STATEMENTS OF AMERICAN POLICIES
President’s Peace Message.—Apparently as a means of putting new life into the arms negotiations at Geneva, and in an effort to get some positive action before the London economic conference, President Roosevelt on May 16 addressed to the 54 nations participating in the arms conference an urgent appeal for progress in arms limitation as an essential step toward economic recovery. The President declared that the ultimate aim must be the “elimination of all offensive weapons”; that the first step should be the adoption of the measures “broadly outlined in the MacDonald plan”; and that all nations “should enter into a solemn and definite pact of non-aggression”—to “send no armed force of whatsoever nature across their frontiers.”
The message in its essential passages follows:
This government believes that the program for immediate reduction of aggressive weapons, now under discussion at Geneva, is but a first step toward our ultimate goal. We do not believe that the proposed immediate steps go far enough. Nevertheless, this government welcomes the measures now proposed and will exert its influence toward the attainment of further successive steps of disarmament.
Stated in the clearest way, there are three steps to be agreed upon in the present discussions:
(1) To take, at once, the first definite step toward this objective, as broadly outlined in the MacDonald plan.
(2) To agree upon time and procedure for taking the following steps.
(3) To agree that while the first and the following steps are being taken, no nation shall increase its existing armaments over and above the limitations of treaty obligations.
But the peace of the world must be assured during the whole period of disarmament, and I, therefore, propose a fourth step concurrent with and wholly dependent on the faithful fulfillment of these three proposals and subject to existing treaty rights:
That all the nations of the world should enter into a solemn and definite pact of non-aggression; that they should solemnly reaffirm the obligations they have assumed to limit and reduce their armaments, and, provided these obligations are faithfully executed by all signatory powers, individually agree that they will send no armed force of whatsoever nature across their frontiers.
The President’s appeal was greeted with general acclaim, but in France there was disappointment that no definite indication was given as to the nature of American cooperation against an aggressor.
Davis Promises American Support.— In a very carefully worded speech at Geneva on May 24, Ambassador Norman H. Davis aimed to supplement the President’s statements by declaring more specifically what this country would do toward international co-operation against an aggressor. He declared “the simplest and most accurate definition of an aggressor is one whose armed forces are found on alien soil in violation of treaties.” He gave our support to the British limitations plan and to some measure of international supervision of armaments. On the question of co-operation against an aggressor he said:
We are willing to consult the other states in case of a threat to peace with a view to averting conflict. Further than that, in the event that the states, in conference, determine that a state has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures against the violator, then, if we concur in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which these states may thus make to restore peace.
Arms Embargo Limited.—The arms embargo resolution giving the President power to prohibit the export of arms or munitions from the United States to a belligerent nation or nations was passed in the House and on May 27 was reported favorably by the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. The latter committee, however, added a potent clause declaring that the embargo must apply to “all parties in the dispute.” Thus Congress retained the right to decide when an embargo—in its essence an unneutral or unfriendly measure—may be employed against any one state. It restricted the powers of the President, and also weakened the promises made by Ambassador Davis at Geneva as to our co-operation in measures against an aggressor.
Make Haste Slowly.—On the alleged fundamental relationship between disarmament and economic recovery, Mr. Walter Lippmann commented in May as follows:
My own skepticism as to how much real progress toward disarmament can now be made arises from a conviction that little can be done by manipulating weapons until the underlying political situation is altered. This, if the newspaper reports are to be trusted, is the point of Mussolini’s efforts to produce a new four-power pact. These efforts seem doomed at the moment to fail. But the essential principle of his effort, that a political settlement is necessary to genuine disarmament, goes to the heart of the whole problem.
Now, a political settlement is not Mkely to be reached in the present condition of Europe. Germany has gone through a revolution which is just beginning to pass out of the first phase of violence and wild agitation. Time is needed to enable the Germans to return, as they surely will, to the sobering responsibilities of their government and their national existence. All the nations, including Germany to a high degree, are afflicted with the miseries of the world depression and the awful anxieties which it produces. It is idle to suppose that the deepest political differences in the Western world can be reconciled in this atmosphere.
It is a mistake, therefore, to argue that decisive steps toward disarmament are essential to economic recovery. It is much nearer the truth to say that economic recovery is essential to peace and disarmament, for the only conceivable circum- j stances under which men would have enough good-will to keep the peace would be when they are again at work and have some hope for the future.
It is, therefore, particularly important that we should not aggravate the political crisis by forcing issues and pressing for results before there is real certainty that the issues can be met and the results achieved.
EUROPEAN POLITICS
Hitler on Arms and Policy.—Deeming that a critical moment had been reached in Germany’s struggle for equality of armaments, Chancellor Hitler on May 171 called the Reichstag into brief but solemn session to listen to his statement of the government’s position on this and other questions of foreign affairs. The speech followed only a day or two after President Roosevelt’s peace appeal, and it may have been partly due to the warnings therein contained that the Chancellor’s address was surprisingly moderate in tone. The main points in the speech, as summarized by the Associated Press, were as follows:
The idea of rendering useful service to other peoples by destroying economically a people of 65,000,000 is so absurd that nobody can dare today openly to expound it.
No new European war could replace the present unsatisfactory condition by something better.
Germany would be ready without further ado to dissolve her whole military establishment and destroy the scanty remnant of arms left her if neighboring nations unreservedly did the same.
Germany must at least insist on her equality claim.
Germany is in the main agreed to accept a transitional period of 5 years for the establishment of her national security, in expectation that after this period Germany’s real equalization with other nations will occur.
Germany has only a single desire, namely, to be able to preserve her independence and protect her borders.
For President Roosevelt’s proposal the German government is indebted with warm thanks. It is ready immediately to endorse this method of remedying the international crisis because it, too, believes that without a solution of the disarmament question no enduring economic recovery is imaginable.
The only nation whose fear of invasion can really be justified is Germany.
Germany is ready at any time to renounce aggressive weapons if the whole world also bans them. Germany is ready to join any solemn nonaggression pact because she thinks not of attack but of her security.
The German government and German people will not, however, under any circumstances, submit to being compelled to affix their signature to anything that would be tantamount to perpetuating Germany’s disqualification.
Each attempt to overpower Germany by means of a mere majority decision in contravention of the clear spirit of treaties could only be dictated by the intention to force us out of the conferences.
As a nation under a perpetual stigma it would also be difficult for us to remain within the League of Nations.
Four-Power Pact Progress.—Though again held up by French objections, the four-power European agreement of France, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy was considered practically in shape for approval at Rome on June 3. If finally ratified, it will bind the four states for a 10-year period to refrain from force in settling disputes and to work together for the peace of Europe. No opinion is expressed in the pact as to the need of revising the post-war territorial settlements, but it is provided that any action of this nature must be done under Art. XIX of the League Covenant. The right of Germany to equality of armaments is recognized, and a plan is set forth for putting her on an even footing in 5 years. Even though the agreement may be further weakened before ratification, its acceptance is regarded as a tribute to the prestige of its original author, Premier Mussolini, and a recognition also of the idea that national aims in Europe must be further adjusted before there can be reduction of armaments or lasting peace.
As viewed in Germany, the pact
creates over and above the cumbersome League Council a super-council of four chief powers that will be able to conduct European affairs with more dispatch and authority. With President Roosevelt’s declarations of the willingness of the United States to consult with other powers, America becomes in effect an unofficial member of the super-council.
But Poland and the Little Entente nations, to say nothing of Soviet Russia, will certainly not care to have European business of any great moment conducted in this fashion. As described by former Premier Herriot, who strongly opposes French acceptance, the pact is either something useless or something very dangerous.
Work of Disarmament Commission.— Reanimated by President Roosevelt’s message, by the reasonable tone of Chancellor Hitler’s speech on foreign policy, and by Ambassador Davis’ promises of American co-operation to maintain peace, the disarmament commission after a short recess reopened on May 19 for what it was hoped might be a “final phase” leading to definite accomplishments before the economic conference in June. The German delegates returned with a “new attitude,” and stated their willingness to accept the British reduction plan not only as a basis for discussion but as the actual framework for the final convention or agreement. In the special committee on security, the simple American definition of an aggressor state as one “whose armed forces are found on enemy soil in violation of treaties” was extended by a Russian formula which tabulated the varieties of such an offense, including blockade and the failure of a nation to suppress armed bands on societies guilty of offensive action beyond its frontiers. This definition the British government regarded as over-precise and not sufficiently regardful of the general antecedent circumstances. Former Premier Ishii of Japan suggested, though not at Geneva, that violation of treaties and economic boycott should also be included among acts of aggression.
In the discussion of weapons and methods of warfare, there was general agreement on the abolition of aerial bombardment, “except for police purposes in isolated regions”—this last inserted to meet the desires of the British government. Japan objected to the inclusion in the general treaty of the naval restrictions adopted at Washington and London, on the ground that these agreements were to run only until 1936 and were not matters to be submitted to all nations for ratification.
By the close of May it became evident that the time was too short for significant results that would influence economic negotiations in London, and the commission was adjourned to a date not later than July 3, with provision that the smaller arms bureau and committees should continue work in the interim.
LONDON ECONOMIC CONFERENCE
Tariff Truce Adopted.—On May 12 the 8 nations—the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Norway—in charge of preparations for the world economic conference in London pledged themselves to a tariff truce to take effect at once and to continue for the duration of the conference. Copies of the pact were sent to the 58 other nations who will be represented at London, with an appeal for its general adoption. The agreement does not cover legislation or trade agreements already under consideration, but pledges the signatories not to adopt “any new initiatives which might increase the many varieties of difficulties now arresting international commerce.” Certain reservations were made by France to guard against dumping of goods and depreciation of foreign currencies, and in general the agreement was significant chiefly as a manifesto of good intentions preliminary to the London gathering.
American Delegation.—The American delegation to the London conference, headed by Secretary Hull and including Mr. James M. Cox, Senator Key Pittman, Senator James Couzens, Representative S. D. McReynolds, and Mr. R. M. Morrison of Texas, sailed from New York at the close of May. At that time no definite powers had been secured from Congress for lowering of tariff rates by either general or bilateral agreements, but there was an optimistic belief that the unanimity of sentiment expressed during the preliminary conversations in Washington gave promise of real progress away from the policies of economic nationalism which have worked injury to international trade.
LATIN AMERICA
Peace Prospects on the Amazon.—As expected, the new government in Peru after the assassination of President Sanchez Cerro proved more amenable to League pressure, and on May 25 both Colombia and Peru signed an agreement by which the Leticia warfare was ended and the disputed territory turned over to a League commission pending arbitration. This solution established two notable precedents, in that it was the first time peace had been secured by League action within the regions covered by the Monroe Doctrine, and also the first time that an international force was provided to uphold a League settlement. This last arose from the fact that the peace commission was given power to employ such forces as necessary to maintain order in the Leticia area. The government of Colombia will bear the expense of the commission and the administration. The commission, which as stated at Geneva will consist of a United States army officer, a Brazilian naval officer, and a Spanish diplomat, will not function beyond a year, and as soon as possible the two nations are to notify it of the method of negotiations to be adopted in settlement of the dispute.
Paraguay’s War Declaration.—After 11 months’ warfare, with a total on both sides of some 50,000 casualties and prisoners, Paraguay on May 10 finally made a formal declaration of war against Bolivia, the primary purpose of the move being to facilitate action of neighboring neutrals in the way of arms embargoes and other restrictions which might bear more heavily on Bolivia as an inland state. Chile has kept open for Bolivia the port of Arica on the west coast, but Bolivia has been securing special permission for each war shipment via this route. Following Paraguay’s war declaration, Bolivia showed a somewhat more receptive attitude toward the peace efforts of her neighbors Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Peru, but these states on June 1 decided to leave further negotiations to the League.
FAR EAST
Truce in North China.—During May the Japanese renewed hostilities south of the Great Wall, re-occupying and extending their gains in the Swan River-coastal triangle and driving southwest from the Kupei Pass to the very outskirts of Peiping. During the third week in May, however, hostilities virtually ceased and negotiations were opened with the Chinese leaders which ended on May 31 in a truce agreement signed at Tangku below Tientsin. By this document all political questions relating to Manchukuo, indemnities, etc., were deferred for future negotiations. The military terms provided: (1) That Chinese troops should withdraw immediately to a line about 250 miles long starting on the west at the Great Wall and running about 10 miles north of Peiping and 35 miles north of Tientsin; (2) Japan would have the right to inspect this area by airplane or otherwise to insure execution of the first provision; (3) Japanese forces would withdraw beyond the Great Wall as soon as the first provision was carried out.
The truce, which was negotiated by representatives of the Nanking government, was generally accepted by military leaders in North China, and aroused less criticism than was expected from the factions at Canton. Prior to the truce the Christian general, Feng Yu Hsiang, who had remained inactive at Kalgan during all the fighting, declared his intention not only to oppose the Japanese but also to overthrow the Nanking leaders, and it was surmised that he might be supplied with munitions from Russian bases in Mongolia. But Feng’s lack of funds made it unlikely that his opposition would prove a serious factor.
Negotiations over C. E. Railway.—Russian acceptance of the new situation in Manchuria seemed indicated by offers of the Soviet government early in May to sell to Japan its rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway, the price mentioned being about $153,000,000. Japan estimated the true value at some $20,000,000, but seemed not eager to purchase at any price. By the original agreement between China and Russia, China would have the right to repurchase the railway after 1936 and to have it restored without cost in 1980. The later date was subsequently lowered to 1960. Whatever the Soviet Republic’s feeling about transfer of the line to Manchukuo or to Japan, China in a memorandum of May 10 declared she would in no way allow her rights in the railway to be surrendered or impaired.
As a means of preventing Russia from impounding freight cars of the line, Manchukuo at the close of May established restrictions on the passing of cars beyond her frontiers.