Very inadequate consideration, it is believed, has to date been given to the building up of a doctrine for the effective naval utilization of airships by our service. A reason for this apparent apathy has, of course, been the lack of vessels of this type to operate with the fleet and thereby assist in building up such a doctrine. The general public in this country and many officers of the Navy have what are considered to be erroneous ideas as to airships, particularly their war use, and more particularly, their specific strategical and tactical missions. These erroneous ideas were founded largely in war-time propaganda, and have flourished in the fertile soil of general ignorance and apathy toward airships.
Now, however, the U.S.S. Akron, the Navy’s newly commissioned airship scout cruiser, is available for fleet work, and it is believed highly desirable to have an airship doctrine worked up without delay. Such an airship doctrine should be originated, it would seem, jointly by the staff of the Naval War College and airship officers; it should be a specific written doctrine, covering the major and secondary strategical and tactical missions of airships, in the light of accumulated experience and the present state of the art. The initial purpose of such a doctrine, and a reason for working it up with minimum delay, would be to crystallize naval opinion as to the role of airships. The original, or Mark I, doctrine would be a first approximation and would be modified from time to time as the lessons to be had from the Akron’s operations can be assimilated.
With the idea of starting discussion, and perhaps, healthy controversy, the writer proposes to herein briefly discuss some of the considerations bearing on this matter, and to submit in outline form his idea of what the airship doctrine should be. This proposed doctrine, as well as all other opinions expressed herein, are those of the writer personally, and it should be realized at the outset that many of them may not find general agreement in the service, or even among airship officers.
To fully cover the subject, it must be considered under two general headings, viz:
ZN—Nonrigid (or pressure) airships—blimps.
ZRS—Rigid (Zeppelin), airships, scouting vessels.
Hereinafter, the term “blimp” will be used to denote the nonrigid or pressure type, and “airship” to denote the large rigid (Zeppelin) type.
Blimps
Discussion.—This class properly includes both the conventional fabric-hull vessel and the metallic hull-and-plated pressure vessel of the ZMC-2 type, of which only one ship has thus far been built. (It is only fair to point out here that the ZMC-2 was not built primarily to compete with conventional blimps, as such, but rather as an experimental ship looking towards later adaptation of metal hull covering to ships of Zeppelin size.)
Blimps were used very effectively by the major powers in the war of 1914-18. No convoy escorted by a blimp was attacked by a submarine. Records show that allied blimps cruised approximately 89,000 ship hours and about 2,250,000 nautical miles. In late years we have made use of this class in only one of its categories of usefulness, namely, training of personnel. It is strongly believed that we should develop and utilize this class far more extensively than at present, in order to take full advantage of its possibilities.
The blimp’s useful employment may be divided into three categories, namely: (a) training of personnel; (b) research, test and development, general utility, mapping, photographing; (c) strategical and tactical employment. Category (a) may be subdivided into “Training of personnel for ZRS duty” and “Training of personnel for blimp duty.” It is strongly believed that adequate training in blimps is essential and indispensable in producing watch officers for large ships.
Not only is primary training necessary, but continuing familiarization training of ZRS officers in blimps (except for commanding and executive officers) is necessary if we are to have officers with some ship-handling ability in the chain of command. Enlisted men of the crews of ZRS’s should also have had a few hours in blimps before they receive the designation “qualified for airship duty”; more particularly, enlisted men in training for the elevator watch list of a ZRS, should have adequate primary time in blimps. It is believed that lack of blimp training was a fatal flaw in recent British airship policy. It is also just as much of an error in German policy, but is, in this latter case, largely counteracted by certain other considerations.
Personnel must, of course, be trained for blimp duty. This training should be more comprehensive and extensive than in the case of ZRS crews. When more blimps become available the present course and syllabus at Lakehurst may advantageously be expanded to provide more fully for the necessary training in these ships.
Under category (b), blimps can be utilized in a great variety of research, test, and general utility missions, on behalf of lighter-than-air and other branches of the service, very efficiently and economically. The present-day blimp itself is susceptible to improvement in performance.
Under category (c), the blimp is conceived of as strictly a naval district craft; her area of operations is the coastal belt extending from the outer limits of territorial waters to a distance of several hundred miles offshore; she is a low-altitude craft, 6,000 feet probably being a normal service maximum altitude. Within her area of operation, she will be valuable, strategically, as a high-speed scouting and patrol vessel; for convoy escort; for covering mining and mine-sweeping craft, and for dispatch work. Tactically, the blimp must retire or take cover from enemy surface or airplane attack; under many conditions, however, the blimp may successfully engage enemy sub-surface craft; the blimp is particularly well fitted to discover and track submarines. In general, the blimp is believed to be a most valuable coastal type, superior in performance (speed and range) to most coastal craft (except the seaplane), able to take cover in clouds, particularly suited for night and low visibility operations, negative scouting and anti-submarine patrol.
Secondary and infrequent utilizations of blimps are: assisting in blockade of enemy ports; running own blockaded ports; operating from airplane carriers; liaison with army coast defense forces.
ZRS (rigid airships)
The Akron and Macon are designed as scouting vessels. They will combine very high speed, (twice that of the fastest surface cruiser) with long range, maneuverability in three dimensions, good sea-keeping ability, and excellent livability for their crews. Their upkeep, maintenance, and operation costs, as well as personnel costs, are small compared to surface cruisers. They will carry more planes than present-day surface cruisers.
Considering their specific primary mission of scouting, their areas of visibility will be greater than those of surface cruisers by a great or small amount depending upon altitude and meteorological factors; therefore, for a certain number of miles steamed, more square miles of surface area will have been observed by the airship. Bringing in the time factor (speed), it is evident that in a given time interval, the ZRS will be able to scout an area many fold greater than can a surface cruiser. Ship’s planes can, of course, be utilized as extensions to the “eye” of a vessel of either type. But it would seem that the airship can more efficiently and effectively utilize her planes in this way, because, in the first place, she has more planes, and in the second place, she can get her planes back aboard without slowing down; it is probable, furthermore, that the airship’s planes can be designed with better performance than can those of a surface cruiser.
Another major advantage of the airship over her sister cruiser on the surface is her ability to take cover in clouds when the meteorological gods are kind enough to provide such; she can do this without sacrificing speed or endurance (with which handicaps the submarine is taxed when submerged); and the airship’s spy basket is a much better “eye” than is the periscope. And when submerged in clouds, or concealed above them, the ZRS has full normal use of her powerful, long-range, intermediate-frequency and high-frequency radio transmitters, which use of transmitters is denied the submerged submarine. Of course, the same applies to the use of radio receivers and direction finders.
The airship’s armament will consist primarily of a battery of light rapid-fire guns (.50 cal. machine guns), and her mobile, long-range “guns,” that is, her complement of airplanes. As a secondary item of ordnance, she will probably carry a small quantity of bombs. The shipboard guns will be so disposed as to cover all angles of approach, and furthermore in such a way as to allow the maximum concentration of fire in the directions from which attack is most likely and most dangerous. Naturally the battery is to be considered primarily an anti-aircraft one. The ship’s airplanes, of course, will carry conventional heavier-than-air types of machine guns, light bombs, and “smoke” apparatus.
As a steady gun platform the ZRS is superior to any other fleet type. In heavy weather the airship has far smaller amplitudes in roll and no greater amplitudes in pitch and yaw than present battleships or carriers. In regard to seaworthiness, or weather-worthiness, the airship’s position is very favorable. Being completely and continually submerged in its operating medium, the air, the airship is not subjected to the “wracking” and pounding which the surface vessel suffers in heavy weather, at the “surface of discontinuity” between air and water. Often when a “whole gale” is blowing and surface ships are most uncomfortable, the air will be smooth at airship levels, and the ZRS suffers no inconvenience except loss of ground speed if wanting to get to windward. In turbulent air conditions at sea the airship’s motion in roll, pitch, and yaw is less than, or comparable to, that of the largest surface vessels in analogous conditions. The airship’s high mobility, furthermore, permits her to detour around extremely foul weather when it may be expedient to do so. Low surface visibility means nothing to the airship so far as ship control is concerned under way. On some occasions when sub-surface and surface craft are handicapped by weather conditions, and when surface based planes will be weather bound, the airship will be functioning at or near her full efficiency and may be able to use her planes effectively.
Now, to argue on the negative side of the question, a few of the general misconceptions relative to airships will be stated and briefly discussed.
Very vulnerable (easily sunk by airplane attack).—This idea is directly traceable to war-time allied propaganda, wholly justified as a war measure, but unfortunate in its later effect upon airships in this country. A perusal of the records of the German war Zeppelins gives one the very definite conviction that they were far from being unduly vulnerable. A vast preponderance of the German ships were lost because of improper or unwise employment and directly or indirectly because of the too-short training periods and inexperience of their crews—in other words, poor handling. The number of ships which were lost by enemy action, airplane or otherwise, when properly employed and moderately well-handled, was very small indeed; and this in spite of the very small and poor ships which were utilized, judged by modern standards. Nevertheless, German Zeppelins during the war steamed about 3,000,000 miles in about 75,000 ship hours.
Of course, the airplane men will say: “But remember, the airplane too has improved in performance enormously since the war.” The present status of airships tactically, in direct combative action, as it appears to the writer is: Airplane attack in large force, and “pushed home” energetically and efficiently will undoubtedly quite often sink an airship (especially if a plane “rams”), and particularly if the attack is surprise. This is largely analogous to a surface cruiser attacked by a large force of destroyers or torpedo planes. Properly employed, the airship will not usually be subject to enemy airplane attack in force. Even if attacked in force, the airship will give a good account of herself, and will put a number of enemy planes out of action. Unless the enemy has great preponderance of airplane superiority, and in the unusual event of being afforded an opportunity to attack an airship in force, will he care to risk losing an appreciable number of his planes in a Zeppelin attack prior to a fleet action? Will he not prefer to harass the airship with a few planes, and let it go at that? If attacked mildly (a few enemy planes), the airship should have no more difficulty than a surface cruiser would have if attacked by a few destroyers. Reasons: powerful ordnance layout; excellent gun platform; speed and maneuverability (high compared to surface vessel); own planes which will undoubtedly be superior in performance to attacking surface-based planes; ability to take cover in clouds and darkness.
The airship, properly employed, is subject to attack only by enemy aircraft, while surface or sub-surface craft are subject to attack by enemy air, surface, or sub-surface craft. Even airplanes of most types are subject to attack by surface batteries.
It will be as difficult, or more so, to shoot the buoyancy out of an airship as it will a water-sustained craft. Gas comes out of even relatively large holes in gas cells slowly, and holes can be rapidly and readily closed by the crew. The structure is so redundant and with such ample factors of safety, that it would take rather enormous structural damage to put the airship “out.” Buoyancy and power plant are subdivided into multiple units, and controls are duplicated. Use of helium reduces to negligibility the fire hazard.
The problem of bombing an airship will be very difficult for airplanes because of the high speed and maneuverability of the airship and the difficulty of knowing the differential altitude. Bombs must land on the ship, there being no “mining” effect from landing bombs alongside, as in water craft targets.
Good only for negative scouting.—The writer strongly believes this is not the case and that airships are excellent for positive scouting. The airship’s high speed and long range as compared to a surface cruiser, and her ability to often take cover in clouds, but without the submarine’s attendant necessity to sacrifice speed and communications, make her a valuable positive scouting vessel, equal in effectiveness, under many sets of circumstances, to several surface and/or sub-surface scouts. The airship’s speed permits her to track any enemy surface craft contacted, unless beaten off by enemy airplane attack in force; a submarine cannot always do this because of low speed.
Airships must attain high altitudes, (presumably to avoid surface batteries or airplanes), and in so doing lose most of their performance.—It is believed that this is one of the most serious misconceptions with respect to airships with which we have to deal. Its genesis again lies in the war of 1914-18, during which the Germans built many ships specifically for the abortive raiding (bombing) expeditions to England. Practically every other feature in these ships was sacrificed and “trimmed” to produce a superlight vessel which could attain extreme altitudes on the return voyages. Actually and properly, it is now considered that bombardment of enemy territory is a minor and infrequent mission of airships; in general, surface craft or airplanes can do it more effectively and efficiently. Our airships are built as scout cruisers, not as “high altitude bombers.” If there were any legitimate need for airship bombers it would be a straightforward engineering job to design and build them (as the Germans did), just as it is feasible from an engineering standpoint to design and build submarines capable of operating at extreme (and absurd) depths; of course, the submarine would be so heavy structurally that she would have no buoyancy left for fuel, just as the airship at extreme altitude would have no fuel left. Our airships are essentially and primarily scouting vessels. It is submitted (and many may not agree with the writer on this) that they are essentially and primarily low-altitude scouting vessels, (in much the same way that our submarines are relatively shallow-submergence vessels). It is submitted that airships in their proper and normal rôle, do not have occasion to go above 6,000 ft., and probably will seldom do so; it further would seem that 10,000 to 12,000 ft. will be a maximum emergency altitude, very infrequently attained. The guess is made that 90 per cent of cruising will be at 3,500 ft. or below.
Are vulnerable to shore batteries.—True, but so are all naval craft. Airships are essentially ocean-going vessels, high-seas craft, and have no more reason to be under the guns of shore fortifications (whether coastal or inland) than have any other units of the fleet.
Airships are slow and cumbersome compared with airplanes.—True, but there is no justification for comparing airships with airplanes, any more than it is justifiable to compare the performance characteristics of submarines with those of destroyers, or a surface liner with a racing boat. Rather, they must be contrasted. In considering their proper place in the fleet, airships are to be compared with surface scout cruisers, since the airship’s role is essentially that of a scout cruiser. Airplanes and airships are mutually complementary, not competitive; neither is capable of carrying out the other’s mission or missions effectively.
Summary
Somewhat in the way of recapitulation, the airship’s attributes which tend to make her a valuable and efficient fleet type are: very high speed, (twice that of any other type of vessel, exceeded only by airplanes); long range at high speeds; livability for crew, excellent and comparable to latest surface craft; suffers less from stress of weather than certain other types; greater area of surface visibility under given conditions than other types, except airplanes; powerful radio equipment; excellent gun platform; carries more airplanes than other vessels, except carriers with probably higher-performance planes; armament and ability to withstand “punishment” from enemy attack is comparable in effectiveness to an unarmored surface cruiser, considering the forms of attack to which each type is exposed, respectively; it shares with the submarine the advantageous strategical and tactical attribute of ability to render self invisible (taking cover in or above clouds), under frequent meteorological conditions, without, however, the accompanying handicap of loss of speed and loss of ability to use radio transmitters, which the submarine suffers, and the spy basket is a better eye than is the periscope; its vulnerability is comparable to that of an unarmored surface cruiser, and is believed less vulnerable than subsurface craft; its cost is very low.
No performance figures are given, since such statistics have been published so frequently and widely in recent months, that it is assumed every one is familiar with them.
Outlines of Proposed Doctrines for Airships
In conclusion, and following upon the above brief discussion, there will now be presented in outline form the writer’s proposed doctrines covering utilization of airships by our service.
BLIMP DOCTRINE
(A) Training of personnel.
- Personnel for rigid ship duty (including continuing familiarization of qualified personnel).
- Personnel for blimp duty, including instructors.
(B) Research,, test, and development; mapping, photographic, and general utility.
- Such as calibration of radio D/F stations, other radio tests, fuel gas, new engines, target towing, etc.
(C) Strategical and tactical.
(1) Strategical.
- Scouting and patrolling in coastal belt.
- Convoy escort in coastal belt.
- Covering mining and sweeping operations, etc.
- Tactical.
- Track enemy, keeping cover if possible, and keeping own force commander informed, (coastal belt).
- Attack enemy submarines and other craft if favorably disposed, (coastal belt).
- Retire or take cover before attack by enemy craft.
“ZRS” DOCTRINE
(A) Major strategical mission:
Operate as a scout cruiser with the fleet in a naval campaign, both positive and negative areas (in general, at low altitudes).
(B) Major tactial mission:
- Unless otherwise directed track enemy, keeping C-in-C fully informed.
- During or before contact of main bodies:
- Scout lines of probable enemy retreat.
- Scout lines of probable own retirement.
- Cover movements of enemy fleet components, such as a detached cruiser squadron, destroyer squadrons, or “ambushing” submarines.
- Or as directed.
- “Follow-up” phase—track enemy and keep C-in-C informed as to retreating or pursuing enemy; harass enemy small or disabled craft.
(C) Secondary missions.
- Convoy escort (ocean).
- Enemy commerce raiding.
- Blockade, or control of neutral shipping.
- Bombardment of enemy territory, coastal or insular.
- Communications, dispatch, transport, and general utility.
- Direct action against backward coastal or insular communities.