IN REVIEWING THE HISTORY of the United States Navy it is interesting to note that its organization is traceable to the threats and depredations of nations which since then have disappeared from the face of the earth, and that it was against these same powers that its first major operations were directed.
It is a well-known fact that it was the exigencies of Algiers which first induced Congress in March, 1794, to authorize the President:
to provide, by purchase or otherwise, equip and employ, four ships to carry forty-four guns and two ships to carry thirty-six guns each; or ... in lieu of the six frigates, a naval force not exceeding, in the whole, that by this act directed, so that no ship thus provided should carry less than thirty-two guns; or he may provide any proportion thereof, which in his discretion he may think proper.1
Thus was the Navy born, and though it was more than twenty years before hostile operations were undertaken against Algiers, it was but seven years until this fleet received its baptism of fire against Tripoli, another of the Barbary powers.
What is less well known is that the blockade by which the United States responded to Tripoli’s declaration of war in 1801 was not declared by Commodore Dale, commander of the American squadron, but by Mr. William Eaton, consul at Tunis, not only without any authority from the government to do so but even without the knowledge, advice, or consent of the commodore. Such a situation is almost without historical precedent and therefore is worthy of comment, more especially so when one considers that this was the first time an American force ever attempted the blockade of a foreign port.
1 Gardner W. Allen, Our Navy in the War with the Barbary Corsairs.
American relations with Tripoli had commenced with the treaty of 1797 secured through the good offices of, and guaranteed by, the dey of Algiers. The stages by which they changed from reasonable harmony to open hostility need scarcely be reviewed. Suffice it to say that, spurred alike by greed and chagrin at the Algerian clause, the treaty became intolerable to the bashaw of Tripoli and war became inevitable. Warnings of the impending storm were sent out by Mr. James Leander Cathcart, the American consul at Tripoli, in January, 1801, which had such good effect that when the bashaw finally declared war on May 10, and his corsairs put to sea to hunt for American prizes, the search proved vain.
Before the news of the opening of hostilities reached Washington, the administration, feeling that a show of force might ease the tension in Barbary, had ordered Commodore Richard Dale to cruise the Mediterranean with a small force. Accordingly he sailed from Hampton Roads on June 1, 1801, with a squadron consisting of the following vessels: the President, 44 guns, flagship; the Philadelphia, 36 guns, Captain Samuel Barron; the Essex, 32 guns, Captain William Bainbridge; and the Enterprise, 12 guns, Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett.
Dale’s instructions, dated May 20, 1801, were to cruise the Mediterranean and if all were tranquil to return home not later than December of the same year. A number of eventualities were, however, provided for.
. . . Should you find on your arrival at Gibraltar, that all the Barbary powers have declared war against the United States, you will then distribute your force so as best to protect our commerce and chastise their insolence—by sinking, burning or destroying their vessels wherever you shall find them. . . . Should Algiers alone have declared War against the United States, you will cruise off that port so as effectually to prevent anything from going in or coming out, and you will sink, burn, or otherwise destroy their ships wherever you may find them. Should the Bey [Bashaw] of Tripoli have declared war (as he has threatened) against the United States, you will then proceed direct to that port, where you will lay your ships in such a position as effectually to prevent any of their vessels from going in or out.... If Tunis alone, or in concert with Tripoli, should have declared war against the United States, you will chastise them in like manner. . . . Any prisoners you may take, you will treat with humanity and attention, and land them on any part of the Barbary shore most convenient to you . . . ,2
Subsequent events were to prove that these instructions were wholly inadequate and that they materially protracted the duration of the war. Though Dale had laid upon him the obligation of blockading Tripoli and of meeting and destroying her ships, he was, however, restrained from holding prisoners of war, the taking of prizes, or any direct offensive operations against the enemy. These limitations on his actions are easily traceable to the strict interpretation of the Constitution held by Jefferson who claimed that without authority from Congress the President might not undertake other than defensive measures in the event of war or attack.
When Dale arrived at Gibraltar on July 1, he found that war had already been declared. In accordance with his instructions he proceeded at once to Tripoli via Algiers and Tunis. He arrived at this latter port on July 17, and delayed there three days for water and provisions. It is probable that he discussed the general situation with Consul Eaton and he may also have intimated the nature of his instructions. Eaton had been having difficulties with the bey of Tunis and, although the commodore was not received by His Highness, the presence of the squadron and a diplomatic letter from Dale seem to have eased the situation considerably, for in writing to the commodore a few days later Eaton mentions “the favorable impression your appearance here made on this bey.” On July 20, the squadron sailed for Tripoli where it arrived the twenty-fourth, without, however, any public declaration on Dale’s part of his intentions.
2 American State Papers, Foreign Relations Vol. II, pp. 359-60.
The squadron had not yet arrived off Tripoli when a favorable series of circumstances prompted Eaton on July 23 to notify the Tunisian government and all local consuls that Tripoli was actually under blockade. Why he should have taken such a step, which must inevitably definitely commit the commodore to a course of action for which he was perhaps not yet prepared, can only be made clear by consideration of Eaton’s correspondence with Dale, a copy of which is now preserved in the archives section of the Department of State at Washington. As this correspondence has never before been published it is of interest to quote from it so far as it applies directly to the matter of the declaration of blockade.
A full explanation of the circumstances is contained in Eaton’s letter of July 24, which, with a postscript dated August 1, reads as follows:
Tunis, 24 July, 1801
To Richard Dale, Esq.,
Sir,
... A person of confidence at court, and much in my friendship, came to advise me that Tripoli was actually famishing for bread, & that she depended alone on Tunis for her Supplies. He intimated that application would be immediately made by this Government for my passports of Safe conduct for Several Vessels which were now taking Cargoes for that place—In order to evade such an application, And with a view of profiting of this weapon toward the enemy, I instantly circulated Among the foreign Agents here Exhibit A of the enclosures3 sending at the same time a Copy to the Bey’s prime Minister—It produced convulsions at the Palace. All commerce here is monopolized by the Govt. The chief Commercial Agent was sent to my house with a particular request that the blockade might be so modified as not to effect the interests of this Regency—I answered that however desirable such a modification in respect to our friendship with Tunis might be, it could not be acceded without defeating the intention of the blockade. Tripoli had made war against us in violation of the most sacred faith and honor—She ought previously to have taken into calculation all the possible consequences of such a Step—And if our friends Suffered a partial and temporary inconvenience from the Dispositions we found ourselves compelled to adopt to punish the outrages of our enemy it was but the common effect of war, and ought not to give umbrage—Some time passed in discussion. The Agent grew agitated, and said he was authorized to assure me that Adherence to this position would endanger our peace with Tunis. Here I appealed to the good sense of the Bey; observing that I felt a confidence that the Bey would never so far depart from the established and acknowledged maxims of war as to demand of an Agent of a nation at war passports to furnish the means of defence and Subsistence to an enemy. He demanded a letter from me recommending to your Clemency a vessel laden with wheat already departed and another on the point of departure for Tripoli—This I refused on the General principle—He proceeded to menace my personal Situation. I told him I was prepared for all events but the censure of my Government— He demanded “Are you then decided?” Necessarily so, said I—He left my house in a most violent rage. . . . Thus, Sir, I have blockaded Tripoli at Tunis without consulting you because this, with many other things, the want of time and pressure of Affairs let slip my memory. I trust, however, the emergency will justify the expedient. It is certainly the most distressing blow which at this moment we have the power of inflicting—& famine is a weapon lawfully employed to vex an enemy—I cannot doubt therefore but this measure will obtain your approbation and Support. Tripoli is in great distress—Her Corsaires are all at Sea. She is Starving in her Capital; And will be thrown into consternation at your unexpected appearance. If this position, which the good providence of God gives us, can be Sternly held a few months Tripoli will be compelled to ask peace on our own terms—The object is so desirable that it seems worth exertions— more especially so as Algiers and Tunis are looking to the issue of this rupture as precedent for their intercourse with the United States.
I have the honor to be,
Sir,
W. Eaton.
3 The other enclosures were a copy of a letter from the British consul at Tunis asking exemption from the blockade for ships sent to purchase cattle in Tripoli for the use of the English garrison at Malta, and Eaton’s reply granting the request.
Exhibit A
Dispatch No. 10
Circular.
Consulate of the United States
of America in Tunis July 23d 1801.
The Bashaw of Tripoli having declared War against the United States of America, a squadron has been destined by the American government to impede the mischief meditated by that Regency against our Commerce and tranquility. It consequently becomes obligatory on us, to inform the agents of all powers in friendship with us, that Tripoly is actually blockaded by said American Squadron: and that any vessel attempting to enter that Port, will be dealt with according to the laws of nations applicable in such cases.
Signed—William Eaton
Agent and Consul of the U. S. of America
for the City and Kingdom of Tunis.
Postscript dated August 1 to letter of July 24, to Commodore Dale—4
I have carried the point of blockading Tripoli with this Regency. The progress of Stripments [shipments?] is Stopped; and the Tripoline Agent is actually offering for Sale in the market the supplies of grain he had made to be Shipped for Tripoli—The Tunisian Minister observed to me at the palace 30th. ult. that there is a small port about ten Leagues on this side of Tripoli to which the Sandals of Tunis were constantly in the habit of carrying provisions; and demanded whether this port was included in the blockade? To which I answered that the object of the blockade extended to cutting off all communications by which Supplies could be furnished to the enemy and that this port was necessarily included. He said he knew the laws of war among the Christians— but exceptions had always been made to those less in favor of Tunis by Christians at war with the other Regencies of Barbary—and he hoped to find the same friendly dispositions in the United States—I answered that it would be painfull to us to wound the interests of Tunis in our operations against Tripoli; but the nature of this war could not admit of exceptions to the Common maxims of war in favor of any friend whatever, when those exceptions opened the Door of Supplies to the enemy. The commercial Agent of the Court signified to me that this step so sensibly touched the interests of many individuals in Tunis that a rigid adherence on my part might endanger my Personal Safety, and that they could not respond for any Violences which must be said to originate in my own unaccommodating dispositions. To which I replied, that the idea of being assassinated by the hand of a Ruffian in his Country was much more tolerable than that of being hung in my own. (Thus conveying the idea that it would be treason in me to give passports to furnish provisions to Tripoli—it was so received!) After I left the palace a consultation was had between the Agent and the Tripoline Minister, at which my friend, mentioned in the preceding letter, was present; when it was proposed, whether it would be prudent to offer me a pecuniary consideration to relax the Severity of the position I had taken; but it was concluded that Such an overture would be likely rather to produce resentment than accommodation; and the motion was dropped. It is nevertheless a proof of the intire Submission on the Part of this Regency to the measure of the blockade, and of the distressing effect it must have on Tripoli if Rigidly inforced. I am extremely Solicitous to get this information to you and except an occasion offer within a few days, shall certainly send, at all risques, a Polacre of my own in the hope of finding and delivering you this letter. If this step of mine, which I am sensible is not very regular, obtain your approbation and Support it will be apt to produce immediate overtures on the Part of Tripoli to negociate. If nothing new turns up here to demand my Vigilance I shall leave our Affairs with an upright Batavian and come to you in the Philadelphia—Tripoli had made no Captures as late as the second of July; nor had any of their Corsairs returned into port.
W. Eaton.
4 Delays in securing a suitable courier made possible the adding of this postscript to the above letter before forwarding it to the commodore.
The above letters, due to delays in securing a proper courier, did not reach Dale until August 26, by which time he had gone to Malta and returned to his post before Tripoli. On the twenty-eighth he made acknowledgment of Eaton’s communications and expressed approbation of his initiative in the following terms:
On board the
United States Ship President
off Tripoli Augt. 28, 1801.
Sir:—
You giving information in Tunis that I had Blockaded Tripoli meets my approbation. I have been determined for some time past not to suffer a vessel of any Description or Nation to enter the port of Tripoli that had any Cargo in, I gave that information to the Bey’s agent in Malta, should the English think proper to send empty vessels to Tripoli for stock, I shall not prevent them, they are our friends, I found them so both in Gibraltar and Malta, they know what is right, Respecting a Blockaded port.
I am happy to inform you that there has not been a vessel of any description gone in, or come out of the port of Tripoli since I have been away, the Bey has three Corsairs in port two Ships, and one polacar. One Ship of 20 Guns the other 18, the polacar 12, their sails are bent, but he cannot get men to go to Sea in them, the Admiral is still in Gibraltar;5 that is the reason you do not see the Philadelphia; the Bey has only three Corsairs out that will attempt to come to Tripoli, say two Gallies, and one polacar. I am looking for them every day.
... I will give three months for the Merchant Ships, to furnish themselves with your passports: it is not to be understood that your pass, will Screen any Merchant Ship belonging to Tunis or any other nation bound to Tripoli, should they attempt to enter the port without my leave while it is under blockade by my orders. . . .
Richard Dale.
With the above correspondence before us we are in a position to consider the merits of Eaton’s subsequent claims to all the credit for the success of the blockade during the first year of the war. Dale’s instructions made the blockade of Tripoli mandatory upon him in the event of war. As to why he should have failed to declare his intentions at the earliest opportunity it seems possible to ascribe two reasons; the truth may actually be a mixture of them both. The commodore may not have felt it wise to commit himself until after having had an opportunity to study the actual state of affairs at Tripoli and to establish a suitable base at Malta or in Sicily, or, he may have been ignorant of the necessity of making a public declaration of his mission in time of war. Supporting the former view is his statement as regards his relations with the English, and with the bey’s agent in Malta before the receipt of Eaton’s letters. For the latter, the lack of any public declaration may be cited together with the fact that Richard Dale was essentially a sailor and a fighter, having won his spurs under Paul Jones nearly a quarter of a century earlier, and in matters not relating directly to his profession his education was limited. It must not be forgotten that this was America’s first blockade of a foreign port and that ignorance of the proper procedure for instituting a blockade is therefore not unreasonable.
5 Murad Rais, alias Peter Lisle, had been blockaded by Dale at Gibraltar. He later abandoned his ships and together with his crew made his way back to Tripoli, via Morocco.
Eaton’s position in so acting without authority seems to have been dictated by the pressure of circumstances. It seems reasonable to suppose that he was informed of the squadron’s mission and that he considered himself merely as aiding in it. He may, however, have been ignorant of both Dale’s instructions and intentions, in which case he would appear to have considered the presence of an American squadron as sufficient warranty for his words, when declaring a paper blockade, to scare away any ships contemplating traffic with the enemy. In any event his declaration was timely and judicious and did suceed at once in impeding the sending of supplies to Tripoli.
Later events were to prove the blockade of little real worth and only a direct attack on Tripoli was able to bring a cessation of hostilities. It must not be overlooked, however, that the blockade, whatever its lasting effect on Tripoli, did operate successfully for nearly a year and served as a beneficial reminder to the other Barbary powers, who decided as a result to remain neutral.
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No matter how full a reservoir of maxims one may possess, and no matter how good one’s sentiments may be, if one has not taken advantage of every concrete opportunity to act, one’s character may remain entirely unaffected for the better. With mere good intentions, hell is proverbially paved. And this is an obvious consequence of the principles we have laid down. A character, as J. S. Mill says, “is a completely fashioned will”; and a will, in the sense in which he means it, is an aggregate of tendencies to act in a firm and prompt and definite way upon all the principal emergencies of life. A tendency to act only becomes effectively ingrained in us in proportion to the uninterrupted frequency with which the actions actually occur and the brain “grows” to their use. When a resolve or a fine glow of feeling is allowed to evaporate without bearing fruit, it is worse than a chance lost; it works so as positively to hinder future resolutions and emotions from taking the normal path of discharge.—James.