As a prelude to this discussion let us define the terms mechanization and motorization. The definitions given are largely based on those of that eminent British writer Captain B. H. Liddell-Hart. Mechanization is the provision of humanly operated fighting machines. Motorization is the provision of complete motor transportation for the various arms and their supplies. The tank and combat car illustrate mechanization while the tractor, the trailer, and truck illustrate motorization.
A marked trend along the line of motorization and mechanization is observable in the armed forces of all the great powers. Many cavalry units are being converted bodily to mechanized and motorized outfits, as the value of such converted units becomes more and more apparent. Great Britain has done a great deal of pioneering in mechanized brigade. The performance of mechanized and motorized units in the British maneuvers of 1930 and 1931 was of outstanding quality and if these performances are any criterion this new development bids fair to revolutionize tactics in major operations.
Effect of motorization on mobility.—Motorization provides a great increase in mobility, for reasons that are both apparent and simple. For example, the truck can move farther in one hour than the infantryman can move in a day, and with less road congestion in so moving. Still more important, the infantryman is delivered at or near the scene of action, weary perhaps, but not fatigued. This delivery of unfatigued troops further facilitates mobility for the soldier enters the action fresh and with better morale than if he had had to undergo hours of tiring march before arriving at the jumping off point. The soldier’s best efforts are put forth in fighting instead of marching. Still more potent is mechanization in effecting mobility for not only does the fighter progress to the fight by motor power but through the fight in the same way. Mobility is further increased by facilitated control, protection, and fire power. By virtue of mechanical aid radio communication can be carried along in mechanized units so that movement is not delayed by waiting for orders and instructions, but rather expedited. Similarly where weight and bulk are not limited by man power to move them, mobile protection in the form of armor can be carried along, and the fighter is not compelled to stop and seek protection from too deadly hostile fire. In addition to the two huge advantages already enumerated, a further aid to mobility accrues from the increased quantity of automatic weapons and ammunition that can be carried, and the fire power thus made available serves to smooth the way for movement. To be conservative, it can be stated that mechanization and motorization will increase mobility tenfold, both in combat and in troop movements prior to the actual engagement. With this tenfold increase in mobility, mechanized and motorized units have changed tactics by greatly increasing striking power as well as speed of striking. The foregoing potentialities in the hands of a good commander might easily become decisive.
Control.—One of the most important elements of tactics is that of control. The will of the commander can only be carried out properly through adequate and continuous control of the various combat arms. In recent wars control has become increasingly difficult due to increased size of units and to dispersion forced by the necessity of reducing casualties. As warfare has become more complex, control has become more difficult and in the late stages of an action control has been practically nonexistent except in the very smallest units; moreover, valuable time has been wasted in regaining control. Once a force has been committed to action, only the most minor changes have been feasible, and higher commanders have seldom been apprised of local successes in time to take advantage of or to exploit them.
With mechanization and motorization this unfavorable element seems likely to be obviated. Radio and radiotelephone can provide the means, and the machine the transportation necessary to have continuous communication and thus continuous control. In addition to this development it will be possible to have mobile command posts in the form of large radio-equipped tanks, whereby the commanders, in reasonable safety, can keep up with and keep in touch with all developments of an action. Commanders can thus keep abreast of the action, control their units so they can exploit their successes, limit their reverses, and continuous command can again become a fact instead of a dim distant ideal toward which to strive.
Economy of force.—Tied inextricably with mobility and control is economy of force, of which the late Marshal Foch was the ardent disciple. We were taught in an old axiom of physics that force equals mass times velocity, and this same truism may be accepted from a military viewpoint if we amend it to state force equals mass times velocity times fire power. With our velocity, i.e., mobility, increased tenfold we can decrease our mass by nine-tenths, or be ten times as effective as a similar force not mechanized or motorized, provided our fire power remains unchanged, and if our fire power too is increased by adding automatic weapons the disparity between mechanical forces and those not so equipped is still greater. Thus a true economy of force can be obtained by mechanization and motorization, for a pronounced decrease in personnel may be made without loss of fighting power.
Dispersion of forces to avoid casualties and economy of force can be further accentuated due to increased efficiency of control and the ease and dispatch with which forces can be assembled for either offensive or defensive action.
Shifting of forces becomes simple and rapid without inflicting hardship on the combatant units, so that the few may be as effective as the many, which is true economy of force and a great material and monetary economy as well.
Fire power.—Success of nearly all tactics is predicated on the development of sufficient fire power to overcome hostile resistance; fire superiority must be attained and maintained. It is easy to see how hostile infantry can be overcome by mechanized and motorized units where the mobility and supply of automatic weapons and their ammunition is unlimited, and where, under protection of armor, these weapons could be sited in the most favorable locations.
One tank with two operating machine guns has practically the same fire power as the actual assault elements of a rifle company, not counting the support sections and platoon.
Where whole or partial mechanization prevails in the hostile forces, however, the problem complicates itself for fire power must overcome not only personnel but machines; and machines take a great deal of fire to stop them and a great deal of skill to hit them.
The anti-tank rifle and the small cannon were World-War developments in antitank work, but even against the slow, clumsy tanks of the time were not successful due partly to insufficient number but mainly to the relative immobility of these weapons.
Motorization answers the question of mobility for anti-tank weapons since weight and bulk are no longer such grave deterrents to placing desired weapons at desired points. Ordnance developments in large-caliber machine guns, and small cannons and their respective ammunition have provided the means for stopping machines. Skill in their use remains to be acquired, as well as suitable mounting and transportation for the armed services as a whole; although experiments of a valuable nature have been made in these matters of transportation and use.
It is mainly against personnel, however, that mechanization will be highly effective, for unprotected infantry, no matter what their number, offer a very slight obstacle to the tank or combat car. To obtain protection from a hostile mechanized force, infantry would have to be so dispersed as to be absolutely ineffective as a fighting force. The "pill boxes" of the World War showed terrific stopping power against infantry and if these pill boxes can in effect be made mobile in the form of tanks, it can be seen that masses of infantry cannot be safe unless they are protected by the strongest of fortifications arid thus become immobile, therefore useless.
A consideration of fire power must also be made to include artillery as well as infantry weapons. In the World War there was a constantly increasing proportion of artillery to infantry, particularly in the larger calibers, so that at the end of the war huge artillery concentrations were possible.
Mechanization and motorization of other units will cause the artillery to follow suit. The absence of infantry protection, so available in the past, will necessitate a highly mobile artillery that can get and out of action in very short order. In fact, artillery firing from a moving, motorized mount is not beyond the realms of probability. This necessity for mobility will probably make the lighter artillery most usable and to a great extent cut out heavy caliber artillery, except for very special use. Artillery thus motorized, with good cross-country mobility, will increase greatly the use that may be made of these weapons. The artillery concentration and distribution thus made possible will serve to still further keep hostile infantry dispersed to a point where they will be impotent.
Vulnerability.—Vulnerability of personnel has long been the concern of the commanders as well as of the soldiers. A casualty reduces the fighting force and puts an added strain on the rear area in that every possible means must be used to reduce casualties.
Concealment and cover are the two old stand-bys for the prevention of casualties. Concealment works on the principle that what cannot be seen cannot be hit, and utilization of natural concealment and artificial concealment or camouflage has reached a very high point of efficiency but still offers room for improvement.
Cover may take the form of natural or artificial earthworks, fortifications, or armor. The labor entailed in constructing earthworks or fortifications makes armor much more efficient provided it can be moved about where needed. This mobility of armor is possible and is one of the most important advantages of mechanization. Also transportation of tools and supplies for construction of fortifications is made easier and better through motorization.
The soldier fighting from an armored machine feels and is relatively safe. This will cause the soldier to fight in a cool, calculating, and intelligent manner not possible to the infantryman under the strain of fatigue and apprehension of danger. Morale is greatly heightened by this sense of security and with it the will to win is increased.
Reconnaissance.—Knowledge of enemy- strength and disposition as well as terrain is of paramount importance to all commanders of combat units. Aerial reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance by patrol, and study of maps have hitherto been the primary methods of gaining requisite information for operations. Personal reconnaissance by the commanders of units as large as the battalion or regiment has been of very limited application due to danger and restricted mobility. Use of command tanks will give both the protection and mobility necessary for commanders to make personal reconnaissance of their entire zones. Aerial reconnaissance will still be highly useful and more usable because radio can be utilized to make the flow of information continuous from plane to command post.
The personal skill and ability of the commanders can thus be given greater scope because they can better direct their forces.
Efficiency of flow of important military information will be greatly enhanced and chance uncertainty will be greatly diminished with their unpleasant attendant results.
Aircraft, while really a motorized force in one sense of the word, has developed distinctive tactics of its own which will not be discussed except so far as they will affect the tactics of mechanized and motorized forces. The aid of aircraft in reconnaissance has been discussed in the preceding paragraph.
Hostile aircraft are dangerous to infantry masses in the field and in march as well as in the rear. Against mechanized units in the field, aircraft will not be very effective except in hampering visibility and action with smoke and gas. Hostile aircraft will be dangerous to mechanized and motorized columns on roads, but cross-country mobility will cut down road congestion with a consequent decrease of favorable aerial targets; large repair and supply stations for mechanical forces will also be targets for aerial attack and will necessitate an efficient motorized defense.
Motorized anti-aircraft units will be necessary and desirable as accompanying weapons during marches, and would be later useful in the same capacity in action or well utilized as anti-tank weapons.
Perhaps the most important use of aircraft, aside from that of reconnaissance, will be the laying of smoke screens in conjunction with movements of mechanized forces.
Infantry.—At present even the most enthusiastic exponents of mechanization admit the necessity of some infantry. It is a fact which cannot be gainsaid that captured territory must be occupied to hold and utilize it; this job must be done by the infantry. Furthermore, in the field there will be many odd jobs that cannot be done by mechanized forces and for the accomplishment of which we must turn to the infantry.
Captain Liddell-Hart has advanced the idea of having a sort of land marine to accompany and support the mechanized forces, moving by motor except during actual conflict; this ideal soldier to be equipped in the lightest manner consistent with his job. This seems like an excellent estimate of what is needed.
These light infantry would be expert shots, experts in demolitions, specially trained in guerrilla tactics, possessed of great skill in night operations, and able to co-operate thoroughly with mechanized units. This seems to be a large order and it is. Only the best of officers and men could stand up under the activity and strain of such work.
Personnel.—While not strictly a part of tactics it should be noted that two types of personnel must be used. First the combat personnel, gunners and light infantry, and second the technicians such as mechanics, radio operators, and chauffeurs. The proper training and distribution of this personnel is the foundation for tactics of any sort.
Logistics.—The demands of supply and maintenance enter largely into tactics as is well known to all. These demands will be materially lessened by mechanization and motorization. This decrease will be due to decrease in personnel and abolition of animals on one hand, and greater self-sustaining ability of mechanical units on the other hand. One of the great arguments in favor of the machine is the fact that when it is not in use it is not consuming supplies.
Mechanized and motorized units are also able to take a much larger initial supply with them into action with less strain being put on the service of supply to initiate and maintain combat.
Accompanying repair and fuel trucks may be used to make the mechanical units very self-sustaining in the field. This feature makes it less necessary to guard lines of communication. In fact, only a few major bases need be maintained and defenses can be easily concentrated around these to make them safe from attack from any direction. Mobility of large units will be greatly aided by this lessening of the logistic factor.
Summary.—Let us now list the important changes that may be expected to occur in tactics due to mechanization of our military services:
- Mobility will be increased greatly, giving great striking power and speed of striking.
- Control.—Actual and continuous control by unit commanders will again be possible by use of mobile command posts and continuous communication. Local successes may be exploited and reverses speedily checked.
- Economy of force.—The few may do the work of the many, both in offense and defense. The force, due to mobility and centralization, will be responsive to the will of the commander, yet may be dispersed and fluid without weakening its effectiveness.
- Fire power will be overwhelming due to mobility and numbers of weapons and quantity of ammunition. This same fire power will make nearly any maneuver highly successful by overcoming all unprotected human resistance. Antitank and anti-aircraft weapons will be needed in quantity. Artillery will be generally decreased in caliber and greatly increased in mobility.
- Vulnerability.—By virtue of speed and armor casualties will be lower, and the will to win will be greater.
- Reconnaissance will be more thorough and knowledge will replace chance and uncertainty.
- Infantry will have to be reduced in number, be lightened of their burdens, and be raised to a high degree of perfection if they are to survive and be useful.
- Logistics.—Supply and maintenance problems will be decreased and lines of communication will be less necessary and therefore less vulnerable. Mobility of large forces will be greatly enhanced.
- Leadership.—By control and mobility the leader can once again continuously command his forces through all phases of an action. Personal ability, initiative, and intelligence will have full play. Complete personal reconnaissance will aid in better estimates of situation.
- Offensive combat.—The advance in route column, the approach march, fire fight, and assault will all merge into one fluid, swiftly moving action. Weak spots will be penetrated, local successes exploited on the spot, and destruction of hostile forces will be the reward of proper action and decision.
- Defensive combat will consist of active attack on penetrating forces from strategically located units.
- Development of both combat and technical personnel will be necessary. A much greater percentage of officers and noncommissioned officers will be necessary than as at present.
- The country best prepared from the viewpoint of mechanization and motorization, and with proper aerial assistance, will be capable of winning a war before a hostile power can take steps to defend itself.