The Polish corridor is the direct result of President Wilson’s declaration in his fourteen points that Poland must have access to the sea over its own territory. At the peace conference, Poland, in the face of British as well as German resistance, was given a strip of land that divided the Germany of 1919 into two geographical parts. This strip of land spoken of as “The Polish Corridor” has a shore line on the Baltic Sea west of the Free City of Danzig, and extends northward from Upper Silesia, separating East Prussia from Germany.
Thus, after a captivity of 150 years, Poland, in addition to regaining its own independent political life, has had restored to it a seacoast. In so gaining access to the sea, Poland increased its territory by an area of 6,000 miles. Erased from the map of Europe in 1772, when Frederick the Great took its land in the first Polish partition, Poland had become but a legendary name to the great majority of people, even to those well informed in politics.
The territory which is now called Poland has been occupied by its people from times which even archaeologists cannot determine. The country, being surrounded by swamps and forests, was untouched by the hordes of barbarians who made inroads into Europe in the early ages. Later, however, the Slav peoples living farther east and west, were overwhelmed by Asiatic invaders. Then Poland undertook the defense of Europe, and again and again drove back the hosts of Turk and Tartar, as for instance, when the Poles under King Sobieski destroyed the power of the Turks under the walls of Vienna in 1653.
Thus forced constantly to defend themselves, the Poles, an agricultural people, were welded together. It is exceptional that they did not become a war-loving or a conquering nation. The people united to improve their government, and developed a true republican spirit of freedom and tolerance; they were patriotic and betrayed an unusual respect for human rights and ideals. They upheld a government “for the people, by the people.” Throughout its early days, Poland was frequently obliged to quell disturbances on its eastern borders. The Russian Empire, rising from the remnants of the Tartar tribes and taking from them their military lust for aggression, did not give the Poles an opportunity to defend themselves against the fast growing power of the Teutonic Knights to the west. Unhindered, East Prussia became established on Polish territory, to become the leader of the German states, and filled with ambition to dominate the world. The growth of these neighbors, empires where absolutism and ideas of conquest ruled, placed Poland geographically in a singular position. To these empires, Poland opposed its high ideals and its armies and united its forces with those of the weaker nations of Europe. This policy brought about a number of alliances—with Lithuania against the aggressions of the Teutonic Knights and of Russia; with the Bohemians and Hungarians against the attacks of the victorious Turks and against the attacks of the Austrians. Poland defended Latvia against Russia; and with the patriotic Ruthenians it founded a free Ukraine, independent of the former oppressor, Russia.
Their own unhappy conditions made all Poles sympathize with any nations struggling, as they were, for democratic government and republican freedom. For this ideal Kosciusko took part in the American Revolution; for the French idea of republican freedom the Polish legions fought under Napoleon in Italy, in Germany, and in Russia. During the World War, Poland opposed the three great powers who were its hereditary enemies. After the downfall of Russia, Germany, and Austria, Poland regained her freedom. Though defeat had brought many changes in the governments of the defeated nations their national tendencies still remain. If Poland, by maintaining its high ideals, by maintaining friendly relations with the defeated powers, can so influence them that they will turn to the true democratic ideals of justice and right, then we may safely conclude that in restoring Poland to her rightful place among European nations, a safeguard for peace has been created. To this great task, Poland has heartily devoted herself, and the past decade has been replete with concrete evidence of her good faith.
However, in thus restoring Poland and in giving her access to the sea, there has been thrust into the calm of Europe the perpetual problem of the corridor. A glance at the map will assist in understanding the live importance of this danger spot to the peace of Europe. East Prussia has become a dismembered thumb of Germany. It has already commenced to wither, and with it is withering the influence of Germany on the area between Danzig and the Gulf of Finland. Furthermore, there exists today the indisputable fact that East Prussia is gradually being absorbed by Poland. This is a constant hurt to German pride and it is extremely doubtful if any German government or party can long continue to accept the status quo and the present frontiers. The corridor, therefore, forms the fundamental issue between Germany and Poland, and the main question is whether the outcome of the treaty of Versailles is conducive to European peace or not.
The political atmosphere of Europe is full of brimstone. The press of Europe, England, and America is full of the pros and cons of the status quo. Writers of articles and publications seem to compete with each other in selecting bellicose titles under which to discuss the part that Poland is now taking in the politics of Europe. For example, one reads: “The Battle of the Ports” (referring to Gdynia and Danzig), “Poland’s Westward Trend,” “Poland’s Reign of Terror,” “The Polish Corridor,” “A Danger Spot to Europe,” “The Corridor, Indispensable to Peace,” and, “Poland Makes Good.”
Likewise, from Poland come bellicose political and journalistic bloodlettings. One Polish author, Stanislav Bukevieki, in his Poland’s Task in East Prussia, writes: “From what has been said it follows that the mutual relations between Poland and Germany will for a very long time remain hostile.” Another author goes a step further. Again Grabski, professor of political economy in Lemberg University, in his pamphlet on “Poland’s Trend to the Baltic and the Oder,” writes:
The German tendency to expand in the direction of Poland is the same as it always has been. Does any one believe that Germany has permanently acquiesced in the loss of the industrial district of Upper Silesia, and in the severance of East Prussia from the rest of Germany by the corridor? If so, he is either blind or he declines to see the real facts in the case. The decision of the East Prussian problem which was given by the treaty of Versailles is too artificial to be permanently maintained. Poland can exist without having access to the Dnieper, but without permanent access to the sea she cannot exist. This is the decisive point of view. . . . But Poland, on account of the Baltic coast, will sooner or later clash with Germany.
In regard to the access to the Baltic Sea, there is no question but that time is working on the side of Poland. Day after day witnesses the departure of Germans from East Prussia to the more prosperous homeland. As the Germans emigrate, the Poles move in. The longer this goes on, the longer the opportunity for Poland to run its own affairs, and the longer Poland remains unmolested in carrying out its policies toward winning over East Prussia, the weaker the German case for frontier revision will become. From a German source we find the most concrete evidence in behalf of the status quo. Dr. Hellmuth von Gerlath, president of the German League for the Rights of Man and Citizen, recently made the following statement: “From the international point of view, there is no possible ground for discussion of a rectification of our eastern frontiers, which would amount to annexation pure and simple.”
This statement is supported by the map studies of the historical shifting of the frontiers of Poland, from the time of its greatest extent in 1654 through the period of its captivity to its reestablishment by the peace conference. A solution of this dangerous question of the Polish frontiers cannot be found in history—exhaustive research of the history of Europe has produced arguments equally favorable to each side and the pendulum of justice may be made to swing from one to the other. If the case admitted, a clear decision would have been discovered by the many eminent statesmen who have reviewed the conflict in the status of impartial neutrals. The threads emerging from the tapestry of history cannot be unraveled, and it appears to enter into an endless argument as to which side has the better claim. It is the purpose of this article to produce a “balcony” from which to observe the progress of events.
Although the past speaks with two voices, the fact that the election returns to the Segm (Lower Polish House) recently showed that the German minority in the area covered by the so-called corridor made up but 15 per cent of the total vote polled. The Polish census of 1927 accounted for 850,000 Poles to 120,000 Germans in that area. A review of this census and the one taken just after the war, develops the fact that over 300,000 Germans have left this area and their places have been taken by Poles. No one can dispute the fact that the Polish corridor is now unmistakably Polish.
At the rebirth of the Polish nation as a country with definite frontiers, the statesmen returning her to a place in the world failed to, or at least did not, place within her boundaries the mouth of the Vistula river. This river is the “Mississippi” of Poland. At the mouth of the Vistula is located the Free City of Danzig with its population 90 per cent German. Before the World War, the lines of trade ran east and west, Danzig flourished. The Free City was an important seaport on the Berlin- East Prussia line of communication, rail or water, to Konigsberg.
President Wilson, insisting that Poland have access to the Baltic, abruptly removed or lifted up a section of this important line of communication and rotated it 90°, writing literally, forming a north and south channel. On the east, the Vistula alternately enters Prussian and Polish territory. On the west is the frontier of Germany. Although denied access to the Baltic via the mouth of the Vistula, the Polish government is zealously fostering this valuable water route which has its watershed in the wide southern frontiers of Poland. The products of the fields and industries of Poland, seeking an outlet into the Baltic, come down this main line of communication to bring up with a “bang” against the tariff wall imposed by Danzig. The Free City has been hostile; quarreling between it and Poland grew to such an extent and resistance to trade became so serious that the Poles, feeling that appeal to the League of Nations was hopeless, decided to build their own seaport. Twelve miles to the west of the mouth of the Vistula there has sprung up the seaport of Gdynia. Ten years ago this port on the Baltic was nothing but a small fishing village. Its growth has been phenomenal—today it equals Danzig in the matter of cargo handling facilities with a capacity to handle 15,000,000 tons a year.
At one end of the harbor of Gdynia, a naval basin has been established. Here may be seen units of the Polish Navy:
240 officers, 2,064 men; 2 gunboats, 2 destroyers, 5 torpedo boats, 3 submarines, 4 mine sweepers, 1 surveying ship, 1 transport, 2 training ships, 5 river monitors, 6 river gunboats, 30 river motor boats, and 32 mercantile marine steamers, totaling 33,775 tons; about 120,000 tons river craft of which some 10,000 tons are steamers.
Into this new seaport, railways are beginning to enter directly from the heart of Poland and from Silesia. Here is trade rivalry—here is concrete evidence of how failure to recognize the importance of the mouth of the Vistula has created a danger spot to the fostering of peace in Europe. Danzig is fast failing economically. Will the Free City with its population of some 400,000 Germans appeal to Germany for relief? In the war it was a part of Germany. Its citizens fought valiantly in behalf of Germany. Gdynia is destined to replace this old port. The financial ruin of Danzig is another wound in the pride of the German nation. It is well to understand this situation and to realize the facts.
Take, now, the ordinary case of a naval military staff being asked to prepare a war plan against a certain state and to advise what means it will require. To any one who has considered such matters it is obvious the reply must be another question-—What will the war be about?
Before they take any step further they must know many things. They must know whether they are expected to take something from the enemy, or to prevent his taking something either from us or from some other state. If from some other state, the measures to be taken will depend on its geographical situation and on its relative strength by land and sea. Even when the object is clear it will be necessary to know how much value the enemy attaches to it. Is it one for which he will be likely to fight to the death or one which he will abandon in the face of comparatively slight resistance? If the former, we cannot hope to succeed without entirely overthrowing his powers of resistance. If the latter, it will suffice, as it often has sufficed, to aim at something less costly and hazardous and better within our means. All these are questions which lie in the ministers charged with the foreign policy of the country, and before the staff can proceed with a war plan they must be answered by ministers.
In short, the staff must ask of them what is the policy which your diplomacy is pursuing, and where, and why do you expect it to break down and force you to take up arms? The staff has to carry on in fact when diplomacy has failed to achieve the object in view, and the method they will use will depend on the nature of that object. So we arrive crudely at our theory that war is a continuation of policy, a form of political intercourse in which we fight battles instead of writing notes.—Corbett.