In attempting to evaluate the contribution of John Clerk of Eldin to the science of naval tactics writers have consumed great quantities of ink—more ink, it has been jestingly declared, than the blood shed in the battles that were fought in accordance with his revolutionary teachings. One hesitates, then, to shed more ink in such a word battle. But the following has been written in order to emphasize one phase of the problem which has been too frequently minimized. In short, an attempt will be made to show how contemporary leading naval officers estimated the principles taught by Clerk. The question is whether, as some declare, such men belittled Clerk’s new ideas and sneered at the man because he, a civilian, was trying to teach seamen their profession, or whether they recognized the significance of his ideas, followed them, and afterwards gave him due honor and credit.
The practical experiences gained by the English in the First and Second Dutch Wars, during the middle of the seventeenth century, were embodied in what is commonly referred to as the Duke of York’s Fighting Instructions. These appeared first in 1665, but in a final form in 1673 as “Instructions for the Better Ordering His Majesty’s Fleet in Fighting.” As to how much credit should be given to the Duke personally, the following opinion has direct bearing on the question:
The scarcely concealed doubts which many writers have felt as to whether the new system of tactics can have been due to the Duke of York may now be laid at rest, and henceforth the great reform must be credited not to him, but to Cromwell’s generals-at-sea.1
1 Julian S. Corbett, Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816, edited for the Navy Records Society, 1905, p. 111.
The system of tactics, thus ordered, was not, in fact, so hidebound and artificially restrictive, as is sometimes thought. For example, some may be surprised to find that Instruction III states,
In case the enemy have the wind of the admiral and fleet, and they have sea room enough, then they are to keep the wind as close as they can lie, until such time as they see an opportunity by gaining their wakes to divide the enemy’s fleet.
It then proceeds to explain how the van is to tack and break through, upon securing a favorable position, and how the center is to remain to leeward and co-operate with the van as opportunity appeared. This maneuver was, however, considered a rather difficult and hazardous one and this instruction was soon dropped out of the fighting orders. In an age where a premium was placed upon a conformity to tradition and custom rather than upon originality, admirals found it to their advantage to run no such risks but to follow instructions like numbers VIII and XVI. The former prescribed,
If the enemy stay to fight (His Majesty’s fleet having the wind), the headmost squadron of His Majesty’s fleet shall steer for the headmost of the enemy’s ships.
The latter definitely required,
In all cases of fight with the enemy, the commanders of His Majesty’s ships are to keep the fleet in one line, and (as much as may be) to preserve the order of battle which they have been directed to keep before the time of fight.
It was the careful adherence to these two articles that destroyed the initiative of commanders, and produced the comparatively ineffective and indecisive type of naval warfare which became characteristic of the period of about one hundred years following the instituting of these famous Fighting Instructions.
By this time, there was a general feeling that something was wrong with the British Navy and the old system of fighting, and a readier ear was therefore turned to the new ideas presented by Clerk of Eldin. It might be well first to consider what was so revolutionary in his teachings. So much attention has been given to certain specific suggestions in his Naval Tactics that the fundamental significance of his new system has often been entirely overlooked. This is to be found particularly in his introduction where he declares that British naval officers and their crews had demonstrated over and over again a superiority in quality of courage and fighting ability over their enemies, and in single ship actions had won decisive victories, but that in general engagements the results had been indecisive. The reason for this, he pointed out, was that they had allowed themselves to be governed completely by fighting instructions which favored the side that wished to avoid decisive action, and which were bonds and obstructions to the stronger side, perfectly capable of inflicting an overwhelming defeat on an enemy. Clerk recommended, therefore, such formations and methods of attack as would bring on a close action, concentration on a part of the opposing fleet, breaking up of the enemy formation, and, in short, fighting tactics which would allow free play to British individual ship superiority. This was the dominating principle in his book. There was much more to his system than the maneuver of “breaking the line,” which is about all that many associate with the name of Clerk.
The first engagement in which the influence of these new ideas is apparent was that between De Guichen and Rodney, on April 17, 1780, off Martinique. In Rodney’s dispatches, he writes:
At forty-five minutes after six, I gave notice, by public signal, that my intention was to attack the enemy’s rear with my whole force. . . . At fifty minutes after eleven A.M. I made the signal for every ship to bear down, and steer for the opposite in the enemy’s line, agreeably to the 21st article of the additional Fighting Instructions.
As an explanation for his giving this second signal, Rodney wrote, some years afterwards, on the margin of his own copy of Clerk’s Naval Tactics:
That was in a slanting position that my leading ships might attack the van ships of the enemy’s center division, and the whole of the British fleet be opposed to only two-thirds of the enemy. The moment before the battle began, the signal for the line was hauled down, and no other signal kept up but for battle, and close battle, which signals were repeated by the frigates appointed for the purpose. . . . It was never changed. His fleet disobeyed his signal. His rear tacked without orders, and his van disobeyed and stood to windward of the enemy’s van at a distance, and scarce within random shot.
That Rodney was altogether aware of the merits of this new maneuver, which he thus attempted, is shown by the fact that he wrote afterwards that he “thought little of his victory of the 12th of April, 1782” at Saints’ Passage but that he looked upon the earlier action against De Guichen as “one by which, but for the disobedience of his captains, he might have gained immortal renown.”2
So completely did Rodney, in this attempt, exemplify the spirit of Clerk’s new tactics that the latter had good reason, in referring to Rodney’s signal, to write,
This was a language altogether new, either from Admiral Rodney, or any of his predecessors; and as it was the first instance in which a British admiral had ventured to deviate from the old practice, I could not help immediately ascribing it to the communications I had made to Mr. Atkinson, as mentioned before.
2 Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, Types of Naval Officers, 203
Those who have attempted to discredit the influence of Clerk’s new ideas have pointed out that his book, even in part, was not published until 1782, which was some two years after the naval engagement under consideration. This is true, as Clerk writes in the “Advertisement” to the first regular edition of his book, that of 1790, “A few copies of this First Part of an Essay on Naval Tactics, being printed in 1782, were handed about among Friends.” But such critics appear to have overlooked the following statement in Clerk’s preface:
In January, 1780, when I was in London, being fully impressed with the importance of the naval ideas which long had been working in my imagination, and in consequence of the strictures on Lord Keppel’s engagement sent the year before, some appointments for the further communication on this subject were made by my friends. Among the first of these was an appointment with Mr. Richard Atkinson, the particular friend of Sir George Rodney, who was then in London, and was immediately to set out to take command of the fleet in the West Indies. At this meeting, the whole of my acquisitions on the subject of naval tactics, for many years back, was discussed. I communicated to Mr. Atkinson the theories of attack from both the windward and the leeward; the first as contained in the first part of this essay; the last as contained in the second part, now published a second time. I particularly explained my doctrine of cutting the enemy’s line, etc., as set forth in both first and second parts. I also produced the paper of strictures on Lord Keppel’s rencounter of the 27th of July, which contained all my general ideas on the subject of naval tactics. All this Mr. Atkinson undertook to communicate to Sir George Rodney, which he could have no difficulty in doing, as I left in his custody sketches made according to my usual method of demonstration, together with the necessary explanations.
The suggestions which Rodney seems to have known and to have followed Clerk set down afterwards in Section I of his Naval Tactics, entitled “The Attack from the Windward upon the Rear of the Enemy.” His discussion here is an answer to the general question, which he proposes,
Why should we uniformly attempt getting up with the enemy’s van, with a view to carry their whole fleet, instead of contenting ourselves with a certainty of cutting off a few of their dullest sailing vessels in the rear?
A comparison of Clerk’s mode of attack here proposed with the attempt made by Rodney will show conclusively that the two are identical in spirit and purpose, and different from the accepted practices of that day.
The limits of this article do not permit a full discussion of Rodney’s famous maneuver of breaking the French line at the Battle of Saints’ Passage, on April 12, 1782. It would take much too long to review the controversy which arose some fifty years after the battle as to whether the honor for originating this maneuver should be given solely to Captain Charles Douglas, commanding Rodney’s flagship—a claim made by General Howard Douglas, son of Captain Douglas.3 It is my opinion, after reading the claims pro and con, that the honor should be accorded largely to Eolus, god of the winds, whose capricious breath prepared the favorable opening in the French line just at the right time for the English to break through. It is probably true that Captain Douglas was first to realize on that day the favorable moment for executing such a maneuver and that he urged Rodney to take advantage of this extraordinary and unexpected opportunity. Such a maneuver had not been planned by Rodney. He was still to leeward and thus subject to certain hazards which this position for attack involved; no signals had been given preparatory to such a sudden change in battle plan; his van was already far in advance of his own ship. It is not strange, therefore, that he hesitated to take Douglas’ advice, even though he was thoroughly conversant with Clerk’s observations on the advantages of the maneuver under certain conditions. It was upon Rodney, not on Douglas, that the full responsibility of command rested. This maneuver had always been looked upon as difficult and hazardous. Even Clerk had had his doubts about it.
3 For the controversy, see: Naval Evolutions: A Memoir, by Major General Howard Douglas, 1832; Edinburgh Review, April, 1830; United Service Journal, Part II, November, 1829, and Part II, August, 1830; and Quarterly Review, January, 1830.
In explaining why he omitted a discussion of it from his edition of 1782, he wrote:
It was conceived it might be of prejudice to the other parts of the subject to advance any thing doubtful, no example of cutting an enemy’s line, in an attack from the leeward, before that time, having been given.
After considering a few moments, with prudence and good judgment, the situation in which the fortuitous change of wind had placed them, Rodney agreed with the suggestion of his captain, and the flagship Formidable led through the French line. A decisive victory followed. In view of the fact that chance played so important a part in this battle, it would seem that entirely too much emphasis has been laid upon the engagement as illustrative of the new tactics of Clerk. As far as Rodney’s intentions and plan of battle are concerned his previous engagement with De Guichen is much more important evidence of his indebtedness to Clerk. Yet there is no denying that Saints’ Passage, in its later phase, was fought after the letter as well as the spirit of Clerk’s new tactics, however extraordinary may have been the circumstances which led to the breaking of De Grasse’s line.
As to Rodney’s recognition of his indebtedness to Clerk, there is ample evidence in the affirmative. In the preface to his Naval Tactics Clark declares:
From the best authority I have been informed that Lord Rodney himself at all times acknowledged the communication [from Clerk through Atkinson]; and having, from the first, approved of my system, declared, even before he left London, that he would strictly adhere to it in fighting the enemy.
In this same preface he goes so far as to write,
Sir George Rodney himself, when he arrived in Britain, made no scruple to acknowledge that I had suggested the manoeuvres by which he had gained the victory of the 12th of April, 1782.
That Clerk had good reason for making such statements can be conclusively proved. Professor John Playfair, distinguished Scotch mathematician and physicist, gives the following evidence:
Lord Rodney, who had done so much to prove the utility of this system [by Clerk], in conversation never concealed the obligation he felt to the author of it. Before going out to take command of the fleet in the West Indies, he said one day to Mr, Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville, “There is one Clerk, a countryman of yours, who has taught us how to fight, and appears to know more of the matter than any of us. If ever I meet the French fleet, I intend to try his way.” He held the same language after his return. Lord Melville used often to meet him in society, and particularly at the house of Mr. Henry Drummond, where he talked very unreservedly of the Naval Tactics, and of the use he had made of the system in the action of the 12th of April. A letter from General Ross states very particularly a conversation of the same kind, at which he was present. “It is,” says the General, “with an equal degree of pleasure and truth that I now commit to writing what you heard me say in company at your house, to wit, that at the table of the late Sir John Dalling, where I was in the habit of dining often, and meeting Lord Rodney, I heard his lordship distinctly state that he owed his success in the West Indies to the manoeuvre of breaking the line, which he learned from Mr. Clerk’s book.” ... An anecdote which sets a seal on the great and decisive testimony of the noble admiral is worthy of being remembered; and I am glad to be able to record it on the authority of a noble earl. The present Lord Haddington met Lord Rodney at Spa, in the decline of life, when both his bodily and mental powers were sinking under the weight of years. The great commander, who had been the bulwark of his country and the terror of his enemies, lay stretched on his couch, while the memory of his own exploits seemed the only thing that interested his feelings, or afforded a subject for conversation. In this situation, he would often break out in praise of the Naval Tactics, exclaiming with great earnestness, “John Clerk of Eldin forever!”4
Further confirmation is to be found in the following letter of June 11, 1809, from John Fordyce, Esq., to John Clerk of Eldin:
4 “Memoir Relating to the Naval Tactics of the Late John Clerk, etc., etc.,” in Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Vol. ix, 1823. Also quoted in The Edinburgh Review, April, 1830, pp. 15, 16.
A good many years ago, I think in the year 1786 or 1787, when I was living with my friend Colonel Fullarton in Berkeley Square, Lord Rodney one day dined with us, and being very communicative, he gave us a very interesting account of his own great actions, which engaged our attention much; the more from his giving you a chief share in the merit. He declared that he had followed the plans and principles recommended in your Naval Tactics, a work to which he gave the highest praise. . . . Indeed, I happened on another occasion, and a very remarkable one, to hear this declaration of Lord Rodney’s very strongly confirmed by another unquestionable testimony. I happened to be down at Walmer Castle with Mr. Pitt at the time of Lord Duncan’s great battle on the coast of Holland; Lord and Lady Melville were living with him at the same time. We were sitting drinking a glass of wine, I remember, after dinner, when a man, whose name I do not at present recollect, a smuggler, came rather abruptly into the room and told us he had just come on shore from his vessel, returning from the coast of Holland, where he had witnessed the great victory gained by Lord Duncan. He described the action, and having mentioned the breaking through the line, Lord Melville took notice of that new instance of the success of your system; and then mentioned Rodney’s having often told him that he had taken that mode of attack from you.5
5 The Edinburgh Review, April, 1830, pp. 16-17.
Having thus established rather definitely the fact of Rodney’s recognition of his indebtedness to Clerk, let us turn to a consideration of some of the later naval leaders. The next to gain great distinction was Admiral Richard Howe, who won a complete victory over the French in the Battle of the Glorious First of June, 1794. Being well acquainted with Clerk’s Naval Tactics, he praised the ingenuity of the maneuvers therein suggested, but he sent word to Clerk that “he would adhere to the old system if ever he had an opportunity of engaging the French fleet.” Playfair further states:
When he (Howe) commanded the Channel Fleet in 1793, Mr. James Clerk . . . served as a midshipman on board the Admiral’s ship, the Queen Charlotte. He possessed a copy of the second edition of his father’s book, which was borrowed by Captain Christian, no doubt for the Admiral’s use. Thus much is certain, that the action of the 1st of June, 1794 was in its management quite conformable to Mr. Clerk’s system, and its success entirely owing to the manoeuvre of breaking the line.
This statement is open to question. There is no maneuver described by Clerk which is similar to Howe’s plan of battle on June 1, 1794, in which his fleet changed from line ahead into line abreast and then bore down diagonally on the French, who were in line ahead, each British ship endeavoring to break through the French line. However, the attack was made in the spirit of Clerk so far as the enemy was brought into close action where the individual superiority of single British ships over single French men-of-war could be used to victorious advantage. The very essence of Clerk’s theory of breaking the line was that some ships of the enemy line would be brought under close fire, not on one side but on both, and would be crushed by superior numbers and superior gun power before others could come to their assistance. Only six of Howe’s ships succeeded in breaking through, but the results were just as Clerk had foreseen. That Howe’s plan was closely associated in the minds of naval leaders of that time with that of breaking of the line as taught by Clerk and used by Rodney at Saints’ Passage is shown by the fact that in the “Explanatory Instructions” of Howe’s Signal Book of 1799 the primary intention of signal 27 for breaking through the enemy’s line in all parts is for Howe’s maneuver; but, if a red pennant is hoisted at either masthead, the signal meant that the
fleet is to preserve the line of battle as it passes through the enemy’s line, and to preserve it in very close order, that such of the enemy’s ships as are cut off may not find an opportunity of passing through it to rejoin their fleet.6
6 Julian S. Corbett, op. cit., pp. 260 and 279.
This was in complete accordance with Clerk’s plan of attack from the leeward. It appears, then, that Howe followed the spirit rather than the letter of Clerk’s new tactics, and unconscious of this indebtedness to the latter, accorded no recognition to him, as far as I have been able to discover. This much is certain, however, Howe did not fight the French on June 1, 1794, according to “the old system,” as he had said, some years previous, he would do “if ever he had an opportunity of engaging the French fleet.”
Another naval officer, somewhat younger than Howe, who also was not very favorably disposed to Clerk’s system of tactics was Sir John Jervis, Lord St. Vincent. The following anecdote regarding him is recorded in the Naval Chronicle:7
7 January, 1799, vol. 1. p. 33
General Debbieg, an officer well known from his superior genius in his own profession, and naturally an admirer of works of genius, having read Mr. Clerk’s essay, lent it to Lord St. Vincent, then Sir John Jervis. Sir John, after reading it, enquired of the General where he might buy a copy for himself. “It is not to be bought,” answered the General; “I had this copy from the author, who is a particular friend of mine; he had but a few copies printed, all of which he has given away among his friends.” “Since that is the case,” said Sir John, “you shall not have this copy back again; it is too good a thing for you, who are a landsman; I will keep it to myself.”
If this incident is truly reported, Lord St. Vincent somewhat modified later this earlier good opinion of Clerk’s work. In a letter which he wrote to Viscount Howick, June 2, 1806, he states, “I would not for the world subtract from the merits of Mr. Clerk, which I have always admitted,” and then proceeds at once to subtract from his merits by claiming he was indebted to Père le Hoste and other French writers on tactics, says his own victory gained over the Spanish “off Cape St. Vincent is totally out of the question,” and minimizes Clerk’s influence over Rodney, Howe, Duncan, and Nelson. He concludes, however,
Mr. Clerk is most correct in his statement of the advantages to be derived from being to leeward of the fleet of the enemy. His mode of attack in columns when to windward has its merits, as have also his statements of the advantages and disadvantages of shifts of wind. Upon the whole, his tactics are certainly ingenious, and worthy the study of all young and inexperienced officers. 8
That Sir John’s action off Cape St. Vincent is not “totally out of the question” and that he, when a younger and less experienced officer, might have profited from a closer study of Clerk are made evident in the following commentary:9
8 Captain W. V. Anson, R. N., The Life of John Jervis, Admiral Lard St. Vincent, 1913, p. 353.
9 Julian S. Corbett, op. cit., pp. 265, 266.
Jervis had surprised the enemy in disorder on a hazy morning after a change of wind, and this was precisely the “not very probable case” which Clerk of Eldin had instanced as justifying a perpendicular attack. The signal with which he opened, according to the signification as given in the flagship’s log, was “The admiral intends to pass through the enemy’s line.” There is nothing to show whether this meant Howe’s manoeuvre or Rodney’s, for we do not know whether at this time the instruction existed which enabled the two movements to be distinguished by a pennant over. What followed, however, was that the fleet passed between the two separated Spanish squadrons in line ahead as Clerk advised. The next thing to do, according to Clerk, was for the British fleet to wear or tack together, but instead of doing so Jervis signalled to tack in succession, and then repeated the signal to pass through the enemy’s line although it was still unformed. It was at this moment that Nelson made his famous independent movement that saved the situation, and what he did was in effect as though Jervis had made the signal to tack together as Clerk enjoined. Thereupon Jervis, with the intention apparently of annulling his last order to pass through the line, made the signal, which seems to have been the only one which the captains of those days believed in—viz., to take suitable stations for mutual support and engage the enemy on arriving up with them in succession.
Was it Jervis’ realization of near failure, only saved by Nelson’s initiative, when he did not properly follow Clerk’s suggestions, that led him afterwards to take such a critical attitude toward Clerk as a sort of self-justification?
Jervis was certainly far astray when he attempted to minimize Clerk’s influence on Admiral Duncan, who was victorious over the Dutch at Camperdown, October 11, 1797. In the Naval Chronicle,10 one reads:
Lord Duncan, having received one of the few copies of this essay first printed, soon after wrote to advise Mr. Clerk to reprint it, as he said it was very much approved of by all the navy officers, many of whom, not being able to procure printed copies, had copied it over in writing. When Lord Duncan returned to Edinburgh, after the battle of Camperdown, he waited on Mr. Clerk, complimented him upon his works, and in a liberal and handsome manner acknowledged that he and the other admirals had been much obliged to him.
There is very little doubt as to the truth of this statement. His biographer thus confirms it:11
Admiral Duncan possessed a copy of Clerk’s Naval Tactics and, judging from the external and internal appearance of the book, which is still with his papers, studied it carefully.
He also quotes from a letter from Lord Melville to W. Adam, Esq., of June 5, 1810, as follows:
Lord Melville often discussed the subject with Lord Duncan, who had studied Clerk’s system with great care and was deeply impressed with it. He stated that Lord Duncan always said he would act upon the principles laid down in Mr. Clerk’s book and also that the scene described and the different facts stated by Mr. Fordyce in his letter when the news of Lord Duncan’s victory was brought to Mr. Pitt at Walmer Castle are correct.
That Duncan followed his earlier intention is evident, for there has never been any question but that Camperdown was fought literally according to Clerk’s system.
10 January, 1799, vol. I, p. 33.
11 Earl of Camperdown, Admiral Duncan, 1898, p. 226.
Just as unfair was Jervis in trying to depreciate Clerk’s influence on Nelson, the naval genius who was to show what brilliant victories could be won by following the new tactics. That Nelson was thus influenced in the formulation of his ingenious plans of the battles of the Nile and Trafalgar is unquestionable. As to the latter engagement, Julian S. Corbett writes:
Nelson’s conception was now an attack in two divisions of different strength, the stronger of which, as the memorandum subsequently explains, was to be used as a containing force to cover the attack of the other, and except that the balance of the two divisions was reversed, this is practically just what Clerk of Eldin had recommended and what actually happened in the battle.
That Nelson’s officers were cognizant of this indebtedness is shown by the following from Playfair:
Nelson’s instructions before the Battle of Trafalgar contain, in the body of them, several sentences that are entirely taken from the Naval Tactics. These instructions were transmitted to Mr. Clerk by one of the commanders of that memorable action, Captain, now Admiral Sir Philip Durham, with a note, which shows in what light his discoveries were viewed by those most capable to decide: “Captain Durham, sensible of the many advantages which have accrued to the British nation from the publication of Mr. Clerk’s Naval Tactics, and particularly from that part of them which recommends breaking through the enemy’s line, begs to offer him the inclosed form of battle, which was most punctually attended to in the brilliant and glorious action of the 21st of October. Mr. Clerk will perceive with pleasure that it is completely according to his own notions, and it is now sent as a token of respect from Captain Durham, to one who has merited so highly of his country. 29th October, 1805, off Cadiz.”
This indebtedness of Nelson’s famous Memorandum, or plan which was substantially carried out at Trafalgar, to Clerk’s Naval Tactics is confirmed by J. K. Laughton,12 one of the biographers of Nelson, who declares,
His (Nelson’s) celebrated Memorandum of 9 October, 1805, in directing the attack from the position to windward, adhered closely to Clerk’s proposal, and though he afterwards saw fit to modify the details, the principle was left unchanged. This must be considered Clerk’s grand achievement.
12 “Clerk” in Dictionary of National Biography.