THE NAVY: DEFENSE OR PORTENT? By Charles A. Beard. New York: Harper & Bros. 1932. $2.00.
Reviewed by Vice Admiral W. L. Rodgers, U. S. Navy (Retired).
(Reprinted from the Philadelphia Inquirer by permission.)
This book is a violent polemic. It is said that bad lawyers, when they have a poor case, think it wise to abuse the opposing counsel. This is the course which Doctor Beard follows. The volume is chiefly devoted to impugning the ability, motives, and character of those who hold views contrary to the author’s in regard to the Navy and the national defense. These opponents he classifies as naval officers, members of the Navy League, and shipbuilders and steel manufacturers.
In the very title of his book Doctor Beard shows animus. He pretends to believe that naval officers as a body are attempting to assume control of national policies, and states that the issue is whether the civilian branches of the federal government are to be really supreme over army and navy bureaucrats, (p. 13). In his heat he commits the absurdity of alleging that naval officers advocate that the United States should have an army and navy strong enough to enforce its decisions against any power or combination of powers on earth (pp. 9-10). Even the British Admiralty in the days of its predominance a generation ago never went so far beyond reason as that.
The author betrays no serious knowledge of naval matters nor of the part which navies play in supporting national policies. His acquaintance with the Navy of the United States seems chiefly derived from a study of Congressional Committee hearings on the Navy and particularly the recent one on the London Naval Treaty. Parts of these hearings were of the nature of cross-examination of naval officers, and all that was most unfavorable to their stand Doctor Beard selects for exposition. To the evidence in chief he gives no attention and thus is able to condemn the Navy freely.
He would have us believe that the opinion of naval officers on naval matters is without weight because they have so often been wrong. One instance which he cites with gusto to prove that officers speak without knowledge was a series of questions evidently framed with knowledge beforehand, asking an accomplished and experienced officer whether he had held certain specified offices and, as the answer was, necessarily, no, Doctor Beard assumes for the purpose of his argument that the witness knew nothing. Of course, experts are often wrong. Bridges designed by skilled engineers collapse, lawyers frequently lose their cases, and physicians do not always cure their patients; but after all expert advice is the best that can be had, and Congress seeks and will continue to seek the opinion of naval officers on naval matters for the simple reason that as a class they know more of the subject than any other set of men.
There is much denunciation of the Navy League which has as much right to urge its views on Congress and on the public as any other body of citizens. Every cause is now urged by organized effort and the country is fortunate that it has the advantage of hearing both sides of this question. The shipbuilders, too, are assailed for the sordid impropriety of profit making out of naval building, and the supply of arms. Of course, the deceptiveness of this argument lies in the tacit assumption that the national defense is an evil thing. If, on the contrary, as the great majority of People believe, national defense is right, it is wholly proper for any one to urge on Congress and on the public the reasons for adequate defense even if he expects to earn his living thereby.
Very few legislative measures get before Congress that are not pushed by some one who is financially affected by them. Making money is a proper employment for any one provided the method does not injure the state. Manufacturers who will gain by high tariffs and those who will gain by low ones do not hesitate to urge their views upon Congress, the duty of the Congress being to listen and to do what seems right. Similarly, when shipbuilders urge the advantages of a strong navy, their arguments are by no means invalidated by the fact that they will earn a dividend if Congress and the people accept their views.
As to Doctor Beard’s general knowledge of naval affairs we may judge him from the attempt he makes to show that it is almost as culpable for shipbuilders to urge a merchant fleet for this country as it is to make men-of-war. He ignores the fact that commerce has always been a chief promoter of civilization and that nowadays manufacturing and exporting nations cannot afford to let their national rivals have a monopoly of their transportation. Neither does he seem to be aware that from the beginning of history navies have existed to protect national commerce, and in time of war to attack the hostile commerce which enables the enemy to carry on the war. The sea is barren and navies would have no reason for existence were it not for maritime commerce. Such commerce may be for the support of the civil population or of an invading army, but in either case no sea battle ever accomplished anything except as it affected the economic relations and the supplies of the belligerents.
Doctor Beard is strongly for the proposition that all persons, private and official, who speak and write in the field of armaments, should be without interested motives (p. 186). Unfortunately, people who are without interest in any matter usually are worthless guides, and, besides, were Doctor Beard to follow his own precept, we should not have heard him, for presumably he is paid for writing his book.
THE NAVAL GENIUS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON. By Captain Dudley W. Knox, U. S. Navy, (Retired). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1932. $7.00.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral L. H. Chandler, U. S. Navy, (Retired).
“There is nothing new under the sun” is an old saying that, in these days of progress, is being disproved almost daily. It has been the good fortune of Captain Dudley W. Knox, U. S. Navy, to add his voice effectively to the general refutation of the truth of the old adage by giving to us a new and admirable picture of one of the world’s best-known and greatest characters, George Washington. By dint of perseverance and hard study Captain Knox has gathered together and presented to us in coherent and logical, as well as in most readable form, a hitherto neglected and never truly or fully understood phase of the attainments and character of our first president.
It is not the least part of this tribute to Washington that it shows him as ranking very high among those men possessed of one particular attribute of true greatness; the ability and the willingness to learn from events and from other men. This is an attribute, the absence of which has caused the downfall of many, and it is one which has often slipped away from its original holder as he advanced in years, and by its fading has contributed to his downfall, as was perhaps most noteworthy in the case of Napoleon Bonaparte. Captain Knox shows us very vividly how this trait of character and mind made its appearance in George Washington in regard to the vital subject of sea power, knowledge of which he (Washington) “frankly disclaimed” even while he “urgently pressed” upon others for such action as was demanded by his “clear perception of the functions” of sea power brought home to him by his accurate comprehension of events, conditions, and the true principles of strategy.
That some event taking place in one part of the world should have a very great effect, possibly even a decisive one, upon other events taking place perhaps many thousands of miles away, was and still is a thing that few people really see. This vital fact was originally presented to us by Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, U. S. Navy, in his first books on naval strategy, wherein the writer revolutionized the writing of history by bringing into its true perspective the effect of maritime strategy upon the progress and development of events on shore. Now Captain Knox shows us conclusively that George Washington, very many years before the advent of Mahan’s splendid work, understood, realized, and applied the principles which our great naval historian was later to set forth in such convincing terms.
Captain Knox shows Washington as doing this imperfectly and perhaps somewhat reluctantly at first, but with gradually increasing clarity of perception and vigor as our war for independence progressed. That such understanding was to a considerable degree forced upon him by events, in no way detracts from his wisdom and greatness in this respect. Captain Knox gives us full evidence that in this, as in all other matters, Washington learned, not only through the pressure of events, but by deliberate, mature, and reasoned thought and study of a very abstruse subject, one with which the minds of few people had as yet grappled comprehendingly.
For the present reviewer to attempt to enter into any detailed discussion of Captain Knox’s fine work would be but to detract from the clarity and precision of what he has recorded, and the reviewer does not feel qualified to proceed along those lines; nor has he any desire to try to repeat what has been said by Captain Knox so much better than he could hope to say it. He can do no better than to close this brief review by saying that Captain Knox has recorded how a man absolutely unacquainted with all these things, as was Washington at the beginning, successfully won his way through the haze that then veiled the true principles and value of sea strategy. In telling this the writer of this book has paid the greatest tribute to the genius of Washington. In no possible way can the gist of this tribute be better stated than has been done by Captain Knox in the closing paragraph of his introductory chapter:
The supreme test of the naval strategist is the depth of his comprehension of the intimate relations between sea power and land power, and of the truth that basicly all effort afloat should be directed at an effect ashore. History abounds in examples of naval effort misdirected because the naval mission was too restricted in its military outlook. More frequent still are the historical cases of army commanders failing to appreciate the vital importance of the naval element. The cause of American Independence was fortunate in having combined in Washington the rare qualities of a great general and a great naval strategist.
APPLIED WING THEORY. By Elliott G. Reid. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. 1932. $3.00.
Reviewed by Commander A. C. Read, U. S. Navy
Professor Reid’s book fills a very definite need for a treatment of theoretical aerodynamics suitable for classroom work with advanced students. A long chapter on fundamental theory is particularly clear and complete. The illustration by simple figures of the physical significance of the various basic equations should enable the student to understand fully the factors and the reasoning involved. The same treatment is carried out in the chapters on the Kutta-Joukowski theorem of lift, the finite monoplane, multiplanes, miscellaneous applications of wing theory, and wing profile theory. The last four chapters cover most of the common practical applications of the theory developed in the first part of the book. This latter part contains much of interest and value to the airplane designer.
An outstanding feature of Professor Reid’s book is his comment regarding the applications and the limitations of the various formulas and methods. These comments, together with the numerous figures giving direct comparison of theoretical and experimental results, are especially valuable for instruction purposes since it is always difficult for the average student to grasp the physical significance and limitation of a theorem with conventional presentation.
Applied Wing Theory is intended primarily as a textbook for graduate students, but it will make a valuable addition to any reference library. Owing to the nature of the subject material, a good working knowledge of calculus and mechanics is required for its full appreciation. The presentation, however, is very clear and the average engineer will find its reading easy and profitable.
YACHT OWNER’S LOG BOOK. Arranged by John C. Groome, Jr. Philadelphia: John E. Hand & Sons Co. 1930.
A recent case came to the writer’s attention where a small yacht got far off its course in a fog and ran aground, an accident that caused considerable inconvenience as well as expense. The skipper complained that the owner had turned on the radio which had affected the compass. True or not, this condition could have been detected and damage avoided if a careful record had been kept of courses steered and made good under varying conditions.
The Yacht Owner's Log Book provides a convenient means of keeping such a record as well as entries concerning weather, fuel on hand, pumping of bilges, guests on board, etc., which every yacht should have. As a matter of safety of the vessel, as well as a matter of interest, it seems every yacht should have one of these on board.