The recent evacuation of all marines from Nicaragua closed the most exacting period of peace-time soldiering in which the Marine Corps has ever engaged, and terminated for Marine Corps aviation the most colorful duty performed by any aviation component of the armed forces of the United States since the World War.
The second Nicaraguan campaign conclusively proved the great value of aircraft to an expeditionary force. With operations being conducted in a sparsely settled country, extensive in area, where roads are unknown and even the trails traversing thickly wooded areas passable only with the greatest difficulty, aircraft were of vital assistance to the commanders in Nicaragua. They helped in the supply and administration of far-flung patrols and detachments; they furnished information and assisted at times in beating off enemy ambushes that threatened their progress and safety; they brought information to higher command; and dropped supplies that helped maintain morale when confronted with most trying conditions.
In 1927, it became necessary as a result of civil war in Nicaragua to re-enforce Navy and Marine Corps forces engaged in "the protection of lives and property of American citizens.” Observation Squadron One, of which the writer was a member, was assigned to the forces of intervention and reached Managua, the Nicaraguan capital, on March 1, 1927. It was commanded by Major Ross E. Rowell, who will always have the distinction of being the American pioneer user of aircraft in bush warfare. So necessary did aircraft operations become that, at the time of the evacuation, one squadron of six observation planes had grown to an aviation force of twenty-six planes of various types. During the six years’ operations in Nicaragua, Marine Corps aviation was called upon for every known use of military airplanes except combat in the air with opposing aircraft. From the date of arrival in Nicaragua with its airplanes dismantled on the deck of a navy transport to that of evacuation when the planes left Managua in flight, this organization was actively engaged against armed opponents under war conditions. It is the only United States air organization to have experienced such service since the World War.
On December 14, 1926, the Nicaraguan minister of foreign affairs in a note to the United States minister, authorizing the use of United States forces for the protection of American lives and property, wrote:
My government will consider as a friendly aid whatever steps the government of the United States may take for the re-establishment of peace and order in the country. These acts will be viewed by my government as demonstrations of the friendship of your government made in the best interests of Nicaragua.
In May, 1927, the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, as personal representative of the President of the United States, effected between the leaders of the federal and revolutionary armies an agreement, known as the Tipitapa agreement, which ended the civil war. Its principal features were: general disarmament of both forces; supervision, in order to insure impartiality, of the Nicaraguan presidential elections of 1928 by Americans with ample police power to make effective such supervision; and establishment of a non-political native constabulary, the Guardia Nacional, which was to be organized and trained by American officers. In negotiating the Tipitapa agreement, it was recognized that:
while it was anticipated that General Moncada [the revolutionary leader] would be successful in persuading his forces to disarm, it was necessary to consider that certain sections of the country outside of the district controlled by American forces or by the Diaz troops [the federal army] or by General Moncada had been in a state of anarchy for some time and at the mercy of marauding bands. General Moncada’s presence had had a restraining influence over leaders of these bands but, with this influence removed, it was apparent that it might become necessary for American forces to occupy certain parts of the country rapidly in order to prevent a reign of terror. Mr. Stimson was warned by General Moncada himself that such a situation would probably arise after disarmament. Therefore, in order to insure the rapid and effective tranquilization of the country, and at the request of both the Diaz government and General Moncada, 800 additional marines were ordered to proceed from the United States to Nicaragua.
Included in this force was Observation Squadron Four.
Following the Tipitapa agreement, one revolutionary chief, Sandino, refused to lay down his arms and retired to the northern part of the country.
Peaceful methods to persuade him to lay down arms were unavailing. On a number of occasions, before extensive military measures were adopted, efforts were made by appealing to Sandino’s patriotism to persuade him to discontinue armed resistance. These efforts met with defiant replies. After Sandino held for ransom the managers of certain French and German concerns near Ocotal in June, 1927, the commander of the American forces in Nicaragua considered it necessary to treat him as an outlaw, which Nicaraguans generally considered him to be.
Using the wildest parts of the North as bases and when hard pressed, crossing the border into Flonduras, Sandino and others allied with him for five and a half years intermittently engaged in outlaw operations, murdering and robbing peaceful inhabitants, raiding isolated towns and villages, attempting to interfere with elections, and ambushing marine and guardia patrols policing the country. Other disaffected elements joined Sandino or con' ducted similar operations on their own initiative.
The marines were withdrawn into Managua in June, 1931, leaving all patrolling and policing of the interior to the Guardia Nacional, which, from the time of its inception, had been actively engaged in suppressing banditry and affording security to peaceful inhabitants of the country.
The mission of the aircraft squadrons was to support the ground troops in their operations by providing observation aviation, ground attack aviation, and transport service. It was soon evident that the two squadrons, originally equipped for but three months' field duty, must be augmented. The necessary transport service could not be done solely by observation planes in a country with practically no roads and where the troops were scattered in small detachments over a very large area. It became evident also that more permanent installations for the overhaul and upkeep of aircraft and their accessories must be provided. Consequently, personnel, planes, and equipment were increased and an organization effected, designated as Aircraft Squadrons, 2d Marine Brigade. This consisted of 1 observation squadron of 12 to 16 landplanes; 1 utility squadron of 3 to 5 three-engined transports and 5 amphibians; 1 service company with overhaul facilities for the squadrons and their equipment; and 1 headquarters detachment for administration, communication, and supply activities.
Aviation in Nicaragua was commanded by Major Ross E. Rowell from February, 1927, to August, 1928; by Major Louis M. Bourne, Jr., from August, 1928, to December, 1929; by Major Ralph J. Mitchell from December, 1929, to July, 1931; and by the writer from July, 1931, to the date of evacuation, January 2, 1933.
We have noted briefly the circumstances attending the intervention of United States forces in Nicaragua; the pacification measures adopted by these forces; the appearance of aviation with the expeditionary force; and, in general, the support given by aviation to ground forces. Such support may be best portrayed by some concrete instances of aviation activity in Nicaragua.
Prior to the Tipitapa agreement, United States forces were engaged in guarding a neutral zone and in preventing the contending Nicaraguan armies from fighting within that zone. During this period Observation Squadron One maintained constant reconnaissance throughout the zone and was always available for combat should such become necessary to maintain the zone’s neutrality. Even at this time, aviators had the then rare experience of being under fire. Two American civilian aviators were at that time in the employ of the federal army and, as a consequence of their activities against the Liberal revolutionists, were often the targets of fire from the ground. When the Marine Corps planes appeared, armed men made no distinction between these and the planes previously seen. As a result, during a period of but two months after arrival, our planes were hit twenty-five times.
On conclusion of the Tipitapa agreement, small detachments of marines fanned out into the departments of Esteli, Jinotega, and Nueva Segovia to garrison small towns which might be attacked by outlaws. Planes covered their movements and co-operated with them in reconnoitering the country. After such garrisons were established, they were visited daily by planes engaged in reconnaissance and liaison missions.
It was not long before the Sandinistas made a test of their strength. On July 16, 1927, while on a flight to Ocotal, Marine Gunner Mike Wodarczyk, the pilot, noticed that no marines were at the landing field, but quickly learned the reason when he flew over the town. The small garrison of marines and guardia was in a building in the center of town, besieged by a force of bandits five times the size of the garrison. The bandits, under cover of buildings and the stone walls enclosing the town park, were attacking from three sides. Gunner Wodarczyk had no bombs, but he attacked at once with his fixed gun and, in the face of opposing fire from the ground, dived low time after time until his ammunition was exhausted. The accompanying plane (all flights to outlying stations and on patrol were habitually made by planes in pairs) joined in the attack. After their attack, which gave the hard- pressed garrison a breathing spell, both planes went to Managua with news of the emergency at Ocotal. Within an hour five planes, led by Major Ross E. Rowell, took off with capacity loads of fragmentation bombs and machine-gun ammunition. Upon arrival at Ocotal, the planes formed a dive bombing attack formation and began a thrilling battle with the bandit force. Down in a screaming dive hurtled plane after plane. With each dive came a hail of bullets from the front gun and a 17-pound bomb which burst on the ground into hundreds of fragments, causing casualties in all directions. The bandits stood up to the plane attack and at tempted to use their weapons against the aerial visitors, but were soon routed. They had never before experienced a serious bombing attack and soon scattered to all points of the compass only to become targets, as they ran for cover, for the guns of both cockpits, the pilots firing their fixed guns as they dived and the observers using their free guns as the planes recovered from the dives and gained altitude for further attacks.
The action lasted but forty-five minutes, but it dealt the bandits a staggering blow, raised the siege, and saved the small garrison from possible annihilation. From later experience with bandit methods it is certain that, with their ammunition supply exhausted, the defenders would have met with horrible death. The garrison commander later reported that, at the time of the aerial attack, the bandits were growing bolder, his own ammunition was running low, and his force was in a most precarious position.
This battle demonstrated beyond all doubt the wisdom of including an aviation unit as an integral part of any expeditionary force. Because of the distance and character of the country, before additional ground forces could have reached Ocotal, the defenders would undoubtedly have suffered heavy losses and might possibly have been annihilated. The prompt and effective intervention of the airplanes was as invaluable as it was spectacular.
The aviation action at Ocotal and the movement of the Nueva Segovia expedition, a comparatively large ground force under Major Floyd, through the area east of Ocotal, resulted in comparatively quiet conditions for some time. However, aviation had plenty of work maintaining liaison with ground forces in outlying towns.
While Sandino suffered a severe blow at Ocotal, a few months later he rallied his shattered forces and augmented them by recruiting even in foreign countries. In October, bandit forces appeared in strength in the vicinity of Quilali and rumors were heard of an impregnable outlaw camp. The intelligence sources had no knowledge of any such place, but bandit correspondence captured indicated that Sandino had a base at a mountain stronghold, called "El Chipote." Airplane patrols were maintained daily over eastern Nueva Segovia on reconnaissance and liaison missions for the ground patrols, on combat missions to assist the movement of ground patrols, and in search of the apparently mythical El Chipote. During late 1927 and early 1928, intense activity by ground and air forces finally resulted in the destruction of the Chipote stronghold and witnessed such a heroic performance of extraordinary skill and determination as to earn for Lieutenant C. F. Schilt the award of the Congressional Medal of Honor.
On November 23, 1927, Major Rowell found the long-sought Chipote during a reconnaissance mission in which he and Gunnery Sergeant Albert S. Munsch had a very hot engagement with the occupants of the mountain stronghold. Plans were immediately made for a combined ground and air attack to capture and destroy Sandino's base. The plan involved the Junction of two large combat forces at Quilali prior to the attack on Chipote and led to an extraordinary situation in the Quilali area in which aviation had the novel experience of rescuing a ground force from a desperate situation, directing its march, and protecting its movements to safety.
On December 30, before reaching Quilali, both combat forces mentioned above were struck by overwhelming numbers of bandits. The stronger column under Captain Livingston, who himself was seriously wounded, was hard hit but drove off its opponents and reached Quilali, having suffered 7 killed, 8 seriously wounded, and 17 slightly wounded. Lieutenant Richal’s column drove off the bandit force but had one man seriously wounded. Two days later, about six miles northwest of Quilali, Lieutenant Richal’s column was again attacked, and Lieutenant Richal was seriously wounded and Lieutenant Bruce of the guardia, the only other officer with the column, was killed. It was necessary to send re-enforcements from Captain Livingston’s force at Quilali. Junction of the two columns was finally effected in Quilali on January 3.
The serious situation of the ground forces brought prompt co-operation from aviation. Air support was practically continuous during daylight hours. Emergency stretchers for the wounded were dropped to Lieutenant Richal’s column. The area was thoroughly reconnoitered, and combat support, in which at least three bandit attempts at further attack were broken up, was furnished until Lieutenant Richal’s column reached Quilali without further casualties. During the following week the march of the beleaguered column from Quilali to San Albino, a regularly garrisoned post, was made in two days. The planes provided continuous reconnaissance and support for six hours daily, notified the marching troops when to move and when to halt, and broke up two strong ambushes on the first day. This was truly a unique situation in which the march of ground troops was conducted and regulated by an air organization. One of those to make the march from Quilali to San Albino and later to Ocotal was an aviator who, while engaged on a reconnaissance mission, was obliged to make a forced landing in which his plane was wrecked on the miniature field at Quilali.
We must go back a little in the sequence of events to get a glimpse of Lieutenant Schilt’s memorable exploit. After Lieutenant Richal’s column had reached Quilali, the situation of the combined force was still most desperate, as shown by the following extracts from a message written by the officer who succeeded to command:
... I am absolutely certain that an evacuation of this place will result in a concentration of enemy forces that will result seriously. ... I can dig in and hold until a safe passage is assured or other means devised to extricate us from a serious situation. . . . The result of this [another attack by the enemy] will be disastrous because of the nature of the country and the trails, which preclude the possibility of maneuvering troops and weapons when attacked, and as my march must be conducted in single file with a train strung over a mile or more of trail. The weakness of this can be pictured. ... As before stated, I am absolutely certain that I will meet most determined opposition. A full concentration of planes, with a thorough searching of all trails and a thorough bombing of Chipote before I leave, is most urgently recommended. I cannot too urgently stress the fact that a concentration against me must be prevented. ... If humanly possible, I recommend that a Corsair land here to evacuate the wounded. ... An immediate reply, this date, is requested.
Immediate reply was forthcoming in the form of Lieutenant Schilt’s volunteering to bring out the wounded by plane. The partially burned village of Quilali was further dismantled to provide a rough, narrow runway only 200 yards long. With almost superhuman courage and skill, Lieutenant Schilt, on January 6-8 made 10 trips to this improvised landing area. He evacuated 18 wounded officers and men, 3 of whom, according to medical officers, would have died had they been brought out in any other way. On his inbound trips he carried into Quilali a relief commander for the beleaguered force and 1,400 pounds of medical supplies and provisions. On the eighth trip his tail skid assembly was wrecked in landing, but Lieutenant Schilt, nevertheless, took out two men and got back to his home airdrome. Two center section struts were bent on the ninth trip, but he brought out two more men, sticking at the task till completed. It is very doubtful if retirement from Quilali could have been effected without serious loss had not Lieutenant Schilt’s heroic action relieved the column of its many wounded.
The unexpected combat strength displayed by the bandits led to the abandonment of the projected plan. It was then decided to destroy the bandit stronghold by air attack which would be followed by a thorough mopping up of the mountain by ground forces. Accordingly, on January 14, four planes, piloted by Major Rowell, Lieutenant Weir, Lieutenant Lamson-Scribner, and Gunnery Sergeant Munsch, bombarded and shot up the outlaw stronghold in a 35-minute attack. One bomb made a direct hit on a house and caused the appearance of a group of about fifty men looking for cover, in the midst of which Gunnery Sergeant Munsch promptly dropped another bomb. The ground forces later occupied the mountain with but slight casualties and destroyed everything of value to the bandits. The loss of his fortified base on Chipote cost Sandino his prestige and caused the desertion of many of his recent recruits. It was not until more than two years later that he again occupied a position that might become the target of a strong aerial attack. In June, 1930, a large force of bandits was discovered on Saraguasa Mountain and given a thorough beating by an attack of six planes, in which it was later reported that Sandino himself had been wounded in the leg by a bomb fragment.
Such names as Chateau-Thierry, St. Mihiel, and the Argonne will never be forgotten in the Marine Corps; similarly, such names as Ocotal, Quilali, and Chipote will long be remembered in Marine Corps aviation as will many other hazardous and arduous air missions not characterized by the same glamour.
During the latter part of 1928 and early 1929, operations of ground patrols, in their efforts to obliterate banditry and to supervise the presidential elections of 1928, were carried on in the practically unexplored jungle of northeastern and north central Nicaragua. These operations daily required long, dangerous flights by the planes to maintain contact with ground patrols and to furnish them necessary supplies. These flights, often accomplished under dangerous weather conditions, taxed the courage, skill, and determination of the pilots as much or more than did the earlier spectacular actions in Nueva Segovia.
In order effectually to support the operations, an aviation base was established in April, 1928, at Puerto Cabezas, from which 3 officers and 30 enlisted men operated 5 amphibian observation planes. These planes took care of aerial support up the Coco River as far as Bocay, and to the west as far inland as La Luz mine. In May, 1929, conditions had quieted to such an extent that the aviation detachment at Puerto Cabezas was moved to Managua and made only occasional flights to the eastern area.
Bandit activity again broke out in the eastern area in 1931, and again extensive aerial patrolling became necessary. From September, 1931, until the evacuation, a 2-plane amphibian patrol, augmented when necessary during periods of intensive guardia operations, was maintained continuously in the eastern area. Instead of setting up a separate aviation detachment, airplane support was effected there by detailing two amphibians from Managua for a period of a week to ten days, at the expiration of which they were relieved by two others. This was in conformity with United States' policy in late 1931 of keeping marines from duty in outlying stations.
The character of the country and the weather conditions in northeastern Nicaragua made imperative the use of amphibians. The terrain in this area is characterized by dense tropical forests, many rivers, and extensive swamps. Puerto Cabezas was the only site that could be used as a landing field for landplanes in an area of 20,000 square miles. The percentage of dangerous flying days is very high because of treacherous weather conditions and heavy and extensive rain squalls. Several harrowing experiences by pilots of the amphibian detachment on the east coast proved that the use of land-planes in that area would inevitably have resulted in the loss of planes and personnel. In extremely bad weather, it was possible for the amphibians to “sit down” in one of the rivers and wait for a storm to pass. However, if similarly caught over a jungle, they were little better off than landplanes.
On one occasion, while returning to Puerto Cabezas from Bocay, two amphibians were caught in a line squall. One plane was twice forced down in the Coco River and did not reach its destination till the following day. The other was not heard from for two days, until the pilot and observer hiked into Cabo Gracias a Dios from Honduras. While trying to get through and around the storm, the pilot became lost, was forced into Honduras, and finally landed in a lagoon near the coast with only a 10-minute supply of gasoline left. When some Indians appeared, exhibiting unfriendly expressions and armed with machetes, the pilot took off but soon exhausted his gasoline, and was forced to land in the open sea. The plane was soon broken up by the pounding of the heavy waves. The crew waded ashore and finally reached Cabo Gracias a Dios by walking down the beach.
While the amphibians were able to deliver some supplies and to support ground patrols on the Coco River as far as Bocay, it was necessary to use transports from Managua to insure adequate supplies for the troops after they reached Bocay and in their operations between the Coco and Bocay rivers. On one occasion 3,076 pounds of supplies were dropped by transports at Poteca. Ordinarily, these rations would have been transported by boat from the east coast up the Coco River, and it would have taken considerable time to make delivery. The ground troops, who had had a terrible time making their way up the Coco River from the east coast to Bocay and Poteca, were most appreciative of aviation efforts to do their utmost for their comrades’ comfort and morale. After dropping cigarettes to Lieutenant Ridderhof’s patrol on the Coco River, the following message was picked up by plane: “Thanks for the cigarettes. You don’t know how much better they taste than dried coffee grounds.”
Bocay is 165 miles air line (which route could seldom be followed) from Managua over the worst kind of country, where, in the rainy season, low visibility and sudden severe storms are the rule rather than the exception. Nevertheless, transport pilots stuck to their tasks with commendable determination, and, despite hazards and difficulties, saw to it that supplies, when needed, reached the sorely tired ground troops.
As an instance of the difficulties surmounted by the “big-ship” pilots in carrying out their missions, the following is quoted from the operations report of aircraft squadrons for the week ending July 28, 1928:
With an emergency appendicitis patient in No. 3 Fokker, Lieutenant Williamson was hemmed in in the mountains, last Saturday, by heavy rain storms so thick he could not see the propeller on the bow motor. The warmth of the interior of the cabin clouded the rain over the windshields, destroying all view ahead. After using all the rags in the tool kit, Pharmacist’s Mate 3d Class McKenzie, who was accompanying the patient, opened some gauze packings and these were used effectively by Corporal Wenc, the crew chief of the plane, and Gunnery Sergeant Johnson, a passenger, who took turns in wiping the glass and wringing out the gauze. A forced landing seemed inevitable, but Lieutenant Williamson circled the area, gaining altitude until a hole in the storm was found. Though this seems unusual, it is a routine happening with big-ship pilots.
In November, 1928, the marine and naval forces in Nicaragua totaled 5,480. As the guardia developed, the number of marines was gradually reduced until in November, 1930, the total was 1,763.
In order to furnish the troops with adequate supplies of rations, clothing, and ammunition, transport planes made almost daily trips to Esteli, Ocotal, Apali, Condega, and El Sauce, where the planes could be landed. Where ground patrols were operating at great distances from these places, drops were made directly to patrols. When the greatest number of American personnel was on duty, 50,000-60,000 pounds of freight a week was the average movement effected by transports to the hills. The following quotation shows the kind of assistance rendered by transports:
On the first of June, Master Technical Sergeant Paschal, with Corporal Claude in No. 3, made the record run to date. Taking off at Managua at 0830 they flew 5 hours and 35 minutes with the following itinerary over the route: off at Managua with 1,600 pounds of quartermaster supplies, they flew over Esteli, dropping a message; a bag of mail and post-exchange supplies were dropped at Condega, and landing at Ocotal they discharged their load; picking up 600 pounds of supplies at Ocotal, they flew back to Esteli and landed; loading on blanket rolls and personal effects of 52 men, a return trip was made to Ocotal; a money drop of $4,500 for Somoto, mail for Limay and El Sauce, and a large cable weighing 400 pounds, with a dozen axes for Somotillo, were then loaded. The mail was dropped at Limay and El Sauce, the money at Somoto. The heavy cable was wrestled by Claude, and on a signal from Paschal, the writhing mass was hurled through the hole in the deck of the plane into the town square of Somotillo. The axes were dropped on the next passover. From a report received later, the serpentine cable and the scattering axes created pandemonium among the natives.
The transports, in addition to their function of moving supplies, were a valuable adjunct to operations in making rapid transfers of personnel in critical situations. In November and December, 1931, when a large group of well-led and well-armed bandits were operating in the departments of Chinandega, Leon, and Esteli, the scattered guardia troops (there were no marines stationed in outlying districts at this time) would have been seriously handicapped had they been compelled to move overland in concentrating against the outlaw bands. As it was, prompt movement of guardia re-enforcements by air kept these bandits continually on the move until they quitted the threatened area without causing material damage. Besides ferrying a great quantity of supplies to the area of operations, the following guardia troop movements were effected: (a) 39 men from Ocotal to Condega; (b) 31 officers and men from Managua to San Francisco (this movement was made in observation amphibians because of the inability to land transports owing to a wet field); (c) 76 officers and men from Managua to Esteli; and (d) 62 officers and men from Ocotal and Apali to Condega.
That the outlaws learned to have a healthy respect for the striking power of aircraft was evident as time passed. They attempted at first to fight it out with the Planes; they later made few attempts to engage aviation in combat and took great Pains to conceal themselves from aerial observation. Occasionally, some groups would fire at planes, for as late as July, 1932, one plane was hit five times in an engagement in the eastern area. The growing reluctance of bandits to engage aircraft in battle, with the consequent difficulty of planes finding the object of their search in the densely wooded areas where most outlaw movements were made, was illustrated by the diminishing number of contacts with bandits made by airplanes as the campaign went on. Up to the end of 1928, aviation had 84 contacts in which the planes were struck 82 times by fire from the ground; in 1929, the number of contacts dropped to 26; in 1930, there were but 5; in 1931, 7; in 1932, 9; and from July 1 to December 15, 1932, 1. Consequently, it was impossible to relax the vigilance of aerial patrols but, of course, the necessity of aerial transport was continuous. The later years of the campaign were characterized by sporadic outlaw depredations rather than by the fairly continuous operations of the earlier years. For weeks at a time little would be heard or known of outlaw movements. On the other hand, an attack in almost any part of the country might occur at any time. These conditions kept aircraft squadrons continuously on the alert and prepared for any contingency. While at times the area covered by airplane flights was contracted, it was always necessary to patrol the greater part of the country.
As an instance of the difficulties that characterized all flying in the remote jungle areas, the crash of an amphibian southeast of Rama and the subsequent rescue of the crew are noteworthy. On August 21, 1932, two observation amphibians left Managua at 0720 for Puerto Cabezas via Bluefields, to operate for a week on the usual eastern area patrol. Bad weather was encountered over most of the route towards Bluefields. At 0855 the planes while 25 miles southeast of Rama and flying at 4,000 feet, were caught between two severe squalls which closed together, resulting in extremely unfavorable flying conditions. One plane, flying by instruments, reached Bluefields and reported to Managua that the accompanying plane was missing. Efforts made that afternoon by landplanes from Managua to reach the location where the missing plane was seen last were thwarted by bad weather in the mountains east of Lake Nicaragua. However, a transport amphibian got through to Bluefields under orders to base there for search operations. There was no field at Bluefields for land-planes.
The other plane, in attempting to fly through the storm, had once gone out of control and lost 1,000 feet of altitude in a spin. Shortly afterward the pilot fell into another spin and, as he was losing much altitude, decided that he and his crew of two should abandon the plane. The two men were occupying seats one above the other in the rear cockpit. The pilot signaled the one behind him to jump and stepped out on the wing to make sure his signal was understood. The man in the upper seat from the edge of the cockpit lifted his seat out of the way of the man below, and shortly all three were on the way to the ground in parachutes. All landed safely in high trees but because of the fog were lost from each other in their descent. Two got together shortly after landing, but the third did not join the others till the next day.
On the following morning four land- planes and two observation amphibians from Managua, and one transport amphibian and one observation amphibian from Bluefields began a search of the jungle along the Rama River and its tributaries. For many miles in all directions from the location where the missing plane was last reported there were practically no habitations or clearings in the dense jungle, and it was generally impossible to see the ground through the intermeshed foliage of high trees. Considering the area to be searched, the missing personnel were found in a surprisingly short time, although the crashed plane was never seen. At 1130 on August 22 three parachutes were discovered in the tops of trees on the north side of the Chilamate River. A short time later, the crew was found in a small clearing about a mile from the parachutes. The most practical route from this place to Rama was by water down fifty miles of rivers. The stranded crew was ordered to stay where it was until assistance reached it. This area was not one in which bandits habitually operated.
As it was impossible to land a rescue plane within miles of the stranded crew, a guardia patrol from Rama with some native Indian paddlers immediately set out to bring in the lost personnel. During the progress of this rescuing party up the rivers, planes from Bluefields and Managua dropped supplies to the stranded crew, visited them several times daily to get information as to their physical condition, and maintained contact with the rescuing party. On August 24 the Rama patrol had reached a point on the Rama River about ten miles from their destination, and it was expected that the stranded crew would be brought into Rama in two more days. However, at this point the patrol was forced to return to Rama to bring in the bodies of a pilot and observer who were killed in a crash of an observation amphibian while working with the patrol. On August 27 the patrol reached the lost flyers and on August 30 amphibian planes picked them up at Rama and ferried them in.
Because of the irregularity of operations of the marines opponents and because of unfamiliarity with conditions of terrain and language, the second Nicaraguan campaign often called for a high degree of resourcefulness on the part of all engaged. On many occasions the airplane pilots displayed extraordinary ingenuity and resourcefulness in carrying out the letter and spirit of their missions. One of the most striking instances of carrying the job to a successful conclusion under unusual conditions occurred in November, 1930. On the sixth of that month word was received that the village of Matiguas had been attacked the previous afternoon and that the small guardia garrison there had been annihilated. Matiguas was a small isolated village on the extreme eastern limit of inhabited territory in central Nicaragua. At times guardia were stationed there, but no pilot then in aircraft squadrons had ever visited the place. A 2-plane patrol was dispatched to investigate the situation, arriving at the approximate location of the village as shown on the map, the planes found a burning building which later was identified as the guardia barracks. But there were no guardia in sight with whom to communicate. The problem confronting the aviators was a nice one. They were not even sure that the village below was Matiguas, as many sections of extant maps of Nicaragua are grossly inaccurate. With no guardia there to display panels, how were they going to get information of previous happenings and of the whereabouts of bandits? However, the information was obtained.
One of the pilots, Lieutenant J. S. E. Young, possessed a good working knowledge of Spanish. Noticing a native and a Pile of lumber in the vicinity, Lieutenant Young dropped a note to the native asking him to place two logs in the form of a cross d the village were Matiguas. The signal promptly appeared. Dropping another note the pilot asked the native to place one log if the village had not been attacked and, if it had been to form a cross of two logs and to indicate by three logs, in the shape of an arrow, the direction in which the bandits left. The native put out the affirmative signal and also an arrow pointing north.
The patrol then began a search to the north and about an hour later discovered a small group of bandits wearing red hatbands. Having bombed and strafed the bush where the bandits took cover, the patrol turned back, found a guardia patrol on the Matagalpa-Matiguas trail, and dropped the information gained. It was later found that on the previous day a force of bandits had attacked Matiguas, the small guardia garrison of ten men had held out until after darkness, and, when their ammunition was exhausted, they had escaped into the bush. All of these later straggled into another guardia post at Muy Muy.
During the several months of the even years including and following 1928, aviation found much to do in supporting the various United States electoral missions in their supervision of Nicaraguan elections. During the elections, registration and voting mesas were set up all over the country. It was necessary to ferry by plane most of the American personnel to outlying districts, to supply them there, to maintain communication with them, to patrol the towns and mesas on registration and election days, and, finally, to bring to Managua the ballots. In order to accomplish this work, flying time generally reached its peak during the weeks immediately before and after the election periods. During the electoral supervision of 1928, it averaged 275 hours weekly for two months before the elections, while the flying time during the week immediately preceding the election was 368 hours and 55 minutes, the highest of any similar period during the whole campaign. In that year on election day 237 cantons were visited by airplanes. In 1932, owing to restriction placed by Congress on the number of American troops sent to Nicaragua, the supervision of the presidential elections in areas and mesas in charge of Americans was considerably restricted. Nevertheless, the planes for weeks were flying over 200 hours to carry out the support needed by the ground forces.
When it was finally decided to withdraw all United States forces from Nicaragua, the remaining planes were authorized to fly to the East Coast Expeditionary Force base at Quantico, Virginia. Owing to diversity of types of planes and difference in cruising ranges, they were divided into three flights; one made up of ten 02C-l’s (observation landplanes with 7 hours’ cruising range) and one transport; one of five 02U-l’s (observation landplanes of 4 hours’ cruising range) and two transports; and one of four observation amphibians and one transport amphibian. The landplanes moved via the west coast of Central America to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec; thence via Vera Cruz; Brownsville, Texas; New Orleans and Pensacola to Charleston, South Carolina, where they met the amphibians which had come via Honduras, British Honduras, Cuba, and the east coast of the United States. All proceeded together to Washington and Quantico, arriving eleven days after the first flight took off from Managua. The trip back to the states was made without incident, except that the amphibians were delayed four days (by bad weather in Honduras) in getting out of Nicaragua.
On January 12 all twenty-two planes landed in Quantico, thus completing an act of aviation drama that began nearly six years before, when Observation Squadron One embarked at San Diego. The writer, along with a few enlisted men, bad the unique experience of being a member of the cast at the raising and at the lowering of the curtain.
The courage, endurance, skill, and resourcefulness displayed by pilots, observers, and mechanics were the equal of any such qualities demonstrated by any troops in a major war. Dangerous flying conditions obtained on the majority of air missions; the mountainous jungle country over which most missions were flown presented the hazard of almost certain fatality in case of forced landing; while the possibility of being shot down by enemy fire from the ground was ever present and in some cases became an actuality. The work accomplished under such conditions has added a brilliant and stirring chapter to aviation history.