Members of the Institute may save money by ordering books through its Book Department, which will supply any obtainable book. A discount of 10 per cent is allowed on books published by the Institute, and 5 per cent on books of other publishers (government publications excepted). Address Secretary-Treasurer, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland.
MEMOIRS OF PRINCE VON BULOW, 1897 TO 1903. Translated from the German by F. A. Voight, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1931. $5.00.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Schuyler Mills, U. S. Navy
“William II takes everything personally. . . . He endures nothing that is boring . . . too serious people get on his nerves. . . . His majesty needs praise every now and again . . . You are Kaiser William II’s last card.” These lines were written to Bernhard von Bulow when, in 1897, he was called to the post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and was already mentioned by those close to the court as the successor to the aged Chancellor, Prince von Hohenlohe. Throughout this volume the Kaiser is the central figure. He is depicted as a brilliant man, charming to those close to him, interested in everything under the sun, lovable, and unusually intelligent, but given to illusions and false logic, vain and jealous of those who seemed to outshine him, erratic and neurotic. His principal failure as a ruler was lack of self- confidence. He was as brilliant a talker as Theodore Roosevelt and had the same gift for terse expression that lends itself so readily to quotation. He was liable to be carried away by his enthusiasm for expression beyond the bounds of discretion. The long list of his “breaks,” including the famous “Hun” speech is given at length and the political effects of them are discussed. Prince Hohenlohe felt grave concern about the Kaiser’s sanity, but Bulow insists that the Kaiser was sane, although neurotic and erratic, which, he admits, is a rather fine distinction.
In his official capacity, Bulow accompanied the Kaiser on his visits to other countries. He met and talked with Queen Victoria, King Edward, the Tsar, and all the principal statesmen, politicians, and social leaders of Europe. He recounts his conversations with them and discusses their personalities with complete frankness. It is these personal incidents, so well told, that make the book a fascinating one to read.
This volume is the first of a series of four giving the recollections and the comment of Prince von Bulow, who spent his early life in the German diplomatic service, took charge of the Foreign Office in 1897, was chancellor from 1900 to 1909, when he retired and remained an observer of the downfall of Imperial Germany. The author wrote and revised his manuscript very carefully, and then held it for publication until after his death, which occurred in 1929. As it represents the mature judgment of a man of great experience, who had himself felt the restraints of responsibility, his comment should receive the most serious consideration. It is of intense interest to those who care for the study of the genesis of the World War.
Bulow’s thesis is that nothing in history is inevitable, that the war was caused primarily by the stupidity of his successor in giving Austria the “blank check” in 1914 and, to cap the climax, permitting Germany to shoulder the blame by a premature declaration of war. He maintains that neither the Kaiser nor the German people wanted war, but were permitted to drift into it through the folly of its leaders. This particular volume covers the period from 1897 to 1903, the time up to 1919 and the earlier years being the subject of the other three volumes not yet translated. A few years before the commencement of this narrative the Kaiser had dismissed Bismarck and had radically altered the former policy of Germany by failure to renew the Re-insurance Treaty with Russia, thereby permitting the latter to form the alliance with France. The Iron Chancellor was still alive and fiercely critical. The Kaiser was jealous of Bismarck’s great reputation and strove to show that he was capable of managing affairs. Bulow was a pupil of Bismarck in that he believed that it was vital to Germany’s interests to maintain peace with Russia at all costs. Unlike Bismarck, he believed in the then popular doctrine of economic imperialism and felt that the “will to power” of the German people should be recognized by the acquisition of commercial concessions and territory over seas. The logical result of this policy was the expansion of the Navy and the consequent rise of distrust of Germany on the part of England.
The attempts to gain the “place in the sun” (a phrase coined by Bulow) resulted in some undignified fishing in troubled waters, as at Manila in 1898; some futile results, as in the acquisition of a number of small islands in the Pacific; and the arousing of considerable controversy, as in China. In 1898 the German naval leaders were convinced that Spain would make short work of the United States, particularly in the Far East. It was felt that Spain could not hold Manila long against the insurgents and that Manila would then fall into Germany’s hand like a ripe plum. A squadron was ordered there to observe the fighting and to be ready to take over the Philippines as soon as the time should come. Bulow’s account is not in exact accord with the facts and his comment on Admiral Dewey’s action is unfair, as plenty of time was available for changing the orders for the squadron after receipt of the news of the result of the Battle of Manila Bay, before Germany became involved. Bulow is quite frank about the purpose he had in mind when the squadron was ordered to Manila. The matter was soon settled, but the memory remained to trouble relations later.
The question of the future of the German Navy came up in 1898. Bulow proposed that the new ships should be built for coast defense only, but gave way before the masterly presentation of the case for the battleship by Tirpitz. He did make a proviso that the building of battleships should be given as little publicity as possible and that the subject of defense should be stressed. He gives a very interesting and sympathetic picture of Tirpitz, adding that the Admiral’s great interest in the Navy made him blind to other interests so that he frequently urged policies that were against the interests of the nation as a whole.
The most vital decision in foreign policy during this period was the refusal of English proposals for an alliance. Bulow’s action in this matter seems sound, considering the conditions that obtained at the time. England was so unpopular in Germany on account of the Boer War that King Edward was hissed on the streets when he came over to see his sister on her deathbed. The long-standing enmity between England and Russia might easily have involved Germany with the latter nation without any recompense. It seemed impossible that France would ever forgive England for the Fashoda incident. Bulow did not trust the sincerity of Chamberlain or his ability to persuade both parties in Parliament to accept an alliance. He complains about the Germans being sentimental in their consideration of foreign affairs and maintains that one should be guided by interest and cold reason alone, yet he considered sentiment too strong for France and England to make up their differences, or for England to abide by a fair agreement with Germany.
In the matter of internal affairs there was a constant struggle to control the hasty enthusiasms of the Kaiser and then to explain away to the Reichstag the “breaks” that the latter did make. The speech to the regimental mess where the Kaiser boasted that the regiment was ready to shoot down the socialists at his command and that of his allies, God and the Great Elector, caused more trouble than the “Hun” speech did. The tariff was increased in order to protect home industries, but the need of a balance between manufacturing and agriculture was recognized by giving protection to the latter. That was a great source of strength to Germany during the war, for had she gone as far as England did in the matter of fostering industrial growth, she would have been in a much worse position as a result of the blockade.
In this volume we see the groundwork of German pre-war policy laid down, the decision to expand, to enlarge the Navy, and to avoid closer relations with England. The later volumes will show the development of this policy. It was admittedly a dangerous one, and one that required a sure hand and careful judgment if disaster were to be avoided. In the hands of a bungler such a policy would be fatal. If the later volumes are written with the same charm and deal with events and persons with the same frankness, the entire set will be one of the best and most interesting of all works dealing with the origin of the World War.
H.O. NO. 209—POSITION TABLES FOR AËRIAL AND SURFACE NAVIGATION. By Commander M. R. Pierce, U. S. Navy. Washington, D. C.: Hydrographic Office. 1931. $.75. Reviewed by Commander H. H. J. Benson, U. S. Navy
Commander Pierce’s “tables and their method of use were devised” by him “when he was navigator of the dirigible, U.S.S. Los Angeles.” These tables may be used for all latitudes and “the method of solving for line of position is uniform throughout.” They are published in a convenient-sized book of 223 pages.
After obtaining the Greenwich and local hour angles the computed altitude may be obtained with only two entries in the tables, three quantities being picked out at the first and two at the second. These last two are the computed altitude and the azimuth. It is a particular advantage to obtain the azimuth so readily and rules for naming it are simple and printed at the foot of each page. It is seen that this is a very short method.
Table I being tabulated in tenths of degrees, “when the celestial body is near the meridian an error of two or three miles may occur when working a sight of sun, star, planet, or moon,” unless one resorts to interpolation. That slows up the work somewhat. The surface navigator will find it necessary to interpolate and it is doubtful if the aerial navigator should deliberately throw in an error of three miles which may add to “the probable error due to observation with a bubble sextant.” Table Ia is arranged for certain stars based on their positions in the heavens in 1935. As several of these stars change in declination more than 19" annually, perceptible error may result in other years as the body approaches the meridian. A list of stars included in Table IA would add to its convenience and if the annual variation in declination were given one could be governed thereby.
In Table II the calculated altitude is tabulated to whole minutes and the azimuth to degrees, and as the intercepts frequently are long, another error of over half a mile may result. The assumed position does not as a rule fall on an even degree of latitude or longitude. This lengthens slightly the time required to plot it. These tables may be used for obtaining great-circle courses and distances and other purposes but the author has wisely left out examples of such uses because “more suitable means” are available elsewhere.
Commander Pierce’s method is an excellent one for solving quickly for the line of position. It is certainly one of the shortest, possibly the shortest, for all usual conditions. The navigator will know when to be satisfied with the degree of accuracy which he may obtain.
PILOTS HANDBOOK, 1931. Prepared by the Weems System of Aërial Navigation. Los Angeles: Pilots Handbook Publishing Co. $7.50.
Reviewed by Major Follett Bradley, Air Corps, U. S. Army This book, just published, is designed to teach the cross-country pilot navigation in its various phases, and to deter the tyro in aerial navigation from attempting flights beyond his skill and experience. It is divided into seven parts and has, in addition, a complete set of maps of the United States on the mercator projection.
Part I is devoted to navigation proper, and is subdivided into twenty-three chapters. The first ten chapters comprise an explanation of ordinary “piloting” and dead reckoning, and the remaining chapters explain the Weems system of celestial navigation. All fliers must understand and apply “piloting,” and to some extent dead reckoning, on short cross-country flights. The term “piloting” as used in the handbook, is unfortunately confusing to those land airmen to whom the term means the flying of the airplane. The author is a naval officer and was an experienced marine navigator before he devoted his attention to aerial navigation. He has incorporated in his terminology the sea going meaning of the term. “Piloting is flying from one place to another by identification of landmarks.” Celestial navigation is essential when over clouds, large expanses of water, or uninhabited and uncharted wastes of land. It is not used (except in training and preparation for such flights) when the pilot is able to establish his position by means of maps, compass, and frequent landmarks distinguishable from the air.
The chapters on the compass and its errors, and course plotting and correction are invaluable to all cross-country pilots. The chapters on dead reckoning and celestial navigation have really reduced to a simple, practical method, those complicated mathematical processes formerly necessary to find one’s position from sextant observation of the sun, moon, planets, or stars.
Part II is on meteorology. The handbook would be materially improved by the revision of this part along the lines of less erudition, and more practicality. The student who cares to delve into the theories of thermodynamics as applied to meteorology would not object to seeking his information elsewhere.
Part III is an adaptation to crosscountry flying of the Automobile Blue Book route directions. “ Speedometer reading 5.6 miles, white schoolhouse on left. Turn right—etc.” The handbook calls these “plotted courses” and lists 129 of them, each course being listed in both directions. It would be advisable in the next edition of the handbook to explain that these plotted courses cannot stand alone as the sole means of “flying from where you are to where you want to go,” and to show in some detail how the information shown in them is to be used in conjunction with piloting by map and compass. The difficulty in depending solely on the plotted courses lies in the fact that they furnish no aid to the pilot who has gotten off his course. Future revisions of the handbook should omit reference to indistinct landmarks, and should lay greater stress on landmarks prominent from the air. As examples, one plotted course notes a highway fork as a landmark in terrain filled with highways, but with none outstanding. Another tells the pilot to cross a railroad at Podunk (a hamlet of only a few houses and not shown on the map), but fails to mention another fair-sized town only a few miles away through which two intersecting railroads pass. It would be highly advisable for an experienced crosscountry pilot to fly each course and note for incorporation in the tables, those landmarks that are prominent from the air at low altitude.
Part IV is called American Airports. This name is not indicative of the substance matter, for whereas one would expect to find here a list of American airports, he finds instead an excellent and valuable article on the considerations and factors involved in the selection and construction of an airport.
Part V is a list of airports in the United States arranged alphabetically by states. This is a valuable table, and well worth inclusion in the handbook.
Part VI is a very valuable compendium of information on such subjects as: air commerce regulations; licenses and certificates; clearance and entry; parachutes; gliders and gliding; airway schedules; air markings; schools; and lists of approved aircraft and aircraft engines.
Part VII is a buyers’ guide, “containing a complete directory of where to buy everything from cotterpins to transport liners.”
The handbook incorporates a map of the United States on the mercator projection in twenty-one sections. There is no question that the mercator projection is the best for navigation, particularly celestial navigation. However, the avowed purpose of the chief cartographer of the maps is only partially correct in its conception. He says:
We may briefly mention here that while there is need of frequent landmarks, etc., on the ground, the greater visibility in the air permits the cartographer to forego mentioning the less essential landmarks, and to limit himself to the more prominent ones, thereby bringing about greater legibility, the lack of which is one of the incidental points of criticism of existing flying maps.
He is most certainly correct in his aim of legibility, but the draftsmanship of the maps is poor, the lines and names of places are much too heavily drawn, and the scale is so small that the cartographer has not attained his end of legibility.
It is a mistake to have included, as part of the book, the file of flying maps. They practically double the thickness and weight of the volume and make it more difficult to handle and read. Furthermore, as maps are withdrawn for use in actual flying, the file will soon be incomplete. The maps should be referred to in the book, but sold separately. There should be included in the book for reference only, maps of foreign countries, the more readily to locate places mentioned in foreign aviation news.
The reviewer is tremendously impressed with this book and believes it an invaluable contribution to aviation. Imperfections in the first edition of a work of this nature are bound to occur, and the remarkable thing about this text is that it is so good in its first edition. It deserves a place in every flying office, and in the private library of every pilot desirous of perfecting himself in cross-country flying.
NAUTICAL DIAGRAM. Invented and copyrighted by Captain W. Dekema. Los Angeles. Mounted $3.50; unmounted $2.50.
Reviewed by Commander J. A. Logan, U. S. Navy
Captain Dekema’s “Nautical Diagram” is a sheet on which is printed the diagram with the explanation of its use. The diagram itself is a system of curves on cross- section paper, and these lines give a graphic solution of the astronomical triangle. The sheet is sold mounted or unmounted. In addition to this basic sheet, are two separate sheets; the first containing illustrated examples, and the second containing tables for converting time into arc and vice versa and altitude corrections for sun, moon, planets, or stars. If the basic sheet is mounted it would seem well to paste the auxiliary sheets on the back of the board.
The elements used are latitude, declination, hour angle, altitude, and azimuth combined with two undefined elements B and C. The explanation is clear as far as it goes, but there is nothing to show how the data for preparing the diagram was obtained. This makes its use uncertain under special conditions such as when the declination is zero and when the hour angle is 90°. In this case a small error in either will make a large error in the value of B and C.
Except as noted in the preceding paragraph, the diagram is accurate within six miles for a single line of position—the limits claimed. Whether these limits are sufficient is open to question. The circumstances would have some bearing on this question which would seem to be one to be decided by the person responsible for the use of the diagram.
The time consumed in solving an ordinary line of position is about the same as that consumed by other short methods. With zero or 90° values, the time becomes longer because of unfamiliarity of treatment.
The rules for marking the various elements are simple and natural, except that the azimuth is reckoned always from the south pole, whereas most navigators are accustomed to reckoning it from the north pole.
The greatest value of the diagram seems to be its use for obtaining all kinds of great- circle data. These data are obtained with ease, except when the intersections come in the lower right-hand corner. In this connection, however, it would seem well to stress the necessity of care in using the proper signs for the various elements, and the necessity of watching the initial course in deciding on the direction to apply the “DLong.”
Its use is somewhat more of an eye strain than the use of tables; and to prevent errors, care is required to erase all marks from the diagram as soon as they have served their purpose. This constant erasing makes the life of a single sheet fairly short.