THE blockade of the entire Cuban coast line by the United States naval forces during the Spanish-American War had become virtually effective by the first of May, 1898, and the island was practically isolated from Spain so far as the landing of food, munitions, and mail was concerned. There was, however, one means of communication still available for the Spanish Governor General, Blanco, at Havana. This was the group of ocean cables connecting Cuba with many of the islands in the West Indies and thence to the home government in Madrid.
The task of severing this last link with Spain was entrusted to the Navy, whose plan of operation was simplified by the knowledge that no ocean cables were landed on the north coast of Cuba save those connecting Havana directly with Key West and thus controlled by the United States. On the south coast the cables were looped along the shore from Batabona to Guantanamo Bay; the more northerly loops touching at San Luis, Cienfuegos, Trinidad, and Santiago de Cuba. Because of this arrangement it was only necessary to cut the cables at Cienfuegos, or some point to the eastward of that town, and Havana would lose her last connection with the outside world.
The fourth division of the United States fleet was operating on the south coast of Cuba during the early part of May at the time the Cienfuegos cables were cut. This force consisted of the cruiser Marblehead, the gunboat Nashville, the converted yacht Eagle, the revenue cutter Windom, and the collier Saturn, all under the immediate command of the senior officer present, Commander B. H. McCalla of the Marblehead.
The town of Cienfuegos lies almost six miles from the sea, and the bay which comprises its harbor is entered by a channel three miles in length. The lighthouse on Colorado Point guarded the eastward side of this entrance, the low strip of land being studded by rock formations, trees, and dense Cuban chaparral. The lighthouse itself was built about twenty-five yards from the shore line and was flanked by a signal station and a small barracks for signal men and the military guard. About 300 yards east of the lighthouse stood the cable house. This, too, was close to the water’s edge.
From east of the cable house westward to the channel entrance, coral formations along the shore made navigation of small boats extremely hazardous, while the Spaniards had taken defensive measures in the form of rifle pits and trenches so well screened by rocks and vegetation, that if watchful American eyes had not seen men digging in these trenches, the existence of such defenses would not have been known.
Late on the afternoon of May 10, the Marblehead hoisted a signal that summoned the commanding officer of the Nashville, and Lieutenant Cameron McR. Winslow, also of that ship, aboard the cruiser. When these officers reported, Commander McCalla made known his decision to attempt the cutting of the cables at dawn of the following morning. He directed that a boat expedition, commanded by Lieutenant Winslow, be sent in to find and cut the cables, while the Marblehead and Nashville shelled the Spanish works. He also named Lieutenant E. A. Anderson of the Marblehead as second in command and designated the steam cutter and sailing launch of the cruiser, and the steam cutter and sailing launch of the Nashville as the boats to be used.
With further details of the expedition left entirely to the judgment of the two officers responsible for its success, Lieutenants Winslow and Anderson determined that each sailing launch should be manned by a coxswain, a blacksmith, carpenter’s mate, and twelve men, which, with the officer, made a crew of sixteen. Half of the men were to be armed with rifles and the remainder with revolvers. An ample supply of ammunition and a few extra rifles were put in each boat.
The crew of each steam cutter included a coxswain, two seamen, a fireman, and a coal passer. In addition each carried a sergeant and six privates of the Marine Corps, as well as an officer in charge. The Nashville’s cutter mounted two Colt machine guns, while that of the Marblehead carried a one-pounder Hotchkiss rapid-fire gun forward. The cable-cutting tools, to be carried in each sailing launch, consisted of a heavy maul, blacksmith’s hammers, cold chisels, an iron-plated block of wood, an ax, wire-cutting pliers, and a hacksaw. Grapnels of several sizes for catching and bringing cables to the surface were also provided.
The cable landing at Colorado Point had a central conductor consisting of a strand of seven copper wires, insulated by a guttapercha coating. These wires were housed in a lead tube as a protection against the attacks of the submarine boring teredo. Outside of this tube were two layers of heavy iron wires, the inner consisting of twelve, and the outer of fourteen, wires. Surrounding the whole and forming the external surface of the cable was jute braiding. The whole cable was two inches in diameter and weighed fully six pounds a linear foot.
At a quarter to seven on the morning of May 11, the Marblehead and Nashville began a deliberate and careful bombardment of the Spanish works, and buildings, using both main and secondary batteries. Ten minutes later, while the ships were still firing, the four boats pulled clear of the Nashville’s starboard side, and headed for the beach, the Nashville’s boats leading, the steam cutters towing the launches.
With the boats away, the ships concentrated their fire on the cable house and soon reduced it to a heap of crumbled masonry covering the wrecked electrical instruments. As the boats neared the shore, the ships slackened their fire and the small guns of the steam cutters opened on the rifle pits.
When about 400 yards from the beach, the steam cutters cast off the towlines and took position in deeper water to the rear of the launches. The latter boats manned the oars and pulled directly for the cable house as the cutters maintained their fire from about 100 yards astern.
Nearer and nearer the boats approached the land, unmolested by hostile fire until, at about 100 feet from the shore the bottom was sighted and the grapnels were thrown overboard. The coral formations on the bottom prevented dragging, however, and the boats continued their advance until the Marblehead’s launch suddenly sighted the submerged Santiago cable and grappled it. The Nashville’s launch immediately went to her assistance and both boats hooked firmly to the cable.
As the heavy mass broke surface under the lifting efforts of thirty men, ropes were passed under it and it was gradually lifted over the stern and into one boat, then more easily into the other. After both boats were in line under the cable, the steam cutters took towlines from the seaward boat and went ahead at full speed. The cable was slowly overrun until a depth of about two fathoms was reached. At this point, the Nashville’s launch stopped and began cutting operations while the Marblehead’s launch worked a little further on dragging the cable across the boat to provide slack.
Axes and cold chisels were tried, but the small 9-inch hack saw was found to be most effective. With this saw, and by frequent changing of the men using it, the cable was severed in about half an hour. Having made the first cut, the Nashville’s launch, following the Marblehead’s launch, underran the cable, bending it and coiling it down in the stern sheets. This cable was underrun until it was found to pass under a ledge of coral from which it could be freed. While attempting to clear it, a heavy sea swept over the Marblehead’s launch, held down by the weight of the cable, and almost swamped the boat. After this narrow escape no time was lost in making the second cut, this time by the Marblehead’s men, and the end was dropped over in thirteen fathoms of water. The piece cut out was about one hundred and fifty feet long.
Up to this time the enemy fire had been spasmodic and ineffective, and no attention had been paid to it by the working parties who, without pausing to rest, immediately began to search for the cable running westward to Batabano. The boats pulled westward of the cable house and pulled in until they were a scant sixty feet from the land.
The ships, realizing that the boats were within easy range of the rifle pits, opened a steady and well-directed fire, even though there was risk of hitting their own people. The men in the boats knew that they had to chance both an accidental hit from their ships and receive the fire of the enemy at close range, and yet they worked on in total disregard of both.
The weary crews soon located the second cable, but found it difficult to grapple, for the sea, breaking against the coral shore line, rolled back in a smother that blotted out vision of the bottom. When it was finally hooked this cable was harder to lift for the rough water knocked the heavy boats together, splintering and battering in their planking.
Whenever the fire from the ships slackened the enemy opened on the boats with rifles. Lieuntenant Winslow would order the steam cutters to open fire, and the ships, seeing the boats engaged began their hammering again. The cable was finally lifted, and handled in the same manner as the first, the Marblehead’s launch cutting the shoreward end with the Nashville’s launch making the seaward cut about 100 feet beyond.
While disabling the second cable, a third, and much smaller one was discovered in close proximity. Lieutenant Winslow rightly judged this to be the connection between the cable house and Cienfuegos, and though of little importance the commander of the expedition decided to disable it as well, because he believed little time would be required for the cutting operations.
The rifle pits had practically ceased firing as the boats grappled the third cable and the watchful ships had consequently silenced their batteries. The rough water and the utter weariness of the men delayed the work, but the Nashville’s launch finally hooked the cable about fifty feet from shore. Suddenly the enemy, evidently reenforced, opened a furious rifle fire that threw up sheets of spray about the boats. The steam cutters at once replied and soon shrapnel from the ships was racketing among the ruined buildings and rifle pits.
Hoping that the ships would be able to check the enemy’s fire, the working parties toiled on until they finally brought the cable to the surface. Instead of abating, the Spanish fire increased and bullets whined around the boats. Lieutenant Winslow, surveying the situation from the Nashville’s launch, saw a marine fall in the Marblehead’s steam cutter. Turning to scan Anderson’s boat, the Marblehead’s launch, he saw one of her men drop. As his gaze returned to his own boat, he saw seaman Robert Volz fall, wounded in four places.
The enemy’s fire, now very severe, had been augmented by machine guns and a fieldpiece. It was evident that no work could be done in the face of such opposition and Lieutenant Winslow ordered both launches to cease work and to open with their rifles. It was soon evident that the combined fire of ships and boats could not overpower the enemy so Lieutenant Winslow, who had been wounded in the hand by a Mauser bullet, ordered the steam cutters to stand by to tow the launches, and the launch crews to begin pulling their boats clear of the breakers. Ensign T. P. Magruder skillfully brought the steam cutters in, the launches were soon in tow and the boats made for the ships. Five men were wounded in the Marblehead’s two boats as they headed seaward.
The Nashville, commanded by her executive officer, Lieutenant A. C. Dillingham, after Commander Maynard had been wounded by a spent Mauser bullet, came along the reefs from the eastward and interposed herself between the boats and the enemy. At the same time, the Marblehead and Window, drew closer inshore and directed a storm of shell at the Spanish works and completely demolished the lighthouse.
At eleven thirty the firing ceased and the ships stood out to sea. On board the Nashville, which had been closer to the shore while the boats were working, her commander, Ensign Snow, Pay Clerk Southgate, and several enlisted men had been slightly wounded by spent bullets, during the more than three hours that ship was within range. Of the working parties, two men were killed, six men severely wounded, and one officer slightly wounded. The planking of the boats was pitted and scarred, both inside and out, by bullets, while the Nashville bore marks left by enemy fire, from her water line to the tops of her tall smokestacks.
A few days after the fight, Commander McCalla received a report from Cuban insurgents that the enemy had lost 300 in killed and wounded. This figure was probably fairly correct as the Spaniards, believing that a landing in force was planned by the Americans, had marched an infantry regiment to the threatened point, and had about 1,500 men in the action.