In these days of peace and reduction of our armed forces much oral and written comment is heard and seen on the subject of promotion. As each of us is most interested in ourselves and our own prospects, wardroom discussion and those in periodicals catering to the officers of our services usually are limited to plans for promotion of the officer personnel. I wish to offer a few comments on present and possible promotion for the enlisted men of the Navy.
We are very proud in the Navy of the quality of our rank and file, and of the opportunities offered the young American boy who enlists. In a democratic country we are happy to recognize the enlisted man as a person with the same human rights as have our highest ranking officers. Although the greater responsibilities of the commissioned personnel entitle them to added privilege, just as is the case with officers of civilian firms, no grade in our service is so low that its members do not have the full rights of men and American citizens. We encourage our sailors to make the Navy a career rather than a four-year joy ride. We provide liberal allowances for sixteen- twenty- and thirty-year retirement from active service, and we attempt to reduce turnover and obtain permanence by a rate of pay and gratuities unknown in other navies. However, it is a question if we have reached as yet the most desirable scheme for promotion for our enlisted men.
Officers, under our present laws, advance surely, if slowly, to the grade of lieutenant commander. Failing in dismissal, retirement for physical disability, or the more improbable failure of examination for promotion, an officer can estimate rather closely what his pay will be for his first twenty-one years after leaving the Naval Academy. The enlisted man has no such assurance. We may assume that this problem in mathematics and economics is of little interest to those of either group for their first few years, but usually after a time there is a wife and probably a child or so, and income becomes of vital importance. Tritely, but no less truly, we often observe that we do not care what we are to do, if we can only know definitely what it is. Similarly the officer or man in the service can regulate his life and expenses, if he can but tell what he will be paid two or five years later. The officers have this advantage through our present law. If this system of promotion is reasonable for officers, it might readily be imagined best for the ratings.
Our general plan, of advancement in rating below chief petty officer to fill vacancies on ship or station, is not without merit. A man is often a good man for me because he works my way while he is less valuable to you because your way is different. By advancement to fill vacancies we can promote the men we consider best suited to fill the hole in our organization, and no scheme could be better for our needs at the time. However, as vacancies will never occur according to a schedule that will afford an equality of opportunity for men on different ships, it is probable that the temporary gain in one organization by its power of making its own choice is not a gain for the Navy as a whole, because of the dissatisfaction and loss of efficiency of men on a sister-ship whose way up is blocked by the lack of a vacancy above them. In ratings where most men reenlist (possibly through the lack of a corresponding trade in civil life) such as torpedomen and gunners’ mates, and promotion is always slow, opportunity rather than experience and ability, is becoming more and more the governing factor in a man’s advancement. It is realized that officers too long in one grade stagnate and pass their point of maximum efficiency, and there is no doubt in my mind that the same is true of enlisted men. A torpedoman, second class, who has held his rating seven or eight years, behaved himself, done his work well, received good marks, and passed several examinations for the next higher rating, but who has never been advanced, will meet former shipmates once behind him and find them first-class petty officers, and he will not like it. His ambition will probably die and he will be content to drift along, avoiding disrating, but in a “rut” with no great interest in the work of the service.
Advancement to chief petty officer under the present system is fraught with inconsistency. The idea of selection by the Bureau of Navigation of men obtaining the highest multiple, weighing an examination mark with marks from the man’s service record and credits for length of service, is a wise one, but the human element of the examining board preparing and marking the examination papers, in practice, nullifies the intentions of the bureau. The fact that on some stations an examination mark of 3.7 represents an excellent examination, while other boards are giving a poor paper a 3.8, means that the majority of the ratings are going to average men with a “good” examining board, rather than the outstanding men with an average board. Even the necessity of having the examinations conducted by boards of officers of another ship from that on which the candidate is serving cannot alter the fact that neither in subject matter nor in grading will the examinations give the equality of opportunity that is desired. There are two evident solutions to the problem thus afforded. The first is that all examinations for chief petty officer be prepared by the Bureau of Navigation, and the papers marked by the bureau. This scheme would give the bureau a maximum supervision over the subject matter of examinations and insure that candidates to qualify would have a broad knowledge of their subjects, and be grounded in the fundamentals of their rating in all its varied applications to different types of ships. It would afford an unbiased means of selection, and would remove the personal equation from the examination mark. The second scheme would be to prorate the number of vacancies among units of the fleet and shore stations, and have competitive examinations for these vacancies with aspirants appearing before a single board for each locality. Thus the relative merit of individuals could be determined as referred to that of others taking the same examination.
I believe the best interests of the service are furthered by making the advancement to chief petty officer selective as at present, just as for officers of the higher grades. For other petty officer ratings I feel that the promotion by seniority of qualified men to fill vacancies in the service at large is just as desirable as in the case of officers junior to command rank. My scheme of advancement is as follows: Non-rated men should be advanced to the lowest petty officer grade to fill vacancies as at present. Petty officers, when eligible for advancement and on passing the required examination, would be reported by their commanding officers to the Bureau of Navigation, where their names would go on waiting lists from the date reported as qualified. When the man “made his number” for advancement the bureau would inform his commanding officer, who could then advance him or report him back to the bureau as undesirable for advancement, should he so feel at the time thus striking his name from the list. Similarly, at any time, while the man’s name is on the waiting list for advancement, his commanding officer would be authorized to recommend its removal, which would be the equivalent of failing to recommend him for advancement. Men disrated would be, of course, removed from the waiting list. Thus could proficient and satisfactory petty officers be assured of a definite chance of promotion up to first-class ratings. Assuming that this method might slow up the advancement of the exceptional man, whose ability is well above the average, with a consequent loss of efficiency to the service, I feel that such a loss would be more than compensated by the gain in contentment and in efficiency resulting from the large number of petty officers who would have as their incentive the knowledge that if they kept on doing good work they could be certain of advancement.
I feel that the added paper work that such a scheme would involve would be well worth while in the increased contentment and efficiency of the enlisted men of the service. While I was a plebe at the Naval Academy a classmate of mine, older, “savvier,” and with more previous schooling than the average, submitted a request to be allowed to join the class next ahead, in view of the fact that he had completed the equivalent of the scholastic work of the first year at the Naval Academy before entering. I do not believe the superintendent took the request very seriously except to point out certain customs and regulations of the naval service to the young midshipman. However, had he been an enlisted man he would have had no such restriction, and might have been advanced to the rating of chief petty officer in less time than others could make that of coxswain.
After all, the Navy is a highly technical organization. The hardest thing in it is to find a place for an inefficient man, for in this machine age mere man power without brains and skill is of little avail. Few draw from their brains or mature to use their skill to the best advantage unless they have an incentive. I believe the scheme for promotion for enlisted men that I have outlined would add to the incentive of the majority and thus benefit the service at large.
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The cultivation of morale is not merely commendable, it is a necessity, and it cannot be done by lectures and blackboards alone. It requires a close association between men and the right kind of officers. The real solution is to choose petty officers and officers and give them a free hand. This question of ideals is just as important as questions of rate of pay, for if you have no ideals expressed or subconscious, more pay simply spells more beer.—Dewar.