Editor’s Note: This narrative is from the original manuscript which has recently been presented to the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, by Mr. Edward Carey Gardiner, grandson of Henry Carey Baird (1825-1912). It appears in print for the first time through the kindness of Mr. Gardiner, who made a copy of his grandfather’s manuscript and presented it to the Institute.
PREFACE
Having taken tea and passed the evening of Sunday, October 5, 1862, at Mr. Penington’s in company with Rear Admiral Louis M. Golds- borough, I propose here to record as carefully and as accurately as possible his conversation, adding nothing intentionally to what he then said, except perhaps interweaving a few remarks illustrative of some points given to me by him more in detail at Mr. Penington’s about ten days before. The narrative shall be given as nearly in the order in which the events occurred as possible.
In connection with anything here given which may seem to indicate a disposition on the part of Admiral Goldsborough to criticize in an unfriendly or unfavorable manner the campaign of General McClellan in the Peninsula in 1862, it may be proper here to say that he entertains a high opinion of that general’s abilities and character.
Henry C. Baird
Philadelphia, October, 1862.
Admiral Goldsborough expressed in the most unreserved manner, the X Jl opinion that the entire conduct of the war had been a fearful piece of mismanagement; and that it should before this time have been brought to a successful conclusion; that never in the history of the world had there been anything to equal the slaughter without results which this contest had exhibited. Never, he added, had there been seen a greater want of strategy—that what we now needed was more strategy and less fighting.
He stated that sometime in the month of September, 1861, he was summoned to Washington, and was present at a cabinet council, where General Scott was present. After various persons had spoken, he considered it was time for him to say something; to “have his talk” as he expressed it, whereupon he remarked, “Gentlemen, I have heard a great deal said about the manner in which the war is to be conducted, but thus far I have not heard a word about how it is to be brought to an end.”
His views being at once called for, he urged as a primary necessity the building of thirty ironclad ships of war; remarking that it would be impossible in the condition and spirit in which the rebels then were to advance into their country. With the aid of these ships, he continued, you can simultaneously move upon and take possession of every one of their ports and harbors, and you can only in that way cut them off from the outer world. If necessary, let your army rest upon its arms until this is done, when you will have the enemy thrown upon his knees ready to take any terms he can get; then the army can advance with certain success, and almost without any serious obstruction. Besides which the ships now engaged at great expense in keeping up the blockade might be otherwise employed. These observations were received by General Scott with a most contemptuous sneer. It was stated by someone present that three ironclad ships were now being built, when Mr. Seward said he was in favor of increasing the number to six. Goldsborough, however, said that such a number would be of no practicable use, and that not less than thirty would be needed to carry out the plan proposed by him. The council subsequently adjourned without coming to any decision on the subject.
On separating from the other members, and joining Goldsborough, Mr. Chase told him that he was in favor of his plan and expressed his willingness to do everything in his power towards seeing it carried out, and asked him what the ships would cost. This Goldsborough said he could not then inform him with any degree of accuracy, but he presumed about half a million of dollars apiece. They then went to Mr. Chase’s house, and one of the difficulties of the case, being that of making use of any “appropriated” sum of money, Mr. Harrington, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, was sent for with whom this latter question was talked over. By agreement Chase and Goldsborough on the following day called together upon the Secretary of the Navy on the subject, it having been previously ascertained from Mr. Harrington that a sum large enough to build eighteen of these ships could be taken for this purpose.
On comparing notes with Mr. Welles, the Secretary, and Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, it was found that they both appreciated the importance of the plan and were entirely willing to give their aid in carrying it out.
Goldsborough went promptly to John Lenthall, the chief of the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair of the Navy Department, and informed him that he wished him to furnish as soon as possible the plans, specifications, and estimates for these ships. At once he went to work, and in conjunction with Mr. Isherwood, engineer in chief, attached to his bureau, the plans, specifications and estimates were furnished with the utmost promptness, and it was understood that the eighteen ships could be ready for service in six months. It is believed by Goldsborough that these ships which were to cost $600,000 each would have been fine and thoroughly efficient. He now left Washington and resumed his command at Old Point Comfort, Virginia, it being distinctly understood that the work was to be prosecuted with all the vigor which it was possible to command.
In the following month (October) he was again called to Washington, and finding that not one word was said about the > iron-plated ships, he made inquiry in regard to them, and found that the entire project had been abandoned. To whose influence this was owing he does not to this day know, though he proposes if possible to ascertain. The entire plan continued to sleep, but in his annual report in December, the Secretary of the Navy recommended the building of iron-plated ships, and a bill was soon afterwards prepared for passage through Congress. The Honorable John P. Hale, chairman of the Naval Committee in the Senate, made an attack on the secretary for some of the purchases of ships he had made and was disposed to baffle him in his plans, and accordingly he kept this bill in his “breeches pocket” for six months until the destruction of the Cumberland and the Congress by the Merimac in March, 1862, when it was promptly brought forward and as promptly became a law.
Respecting the destruction of the Cumberland and the Congress, Goldsborough said, having taken place while he was at , Roanoke Island, North Carolina, that a steamer with dispatches was immediately sent to him, informing him of the event. .
He at once abandoned all idea of going to New Bern and set out for Hampton Roads. Here he met Mr. Fox, the Assistant ( Secretary of the Navy, with whom he conferred respecting the arrangements which were necessary in this new contingency. | Goldsborough told him that one of the plans should be definitely decided upon, either to assume the offensive, and seeking out the Merrimac wherever she was to be found, destroy her if possible, or to act strictly on the defensive, and while preventing her from passing through Hampton Roads to sea or up the Chesapeake Bay, be fully prepared should she attempt it, to destroy her. He added that there was a danger in assuming the offensive that she might by some possibility slip through his hands and escape; and . that in view of the very great alarm felt along the entire northern coast—the mayors of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia having addressed the authorities at Washington on the subject—it was important to run no risks. General McClellan having soon after transferred his army to the Peninsula, his new base of operations, the responsibility of preventing her from escaping was greatly increased, and gave rise to an intense anxiety on the part of Goldsborough, which it is hard to appreciate and impossible to overestimate. Had she gotten round among the hundreds of transports collected for that army, she would, as he said, have utterly destroyed McClellan’s campaign, if nothing worse. It was on full and mature consultation and deliberation deemed better to act strictly on the defensive with reference to the Merrimac, and the most thorough and complete plans were matured, which will be hereafter described in this narrative.
Respecting McClellan’s campaign in the Peninsula and before Richmond he said that after a considerable body of McClellan’s troops had arrived in the vicinity of Old Point Comfort, the Assistant Secretary of War, Thomas A. Scott, I presume, arrived there, and visited him on board his ship. Scott said he was desirous of ascertaining what co-operation the navy could give to General McClellan in his operations, remarking at the same time that the Secretary of the Navy was under the impression that it would not be in his power to spare any of his ships. Goldsborough expressed very great surprise that he was thus called upon at this late hour, and that nothing had been said to him or to the department about a desire for cooperation, until 50,000 troops forming a part of the expedition had actually arrived there. He added, however, that he would be able to grant to the army such aid as should be needed. The Assistant Secretary then remarked that he had a very important question which he desired to put to him, and that was whether he would be willing to place himself under the orders of General McClellan. To this he said he could reply without hesitation that he would not place himself under the orders of General McClellan; that there was no principle in war more fully established than that when military and naval forces acted together the commander of neither was to be subject to the orders of the other, and that he would never under any circumstances place himself under the orders of an officer of the army. Added to this he said that General McClellan was a much younger man than he, and had had far less experience, but that should the government desire to have an officer in that position who would place himself under General McClellan, he would not for one moment stand in the way, but would retire from the command which he then held. “This however,” he said, “you may say to the President as well as to the Secretary of War, that everything which it is in my power to do for the advancement of the public good shall be done by me, and they may rely upon my co-operating with him to the full extent of my ability.” This seemed to satisfy the Assistant Secretary, and he so expressed himself and went away.
Subsequently, and before General McClellan came down, Goldsborough had a visit from General Barnard, chief engineer of McClellan’s army, and either before or after McClellan’s visit Colonel Woodbury of the engineers also came.
General McClellan at last arrived, and without going on shore he went on board the flagship where a long, free, and full consultation was held, with a thorough examination of maps and charts. The most thorough and harmonious co-operation and understanding was had, and before General McClellan left the ship at one o’clock in the morning, the following general plan was agreed upon.
It was arranged between them that the main body of the army should advance against York town from Old Point Comfort by the way of Big Bethel, while another should be landed at a place south of Yorktown known as the “Sand Box” while a movement should be made in the rear of Gloucester by McDowell, flanking it and necessitating its evacuation by the enemy. General McClellan was somewhat at a loss to know who should be placed in command of the force landed at the Sand Box, remarking to Goldsborough that General Franklin would be a good officer for the position, but that the difficulty was that he and his command were under McDowell, and that it would not do to separate him from his division. Goldsborough then said that if he had no one whom he would particularly indicate for the position, he would suggest General Hooker. General McClellan said that he really did not know enough about Hooker, to which Goldsborough replied that he had known him long and well, that some years since when he was stationed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Hooker was also there, and that he might rely upon it that he was a most capital man in whom every confidence could be placed. McClellan was satisfied and Hooker was placed in command of the troops intended to so operate.
It was arranged that as soon as the enemy evacuated Gloucester the gunboats should push up the York River and attack the enemy in his position at Yorktown, where, very strange to say, there were no guns; and Admiral Goldsborough expressed the full conviction that Yorktown could have been taken by our forces in six hours after the evacuation of Gloucester. Until Gloucester was evacuated, however, it would have been impossible for the ships which were to be used, all wooden as they were, to pass the double line of heavy gun batteries on the two sides of York River. He expressed the opinion that they would under such circumstances be such, and such views he gave to General McClellan.
General McClellan then asked who was to have command of the naval forces, when Commander John S. Missroon was sent for, and was fully informed of the duty he was expected to perform.
After this interview with General McClellan, possibly within a few days, General E. A. Hitchcock, U. S. Army, who was understood to be the military adviser of the Secretary of War, paid Flag Officer Goldsborough a visit, and the general plan of campaign was fully discussed by them, when they both agreed that they did not approve of the movement by the Peninsula, but that had they had the conduct of it in their hands they would have advanced directly from Washington. Goldsborough gave as among the advantages which would have been obtained by the direct movement, that Washington being in the rear of the army would have been constantly protected by it, and that several thousand more men could have been disengaged from the mere defense of Washington, and added to the force advancing against Richmond. At this interview General Hitchcock expressed himself thoroughly satisfied with the dispositions which had been made by the flag officer for co-operating with the army.
Time wore on, and General McClellan, finding or supposing that the enemy was in stronger force in his front than be had anticipated, was forced in the words of Admiral Goldsborough to “go through the preliminaries of a siege,” and he was induced by these apprehensions to land Hooker’s force, not at the Sand Box, as the plan of operations contemplated, but at Ship’s Point, nine miles farther north of Yorktown. To add to these difficulties, heavy rains came on, and it became almost impossible for the army even to move about in their camps, and before the enemy abandoned their works at Yorktown on the fourth of May the army had lost by death or sickness 16,000 men.
While these things were transpiring, but not until after McClellan had commenced the preliminary siege operations, and Hooker had taken his position at———General McClellan wrote one day to Goldsborough, stating that he had just received a dispatch from the Secretary of War, stating that the government had determined not to send General McDowell’s corps to him, and that he (McClellan) was amazed, and could not imagine what could have induced such an extraordinary decision.1
This corps Goldsborough said comprised 35,000 men, and that with it making the contemplated flank movement, thus inevitably forcing the evacuation of Gloucester, Yorktown would have fallen in six hours, and the gunboats could have immediately pushed up the Pamunkey as far as draft of water would admit, and large bodies of troops could have been carried there by the transports; and that Richmond would to a certainty have fallen. He added, however, that there were never more than 2,000 rebels in the Gloucester batteries, which were without a single gun in the rear, and could readily have been taken by 5,000 men without firing a gun.2 Indeed when once seriously threatened from the rear, the enemy must have immediately abandoned them, for fear of capture, for had they remained there after such a force flanked them, every man of them must have fallen a prisoner into our hands. He said most distinctly and positively that he would have engaged at any time to have taken these batteries with the sailors which he had under him in the squadron.
The long-continued delay in reducing Yorktown he felt at the time would be fatal, and he so expressed himself to Captain Van Brunt of the Minnesota and Commander Case of his staff; for independent of the frightful losses which the army had met with by sickness and death from the rain and working in the swamps, his spies kept him fully informed of the fact from time to time, that the enemy was concentrating an immense force at and between Richmond and Yorktown.
Immediately after the evacuation of Yorktown by the enemy, the President, Secretary of War, and other officers of the government came down to Old Point Comfort. Flag Officer Goldsborough called upon the President one night after he had gone to bed, and the interview took place in the President’s bedroom, he sitting up in bed. The President told Goldsborough that he would like the Monitor and Galena sent up the James River to open it. The latter told the President that if he would wait a short time until he could send around for some of the ships which were in the York River, he would have an adequate force at his disposal, the Monitor, Galena, Naugatuck, and Port Royal, the only ships which could now be sent being totally unable to accomplish the work. The Secretary of War, however, in the most impatient and imperious manner insisted that it should be done instantly; and the President said to Goldsborough that the Secretary seemed so very anxious he would like it to be done, and Goldsborough consented. The President then asked who would have command of the expedition, and he said Commander John Rodgers, who being then at hand, was called in. Some conversation then took place, and the President asked Rodgers whether he was willing to undertake it. He replied that the objections which had been urged seemed to him very just, but that if the President desired it, he would go. He then started, and as is well known, he met with a very severe repulse at Fort Darling on the right bank of the James River, situated high above the water. A number of men were killed and wounded, and Admiral Goldsborough says that Rodgers came near losing his ship, the Galena, which was fairly battered to pieces—her timbers being smashed and her knees crushed, so that at the time he spoke she leaked at the rate of five feet per day.
Goldsborough now on hearing of the repulse of Rodgers immediately went up the river, and after informing himself of the actual condition of affairs, went up the York River, and thence to General McClellan’s Headquarters, where he had an interview with the general, and told him that if he would give him an adequate land force to co-operate with him, he would, himself, take command of the naval forces and thus only could Fort Darling be carried and the James River be opened. McClellan replied that he would have to defer it until he had passed the Chickahominy, then in front of him, when it should be done.
In the interview the most complete arrangements had been made for the destruction of the Merrimac whenever she should make her appearance in the Roads, and every effort was made to induce her to come down. The merchant steamers Vanderbilt, Ericsson, and Arago were strengthened and prepared to be used as “rams,” and the frigate Minnesota was to be used for the same purpose. The batteries of the enemy on the shore towards Norfolk were attacked by the other vessels of war, and orders were given to the commanders of the wooden ships to pass to the rear and out of the way so as to leave ample room for the rams to obtain headway and to maneuver. When the Merrimac on one occasion seemed to indicate a disposition to come far enough down, these wooden ships in accordance with previous orders passed to the rear, while the Monitor maintained her position near the Merrimac, and from two to three miles from any support of our own squadron. Steam was up on board the Minnesota and the rams, the pilot was at the helm, and the flag officer stood by his side in almost constant consultation with him, momentarily hoping that the enemy would bring his ship into such a position that the word “go” could be given, and the encounter, which that officer had so long and so anxiously waited for, should take place. Repeatedly did Goldsborough put the question to his experienced pilot, asking whether the enemy was not at that instant in such a position as would justify them to rush to the encounter, for it must be remembered that the channel by which Norfolk is approached is narrow, circuitous, and treacherous in the extreme, and good sea room was a matter of absolute necessity in the maneuvers of the Minnesota and her three consorts. But the Merrimac never did take up the gauntlet put down by the Monitor. She came as far down on the one occasion named as the buoy, but around she turned, and steamed back toward Norfolk. Tattnall, who was in command of her, did say before the court- martial which tried him for the subsequent destruction of the Merrimac, that he had thrown down the gauntlet to Goldsborough and his entire fleet, but that they had never dared to take it up. Goldsborough, on the contrary, says that Tattnall knew full well that he had never once placed his ship out of the protection of the shoals, for that he knew full well that had he even ventured into the deep, wide channel his destruction would have been e as certain as that he ventured there—escape was impossible as Goldsborough fully believed.
It was the conviction and expectation of Goldsborough that in the encounter, two at least of his own ships would be destroyed, but he was satisfied that of the four, two certainly would strike the enemy in a vulnerable spot, and would sink her. In view of these partial disasters, he had made every arrangement for picking up in boats those of his own crews who should be thus in need of being rescued. No more bitter disappointment ever befell a man than that caused by the failure of the Merrimac to accept the combat thus offered to her—for having made every arrangement for her destruction it was the desire of Flag Officer Goldsborough to accomplish it first there and then and in regular hand-to-hand encounter. A few days after a movement by land was made against Norfolk, the enemy evacuated the town and General Wool occupied it. The President was here at this time, and the flag officer told him on Saturday that it would not be many hours before the Merrimac would either attempt to run through Hampton Roads or up the James River or would be blown up by her own crew. He added that should she attempt to pass up the river it was his intention to follow her in the Minnesota, for it must be remembered that several of our gunboats were still up the river; at all hazard and every risk, even to that of losing his own ship. To this the President gave his unqualified assent and approbation. This Saturday night was an anxious and almost sleepless night to the flag officer—it was the grand climax of his care, anxiety, and watchfulness over this enemy. He threw himself down in his clothes, and gave orders to his orderly to call him either one or two hours before day—I do not accurately now remember—knowing that at daylight the tide would be full and that then, if ever, was the time for the Merrimac to make the effort to pass out. Getting up, after being on deck some time, a great fire was espied in the distance followed by a tremendous explosion in the very direction in which the Merrimac often lay. He at once naturally concluded that it was she, and immediately sent out officers in tugs to make observations, and ere long his expectations were realized, and soon after the announcement was made to the President, who early Sunday morning accompanied the flag officer to Norfolk, the boat passing over on the way the position which had been occupied by the Merrimac at the time she was destroyed. The water was for a great distance around covered with fragments of the wreck, trophies from which were collected for the President and others.
The flag officer had long contemplated the more than possibility—the probability —of a reverse before Richmond, from the delays which had taken place in the movement of our own army, the concentration of the forces of the enemy, and the serious losses which we had sustained, principally from disease. He meant that the enemy should not find their abandoned fortifications on the James River and around Norfolk ready for their reoccupation when such reverses to our arms had happened, and he now early asked the permission of the President to destroy every one of these works. This permission was given, with the simple proviso that it should be done with the approbation of General Wool. Besides those about Norfolk there were three on the James River, two on the right bank at Day’s Point and Rock’s Wharf or Hardin’s Bluff, and one on the left at Jamestown Island. He asked and promptly obtained the consent of General Wool, and without delay destroyed every fortification which had been built by the enemy. General Wool took no action in regard to it, and it is safe to say that had it not been for the flag officer the work would not have been done. Every gun worth removing was carried away and taken to Washington, and the remainder were either destroyed or rendered entirely useless by having the trunnions knocked off them. Many of the works were found of immense strength— casemated earthworks—and requiring in some cases as much as 6,000 pounds of powder to destroy them. The department soon after wrote to him, inquiring by what authority he had destroyed these fortifications, and he replied that he had done it on his own judgment, with the approbation of the President. They were then probably disposed to think but little of the judgment which had prompted this work, but in his opinion they were very glad at a later day that he had done so. In fact, in his reply he said he had been induced to do it, in view of a possible reverse before Richmond. While he was at Norfolk with the Minnesota, and it would be well here to state that in going up in charge of an accomplished pilot, who had just previously buoyed out the channel, the ship grounded twice; he one day was waited upon by a clergyman of the town who desired to know whether-in the event of the “Confederates” coming back to take Norfolk he would fire upon the town. His reply was to the effect that in such an event he would not leave one stone in it upon another, and that he might give the people that assurance. The destruction of the fortifications, and the certainty of the destruction of the town now left nothing that was worth while for the enemy to attempt such a recapture.
One day, when on board the flagship, a dispatch was handed to him, which on opening proved to be from General McClellan, and was as nearly as is possible to remember in these words:
“I have been sorely pressed on my right today. If I fall back on the James River can you support me with the gunboats?”
An answer was immediately dispatched back by steamer and telegraph, and was received by General McClellan in one hour from the time that he had sent the one above mentioned. In it assurance was, of course, given that such support should be at hand, and the flag officer at once sent orders to Commander Rodgers to be ready to give all aid and protection to General McClellan as soon as his army should have reached the river. Knowing how rapidly the army exhausted its ammunition and supplies generally the flag officer gave immediate attention to the forwarding of such supplies, and made such arrangements as were necessary to provide for the future. As soon after as it was possible, he went up the river himself. Reaching Havinson’s Landing he sent word ashore to General McClellan that he was there, and would be glad either to see him on board his vessel, or would wait upon him in his own quarters, to confer with him.
General McClellan came on board during the evening and had a protracted interview. He stated that if the enemy did not attack him within twenty-four hours, he had no apprehensions, for at the end of that time he would be entirely ready for him, and could successfully meet any attack and repulse it. He did, however, entertain fears in another direction. He said that he was very apprehensive in regard to his supplies, and remarked that Commander Rodgers had expressed some doubts as to the possibility of keeping the James River open for the supplies. The flag officer assured him, however, that he need give himself no concern on that point, as he had made every arrangement for keeping the river open, and with the gunboats which he then had could and would certainly do it. General McClellan grasped him by the hand and said, “The assurance you give me is worth to me 20,000 men, nay 50,000.” He left the vessel late in the night. “In the generosity of his heart,” says Goldsborough, he wrote to the department praising the flag officer for the admirable manner in which he had ! conducted everything in the emergency in which McClellan had recently found himself placed. Goldsborough remarked in my presence that he had repeatedly heard various officers of the army at this time speak of the James River being the army’s base i of operations, but that he had as often replied, “Gentlemen, your base of operations is the gunboats, and not the James River.”
Shortly after the interview with General McClellan, Commander Rodgers being on board the flag officer’s ship informed Goldsborough that from his letters he learned that Captain Wilkes was about coming there to take command on the James River, and asked him if he had heard of it. He replied that he had not, but that he thought that it would be very proper to send an officer there of Captain Wilkes’ rank, as the command was so large. Rodgers added, however, that Wilkes was to have an independent command. Goldsborough thought this strange, and could with difficulty credit it.
The President soon after arrived, and When he had gotten through with a visit to McClellan, and an inspection of the army, the flag officer called upon him and had an interview with him. After talking over the present and immediate state of affairs, he mentioned to the President that he had learned that Captain Wilkes was coming down there to take command of the James River flotilla, to which the President replied, yes. “But,” added Goldsborough, “I also learn that he is to have a command independent of me.” The President said, no, that he certainly did not understand it so. Up to this moment Goldsborough had had no intimation whatever from the Navy Department of their intention to make this change, and certainly no suggestion, however remote, of any disapproval of his administration in any particular. But it was not originally the intention of the department to give Wilkes an independent command. He had succeeded, subsequently to being ordered to it, in inducing the Secretary of the Navy to make the change by announcing that he intended to attack Fort Darling, which he never did attack, and which Goldsborough says he never intended to attack. In fact, when he came down there all the dispositions were made, and he did nothing. He caused some boats or launches of a peculiar construction to be built at Norfolk, which he announced he intended to use in the attack on Fort Darling, but which capsized as promptly almost as any one ventured to get into them, and which were, like the proposed attack, entirely abandoned. Indeed, Captain Wilkes was seldom in the James River, but remained most of the time at Fort Monroe where at the hotel he had his family most of the time, and his continued absence from his duty was a subject of remark and comment.
Flag Officer Goldsborough now promptly determined to ask to be relieved from his command, and accordingly he wrote to the Navy Department, informing them that his professional pride had been wounded, in that without one word of intimation that such was the intention of the department, another officer had been ordered to an independent command, within his department; and he would be glad to be relieved. He was told in reply that it should be done as soon as it was possible so to do. This was early in July, and he was not relieved until about the first of September.
1. My friend Mr. A. J. Olmstead of Morristown, New Jersey, stated to me in October, 1862, that General Hitchcock had recently been in Morristown, and had there stated that the reason for making a change in the destination of McDowell’s corps was that from their spies the government received the most positive information that it was the intention of the enemy, in the event of that movement being made, to press forward against Washington, allowing us to take Richmond, and thus making an exchange of the one for the other. He believed that they could have successfully accomplished it. He then also as in the interview with Flag Officer Goldsborough expressed himself as entirely disapproving of the campaign in the Peninsula.— H.C.B.
2. Having repeated this part of Admiral Golds- borough’s conversation to Mr. Carey, (Henry C. Carey, 1793-1879) and he having in November, 1862, met with General Hooker at Mr. Secretary Chase’s, he asked his opinion in regard to this matter of the Gloucester batteries. General Hooker told him that there never was a time when a single brigade could not have turned these batteries. On being asked whether the gunboats could then have run past the Yorktown batteries, he replied that with wooden boats it would have been difficult in a clear and open day, but that it might readily have been done at night or even during the day in a fog, and Yorktown would have fallen.—H.C.B.