The study of the Monroe Doctrine, as it is interpreted today, with its corollaries and modifications, is of peculiar interest to the naval service, particularly that branch represented by the Marine Corps.
The original doctrine was a magnificent act of statesmanship intended to meet a specific object. Its spirit, rightly interpreted, is as applicable today as it was in the beginning. It was a warning to the powers of the old world that we would brook no attempt to establish on our hemisphere their systems of political philosophy—such we regarded as dangerous to the security of the United States. But the doctrine in no sense abridged the right of independent states on the American continent to pursue their own careers. These they were free to follow without fear of intervention by any state. We stood ready then to fight for that principle.
The original promulgation was not all altruism, by any means. It was dictated by our self-interest. No doubt it created a friendly feeling for us throughout the southern republics. There was no intention on our part, nor was it thought for an instant by our South American neighbors, that we assumed to place over them what might seem in a way a protectorate. All nations in the Americas were menaced then by a like danger. We, as the stronger power, took our stand with the weaker ones to face that common peril in its incipiency.
It is now apparent to the observer of Latin-American affairs that our existing policy is one distinctly different from that of previous administrations. Apparently there is a reversion to the old literal intent of the doctrine. There is observed a policy of pronounced respect for the dignity and the sovereignty of the southern republics. Their right to choose in their own way their government is not now overlooked; we are to observe this policy save where some of them may have agreed with each other to the contrary. This attitude of ours toward their domestic disturbances has an important significance.
Mr. J. Reuben Clark, formerly Under Secretary of State and now our accredited diplomatic representative to the Republic of Mexico, has said in this relation:
So far as Latin America is concerned the Monroe Doctrine is now, and always has been, not an instrument of violence and oppression, but an unbought, freely bestowed, and wholly effective guaranty of their freedom, independence, and territorial integrity against the imperialistic designs of Europe.
When the State Department, in 1931, warned Americans endangered by rebel activities in interior Nicaragua to withdraw from the country or to the coast towns, if they felt insecure under the protection afforded them by the Nicaraguan government, the new policy was emphasized. The proposed gradual withdrawal of United States Marines from Haiti and Nicaragua, according as it does to public sentiment, leaves to these republics the solution of their own domestic problems. This is another evidence of the new policy. The United States has assumed, it was stressed only a few months ago, an attitude indicative of the new policy toward the communistic disorders in San Salvador. There the principle was announced, as in the Nicaraguan case, that it was the exclusive task of the Salvadorian government to suppress and punish internal outbreaks. As bearing further on this new attitude of ours, it is noted that that same government of San Salvador recently ordered that “customs receipts, formerly paid a fiscal agent for use in servicing the country’s foreign debt, hereafter should be diverted to the national treasury.” This announcement brought forth no demand that armed forces of the United States be sent there to insure the collection of foreign debts. What is apparent from study of these incidents is equally evidenced by the attitude of our State Department in relation to earlier disturbances, revolutionary in character, in Guatemala, Honduras, Cuba, and Panama. Nor has this change of attitude been restricted exclusively to those charged with the administration of our foreign affairs. On April 23, 1932, Senator James Hamilton Lewis, referring to the killing, on April 21, 1932, of a marine officer and two enlisted men (one of the Navy and one of Marine Corps), stated in the Senate:
But let us end this using the children of America as extra pledges to the security of the private bankers, the forfeit of the pledge being the lives of these sons of our land. Mr. President, thereafter we may move once again toward reviving the friendship of South and Central America and thus justify the policy of the Monroe Doctrine and re-establish that friendship which we sought to extend them in the hope that reciprocity might avail, which in trade or in kindliness would greatly profit us.
The interventions formerly observed in the affairs of countries of the Caribbean have left, it is to be hoped, no temporary stamp on the peoples of the republics affected. The establishment of sounder fiscal systems, the advancement of educational, vocational, and agricultural training, the development of sanitary and public works systems that marked the occupations of Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua should leave a permanent influence for good in these localities. There is evidence that such is true in the case of Santo Domingo. The assembling and training of national military organizations by American officers during these occupations has enabled Santo Domingo to suppress more effectively than heretofore internal outbreaks. A similar condition will doubtless obtain in other countries.
Regardless of interpretations advanced by changing administrations as to our responsibilities under the Monroe Doctrine, that doctrine is not of itself so much a policy as it is a tradition. Back of it, inspiring it, was our admitted right as a nation to self-preservation. Any innovation of government affecting our relations with the republics washed by the Caribbean must continue to hold the particular interest of the United States. Irrespective of our duty under that doctrine, we have a duty to ourselves to see the continuation of stable government and respect for international obligations in the countries bordering the approaches to the Panama Canal. Mr. Reuben Clark, before referred to, states with regard to this feature:
Such arrangements as the United States has made, for example, with Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua are not within the doctrine as it was announced by Monroe. They may be accounted for as the expression of a national policy which, like the doctrine itself, originates in the necessities of security or self-preservation—a policy which was foreshadowed by Buchanan (1860) and by Salisbury (1895), and was outlined in what is known as the “Roosevelt corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine (1905) in connection with the Dominican debt protocol of 1904; but such arrangements are not covered by the terms of the doctrine itself.
Even though the Monroe Doctrine, as interpreted and maintained until recently, was not, in this relation, the doctrine of 1823, it must be recognized that irrespective of our duty under that doctrine we have also one to ourselves dictated by self-interest or self-preservation, that will govern our relation to the affairs of the countries bordering the Caribbean. The approaches to the Panama Canal must not pass from the control of the United States.
To this end the United States ought to be prepared, at all times, militarily, to take care of such situations as may constitute a menace to our peace and safety. It has been said that our policies should conform to the force that backs them. The contrary is equally true. The force ought not to be weakened so as to perpetuate unsound policy. Interventions, where necessary, have always been within the limits recognized by diplomatic custom. They were instituted by the initiative of the Department of State. The military forces thus employed in past operations have usually been drawn from the Marine Corps. That corps might be termed the military arm of the State Department. In that relation, its efficiency at all times has been and should continue to be a matter of deep concern in that quarter. Lieutenant Colonel Harrison S. Kerrick, (C.A.C.) U. S. Army, in his Military and Naval America (1918) says:
Our maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine in the revolution infested group of South Central American republics and West Indies, stimulates that constant preparedness and proficiency so typical of the United States Marines.
The Secretary of War, the Honorable Patrick J. Hurley, also has stated very recently:
The Army is a little different from the Navy and Marine Corps. The Marine Corps can land on foreign territory without it being considered an act of war; when the Army moves on foreign territory that is an act of war. That is one of the reasons for the Marine Corps.
These views correspond to those entertained (1922) by the General Board of the Navy, viz:
The General Board concurs in the opinion of the General Staff that the Marine Corps should not develop into a complete army under the Navy Department, but there is no tendency on the part of the Marine Corps to infringe on the mission of the Army. The missions of the Marine Corps, both in peace and war, are definite and are distinct from the missions of the Army. In peace the Navy, including the Marine Corps, has been frequently utilized by the State Department as the instrument for carrying out the foreign policies of the government. On occasions too numerous to mention, naval landing forces have temporarily occupied foreign territory for the preservation and maintenance of order and for the protection of the interests of the United States and even of the interests of other nations without creating international difficulties. Such operations by the Marine Corps acting as a part of the Navy and of the landing force of the ship or ships are regarded with less suspicion by foreign powers as to ultimate intentions. There is also room for constitutional interpretation that the President’s executive powers abroad reach farther with the Navy and with marines as a part of the former than with the Army. Certainly the practice of over a century confirms this view.1
1 Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 69th Congress, First Session, page 1036 (Extract from Report of General Board, Navy Department, dated May 9, 1922).
It is most advisable, therefore, that officers of naval forces, including marines, who may be called upon to serve in relation to affairs of the republics to our south should have a definite knowledge of the origin, history, and scope of the Monroe Doctrine, as well as the various interpretations and applications thereof. Our service in the Caribbean and other localities affected is, as stated, dictated by the policies of state, whether such be within or without the terms of the Monroe declaration.
The doctrine’s antecedents.—The seed from which might be said the Monroe Doctrine grew was planted decades before the historic message of December 2, 1823, was penned. From the very beginning of our republic, a carefully drawn pronouncement as America’s fundamental creed was made a part of the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, drawing their just powers from the consent of the governed.
The thought underlying these words represented nothing of which the old world was then heedful. It flashed, however, a conception representing the very bed rock of human rights. Its utterance laid the foundation for a structure of government then unknown. The theory underlying this doctrine of political equality in contradistinction to the principle of “the divine right of kings” was destined to blossom, thence to grow to fruition only under the condition of American freedom from European influences.
The War of the Revolution furnished the test for the establishment of this principle. American independence was thereby established. But that principle was destined to still further tests. It had to travel a rough and rugged road beset by many dangers. During that War of the Revolution two treaties with France were consummated. One was of amity and commerce and one was of alliance. Both were negotiated by Franklin and Girard with Louis XVI. Both were dated February 6, 1778. It is not necessary to give the detailed terms of these treaties. It is important, however, to observe that the express renunciation by France of her claims to Nova Scotia and Canada foreshadowed the political theory known as the Monroe Doctrine. And that alliance brought to America what above all was needed—a sea power to counterbalance that of England.
After a decade which saw the winning of our independence and the framing and adoption of the Constitution, an important event, involving our own security, occurred. The French Revolution broke out in 1789. In 1791 the rulers of Prussia and Austria, in the joint declaration of Pill- nitz, declared for the restoration of monarchy in France. In 1792 Louis XVI declared war against Austria and Prussia with Lafayette in command; French armies advanced to the Rhine; Belgium was occupied; Holland was threatened. In consequence of the danger to Holland, Pitt (the British prime minister), unequal to surprising and terrible emergencies, adopted a warlike tone, and in February, 1793, France declared war upon Great Britain. Notwithstanding our alliances with and our debt of gratitude to France, President Washington, in April, 1793, issued his proclamation of neutrality in the European wars, and on June 5, 1794, Congress passed the Neutrality Act. This act foreshadowed Washington’s later warnings as set forth in his “Farewell Address” against political affiliations with Europe. It laid the real foundations of that American policy of isolation which was to guide our statesmanship for a century or more. As late as 1895 Secretary Olney declared: “American non-intervention in Europe implied European non-intervention in America.”
Shortly after France’s declaration of war against Great Britain she sent Edmond Charles Edouard Genet as minister to the United States (March, 1793). Genet, immediately upon arrival, caused to be fitted out a number of privateers to prey on British commerce. He even endeavored to arrange for a force he expected to dispatch for the conquest of Louisiana, then under the flag of Spain. Washington’s prompt proclamation of neutrality brought Genet to book. He later endeavored to defend his actions as within the guarantees given to France by our treaties of commerce and alliance of 1778. Washington finally (August, 1793) demanded and secured Genet’s recall. The French government, in granting our request, declared that Genet’s actions were not in accordance with his instructions. It may be interesting to note that Genet, fearing the fate of his fellow Girondists, did not return to France. He remained in the United States, eventually becoming naturalized as an American citizen.
In the course of the war between Great Britain and France, neutral American vessels engaged in commerce without the protection of a national navy fared badly. This difficulty, however, was solved by a treaty with Great Britain, negotiated in 1794 by John Jay. This treaty was unpopular, both in the United States, where it resulted in bitter personal attacks on Washington, and in France. With Europe in turmoil, Washington, in his “Farewell Address” (September, 1796), issued a warning against political alliances with European powers. This warning is now a fundamental creed of American government. It is the basic principle that underlies the Monroe Doctrine. How important the application of those words to conditions of today:
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.
Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. . . .
Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.
As pointed out, a century later, by Secretary of State Olney, the principles underlying that “Farewell Address” had served to take America out of the field of European politics. At the same time Mr. Olney said that the address was silent as to the part Europe might be permitted to play in America. The French government, however, at the time, interpreted this policy as one unfriendly to its purposes in the sense that it showed a lack of sympathy with the doctrines of the French Revolution.
Because of this France, at the end of Washington’s administration, broke off relations with the United States. The abrogation of the Jay treaty was demanded. A policy more pronounced in sympathy with France was desired. To avoid an open break, President Adams sent three envoys to France to attempt to negotiate an adjustment. By April, 1798, an impasse was reached. Two of the envoys left Paris. The third was recalled in July. The French had made demands for “money, a great deal of money” as prerequisite to a promised letting up of French harassment of American commerce. Such request had been refused. It was in reference to this demand that the famous expression, “Millions for defense but not one cent for tribute,” was first uttered. Intercourse with France was promptly suspended by Congress. The treaties with France were declared at an end. American frigates were authorized to capture French vessels guilty of depredations on American commerce. An American army was formed. Washington was called from his retirement at Mount Vernon to assume its command. Thus the United States had become practically at war with France, an ally once of vital aid in our own struggle for independence.
We had not desired this situation. We were not interested in the issue that brought about the struggle between France and England. We had nothing to gain in its settlement one way or the other. As a controversy it was but the result of primary European interests essentially foreign to American concerns. On September 30, 1800, an agreement was reached adjusting the differences between the French and American governments. Actual war was avoided.
Thus enumerated are some of the major difficulties encountered by our government in steering the American ship of state from the beginnings of our nation. We were to endeavor to keep apart from the political interests of Europe. Our efforts to keep true to such a course created situations of importance for another score of years. Such was manifest in the events leading up to the Louisiana purchase. It was apparent in our conduct in relation to the revolutions in Spanish America. It was so in the war with England (1812-14). Several years after the conclusion of that conflict the London Times made the following comment:
Their (the United States) first war with England made them independent; their second made them formidable.
The direct or most contributing factor that led up to the pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine was the attitude taken by the Holy Alliance to be referred to later.
In September, 1821, Emperor Alexander of Russia issued an imperial ukase granting exclusively to Russian subjects the rights of commerce, whaling, and fishery in the waters bordering Russian possessions on the northwest coast of America. At the peril of confiscation, citizens of other nations were prohibited from operating in such waters. The ukase even prohibited foreign vessels from approaching within one hundred miles of the Russian possessions. Immediate notice was served on the Russian minister in Washington (Tuyl) that the United States
would contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on the American continent, and they would distinctly assume the principle that the American continents were no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments.
The threats implied in the Holy Alliance and the Russian ukase were considered of paramount significance. They constituted a problem suggesting endless difficulties in the future.
In March, 1820, a revolution in Spain had overthrown Ferdinand VII and restored the Constitution of 1812. In September, 1822, Chateaubriand had pledged at the Congress of Verona that France would sustain Ferdinand by force. Afterward Chateaubriand boasted that his purpose was to put France in a position to be able to establish several Bourbon monarchies in America so as to counterbalance the influence of England and the United States.
The chief subjects engrossing Monroe’s attention in his first administration as president were the defense of the Atlantic seaboard, internal improvements, the Seminole War, the acquisition of Florida, the Missouri Compromise, and resistance to the interference of European powers in American affairs, with which we are now more directly concerned.
His second term began in 1821. His constitutional advisers were John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State; Calhoun, Secretary of War; William H. Crawford of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury; Clay was speaker of the House.
From 1817 to 1825, Richard Rush was minister to Great Britain. He was the son of the distinguished Philadelphian, Dr. Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, a patriot of rare public spirit during the Revolutionary War, and one of the principal supporters of the new federal constitution. His son, Richard, born in 1780, was graduated at Princeton. After holding the offices of attorney general of Pennsylvania, comptroller of the treasury, attorney general under Madison, temporary secretary of state under Monroe, he rendered his most conspicuous service as minister to the Court of St. James.
During the period in which we are specially interested, George Canning was in charge of the Foreign Office under Lord Liverpool, nominal head of the English government. Canning was born in London in 1770.
Educated by a wealthy uncle, at Eton and Oxford, young Canning came back to London and, under the patronage of Pitt, entered Parliament at the age of twenty-three. He began life as a liberal, in sympathy with Fox and Sheridan. The excesses of the French Revolution, as shown in the Reign of Terror, seem to have turned him, in the outset of his public career, from the liberalism of the Whigs to the conservatism of the Tories.
In a gathering of the statesmen of his time, Canning took front rank. Many of the reverses suffered by Bonaparte were due to him. Canning never ceased to withstand the principles and policies of Napoleon.
The growth of liberal ideas among all classes of continental Europe was so apparent after the fall of Napoleon that the monarchs of Russia, Prussia, and Austria felt the need of co-operation in stemming the tide, and restoring the old idea of the divine right to rule without reference to the will of the people. And so, not long after the Battle of Waterloo, Alexander, Czar of Russia, induced Frederick William, King of Prussia, and Francis, Emperor of Austria, to form a league which Alexander called the Holy Alliance.
All the other Christian powers of Europe were invited to join the alliance. England held aloof; the kings of France, Spain, Naples, and Sardinia accepted the invitation.
All agree that whatever was its original design, the most effective and frequent use to which the Holy Alliance was put was to suppress, by united effort, popular uprisings and constitutional governments within the jurisdiction of each signatory monarch.
In Monroe’s second term, the Holy Alliance was exercising its benevolent intervention in the affairs of Spain.
The Spaniards had driven their monarch from the throne and had established a constitutional government. Of this the Holy Alliance did not approve as according with the will of God, and so, entering Spain, they succeeded by force of arms in restoring the banished ruler and abolishing the new order of things.
For many years the Spanish colonies in South America had been in revolt but had not been able to make good their independence by the acquiescence of the mother country. The trade of England had been much impaired by these conditions, and, aside from the interruption of their commercial relations, the sympathies of the people of the United States had for many years been aroused in favor of the revolted colonies. Public opinion throughout the country demanded an acknowledgement of independence and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the struggling Americans. At the instance of Monroe, this occurred in the spring of 1822.
Events seemed so shaping themselves as to indicate that the Holy Alliance would not content itself with establishing order in Spain, but that, deeming this finally impossible without subduing her South American subjects, it would ultimately direct its energies to that end.
The legions of the alliance, once firmly planted on South American soil, might content themselves with the professed purpose of intervention and simply restore the colonies, with their spirits crushed, to their cruel mother; or they might, under the alleged inspiration of Divine Providence, divide up those fair provinces among the members of the Holy Alliance themselves. Canning in London, and Monroe in Washington, had no great difficulty in seeing the powers of continental Europe ere long in full possession of the southern half of the American hemisphere.
The contemplation of this result was as displeasing to Great Britain as to the United States. From the English standpoint, it meant the weakening of British influence by increasing her commercial, military, and naval isolation, and the magnifying many times the power of the allies, and their opportunities for commercial and colonial supremacy in the new world. To the North American statesmen, the introduction and prevalence of the principles and practices of continental Europe, enforced by her innumerable phalanxes, threatened the peace, prosperity, and safety of the United States.
With this interesting situation of the several pieces on the chessboard, Fate, the master player, began to move in the game.
In August, 1823, Canning had an eventful interview with Rush, the American Minister. He stated to Rush that Spain’s recovery of her revolted colonies in South America was hopeless, that recognition of their independence was inevitable, that while England was committed to the policy of non-interference, she could not see, with indifference, the transfer of any of the Spanish colonies to any other power.
Under the circumstances, Canning suggested that England and the United States should unite in making a declaration to the Holy Alliance of the disapprobation with which they would view any project looking to the transfer of any of the Spanish colonies to a European power. Rush, in reply, expressed his deep regret that he had no authority to commit his government to such a declaration, but he believed the United States shared the feelings of Canning on the subject, and that his government would regard as highly unjust and fruitful of disastrous consequences any attempt by any European power to take possession of the colonies by cession or otherwise. Rush urged Canning to acknowledge the independence of the colonies, as the United States already had done (1822). But Canning replied he was not then in position to do so.
Rush transmitted to John Quincy Adams, Monroe’s secretary of state, what had occurred between himself and Canning, and asked for instructions.
In later discussions Rush referred to the traditional policy of the United States in abstaining from meddling with European affairs. But Canning argued that it was not a European, but an American question.
By the time Rush heard from his government, occurrences on the continent had relieved the apprehension of Canning and reversed his attitude. M. de Polignac, the French Ambassador, had given such assurances of the pacific intentions of France that Mr. Canning decided to drop his negotiations with Mr. Rush. But Canning’s fateful suggestion to Rush went marching on.
When the interesting dispatches of the American Minister reached Monroe, that wise and prudent president forthwith laid them before his old friends, Jefferson, Marshall, and Madison, and sought their counsel as to his proceedings. These great statesmen, called up from the quiet pursuits of extreme old age, concurred in advising that the time was propitious for the promulgation of a policy upon which the foreign relations of our country should forever rest. The opportunity was one which rarely presents itself in a nation’s history. The weakest of three rivals might impose its terms upon the two strongest. The jealousy between Great Britain and the Holy Alliance made both incapable of movement. The continental powers dreaded the British fleet. Mr. Rush pointed out that Great Britain had called in the aid of the United States because she feared France. The inference was, therefore, that England would not resist the United States should the President oppose France. Mr. Rush had written on October 10, to the Secretary of State:
It appears that having ends of her own in view, she (England) has been anxious to facilitate their accomplishment by invoking my auxiliary offices as the minister of the United States at this court, but as to the independence of the new states of America, for their own benefit, that seems quite another question in her diplomacy. It is France that must be aggrandized, not South America that must be made free.
In the development of this situation, President Monroe had, as stated, wisely sought the advice of his old friend, Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson wrote October 24, 1823, in part as follows:
The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark upon it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and particularly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom.
Chief Justice Marshall, also consulted, counseled a firm stand coupled with a positive statement clearly defining our position to the whole world. In the unique position disclosed by the reports of Mr. Rush, America stood between England and France. Mr. Monroe became the arbiter of the destiny of the American continent.
During the month of November, 1823, the question frequently occupied the attention of the President and his cabinet. As a result of these discussions President Monroe, in his message to Congress on December 2, 1823, laid down the famous principle that he would tolerate no further European intrusion upon the western continent. We so opposed the establishment in the Americas of a base of operations against us. The pertinent parts of the pronouncement are these:
. . . the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.
... It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.
... It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it on their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.
This doctrine, thus declared by Monroe, enunciated three major principles:
- The American continents were not to be subject to future colonization by any European power, and the United States would consider any attempt on the part of the “allied powers” to extend their system to any part of this hemisphere as dangerous to its peace and safety.
- With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power the United States had not interfered and would not interfere.
- To respect ourselves the independence of other new American states.
The Roosevelt corollary.—The success of our diplomacy in the Venezuelan episode of 1895 established the right of the United States to interfere in behalf of a weak neighbor in a quarrel with a stronger European power. It also raised the question as to our responsibility in the event any other weak neighbor, when in the wrong, should defy any power with just claims unsettled. This was a live question later involving the same nation (Venezuela) when both Germany and Great Britain insisted upon collection by force of their claims. It is true that the United States, many of whose commonwealths have at one time or another repudiated their bonds, was in no position to support the doctrine that national debts could be collected by force. The status then (1902) was that foreign creditors must accept the judgment of the United States as to the reasonableness of their demands and the method of collection in case of a delinquent South or Central American nation. Lord Salisbury, representing Great Britain in the Venezuelan difficulties, had said, (November 6, 1895):
If the government of the United States will not control the conduct of these communities neither can it undertake to protect them from the consequences attached to any misconduct of which they may be guilty towards other nations. If they violate in any way the rights of another state it is not alleged that the Monroe Doctrine will assure them the assistance of the United States in escaping from any reparations which they may be bound by international law to give.
To relax, in such a situation, opposition to any European power in its aim directly or indirectly to extend its system to any portion of this hemisphere was “dangerous to our peace and safety.” We were not insensible in the Venezuelan dispute to the potential danger. Our policy was one of alertness. In no slight degree did we depart from our position. Yet there was much merit in Lord Salisbury’s representations. It was their thought that gave birth to the Roosevelt corollary. Mr. Clark defines that policy in these words:
The so-called “Roosevelt corollary” was to the effect, as generally understood, that in case of financial or other difficulties in weak Latin American countries, the United States should attempt an adjustment thereof lest European governments should intervene, and intervening should occupy territory ... an act which would be contrary to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. This view seems to have had its inception in some observations of President Buchanan in his message to Congress of December 3, 1860, and was somewhat amplified by Lord Salisbury in his note to Mr. Olney of November 6, 1895, regarding the Venezuelan boundary dispute.
As has already been indicated above, it is not believed that this corollary is justified by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, however much it may be justified by the application of the doctrine of self-preservation.
President Roosevelt’s assertion (1904) called at the time the big-stick policy, contemplated it the duty of the United States to play policeman in the Western Hemisphere. Here are his words:
Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.
The Roosevelt corollary was applied to the case of Santo Domingo, then a weak Caribbean country involved in financial or other difficulties touching its relations with European or other powers. The United States, under its policy, attempted an adjustment at once of the financial troubles lest European governments intervene and in that intervention occupy territory in violence to the Monroe Doctrine. President Roosevelt’s assertion was followed by our acquisition of the Canal Zone, against the wishes of the Republic of Colombia, under an arrangement with its seceded state of Panama, a territory now recognized as the Republic of Panama. This action, unfortunately, aroused serious apprehensions in Latin America and gave color to the charge freely made in that locality that the United States had converted the Monroe Doctrine from a protective policy into one of selfish aggression. The two most significant features of our Caribbean policy, under the Roosevelt doctrines, have been the establishment of Caribbean protectorates, formal or otherwise, and the exercise of financial supervision over weak and disorderly states in that area, accompanied by armed interventions. The Platt Amendment embodied in the constitution of Cuba is an example of the former. Our interventions in Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua are examples of the latter.
But this much is clear; there is a distinction to be observed as between South American and the Caribbean countries. President Roosevelt’s words “countries washed by the Caribbean Sea” and to “such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama” intimate this distinction. Our interest in such countries rests upon a geographical fact—a condition expressed in international relations as the doctrine of territorial propinquity. However much we may be disposed to be indifferent to dangers involved in our relations with the South American republics, those that pertain to the Caribbean are especially important. There are few Americans familiar with conditions who believe we can with safety to ourselves renounce domination over the Caribbean waters and the countries washed thereby. Our present Secretary of State, the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, states the case in these words, (February 6, 1931):
The difficulties which have beset the foreign policy of the United States in carrying out these principles cannot be understood without the comprehension of a geographical fact. The very locality where the progress of these republics has been most slow; where the difficulties of race and climate have been greatest; where the recurrence of domestic violence has most frequently resulted in the failure of duty on the part of the republics themselves and the violation of the rights of life and property accorded by international law to foreigners within their territory, has been in Central America, the narrow isthmus which joins the two Americas, and among the islands which intersperse the Caribbean Sea adjacent to that isthmus. That locality has been the one spot external to our shores which nature has decreed to be most vital to our national safety, not to mention our prosperity. It commands the line of the great trade route which joins our eastern and western coasts. Even before human hands had pierced the isthmus with a seagoing canal, that route was vital to our national interest. Since the Panama Canal has become an accomplished fact, it has been not only the vital artery of our coastwise commerce but, as well, the link in our national defense which protects the defensive power of our fleet.
And President Roosevelt clarifies the situation, in his words of 1904, thus:
It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States.
The Drago doctrine.—The German activities in connection with Venezuela, to which Great Britain was in a way a party, had to do with the settlement of the claims of certain European states against that republic. These matters were settled satisfactorily to all parties by judicial decisions. The incident, however, together with our application of the so-called Roosevelt corollary in Santo Domingo, brought forth from Latin America a logical doctrine. Dr. Drago, of the Argentine Republic, put this forth in 1902. It was in effect that force should not be used in the collection of debts. It stated substantially that the collection of loans by military means implies territorial occupation to make them effective. Territorial occupation signifies the suppression or subordination of the governments of the countries on which it is imposed. The Drago doctrine was discussed at Rio de Janiero in 1906 before the Third Pan-American Conference in 1907.
Secretary Root at Buenos Aires in 1906 declared:
That the United States of America has never deemed it to be suitable that she should use her army and navy for the collection of ordinary contract debts of foreign governments to her citizens.
His view, however, was qualified by a statement in effect that the debtor state must have been ready to accept arbitration. There are few things more significant than Secretary Root’s declaration in favor of the principle of the Drago doctrine. His significant words were:
I am glad to be able to declare that the United States accepted the principles of the Drago doctrine with respect to the collection of debts.
The purchase of the Virgin Islands.—For many years prior to 1914, the beginning of the World War, efforts were made by the United States to acquire the islands of St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix, located in the Caribbean, then known as the Danish West Indies and the property of the Kingdom of Denmark.
Economically, this territory was of no value to its owners. For years these islands were not self-supporting. The Danish government carried in its home budget a part of the expenses of their government and annually contributed in addition subventions as high as $150,000 to balance the insular budget. True, they made attempts to reform the local tax system. Their efforts, however, were frustrated by the opposition of the local colonial councils. Denmark at all times was willing to be relieved of this drain upon its home resources. This condition was fully known to the United States when the purchase was consummated in 1917. We paid $25,000,000 to Denmark for this acquisition. Since then the United States has contributed even more liberally to balance annually the insular budget.
The success of this negotiation was due to the circumstance that Germany was then actively engaged in the World War. It was commonly believed that German intrigue had theretofore prevented our acquisition of these islands. Their value to us was in no sense economic. Our annual contribution from home resources toward balancing the insular budget is at least three times the sum theretofore paid annually by the Kingdom of Denmark as subventions.
The necessity for our purchase of these islands was their strategic value in relation to our defense of the approaches to the Panama Canal. We could not think of their passing into the possession of another European power. That was not to our interest under the doctrine of self-preservation. Such a transfer, it need not be stressed, would be in clear violation of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.
Applications of the Monroe Doctrine.—Since the pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine, its principles have been observed as one of the major policies of our government. Daniel Webster declared that it involved the honor of the country. “I look upon it,” he said “as part of its treasures of reputation. ...” And President Buchanan, in his message to Congress of December 3, 1860, declared that we could not shrink from our duty under the doctrine “without abandoning the traditional and established policy of the American people.” Secretary of State Olney, in his instructions of July 20, 1895, to our ambassador to England, in connection with the Venezuelan boundary question, stated that:
To abandon it (the Monroe Doctrine) . . . would be to renounce a policy which has proved both an easy defense against foreign aggression and a prolific source of internal progress and prosperity.
President Roosevelt in his annual message of December 3, 1901, stated that:
The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States.
While never having received the official sanction of Congress, except perhaps in the shape of an ambiguous resolution passed by the House of Representatives on April 4, 1864, concerning the French war in Mexico, it has since been attacked by that body indirectly. Motions to eliminate items of appropriations intended for purposes under the purview of the doctrine have been offered at various times. Such have invariably been rejected by the whole body.
Numerous executive and diplomatic interpretations of the doctrine have been made from time to time, i.e., its intended scope, when it will be invoked, and by whom, whether its provisions may be extended to differences with European powers over questions not concerned with colonization or acquisition of territory, and as to the responsibilities of Latin-American states.
The stability of the doctrine may be measured by its effectiveness in the cases in which it has been invoked. Its principles were applied, either specifically or in terms indicating its application, to the question of Colombian independence from France in 1824; to the possible extension to Cuba and Porto Rico of the war between Spain and her revolted colonies in 1825 and 1830; to the rumored transfer of Cuba from Spain to Great Britain in 1840; to the reported interference by Great Britain with the slave trade in Cuba in 1843; to objections on the part of France and Great Britain to the annexation of Texas by the United States in 1844; to the blockade instituted by France and England against Buenos Aires at the invocation of Brazil in 1846; to the proposed transfer of “the dominion and sovereignty” of Yucatan to Great Britain and Spain in 1848; to the rumored desire of Great Britain to acquire Cuba in 1848 and 1849; to the reported interference by European governments in the affairs of Ecuador in 1848; to rumors of French and British intervention in the affairs of Cuba in 1851 and 1852; to the reported preparations for attack on Mexico by Spain in 1858; to the reported plans of Great Britain and France to adopt measures of force toward Mexico in 1859-1860; to the French operations in Mexico (1861-1864); to the claim of Spain for reacquisition of the Chincha Islands (Peru) (1864-1866); to the establishment of the dominion government for Canada in 1867; to Cuba’s struggle for freedom from Spain in 1869; to the Venezuelan boundary line dispute (1881, 1886, 1895); to the proposed sale of Mole St. Nicholas by Haiti to France in 1885; to the rumors of the declaration of a protectorate over Haiti by France in 1887; to rumors that Great Britain intended to seize the Island of Tortuga in 1887; and to the Haitian government’s desire, born out of the “Leuders” indemnity incident with Germany, for a closer alliance with the United States, virtually placing them under our protection (1898).
While the instances cited do not cover all of the cases in which the principles of the Monroe Doctrine were invoked and applied, they indicate the fact that if we are to consider the doctrine a “cardinal policy,” as so stated by Roosevelt, eternal vigilance must be the rule. The frequent invocation of the rule from the date of its declaration to the beginning of the twentieth century in differences between European governments and American states, each difference presenting new facts or new grievances, indicates clearly the aggressiveness, whether selfish or otherwise, with which the doctrine is attacked by those who would, in the absence of its rigid interpretation and enforcement, be constantly on the alert for new fields for forceful aggression, thus constituting a continuing menace to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. Cold experience has shown the selfish attitude of outside interests. Were the United States to adopt a “hands-off” attitude, the Western Hemisphere would soon be overrun by powers seeking territorial expansion; wars of territorial aggression between American states would flourish; our own peace and security would be in continual jeopardy, and our annual bill for national defense would be well nigh incalculable. We would be forced to maintain an army and navy not even equalled by European powers bounded on all sides by potential enemies. The “stitch in time” enforcement of the dicta of the Monroe Doctrine has blocked even footholds that might later trespass on our security, and has made it possible for us to maintain our national defense at a per capita cost less than now obtains in any country on earth, even less than Germany, whose activities in that direction are mandatorily proscribed.
Critics of the policy of the United States under the doctrine have at times intimated that this government has made it (the doctrine) the basis for certain actions that did not come under the terms of the original pronouncement; in other words that its terms have been modified from time to time to suit the needs of the American nations. Referring to this phase of the subject, Brigadier General Dion Williams of the Marine Corps has recently pointed out what Chief Justice Hughes, as secretary of state, has said in his address, “Our Relations to the Nations of the Western Hemisphere” (1928):
I may repeat my statement made at the time of the celebration of the centenary of the doctrine that in all that has been said or done since the declaration of Monroe it must be regarded as modified in only two particulars. What was said with Europe exclusively in view must be deemed equally applicable to all non-American powers; and the opposition to the extension of colonization was not dependent upon the particular method of securing territory and, at least since the time of President Polk, may be deemed to embrace opposition to acquisition of additional territory through transfer of dominion or sovereignty. Neither of these modifications change the doctrine in its essentials and it may be summarized as being opposed (1) to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American states under any guise, and (2) to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by any non-American power.
In the above-quoted summary, it will be seen the principles of the doctrine do apply to other than European nations, for instance to the nations of the Orient.
With cases involving two nations of the Western Hemisphere in disputes as to the ownership or control of territory wholly within the Americas, the Monroe Doctrine has no application and the actions of the United States in such cases looking toward a peaceful settlement of the differences by arbitration, or otherwise, are not taken pursuant to the doctrine. As a case in point, the action of the United States government which resulted in the establishment of an American republic in the Island of Cuba in 1898 was not taken under the application of the doctrine since there was here no question of the acquisition of “any additional territory” in the Western Hemisphere by the government of Spain. The war with Spain was based upon other causes, and the statements sometimes made that “the United States freed Cuba from the rule of Spain in accordance with the dictates of the Monroe Doctrine” is not correct. But, should Spain attempt by reconquest or otherwise (for instance, by purchase) to reacquire territory in Cuba, which it had once occupied and afterwards lost, that action would be directly contrary to the terms of the Monroe Doctrine.
Mr. Elihu Root, before the American Society of International Law, on April 22, 1914, stated that the doctrine was “a declaration of the United States that certain acts would be injurious to the peace and safety of the United States and that the United States would regard them as unfriendly,” and that it (the doctrine) “concerns itself only with the occupation of territory in the new world to the subversion or exclusion of a pre-existing American government.”
Since the beginning of the present century, many instances have occurred, as previously indicated, where the United states has found it necessary to make forceful interventions in Caribbean countries for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of its nationals, quelling disturbances which might have led to more serious consequences, etc. In some of these cases, these interventions forestalled the impending landing of a force from a vessel of a European power in adjacent waters. The British cruiser Colombo at Bluefields in 1927 and the French cruiser De cartes at Cap-Haitien in 1915 are two examples. These vessels were there to safeguard British or French interests should our attitude in these situations render such necessary. These interventions fall within the category of police powers—an outgrowth of the corollary of Roosevelt. That is now recognized as based not so much upon the Monroe Doctrine, per se, as upon the security of the United States under the doctrine of territorial propinquity.
Among these cases might be mentioned the Cuban pacification (1906-09), Nicaragua (1912), Mexico (1914), Haiti (1915), Haiti (1919-20), Santo Domingo (1916), Mexico (1916) and Nicaragua (1926-32). With regard to Nicaragua (1926-32), President Coolidge, on April 25, 1927, publicly stated that we were “not making war on Nicaragua any more than a policeman on the street is making war on passers-by.” He meant that the forces of the Marine Corps were operating in Nicaragua for the primary purpose of protecting our citizens and their property, and incidentally as a police force attempting to quell an internal disturbance and restore the regular order. For these reasons, also, have the forces of the Marine Corps been called upon to supervise the elections in certain West Indian and Central American republics.
While these duties performed by the Navy and Marine Corps were pursuant not so much to direct mandates of the Monroe Doctrine, it must not be overlooked that a restoration of order from chaotic conditions, performed by the United States, might, in some instances, obviate the necessity of some other civilized nation, even European, to attempt itself to protect there the life and property of its own nationals. That such a procedure, if followed, might create conditions regarded by us as a violation of the doctrine is apparent. The realization that the United States follows no “dog in the manger” policy under the doctrine of Monroe is most important.
On January 6, 1916, President Wilson, addressing the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress, made the following statement pertaining to the Monroe Doctrine:
The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It always has been maintained, and always will be maintained, upon her own responsibility. But the Monroe Doctrine demanded merely that European governments should not attempt to extend their political systems to this side of the Atlantic. It did not disclose the use which the United States intended to make of her power on this side of the Atlantic. It was a hand held up in warning, but there was no promise in it of what America was going to do with the implied and partial protectorate which she apparently was trying to set up on this side of the water; and I believe you will sustain me in the statement that it has been fears and suspicions on this score which have hitherto prevented the greater intimacy and confidence and trust between the Americas. The states of America have not been certain what the United States would do with her power. That doubt must be removed. And latterly there has been a very frank interchange of views between the authorities in Washington and those who represented the other states of this hemisphere, an interchange of views charming and hopeful, because based upon an increasingly sure appreciation of the spirit in which they were undertaken. These gentlemen have seen that if America is to come into her own, into her legitimate own, in a world of peace and order she must establish the foundations of amity so that no one will hereafter doubt them. I hope and believe that this can be accomplished.
Mr. Stimson as secretary of state (1931) explains in what respect the existing administrative policies differ from those of President Wilson, at the same time clarifying my own statement in the beginning that the right of our southern neighbors to choose in their own way their government is to be recognized “save where some of them may have agreed with each other to the contrary,” viz:
In his sympathy for the development of free constitutional institutions among the people of our Latin-American neighbors, Mr. Wilson did not differ from the feelings of the great mass of his countrymen in the United States, including Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Adams, whose statements I have quoted; but he differed from the practice of his predecessors in seeking actively to propagate these institutions in a foreign country by the direct influence of this government and to do this against the desire of the authorities and people of Mexico.
The present administration has refused to follow the policy of Mr. Wilson and has followed consistently the former practice of this government since the days of Jefferson. As soon as it was reported to us, through our diplomatic representatives, that the new governments in Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Panama were in control of the administrative machinery of the state, with the apparent general acquiescence of their people, and that they were willing and apparently able to discharge their international and conventional obligations, they were recognized by our government. And, in view of the economic depression, with the consequent need for prompt measures of financial stabilization, we did this with as little delay as possible in order to give those sorely pressed countries the quickest possible opportunities for recovering their economic poise.
Such has been our policy in all cases where international practice was not affected or controlled by pre-existing treaty. In the five republics of Central America, Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, however, we have found an entirely different situation existing from that normally presented under international law and practice. As I have already pointed out, those countries geographically have for a century been the focus of the greatest difficulties and the most frequent disturbances in their earnest course towards competent maturity in the discharge of their international obligations. Until some two decades ago, war within and without was their almost yearly portion. No administration of their government was long safe from revolutionary attack instigated either by factions of its own citizens or by the machinations of another one of the five republics. Free elections, the cornerstone upon which our own democracy rests, had been practically unknown during the entire period. In 1907 (Continued from page 1420) a period of strife, involving four of the five republics, had lasted almost without interruption for several years. In that year, on the joint suggestion and mediation of the governments of the United States and Mexico, the five republics met for the purpose of considering methods intended to mitigate and, if possible, terminate the intolerable situation. By one of the conventions which they then adopted, the five republics agreed with one another as follows:
“The governments of the high contracting parties shall not recognize any other government which may come into power in any of the five republics as a consequence of a coup d’etat, or of a revolution against the recognized government, so long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof, have not constitutionally reorganized the country.”
Sixteen years later, in 1923, the same five republics, evidently satisfied with the principle they had thus adopted and desiring to re-enforce it and prevent any future evasions of that principle, met again, re-enacted the same covenant, and further promised each other that even after a revolutionary government had been constitutionally reorganized by the representatives of the people, they would not recognize it if its president should have been a leader in the preceding revolution or related to such a leader by blood or marriage, or if he should have been a cabinet officer or held some high military command during the accomplishment of the revolution. Some four months thereafter, our own government, on the invitation of these republics, who had conducted their meeting in Washington, announced, through Secretary Hughes, that the United States would in its future dealings with those republics follow out the same principle which they had thus established in their treaty. Since that time we have consistently adhered to this policy in respect to those five republics.
The attitude of Great Britain toward the doctrine.—Thomas Jefferson, on October 24, 1823, had said:
Our first and fundamental maxim should never be to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.
Sixty-five years later, the Secretary of State, Mr. Olney, commented in connection with the Venezuelan boundary dispute with regard to this principle, as follows:
The Monroe administration therefore did not hesitate to accept and apply the logic of the “Farewell Address” by declaring in effect that American non-intervention in European affairs necessarily implied and meant European nonintervention in American affairs.
In 1830 the English statesman, Mr. Huskisson, in the British House of Commons had said that: “England could not suffer the United States to bring under their domination a greater portion of the shores of the Gulf of Mexico than that which they then possessed,” and then added, “That the Gulf of Mexico should not become part of the waters of the United States.” Very different views now animate the government of Great Britain.
Up to 1895 the United States almost always refrained from so much as showing interest in European affairs. Monroe warmly sympathized with the Greek Revolution of 1823. He, however, never allowed himself to express that sympathy. This was in accord with the American doctrine of isolation, a corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. It meant the isolation of the United States from any interest or concern in European affairs. The most striking result of the Spanish War was the abandonment of this cherished doctrine of the two spheres, American and European, the former for us, the latter for Europe. We, because of the result of that conflict, were interjected into world affairs.
In 1902 Mr. Hay did not refrain from making a pointed protest against the treatment of the Jews in Rumania. In 1904 President Roosevelt expressed his “horror upon an occasion like that of the massacre of the Jews in Kishinef.” Towards the end of the Spanish War there was a hint of sending our fleet to harry the Spanish coast.
But this did not mean any abandonment of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. The Roosevelt administration fortified and amplified this principle, but upon the simpler ground of our paramount interest in American affairs. This was shown first of all in our new relations toward Panama. The second Pan-American Congress in 1902 had formally approved the construction of the Panama Canal by the United States government. Our first object then was to procure from Great Britain a withdrawal of the principle of joint interest in the construction of the Panama Canal, an interest embodied in the old Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.
In 1902 a new treaty was negotiated by Mr. Hay, wherein Great Britain admitted our right to go forward singly with the construction of the canal. So far as the world’s highway was concerned, Great Britain thereby abdicated to American power. As she then controlled the Suez Canal, she well could so concede in our favor. Thus the United States went back to the doctrine of Secretary Cass (1858), in effect:
Sovereignty has its duties as well as its rights and none of these local governments, even if administered with more regard to just demands of other nations than they have been, would be permitted in a spirit of eastern isolation to close the gates of intercourse on the great highways of the world.
England from time to time may have objected to some of the corollaries or other deductions drawn from the Monroe Doctrine. On the whole, however, she has not been unfavorably disposed toward the essential features of our policy. It was an open-door policy. It accorded to the principle of free trade. The United States never used it to establish any exclusive trade relations with the southern republics. Great Britain at any time during the thirty years preceding the World War could have settled many of her difficulties with Germany had she agreed with that nation to permit Germany to contest our application of the Monroe Doctrine to estop her in her ambitions in South America, particularly in Brazil. But Great Britain wisely refrained. The success of our diplomatic negotiations in 1895 in the Venezuelan difficulty, as affecting Great Britain, led Germany to such a position that she could assert nothing to the contrary in connection with her difficulties with the same nation (Venezuela) in 1902. And it may be significant to add that Great Britain no longer maintains her coaling stations in the Caribbean as naval bases fortified in the marked degree that prevailed prior to 1898.
The policy of today.—For the past four years our Department of State has, as indicated, corrected misunderstandings by maintaining an attitude toward Latin America distinctly different from previous administrations. An important fact should not be overlooked, written in the pages of inter-American relations a few days ago. It, the State Department, declined to be a party to an extra-constitutional proposal aimed in the interest of the continuance of better conditions of order in the Republic of Nicaragua, to permit the present incumbent of the presidency to continue in office beyond the term prescribed in the constitution of Nicaragua. That refusal received the frank approbation of public opinion in Latin America. The State Department said, in that matter “the amendment of the Nicaraguan constitution is, of course, a question for determination by Nicaragua alone.” The statement continued, saying in effect, it is perfectly clear in stressing the fact that presidential elections must take place during the present year as scheduled, and a new chief executive must be inaugurated on January 1, 1933, in accord with the present constitutional provisions of the Nicaraguan Republic.
The State Department mentions, further, the “admirable progress” Nicaragua has made through the holding of free and fair elections in 1928 and 1930. It declares:
The Secretary of State believes that the course of wisdom would be to consolidate this progress and to add another step to it through holding the regular and normal elections, as scheduled, in 1932 for president, vice president, one-half the membership of the chamber of deputies and one- third of the senate of the regular Congress.
In this statement our Department of State is most emphatic.
The high lights of the new American policy seem to be: (1) The new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, reverting to its original meaning, minus the corollaries and distortions which have discredited it in the past; (2) the reversion of the State Department to the Jeffersonian theory of recognition of revolutionary governments, which pays a tribute to the sovereignty of the Latin-American peoples and their right to choose, in their own way, their own government; (3) the refusal of the State Department to meddle in the domestic quarrels of some of the Latin republics, even when American interests are in danger, as in the Cuban, Honduran, and Salvadorian revolutions; (4) Secretary Stimson’s announcement warning Americans endangered by rebel activities to withdraw from the interior of Nicaragua and not to expect armed protection other than that which the Nicaraguan government and the local authorities could afford them; (5) the gradual withdrawal of marines from Haiti and Nicaragua, and the State Department’s promise that the last marine will quit Nicaraguan soil immediately after the coming presidential elections; (6) the reluctance of the department to interfere further with the internal affairs of Latin-American politics, as evidenced by the failure here of interventionists moves by Guatemalans, Cubans, Hondurans, Salvadorians, and Panamanians, in the last few years, and (7) the reaffirmation of our purpose to be bound, so far as concerns these Central American countries, by their pact binding themselves to recognize no government there established by revolution and at the same time to govern our attitude toward conditions in Central American and the Caribbean countries by considerations involving our own national security.
The most recent Nicaragua “episode” has served to test the sincerity of the State Department’s new Latin-American policy; it has served to prove that the United States government has really abandoned its interventionistic regime of yesterday; it has served to show that there is today in Washington a better understanding of the internal politics of the Caribbean countries and a greater respect for their sovereignty and their ability to settle their own domestic problems.
It will be interesting to observe to what extent these principles may be applied, should necessity arise, to impending difficulties in Chile. At this writing a new Socialistic government, by a coup d’etat, has assumed power at Santiago de Chile. That government has announced a proposed policy involving confiscatory measures touching foreign currency on deposit in Chilean banks and with respect to certain foreign industrial interests. Protests by Great Britain and the United States against these proposed measures have already been made. And it is now announced in the British Parliament that England will demand full compensation for British interests affected.