The average man thinks of the late war in terms of military events. The savage and sanguinary battles on land with their immense contending forces, the spectacular developments in the way of tactics, and the legendary reputations of several military leaders have monopolized public attention. Scarcely a month passes without the publication of some important military memoir. Indeed, the literature on Joffre, Foch, Haig, Ludendorff, and Pershing has already assumed immense proportions. To these works, the publications on the naval aspects of the war do not correspond in volume or in popularity. It is small wonder, then, that the part played by sea power in the World War is often underestimated if not almost forgotten.
When put to the test, the average man’s knowledge of the naval war consists of a few scraps of information about Jutland, Dogger Bank, and Falkland Islands. The wreck of England’s armada at the Dardanelles holds his interest, as do tales of fugitive raiders and resourceful submarine commanders; but the less dramatic story of the naval and economic blockade of the Central Powers is virtually unknown to him. It is plain, that if the lessons of sea power are to be understood and acted upon in America, then this story must be repeatedly and effectively retold.
From the very nature of things the domain of the sea is foreign to the common man. His ventures upon it are often accompanied by acute physical distress and by an overwhelming sense of his own insignificance. The professional sailor is by nature of his task more or less likely to be taciturn and uncommunicative. As Lord John Fisher frequently pointed out, the sailor’s motto is “Deeds, not words.” So natural is it for the silent service of a fleet to be overlooked that in spite of the immense contribution of sea power to the development of the British Empire, it remained for an American, Admiral Mahan, to point out its real significance.
Although the elder von Moltke was not a party to the creed, the military triumphs of Prussia in 1866 and 1871 tended to give emphasis to the dry land point of view held by many European military men prior to the World War. They were sufficiently imbued with professional doctrine and with an absolute confidence in a short war, that they placed little faith in the value of sea power. One can search in vain among the published works of Clausewitz or Foch for even a mention of salt water. Sir Henry Wilson’s diary shows that in December, 1912, he placed the value of the British fleet to the French as 500 bayonets in event of a Franco-German war, but he made it clear that save from the moral standpoint, Foch, Joffre, and Castelnau did not value it at one bayonet.1
The complete collapse of Plan XVII in the sterile battles of the frontiers, and the breakdown of the German plan at the Marne upset all calculations of a short war, and in the struggle that ensued sea power was destined to exert its traditional influence.
The blockade, the ultimate weapon of sea power, is slow to make itself felt. Its operation has been aptly described as being “not akin to a lightning flash striking down an opponent suddenly, but to a steady radiation of heat, invigorating those it was used in aid of and drying up the resources of the enemy.” Even before the curtain rose upon the desperate drama in France, the war on the sea began. In describing the passage of the fleet to its war station, a British historian said:
This simple act, yet perhaps the most decisive of the war, took place before the actual outbreak, on July 29, when at seven o’clock in the morning that greater armada, the British Grand Fleet sailed from Portland to its war station in Scapa Flow. Few eyes saw its passage, fewer minds knew its destination—but from that moment Germany’s arteries were subjected to an invisible pressure which never relaxed until on November 21, 1918, the German fleet arrived in those same northern waters to hand itself into the custody of a force of whom it had seen no more than a few fleeting glimpses during four and a half years of intangible struggle.
Contrary to popular expectation there was no death battle between hostile fleets immediately upon the outbreak of the war. Indeed, that death battle never occurred. The inferior fleet of Germany held to its fortified bases and waited for the attrition of war to reduce the allied superiority in capital ships. Unmolested the allied navies swept German naval and mercantile units off the seas. The British fleet based on Scapa Flow was able to give support to the cruiser squadrons which cut Germany off from trade with the Atlantic neutrals. Whether the allied generals appreciated it or not, from August, 1914, onward the Allies were in a position to use the lanes of commerce, and they were able to deny that use to the enemy.
The initial effect of sea power was to immobilize or render useless the greater part of the merchant tonnage of the Central Powers. In 1914, Germany and her Allies owned about 6,200,000 tons of shipping or about 14.7 per cent of the world total.2 Of this amount 2,875,000 tons were forced to take refuge in neutral ports and 1,165,- 000 tons fell into allied hands. This left 2,160,000 tons in German hands, but its use was limited to territorial waters and to the Baltic Sea. These losses were to have an indirect effect upon Germany by increasing the burden upon her railways and by increasing the freight rates on goods imported by neutral ships.
Blockade machinery and organization.— Strictly speaking, a blockade of the Central Empires was never legally in existence. The failure of the Allies to control the Baltic Sea made trade possible between Germany and the Scandinavian countries. In the course of time this trade was more or less rigorously supervised by the Allies, and when America entered the war, it very definitely declined. Direct over-seas trade between Germany and the Atlantic neutrals was not difficult to control. It fell off immediately in the case of American exports to Germany almost to the vanishing point in 1914. The development of mine and torpedo warfare rendered a patrol of the enemy coast impractical, but a guard of the northern approach to Germany was maintained and the Dover area was carefully watched. If direct trade between Germany and the United States fell off in 1914, American trade with the Scandinavian countries increased to such an extent that nearly 60 per cent of Germany’s deficit was thus made good. The increase of Scandinavian exports to Germany is shown in the following table.
German Imports from |
1913 |
1916 |
Sweden |
£10,000,000 |
£33,000,000 |
Norway |
5,000,000 |
11,000,000 |
Denmark |
10,000,000 |
27,000,000 |
It thus becomes clear that the presence of friendly neutrals offset the full force of the early blockade measures.
Owing to the fact that the Declaration of London had not been accepted by England, a clear statement of allied policy in regard to the naval war was not immediately made. The first several Orders in Council relating to sea-borne trade were more or less contradictory and were criticized as such in the House of Commons.3 Out of regard for the feelings of neutrals and the friendship of the United States, England moved slowly in the process of tightening up the economic barriers around Germany, but the process went on continuously. In September, 1914, the French and British governments linked their customs services with the blockade machinery in an effort to prevent their own supplies from reaching Germany by way of the neutrals. In the main it must be said that England succeeded in placing the onus for the changing nature of the naval war on her enemy. Capitalizing on the use made by the Germans of the liner Berlin in laying mines off England, the Admiralty Warned the neutrals of the novel conditions of the war at sea and declared the North Sea to be a war zone dangerous to neutral shipping. In order to safeguard this shipping, England proposed to offer guides to the shipping which offered itself at designated areas and submitted to search. Other ships which ventured into the North Sea did so at their peril. Points of search were established at Kirkwall, The Downs, Gibraltar, and Alexandria. This system was advantageous to England for two reasons: it safeguarded the searching vessel from submarine attack while carrying out its work, and it allowed England to sift the neutral trade. It is estimated that out of the 2,466 ships which arrived in neutral ports in the North Sea from January to July, 1915, at least 2,132 had been examined and their cargoes passed by the War Trade Department.
The largest share of the blockade work fell upon the 10th Cruiser Squadron which patrolled the northern approach to Germany. This extensive and storm-swept area was much more difficult to control than the Strait of Dover. Early in the war this patrol consisted of old cruisers of the Edgar class, but these obsolete ships soon broke down under this arduous task. They were replaced in November, 1914, by twenty-four armed merchant ships chosen for their speed. In fair weather and foul, this squadron commanded by Admiral de Chair maintained a watch off the northern approach to Germany. Losses by mine, storm, and torpedo were naturally high, but this force had the satisfaction of knowing that more than any other part of the Royal Navy it was subjecting the enemy to direct pressure. The following weekly averages of ships intercepted and sent in by the 10th Cruiser Squadron are given in Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet:
|
1915 |
19164 |
||
Inter cepted |
Sent in |
Inter cepted |
Sent in |
|
Jan. |
.. |
|
21 |
8 |
Feb. |
|
|
39 |
11 |
Mar. |
, . |
|
43 |
11 |
Apr. |
68 |
23 |
40 |
10 |
May |
62 |
16 |
55 |
18 |
June |
73 |
15 |
55 |
20 |
July |
62 |
10 |
62 |
23 |
Aug. |
65 |
13 |
112 |
35 |
Sept. |
64 |
11 |
|
|
Oct. |
56 |
16 |
... |
|
Nov. |
30 |
9 |
... |
|
According to Jellicoe’s figures during the period from April, 1915, to November, 1916, approximately 4,720 ships were intercepted by the patrol and 1,372 sent in for further examination.
In the year 1915, the offices of diplomacy were employed to augment the naval forces at work on the blockade. The weight of allied prestige and bargaining power was used in an effort to prevent neutral imports from reaching Germany. On February 18, 1915, Germany began her first submarine campaign; and as a consequence England, on March 11, declared that she would henceforth seize goods “the destination, ownership, or origin of which was presumed to be hostile.” This far-reaching decision was followed on October 25 by an extension of the contraband list to include 62 articles of absolute and 22 articles of conditional contraband. Since this list covered nearly all the articles of trade, a blockade of Germany was virtually in existence from this time on. In the same month the Allies formed an international quota commission which was to discuss with the neutrals the amount of goods based upon pre-war figures which they would allow to enter the neutral countries.
Since the neutrals of Europe stood in need of English and American goods, the allied powers were at a distinct advantage in bargaining with them. With the control of at least the surface of the sea in their hands, they were in a position to permit or deny this trade at will. Although not desirous of inflicting hardship on the neutrals, the Allies sought to safeguard their own interests by assisting the neutrals in setting up agencies through which their imports could be handled. In Holland the Netherlands Over-seas Trust (N.O.T.) was established; it pledged itself to assist in preventing the re-exportation of goods into Germany. In Switzerland the Swiss Society of Economic Supervision (S.S.S.) took charge of imports. In the Scandinavian countries this function was performed by the Company of Notable Traders and the Norwegian Importers of Mineral Oils. By the end of 1917, this method of restricting German imports began to show definite results. American exports to Holland, Sweden, Norway, and Spain declined in volume of trade after 1916.
30 June-1 July |
£ Sterling |
|
1913-14 |
33,000,000 |
|
1915-16 |
59,600,000 |
|
1916-17 |
28,000,000 |
|
This decline in the volume of goods available for re-exportation to Germany together with the failure of the potato harvest in the year 1916 caused the winter of 1916-17 to be known as turnip (kohlrabi) winter. German stocks of manganese, rubber, cotton, and nickel built up on the expectation of a short war were on the point of becoming exhausted. The war weariness and consequent waning of morale made it imperative that the war be brought to the earliest possible termination. These considerations among others prompted Germany to embark upon a program of unrestricted submarine warfare in February, 1917.
America and the blockade.—Three months of unrestricted submarine warfare brought the United States into the conflict, and this step had a profound effect on the conduct of the naval war. For while during 1914—17 the United States had been the champion of neutral rights against the blockade measures of the Allies, she now adopted the extreme opposite position. The United States was eager to support the blockade as a belligerent to the extent of cutting off all exports to neutrals if necessary. In fact, American ardor was slightly embarrassing to England whose trade with the neutrals of Europe had increased from £42,000,000 in 1913 to £76,000,000 in 1916. Up to this period the French seem to have been more willing than the English were to sacrifice their trade with the neutral world in order to injure their enemy. Such at least is the opinion of Admiral Consett whose position as naval attaché at Copenhagen during the war gave him an opportunity to judge the amount of English exports which reached Germany via the Scandinavian countries.5 Following the lead of England and France, the United States set up an export council; and after July, 1917, a license from this council was necessary for exporting corn, fodder, fertilizers, iron, steel, munitions, and military equipment. Thus American restrictions, where allied attempts had not been altogether successful, assisted in tightening up the blockade. It was not until late in the war that the blockade received proper organization or unity of action. In February, 1916, England formed a blockade ministry with Lord Robert Cecil in charge, while France in March of the same year gave ministerial powers to M. Denys Cochin at the head of a committee of restrictions. The rigor of the submarine war soon made interallied co-operation imperative, and in November, 1917, the allied transport council was set up to handle the shipping resources of the Allies. This step naturally led to the creation of an allied blockade committee in December, 1917, which took over control of all matters relating to the naval blockade. Thus, shortly before unity of command was achieved on the Western Front, interallied co-operation on blockade matters was definitely assured.
The strain imposed upon the Allies by the submarine war added to the difficulties of maintaining the blockade, but the economic encirclement of Germany was never relaxed. In this crisis of the naval war, sea power enabled the Allies to enforce the release of neutral shipping. In 1918 Sweden turned over 400,000 tons of shipping for allied use, Denmark turned over 485,000 tons, and by employing the rights of angary the United States took over 700,000 tons of Dutch shipping. The rapid rate of ship building, the development of new methods of fighting under-sea craft, and the introduction of the convoy system conquered the submarine. With the victory over the submarine came an inevitable increase in the effectiveness of the blockade. By 1918 the neutral exports to Germany, which had fallen to £107,000,000 in 1917, reached the very low figure of £66,040,000.6 Her customs receipts which in 1913 were RM850,000,000 fell to RM133,000,000 in 1918.
While this curtailment of German trade went on, England and France in spite of the submarine war enjoyed an unprecedented volume of foreign trade. The estimates of Guichard show the falling off of German trade from 1913 to 1918, and the tremendous increase in the volume of allied trade. English imports were valued at £760,000,000 in 1913 and at £1,320,000,000 in 1918.
The blockade and German industries.— The commodities which caused Germany the most concern during the blockade years were: cotton, rubber, leather, tin, nickel, copper, and manganese.
In normal years Germany imported about 400,000 tons of cotton, but the wartime demands for cotton in the manufacture of explosives increased her rate of consumption. When the Allies placed cotton on the contraband list in 1915, Germany’s real difficulties began. In December, 1915, she was forced to restrict her allowance of cotton to non-military industries by 70 per cent, and by the end of 1917 this curtailment had increased to 90 per cent. The hardship brought upon the civilian population by a 90 per cent restriction in the use of cotton for clothing and fabrics can be easily imagined. With admirable resourcefulness Germany set out to find a substitute for cotton. She was ultimately able to conserve her supplies by using wood pulp instead of cotton in the manufacture of propellants. Paper fabrics, paper sandbags, even paper suits of clothes were made, but they were never more than substitutes.
There were some commodities, however, which Germany could neither import from neutrals in quantities nor find a substitute for. Rubber was one. Germany’s regular imports were cut off by the blockade, and the neutrals were unable to supply more than their own wants. “War rubber” was manufactured in Germany, but its cost was high and its usefulness limited. The problem of supplying tires for motor trucks was a pressing one, and the writer remembers seeing among the German trucks surrendered at the time of the Armistice a large variety of improvised truck tires made up of woven wire, metal, and steel springs. The rise in the price level of rubber in Germany is the surest indication of its scarcity. One kilogram of raw rubber which cost RM4 in 1913 was worth RM 150 at the end of 1916.
The leather industry in Germany was also severely restricted by the blockade. Before the war Germany imported a great deal of her tanning substances and over half of her hides. When the blockade cut down on her imports and the demands of the army for leather equipment increased, the supply of leather available for home use diminished. It has been estimated that over a thousand shoe factories closed in Germany during the first three years of the war, and that shoe production which reached 120,000,000 pairs in 1913 fell to 12,000,000 pairs in 1917. One can recall from reading Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front how much a good pair of English leather boots was treasured in the ranks of the German infantry.
Oils and fats presented a grave problem in Germany because of increased consumption due to war-time conditions and the fall of imports due to the blockade. As long as Rumania remained neutral, imports were possible from that source; but as soon as she entered the ranks of the belligerents, the situation increased in difficulty. Lubricants became so scarce toward the end of the war that industries were affected and the railways suffered. When trading with neutrals by rail, Germany regularly left the grease boxes on her trucks empty so that they would be filled by the neutral for the return trip. General Max Hoffmann testified before a meeting of the War Cabinet, October 17, 1918, that it would take three months to move five divisions of troops out of the Ukraine, and that trains would be held up for want of lubricants.7
In regard to metals, the German position was somewhat less difficult. Copper was scarce, but her invisible stocks in the form of pots and pans, church bells, and brass rails came to her assistance. Although she possessed an abundance of zinc, Germany felt the shortage of tin, nickel, and manganese. Articles of tin and nickel were early requisitioned by the government, and by 1918 the situation in regard to nickel was so critical that the government was forced to forbid the nickel plating of even surgical instruments.8 Imports of Swedish ores saved the steel situation after the stocks of manganese became exhausted. But in spite of these imports steel production never equaled the peacetime rate. Owing to a general lowering of efficiency, the production of coal also declined. The following table shows the decline of steel and coal production.
|
Steel* |
Coal* |
1913 |
19,312 |
190,000 |
1914 |
14,408 |
161,000 |
1915 |
11,745 |
147,000 |
1916 |
13,293 |
159,000 |
1917 |
13,156 |
167,000 |
1918 |
11,864 |
158,000 |
* In terms of thousands of tons.
Since coal and steel represented the principal commodities which Germany had to offer the neutrals in exchange for their products, this decline represents a serious loss in German bargaining power in spite of increased prices.
The blockade and German morale.—General von Falkenhayn has testified that the tremendous moral impetus given to the German armies in 1914-15 came from the spirit which prevailed among the people at home. At this time the German armies were everywhere standing on enemy soil and the effect of the blockade had not yet been felt. As the war continued, however, the situation became less and less favorable for Germany. Falkenhayn foresaw this and pointed it out in his famous Christmas Memorandum of 1915. He said:
The power of our Allies to hold out is restricted, while our own is not unlimited. It is possible that next winter, or if the Rumanian deliveries continue, the winter after next, will bring about food crises among the members of our alliance if there is no decision by that time.9
The winter of 1916-17 found the food situation acute, although the crisis looked for by Falkenhayn did not occur. The memoirs of Ludendorff show how intimately the state of public morale was connected with the food situation. The following excerpt is typical.
The waning morale at home was intimately connected with the food situation. In wide quarters a certain decay of bodily and mental powers of resistance was noticeable, resulting in an unmanly and hysterical state of mind. In the summer of 1917 my first glimpse of the situation gave me a great shock.10
Despite the abundance of potash available in Germany, the blockade cut off the usual imports of nitrogenous fertilizers and food production fell off as a consequence. The following table, which agrees substantially with the figures given to the Hoover commission by the German government at the end of the war, shows the decline of food production during the war years.
|
1913* |
1915* |
1918* |
Wheat |
4,400 |
2,999 |
2,458 |
Barley |
3,500 |
2,000 |
2,258 |
Rye |
12,000 |
8,900 |
8,000 |
Potatoes |
52,000 |
24,699 |
29,469 |
* In terms of thousands of tons.
In considering these figures we must bear in mind the fact that although the harvest of 1913 was unusually good, Germany’s imports of foodstuffs exceeded her exports in that year by a valuation of $500,000,000.
The semi-starvation of the German people which resulted from this fall of production and from the loss through the blockade of imported foodstuffs progressively weakened the morale of the homeland and definitely contributed to the collapse of 1918. When asked why public morale could not be raised in October, 1918, Secretary of State Schcidemann put the answer plainly. He said:
That is a matter of potatoes. We have no more meat. Potatoes cannot be delivered because we have too few trucks. . . . Fat is absolutely unobtainable. The want is so great that it is a riddle to me what North and East Berlin live on. Until this riddle is solved, any improvement in morale is out of the question.11
The lack of variety in the rations of the of army and the scarcity of meats and delicacies produced discontent when the Ger- w man troops became aware that the sub- of marine war was not preventing the enemy from obtaining the luxuries which the la blockade denied them. In November, 1917, when the Austro-German forces swept forward from Caporetto into the Italian hinterland, a divisional commander, General Lecquis, “exulted more over the capture of a few chickens apiece by his men that over the hosts of prisoners taken.” The diary of Rudolf Binding, the German novelist, shows that in great advance of March, 1918, the German soldiers could not be restrained from running wild in the heavily stocked English army depots. He wrote on March 27, 1918:
Now we are in the English back areas ... a land flowing with milk and honey. Our men can hardly be distinguished from English soldiers. Everyone wears at least a leather jerkin, a waterproof, an English pair of leather boots or some other beautiful thing.12
He felt that the German advance toward Amiens was being held up by the lagging of soldiers, and Ludendorff admits that “the way in which troops stopped around captured food supplies was a serious matter.” So long felt was the scarcity of rubber and leather equipment that even a German officer was seen to stop his car when on an important mission and pick up an English waterproof. It seemed to the Germans that the English made everything of either brass or rubber because those were the two things they had seen the least of during the blockade years. The sudden realization that after years of war the enemy was immensely better off than they were in the matter of supplies and equipment made a profound effect on the mind of the German soldier.
The food shortage also brought about unfortunate repercussions in the Navy. One of the causes for unrest in the German Navy which ultimately resulted in mutiny Was the monotonous and inferior quality of the food. One of the mutineers who was sentenced to fifteen years penal servitude later testified that the food in the Redensburg prison was better than that served on S.M.S. Friedrich der Grosse in 1917.13
The facts put forth in the report of the German government to the American food commission show that the food shortage in Germany was very serious at the end of the war. Basing the bread consumption on the very low rate of 8.33 kilograms monthly per capita, the immediate deficit of bread grain was 1,208,000 tons.14 The same report shows that by 1918 the cereal consumption had fallen 36 per cent below the rate for 1913, meat consumption had fallen 72 per cent, and fat consumption had declined 88 per cent. To this evidence as to the effectiveness of the blockade is added the fact that of the relief measures carried out by the American food commission after the Armistice, Germany required the greatest share of immediate relief. She received 28.7 per cent of the post-Armistice relief, or 1,215,217 tons; Austria came next with 13.3 per cent, or 561,705 tons.15 The American commission accepted as accurate the report of the German government which estimated that 20 per cent of the population was under weight in 1918 and that an average of 800 deaths occurred daily from malnutrition and diseases arising therefrom. The final mournful testimony as to the rigor of the blockade is to be found in the heavy increase of the death rate among civilians during the war.
The question as to how far the blockade crippled Germany industrially or from the standpoint of morale cannot be definitely stated until more of the records are available to scholars. Some of the neutral countries have refused to allow the publication of war-time customs reports. Even should these figures become available, the issue will always be clouded by the controversy which exists as to whether the military arm failed because the homeland collapsed, or whether the homeland failed because the military arm faltered. These points are clear: Germany was on the verge of famine at the end of the war, and her basic industries, coal, steel, and railways, had been seriously reduced in output and efficiency. The very last instruction radioed by the German chancellor to the Armistice delegation was to use all effort to get the blockade lifted in order to save Germany from famine.16
There is a parallel to be observed between the collapse of the Confederacy under the rigor of the Civil War blockade, and the downfall of the Central Powers in 1918. The longer the perspective the clearer it appears that sea power played a decisive rôle in each instance. The World War blockade has been likened to a straight jacket:
as it was progressively tightened, so did it first cramp the prisoner’s movements and then stifle his breathing, while the tighter it became and the longer it continued, the less became the prisoner’s power of resistance and the more demoralizing the sense of constriction.
It was not the loss of lives which decided the issue of the war; it was loss of hope. The helplessness of the German people under the relentless pressure of the blockade led to hopelessness. When hopelessness supervened, then the bold and resolute courage, with which the German people faced their ever growing list of adversaries, collapsed.
1. Caldwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, I, 122. See also Aston, Marshal Foch, 123.
2. Statistics covering shipping and tonnage during the period of the war are often confusing and lacking in agreement. Unless otherwise cited the statistics used in this essay are based upon Louis Guichard’s The Naval Blockade (English translation, N.Y., 1930).
3. The series of Orders in Council, important prize cases, and the general tightening of the blockade can be traced in Julian Corbett’s Naval Operations, Vols. I-III. See also C. E. Fayle’s Seaborne Trade, 3 vols.
4. The figures for August, 1916, include trawlers.
5. Admiral M. Consett, The Triumph of Unarmed Forces (London, 1921).
6. The figure for 1918 does not include Spanish exports to Germany.
7. The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden, II, 105.
8. Guichard, The Naval Blockade, 274.
9. Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 211.
10. Ludendorff, My War Memories, I, 349.
11. The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden, I, 114.
12. Binding, A Fatalist at War, 209.
13. The Memoirs of Philipp Scheidemann, II, 229.
14. Surface and Bland, American Food in the World War and Reconstruction, 191.
15. Ibid., 36.
16. The Preliminary History of the Armistice, 150.