Between April 23 and 25, 1918, there took place in the North Sea two important movements of the opposing naval forces which, if circumstances of a trivial nature had not interfered, might have resulted in a major and terrible engagement between the Allied and German Fleets. These movements are scarcely even mentioned in either British or German naval histories, although von Scheer in his book gives some brief description of his fleet’s movements.
All this time a highly organized and very large convoy had been in the habit of coming from the west coast of Norway to Scottish ports, sometimes twice a fortnight. Various raids by enemy destroyers and fast cruisers had resulted in an escort of strength being provided for this valuable convoy.
For this duty, a battleship squadron, a light cruiser squadron, and half a flotilla of destroyers had been detailed, which, separated as they were when off the Norwegian coast by at least 500 miles from any support, and yet within 20 hours’ steam from German bases, offered an attractive bait. Reports from German agents in Norway, complete with the regularity of sailings and arrivals of this convoy escort, convinced the German naval authorities that there was an opportunity for offensive action.
Plans were laid accordingly, and the whole German High Seas Fleet left their base in the early morning of April 23 to execute a surprise attack with all available strength.
A thick fog was encountered soon after leaving the river mouths and the whole fleet was compelled to anchor for a few hours in the “wet triangle” area near Helgoland. Strict radio silence had been ordered and, owing to the fog, the fleet’s movements had not been witnessed or reported by either allied agents or the British submarines constantly on patrol.
Progress was resumed about 10:00 a.m., April 23, and course set to the northward, towards Norway. Nothing of incident occurred during the day or following night, but by early morning the battle cruiser or scouting fleet, which had advanced some 70 miles ahead of the main battle squadrons, was within sighting distance of the usual convoy route as it left the rendezvous in Norwegian waters.
After a brief search no trace or evidence of the convoy could be found and the battle cruisers were preparing to rejoin the battle fleet to report by visual signals the state of affairs, when a most unusual accident occurred to the battle cruiser Moltke. An inner propeller dropped off, thus causing the turbine on that shaft to race violently and burst. Much damage was caused in the engine-room and a serious leak developed which crippled the ship and brought her to a standstill. This was serious, and the German admiral in command of the scouting fleet immediately radioed to the main force an account of the mishap.
This, of course, immediately gave away the position of the German fleet and their presence far away from their base was immediately spotted by the British direction finding radio stations. Had the British not had other very important plans on their minds at this time, the prompt sailing of the Grand Fleet could have cut the Germans off, handicapped as they were with a valuable and crippled ship. However, by 10:00 a.m. on April 24, the Moltke was safely taken in tow and the whole fleet retraced their steps towards Helgoland with the Moltke making about 12 knots.
Fortunately for the convoy and its escort, they had left rather earlier than schedule and were some 200 miles to the west and south of the Germans, blissfully ignorant of the danger that so nearly overtook them.
April 24 was St. George’s Day, and had been selected for the Ostend and Zee- brugge raid, a daring feat which, although only partially successful, was a brilliant stroke of arms. In order to cover this raid and to prevent any German forces from interfering, the Harwich force of light cruisers and destroyers were out covering the approaches to the Channel, while the Grand Fleet had also left Rosyth on the morning of April 24.
Here was an interesting situation, with both fleets well away from their bases, totally ignorant of the presence of each other until about 10:00 a.m., April 24.
Had the Zeebrugge raid not been staged it would have been possible by prompt action for the Grand Fleet to cut off the Germans some 150 miles from home and to force a major engagement. As it was, the Grand Fleet was delayed and realizing it could not reach the Germans in time turned back and went home. The Germans finally reached the protection of their mine fields by evening of the twenty-fourth, and entered harbor about 10:00 p.m.
Their return that evening was witnessed by British submarines some 70 miles north of Helgoland and duly reported. The Moltke, some miles astern under tow, was observed and attacked by a British submarine and torpedoed, but managed to reach port safely. She was subsequently in dock for some time for repairs.
Thus ended the last sortie of the German High Seas Fleet, before the Armistice compelled them to an ignominious surrender. By a chain of circumstances what might have proved to be the cause of the biggest naval engagement of the war, together with the loss of a large and valuable convoy and escort, ended in futility.
The U. S. Battle Squadron known as the 6th Battle Squadron was detailed for and undertook this Norwegian convoy escort duty on several occasions, and was frequently attacked by hostile submarines, but on this occasion they were with the main Grand Fleet.