centuries of unlimited warfare. There were, according to his analysis, some eight centuries of relative peace under the sway of Rome, and another similar period in the Middle Ages under the influence of the church and the institutions of chivalry, then an epoch of devastating wars from about 1500 to 1648, and again, after the limited wars of the eighteenth century, the present era of "democracy and mass massacre" ushered in by the French Revolution and Napoleon. Democracy has favored the "nation in arms," but the author believes that the present trend toward mechanization, with its demands for high technical skill, will tend to reduce the size of future armies.
The periods of restricted warfare have been periods of relative world order and stability, in contrast to the present condition of marked disorder and unrest. On methods of restoring world order, the author, as might be expected, has no very satisfying suggestions. He does lay down a program for the United States:
Stop meddling, especially with land and air disarmament; evacuate the Philippines [particularly if we intend to give up aggressive trade policies]; apply sound principles to the naval problem, not ratios altogether misleading as to actual naval strength; substitute a moderate but real covering force for our present huge but brittle foundation for a horde army: it is a modest program not pretending to cure all the evils of mankind or "construct a warless world" or any such nonsense as that. But each step is within our power and each would help either to postpone the next war or to make our participation less probable.
One would expect the larger solution to lie (1) in some sort of remedies that would ease the danger of class warfare based on the bad working of the present industrial system; and (2) in the working out of world economic problems of production and consumption along lines that would relieve the present intense nationalistic rivalry. But here the author would say that the remedies lie deeper, in a restored moral and spiritual authority, perhaps first a reunited Christendom.
THE OPIUM CLIPPERS. By Basil Lubbock. Boston: Charles E. Lauriat Co. 1933. 392 pages. $7.50.
Mildly amusing is the publisher's statement on the jacket of this volume that it took "twenty-five years to write," when coupled with the list on an inside page of eleven other large volumes by the same author, mostly dealing likewise with clipper ships and "the last golden days of sail." Twenty-five years, let us hope, did not go into the actual composition, which shows little of the sifting, organizing, and interpreting of material to be expected its sober history. But this is just as well, for in his profuse gathering of information relating to the India-China opium traffic in the clipper-ship era—roughly from 1825 to 1860—the author has given us tales of typhoons, shipwrecks, piracy, murder, mutiny, and "moving accidents by flood and field" beside which history becomes a tame affair.
Light, valuable cargoes for a competitive market put a premium on speed; hence the early advent of the fast clipper type in the opium trade. The first ship to beat up the China Sea in the teeth of the winter monsoon—thus opening the possibility of three Calcutta-Canton voyages a year instead of one—was the little Baltimore-built schooner Dhaulle in 1827. The first true clipper in the trade was the Red Rover, named after the pirate-hero of Cooper's tale, and built on the Ganges in 1829 on the exact lines of the Prince de Neufchatel, a famous New York privateer of 1812. Of some 100 opium trade ships listed by the author only perhaps a dozen were American-built, but most of them followed clipper or American pilot boat lines. Notable among the Yankee vessels were the Baltimore clipper and ex-slaver Syed Khan and the New York pilot schooner Flying Fish (renamed Spec, for speculation), the latter once a naval tender in Commodore Wilkes' Exploring Squadron and sold by him in 1841 in Singapore. The only American firm prominently engaged in the trade was Russell and Co.; from the Reminiscences of one partner of this firm, Captain "Black Ben" Forbes, of Boston, Mr. Lubbock has drawn perhaps as freely as from any other single source.
About 87 pages, or nearly a quarter of the volume, are given to the first Opium War of 1839-42, but only a page or so to later warfare in China in 1857-60. This—again looking at the book from the standpoint of American and especially American naval interest—is a bit unfortunate, for one would have liked some account of the exploit of Commander A. H. Foote and his 287 American sailors and marines in capturing the Canton forts and their 5,000 defenders in 1857, or of the aid given by Commodore Josiah Tattnall, U. S. Navy, to the British in their attack on the Peiho forts in 1859, whence originated the famous phrase, "Blood is thicker than water." Perhaps another evidence of British authorship of the book, though it is usually most generous in its treatment of all American interests involved, is the statement on p. 351 that "In the year 1858 . . . a commercial treaty was at last concluded with Japan, which had been closed to foreign vessels for 200 years," without mention of Commodore Perry's earlier part in this affair.
One of the most attractive features of this fascinating volume is its wealth of illustrations, most of them reproductions of beautiful sketches and paintings of ships of the old days.
ADMIRAL VON HIPPER. By Captain Hugo von Waldeyer-Hartz, German Imperial Navy (Retired). London: Rich and Cowan, Ltd. 1933. 20s.
REVIEWED BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER F. A. SLOCUM, ROYAL NAVY
Franz Hipper was born at Weilheim, a small country town in Bavaria, on September 13, 1863. He was the third son of Anton and Anna Hipper, who kept a hardware and grocery shop.
After preparation under a crammer in Kiel, where he acquitted himself neither better nor worse than his contemporaries, Hipper passed into the Navy on April 12, 1881. From the first he seems to have been popular by reason of his ready wit, honesty, kindliness, and championship of the underdog.
He had three great and genuine passions in life—his profession, shooting, and smoking, and he was also a lover of music.
His first ship was the Niobe, an old sailing frigate which had been purchased from the English Navy. In a passage dealing with sailing orders issued to the Niobe, it is noteworthy that as far back as 1881, the head of the German Admiralty was a soldier. Thirty-three years later it may perhaps truly be said that the influence of G.H.Q. contributed to the vacillating and indeterminate policy of the High Seas Fleet.
When Hipper was promoted to sublieutenant soon after his return from abroad in 1884, he in no way stood out from among his contemporaries (although he was highly esteemed for his straightforward, manly bearing and pleasant temper).
The summer of 1888 found Hipper promoted to lieutenant and serving in the Stosch, dispatch boat to the maneuvers squadron. In 1891 he was-appointed to the Blucher for a torpedo course and began his first experience of destroyers, in which in truth he may be said to have won his spurs. For it was as destroyer captain, division and flotilla commander, that he laid the foundations of his high reputation.
Promotion to lieutenant commander followed in January, 1895, and on the recommendation of Prince Henry of Prussia, the Kaiser selected Hipper as navigating officer of the Imperial Yacht, an appointment which he held for three years.
After a brilliant period in command of the Second Destroyer Division, Hipper was promoted to commander in 1902 at the unusually late age of 39. Following a period in charge of the Second Torpedo Division at Wilhelmshaven, he assumed command of the cruiser Leipzig in 1906, where his ability as a pilot and navigator delighted his subordinates. Thereafter his promotion was rapid and he was appointed to the Gneisenau on his elevation to captain in the spring of 1907.
The year 1908 found him on shore in command of the First Torpedo Division at Kiel, and in October, 1911, he became commodore and chief of staff to the second in command of the Cruiser Force with his pendant in the armored cruiser Yorck.
He was promoted to rear admiral in 1912 and became commander of the High Seas Fleet Destroyer Forces with his flag in the light cruiser Köln. He held this appointment until October 1, 1913, when he left it to command the Scouting Forces of the High Seas Fleet.
In this capacity he entered the World War; a man who had never been inside a ministry, never attended the Naval Academy, never held an Admiralty appointment; a fighting officer pure and simple.
The chapters dealing with the Great War open with a clear and succinct explanation of the causes which restricted the German Navy to a strategy of attrition. Many experienced officers, Hipper included, expected a surprise attack from the British fleet in the early days of the war. Hipper's staff was busy perfecting details regarding the security of the Helgoland Bight, which was the special concern of the officer commanding the Scouting Forces; but the days passed and the silence of the North Sea lulled the German Naval Command into a false sense of security, until the action of August 28, 1914, provided an unpleasant awakening.
Until the beginning of 1916, Hipper chafed under the "defense with readiness to attack" policy of Admiral von Ingenohl and his successor Admiral von Pohl. With the succession of Admiral Scheer, however, Hipper welcomed a leader after his own heart. The strain of his responsibilities was beginning to affect his health, but he postponed his application for a 3-month sick leave until the spring of 1916.
In the description of the Battle of Jutland, for the first time we get a clear personal picture of those dramatic hours following flipper's transfer from the wounded Lutzow to the destroyer G-39, when the latter's speed was seriously reduced and her wireless out of action. For nearly two hours Hipper dashed hither and thither in G-39 until a lull in the action enabled him to hoist his flag in Moltke.
We learn how the rest of the squadron got separated from their leader, of Moltke's movements during the night, the doubt as to whether the English battleships sighted were friend or enemy, and, when finally they were identified, the decision not to fire torpedoes for fear of endangering their own ships.
Throughout the war flipper is seen constantly striving against the enforced inactivity; at first, under the disastrous defensive policy, and later under the dread of mines and submarines.
Finally von Hipper reached the peak of his professional ambition with his promotion to admiral and commander in chief of the High Seas Fleet on August 11, 1918.
But at the last, even he seems to have been affected by the general monotony and apathy and the increasing economic distress of the nation, so that when the end came with the, mutiny in the fleet three months after he had assumed command, he seems to have been powerless to urge the stern measures necessary, whereby the situation might have been saved, if only for a time.
After his retirement into seclusion in December, 1918, the events of the last days of the war were constantly in his mind, and the thought that he had occupied a high position, and yet found himself impotent at the moment when the German Empire collapsed, was a burden which he carried with him till his death on May 25, 1932.