Discussions

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

Capt

the

Pen

dauntless

spirit of the author and his

^ls an

(See page 1587 this issue)

^Meute^TAlN J°^HN D°^WNES> U. S. Navy.— gr_at i^nant Commander Harris is to be con- artid ^on very able and timely en_e<j ? ^which he has written. The threat- Se_rVe °^Ss °f drills and cruises to the Re- ati<j ^{Was a} blow that only the heartiest ^serve°^l0S*' Periotic members of the Re- WJtij r^{d stan<}^ ^UP under and proceed *hal • ^{Clr tra}-ining as though under nor- tiod ?^rCUmstances. Fortunately, the pe- pt{_Ve ®^tween the original intention to de- the _r ? Reserve of training with pay and bad bg^dtUt*^on *ⁿ P^art °f the funds that dur_ati ^{611 w}^drawn was of insufficient of ^ ^ to entirely undermine the morale Unf_0r ^eserve. However, there were some cl_ear ^^nate examples wherein it was made the th ^{at certa}*ⁿ personnel caved in under by j< ^reatened deprivations. This article if _Ca ^e^enant Commander Harris should, ^fead by the Naval Reserve, the ^i, ^to build up the esprit de corps and ^Caahot ^to'^° ^among the Reserve. One • ^read this article without admiring

^s°nal h •         .                          ^{ailu 1113}

offi_c ^aesire to impress upon his fellow-

in the^S)u-^{nd men} ^^act that membership

In a • ^ava-l Reserve is an honor in itself

one ha ^lncentive to put forth the best ^sati_0la ^{S ln} irrespective of the compen- ^c°Urse           ^recei^ve(i- It is realized, of

Un_etn ’ ^ln ^is time of deprivation and

^^einsel^{0yinent man}y ^men fmri

^e Ves without any source of income

whatsoever and the small amount paid by the government for attendance at drill does a great deal to tide over what otherwise would be a most disastrous period for certain individuals. The fact that attendance at drill during non-pay periods maintained a fairly high level is an indication in itself that the vast majority of the Naval Reserve organization has the welfare of the Navy and the Reserve at heart and that it would take more than the loss of compensation to swerve them from their ideals. The Reserve is a most im­portant part of the U. S. Navy and un­doubtedly will fill a most valuable role in case of national emergency.

1625

It is to be hoped that the determination of Lieutenant Commander Harris to meet the adverse conditions thrust upon the Reserve, his appraisal of the situation and selection of the best means of meeting it, may be taken as typical of the average reserve officer. From reports reaching the Bureau of Navigation at about the time this article was written, it is believed it does reflect the attitude of the Reserve in general, or so much of it as comprise the actively drilling and training organiza­tions. Fortunately, after this article was written, sufficient additional funds were allowed the Naval Reserve to permit the annual training cruises afloat for the Fleet Divisions and the annual period of active fleet training for Aviation Divisions; 24 paid drills at the armories and aviation bases and limited use of Naval Reserve vessels; boats and aircraft for voluntary

not been more professional writing on important subject, naval bases.

My life has made me essentially ^a

has

tb>^s

la/ 1 (A^e

a¹'

n^a'

tide to the Boston Herald urging ^a

tional policy for solving, in part at l^ea ’ the allied debt problem through the ^acce‘„, ance by our government of certain s tegic islands and lands in both oceans lieu of substantial debt payments. _t There remains a point, however, ¹ , covered by Captain Knox’s revealing ^a able article, and yet one intimately ^c

dry

inactive training duty in conjunction with or supplemental to the drills. So that we are not faced with the necessity of de­termining how far right or wrong are the general prognostications contained in this article.

In 1921, the experience of even those or­ganizations which were provided with ade­quate armory facilities and floating equip­ment was not generally satisfactory in conducting drills on a volunteer non-pay basis. Recruits usually joined the organiza­tion with great enthusiasm and attended drills regularly for a time, till the novelty wore off and other more interesting di- vertisements presented themselves, when they would drop away. The effective train­ing carried forward seldom got much farther than the school of the recruit. Efficient organizations for active duty on shipboard as such seemed beyond attain­ment.

It is believed that drill pay and training duty pay are essential to the building up, training, and maintenance of worth-while organizations of the Fleet Reserve. It takes years to build up such an organiza­tion. It takes but a short time for it to disintegrate. It is to be hoped never again will serious effort be made to deprive the Reserve of these essentials. However, as Lieutenant Commander Harris points out, the temporary or threatened deprivation of compensation is a challenge and to meet this situation he says in his closing para­graph: “No officer who thoughtfully reads his commission, ‘... reposing special Trust and Confidence in the Patriotism, Valor, Fidelity, and Abilities of—,’ can treat this situation lightly. It is incumbent upon those who bear that commission to see these adversities through to the bitter end with ‘Patriotism, Valor, Fidelity and,’ most important of all, ‘Ability.’ ”

Lieutenant Commander Harris is again to be congratulated on this very splendid message to his fellow-officers and men.

The Ships that Count

(See page 959, July, 1933, Proceedings)

Lieutenant C. A. Wood, U. S. Na^ Reserve.—It is with a distinct sense gratification for a need ably filled that 1^s down completed the July issue of the ceedings with special reference to Ca-P tain Knox’s article “Ships That Count- is no surprise to me that the Captain is _i occasional winner of the Institute’s ess J prize. I marvel, however, that there citizen of the United States, while my has made me a member of the Naval serve. As a result my point of view is nee sarily more that of the layman with bd^a experience in the commercial, industry and political side of life; with restri^{c e} but devoted experience in its naval sid^e’ Even with these limitations and ^a ^ vantages there has long been impress¹ upon me, like a dull aching pain, the ^c ^ sciousness of the great pity of our loss naval bases, our government’s lack of ^aP preciation of the crying need for th^e Some months ago I even addressed an nected with it—the matter of floating docks and floating storage. This may ^ be outlined here to supplement what has said on the subject of naval bases.

Somewhere in that great book, ^ Grand Fleet 1914-1916, Admiral Jed^c _e points out the inestimable value of a W floating dry dock to that fleet in the " The value was outstanding, partied , because of lack of adequately P^reP^a_tjje bases with docking facilities during

■Ps to carry a proportion of the reserve ammu- for tVio

Fl •

a-dv °^atlnS storage of all sorts possesses one great _Con^^aS^e over shore storage; should strategic ^a5iij'^tl°ⁿ.^{S neces}sitate a change of base, the coal, the r!?^nitlon! ^and other auxiliaries can move with d_P„ ^eet' The same argument applies in a lesser

to floating docks.

la^i^^S ^^reat Ksson was learned by Eng- ^{n at} the cost of bitter experience. Let profit by her example.

^ y ^av°iding discussion of strategic loca- q ^{n s}P^ecific potential or existing bases, _S£ ^ain Knox showed commendable re- jjj ^ain^^- Nevertheless, it would be interest- ^g to have a discussion of United States

Uie m,⁰?'' tankers might be substituted in part for ^needs of the United States Navy.

J!^ar- The advantage of the floating facili- ^^es hes in it being possible on short notice establish a workable base wherever and y ^enever most needed. This is especially important to a nation incompletely sup- ^le. ^with permanent bases, as our coun- y !s, and permits the concentration of the ^naval effort in whatever theater of war as |J^a-^v he determined as the focal point for e major operations.

t is more difficult in our democratic country to raise appropriations for un- ^ramatic essentials, such as dry docks and ^Se development works outside the con- ,^ⁿental limits of the United States, than is to get money for ships. It is, con- rsely, at present, vital, owing to our ^Psided naval development, that money ^e allocated to these undramatic essen- ^{la s}> essentials that may be moved from ^ace to place as rapidly as the situation tio^ ^C^^angc Ihe requirements for loca-

^h^eahing of floating storage, on page 84, ^e Grand, Fleet, Admiral Jellicoe says:

of fuelling was of vital importance to ^ ^emP^lre- Therefore, in stating my require- t₀ ^s °f colliers, I gave the number necessary si^^ei?^ahl^e almost the whole fleet to be fuelled ^stori ^tane°^usl>’.... As we needed colliers as coal- cv.- ⁿS ships,* so also we required ammunition ⁸ - ^s to carry a propc l°r the Fleet.

national policy in the Philippines—whether or not we should abandon those islands.

It would also be interesting to know how we hope, if we hope, to counter Japanese rapprochement with Dutch New Guinea and the Japanese development of oil con­cessions there by which she plans to supply her fighting fleet with oil. Might it not be well for the United States to obtain a base along that great trade route and naval artery to Japan through rapprochement, let us say, with England, or even with the Dutch; or should we leave the Orient to Japan? What is the national policy in this matter? Indeed, have we formulated one?

These would be interesting subjects for a future paper from so gifted a pen as that of Captain Knox and subjects upon which much thought might well be expended by all naval officers.

Puleston, Churchill, and the Dardanelles

(See pages 1577, November, 1932, 263 .February, and 883, June, 1933, Proceedings)

George F. Eliot.—It is with deep re­gret, not unmixed with certain fears for the adequacy of my own powers of expres­sion, that I observe how completely Mr. De Weerd has misconstrued the under­lying purpose of Captain Puleston’s work, The Dardanelles Expedition, and of my de­fense of it.

Captain Puleston makes his position perfectly clear in that closing paragraph of his book, to which Mr. De Weerd takes such strong exception in his original article:

In peace time the British form of government is delightful; it offers personal liberty and security of property and person, with a minimum of in­convenience to the individual; in war time with civilian ministers unwilling to be advised, it im­perils the existence of the nation and empire.

There seems no reason, therefore, for Mr. De Weerd to be at such pains to ap­portion part of the responsibility for the Dardanelles fiasco to “the make-up of the British government and the imperial war

machine.” That the system was wrong, certainly neither Captain Puleston nor myself would think of denying. It was the defects of the system which gave Churchill his opportunities for mischief; under a sounder system of strategical direction, a civilian minister would have no such op­portunity of pushing his half-baked ideas “into the domain of action.”

But it is just because American political institutions have similar defects, just be­cause in this country, as in Britain, a forceful and winning personality such as Churchill’s might well forge to the front in an emergency and succeed in putting over unsound ideas by the powers of his own persuasive oratory, that Captain Puleston found it necessary to sound his note of warning against “the possible ad­vent of an American Churchill.”

Lord D’Abernon’s rather optimistic re­mark that “no anxiety should be felt,” as “Winston was not the child of ordina­ry parents,” is not especially reassuring. There can be other extraordinary children in the future, as there have been in the past. That such a person might find him­self in a position of authority in our next war is by no means impossible; nor is it impossible that he might find a consider­able measure of popular support in over­riding or ignoring his professional advisers.

There is, of course, as Mr. De Weerd observes, “something to be gained by warning America against an unsound sys­tem of waging war”; but as a matter of “practical politics,” there is much more to be gained by pointing out the dangers of too much reliance on the advice of per­suasive people without sound military training. That our institutions themselves will undergo such changes—at least in the immediate future—as to obviate the danger of “an American Churchill,” is hardly likely; a statement which should need little elaboration to a professor of history. The making of war by republics has ever been beset by such dangers.

In fact, in this country a most unfortu­nate tendency exists to discount the value of military experience and education. This is perhaps an inheritance from Braddock s day, when in his own peculiar environ­ment the colonial rifleman behind a tree proved of more value in partisan warfare than the stolid British grenadier and bis platoon volleys. Coupled with our ancient | Anglo-Saxon distrust of “standing armies, , this tendency has prevented the develop­ment of anything resembling a sound mil­itary policy. Each time we have g^one to war, we have had to improvise an army> a staff, a supply system, sometimes even a navy. The advice of the professional soldier, in time of peace, is regarded with suspicion if not actual distrust.

Mr. De Weerd has apparently absorbed something of this feeling.

He speaks of the pronouncements ^ol the French general staff as making “amuS' ing reading,” forgetting that these were , issued partly to bolster up the mercurial French public, and that they were of ne­cessity based on inadequate information of the enemy’s strength and movements- In war a general must be dependent upon such information of the enemy as his ■ intelligence section can procure for him- This information will usually be incom' plete; it may even be misleading. It is ob­tained from diverse sources, and intel' ligence staff must winnow the wheat from the chaff, having always to be on guar against deliberate attempts at deception- Based on this information, the genera and his chief of staff make their estimat^e of the situation and issue their orders. A critic years afterward, considering this es­timate and these orders in the light of th^e complete information from both sides since available, may indeed find them “amusing reading.” It is easy to be wis^e after the event; it is not always so easy f°^r civilians to understand the density of the “fog of war” which hangs between every

at _f^^e.^^ermans ruight not have been back hut ^Glr °^Wn ^^ron^^er within three weeks they would have been considerably

istic°^rtael⁰t ^may have been over-optim- ^C’ hut his estimate is not as ridiculous ., ‘•he military point of view as it sounds , ^e <j°^ ^ear ^'he historian, to^ • J°h^re proposed to nibble his way en_er'^C_v^t0ry-” ^{But [t} was Joffre’s coolness, Po ’ ^anc^ determination that made ^Ssible the victory of the Marne and

commander in the field and the doings of ^ais opponent.

To take Mr. De Weerd’s examples ^Seriatim:

(1) “Berthelot expected to reach the ^erman frontier three weeks after the ^ttle of the Marne.” The operations ^hich immediately followed that battle ^are the retreat to the Aisne and “The ^ace to the Sea”—a rapid and continuous ^extension of the outer flanks of both ^armies till they reached the sea, during ^;vhich it is said that the Allies were “al­an army corps too few and 24 hours °° late.” This margin is not a large one; a ^Vety small swing of fortune’s pendulum the ,.".^er way might have produced quite tv ^erent results. As a single example of ^ls delicate balance of events, let me 9uote f_rom British Official History:

lea                     -^^eserve Corps (German), re-

ni v ^ the fall of Maubeuge, arrived in the ^c of time on the 13 th September to stop the j q ^north of the Aisne. It anticipated the British rps by a couple of hours only; on this small the ⁸_A^{m t}'^me did the stand of the Germans on _a , y₎^lsne depend. (Military Operations, France ^a Belgium, 1914, I, 338.)

_a ^^uPPose Maubeuge had held out half j ^ay longer, surely no wild flight of the left^^nati°ⁿ? The way would have been _e ,^C|^ear “for th_^e British I Corps to ablish itself on the Chemin des Dames f ^ge> ^and the flank of all the German fees west of it (Von Kluck’s First Army) ^lght have been turned.” {Ibid., 339.)

saved Paris and perhaps the allied cause.

(3) “Nivelle assured the world he would break the German trench lines in 72 hours.” He failed, not altogether from causes within his own control; is his gal­lant and successful defense of Verdun to be forgotten for that?

(4) “Foch moved amid the terrible welter of events with only one word on his lips, ‘Attaque!’ ” That word served him well enough at the Marne; and his services as supreme commander in chief were not without merit!

These men were professional soldiers. Being human, they made mistakes; being professional soldiers, they had the moral and mental resources to make the best of the resulting situations, to carry on. No amateurs could have done what the least of them did.

Mr. De Weerd also misconceives my purpose in criticizing Churchill’s proposal for a Belgian attack toward the Nethe. Absurd as it was under the circumstances, I would still have the same criticism to offer if the idea had been as tactically sound as Hannibal’s dispositions at Can­nae. I object, not to the absurdity of the proposed operation, but to the cool as­surance and overweening self-confidence of Churchill, a civilian, venturing to sug­gest to the Belgian generals in the very presence of a British general officer, a purely military operation.

That doesn’t “appeal to the sense of humor of an erstwhile infantry subaltern” nearly as much as does Mr. De Weerd’s resurrection of a yarn that was one of the classics of the British Army, and his solemn production of it in the guise of sober argument. I refer to the tale of the staff officer bursting into tears at the sight of the “sea of mud” at Passchendaele, and crying out: “My God, did we really send men to fight in that?”

Seriously, of course, the idea is absurd. The “mud of Ypres” was known to the whole Army; even the Australians had