Why Should the Naval Officer Study American Foreign Policy?

The gravest responsibilities that can come to a people in this world have come to us. We must not fail to meet them in accordance with the requirements of conscience and righteousness.—President Coolidge, Armistice Day Speech, 1928.

I

THE interest of the American people in foreign affairs is probably greater at the present time than at any other period in this century. This interest has been accelerated within the last year by the extensive private and official discussions arising from the Kellogg pact, the cruiser bill, and the so-called Anglo-French armament understanding. It is significant of the importance of these international and national policies that the President of the United States should with such preciseness outline the executive attitude of the government in his Armistice Day speech of 1928. Mr. Coolidge touched directly upon the postwar world order and clarified the foreign policy of the United States in such a definite manner that it was inevitable that his pronouncements should elicit all shades of foreign comment. It is of particular interest to the naval officer that, in this speech, Mr. Coolidge emphasized the interdependence of foreign policy and national defense in clear, vigorous, Rooseveltian terms.

There are fundamental reasons why the interest of the American people has quickened to the importance of things international, and there is in this connection a growing need for leadership to interpret truth without bias or party interest. The fact that the United States occupies the most eminent position in assets, resources, and political power complicates the question of policy and fails to answer the vital questions: how will this position be maintained and how will it be consolidated?

It is the opinion of experts that the United States is today the richest nation that has ever existed in the history of the world. This country enjoys the largest export trade of any nation, and stands second in imports. In October, 1928, the United States had the largest export trade in quantity ever shipped in the record of our foreign trade, and in money value the greatest in eight years. The Statistical Abstract for the year 1929 gives the total foreign trade of the United States in round figures as $9,219,800,000 for the year 1928. The United States has emerged from a debtor nation to one of the world’s most powerful creditor nations, with private investments abroad that have been reckoned at thirteen billions of dollars, plus foreign governments’ obligations to the United States of eleven billions, or a grand total of twenty-four billions of dollars. The dividends on private investments alone in 1922 attained the sum of nearly seven hundred millions. Experts estimate the assets of the United States to be over four hundred billions of dollars. An undreamed of economic strife is being waged in the markets of the world to maintain this lead in world trade and finance. The enormous business involves foreign policy and a protection of foreign policy.

President Coolidge spoke with stern reality and prophetic sense when he said that this position was one of grave responsibility. The ways of the world and the tendency of foreign states to endeavor to dictate our foreign policy seem never to be understood by the sentimentalist, the pacifist, the “vote-getter,” or the “party-solidarity man.” The signposts of consistent and truly just yet protective policies point to an understanding of those policies which contributed to the attainment of the present international position of the United States. From this one gains a true perspective as to how they should be interpreted today in the light of a changed world order.

It is to the interest of the naval service, and vital to the people and government which it represents, that every effort be made to master the details of our major policies, past and present, in order that it may at all times be thoroughly informed and in a position to defeat those who endeavor by propaganda and sentimentalism to undermine that which has contributed so effectively to national greatness, and stands ever ready to protect our interests and our policies—the Army and the Navy.

In a recent popular magazine Richard Washburn Child wrote, in reference to what the then President-elect might tell the people: “He would have to say that, as things are to be for a long time, the national defense we must lean upon is our Army and Navy. The protection we need has increased because of increased foreign trade. It has increased by new needs to maintain the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and to defend island possessions and the canal. It has increased by the shrinking of the oceans as protecting spaces, which have been shortened by speed and power of ships, submarines, and airplanes.” In other words, there are grave facts to be faced if one grants that Utopia has not been reached, and national security has not been effected by promises.

There are three variable but determinant factors in the development and maintenance of foreign policy: first, the will of the people, exercised through the executive in the formulation and promulgation of a policy; second, the work of diplomacy to execute the details of furthering and consolidating, if possible, the policy; third, but not the least, is that of national defense, and in particular, the Navy in its relation to foreign policy. It is the duty of the Navy to augment the foreign service of the United States in all that pertains to the policies of peace, good will, and aid to states in national calamity, famine, or catastrophe; but there is another duty that must not be overlooked, in the field of foreign policy, and that is the protective element. The Navy must be of sufficient strength effectively to safeguard these policies in any war, and, should we be neutral, to protect the tremendous interests of the United States abroad, and the seaways of the world over which our trade is carried, from which much of the material wealth and prosperity of this country is derived.

II

Before entering into the main discussion of foreign policy and methods of its study, it might be of interest to glance briefly at the achievements of the Navy in the field of naval diplomacy. It is always with pride that we read the statement of Secretary of State John Hay to Rear Admiral Chadwick, president of the U. S. Naval War College in 1904: “We have had a number of difficult international situations in the West Indies and in Venezuela in the last two years, and they have all been handled by naval officers very well—they have not made a single mistake.”

The officers of the Navy and the students of foreign affairs have not forgotten the work of Jones, Kearney, Perry, Schufeldt, and Bristol, not to mention the many isolated cases of other officers, in the broad and important field of sea diplomacy. No study of American foreign policy is complete without a study of Jones’s activities ashore in Europe during the period of and just after the American Revolution. In a study of treaties, it is well to remember the part played by naval officers in the negotiations with the Barbary States, the first treaty with Turkey, the opening of Japan by treaty, the first treaties with Japan and Korea, and the commercial advantages gained by the prompt action of a naval officer in effecting our first treaty with China.

A careful study of the above negotiations will show that, although in most cases these naval officers had instructions, they were in no sense complete. Knowledge of our government’s policy and most important, also, that of other states, enabled them to make accurate diplomatic decisions that will ever stand to their credit.

A scholarly diplomat once defined diplomacy as, “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states, extending sometimes to their relations with vassal states.” In other words, it is a system or an official method by which international relations are furthered, commerce extended and maintained abroad, and the nation’s policies promulgated in foreign lands. It is scarcely disputable that the naval profession and the diplomatic corps reflect the foreign policy of the government and should work hand in hand for the best interests of the state.

It is interesting to note that, in the past achievements of the Navy in diplomacy, although there was naval force in most of these instances at the command of the negotiator, it was not used. This power, of course, in some instances had a certain effect, but in the main, these treaties were effected by moral suasion and the just argument of reciprocal advantages to be gained by the contracting parties. Here the point is stressed that it is to the interest of the naval officer and of the government that the officer keep in mind the broad outline of current governmental policy, and the principles upon which it was constructed. A close study will disclose a certain distinction between the theoretical and the actual policy of governments in the conduct of foreign relations.

The naval officer makes no pretense to be an official spokesman of his country, nor does he desire to usurp the important duties of officers of the Department of State. There is sufficient work for all, and cooperation must be the aim.

The naval officer should be cognizant of the foreign policies of the government to such a degree that he will comprehend the full intent of the government, and be guided accordingly. This comprehension is particularly necessary if the officer hopes to gain the reaction that our policies have upon the thought and opinion of other states, and particularly their attitude as to the national defense policy of the United States, and its relation to our commercial policies abroad. In this respect America’s policy, past and present, should be thoroughly understood in order that the estimate of the international situation may be accurate and well founded. The need for such knowledge increases proportionately with the United States’ advance in wealth and political position. The naval officer should acquire this knowledge for the same purpose as he does that pertaining to strategy and tactics—necessary information that equips the individual to master situations confronted, and meet emergencies armed with precedent and fact.

This study further leads to a conciseness and clarity in reports of a political or diplomatic nature. Reports, whether they be good ones or bad ones, are those statements which allow the senior, afloat or ashore, to see the situation through the eyes of the officer “on the spot,” or in the locality. It is the faithful attention to details, and the correct assumptions upon which reports are based, that give to them their much-to-be-desired value when read afar. The attention must ever be directed to the eddies and counter currents of foreign policy, for here are to be found the fine points and ofttimes the vital ones. The sensibility of historical cause and effect touches these subtle factors in foreign affairs and should be kept in mind by the student.

Naval diplomacy and foreign relations are history, but one cannot say that all history consists of foreign policies and diplomacy, for nearly every other page of history is that of war. The lessons of history should have a twofold value for the naval officer. We learn not only why countries go to war over a conflict of policy, but we learn how and by what methods they wage it. This method of historical research as regards sea power reached its zenith in this century by the publication of the brilliant and illuminating studies of Admiral Mahan. His works should be used as standard references in the study of the fusion of foreign policy and national defense, and bring home to the student the influence of sea power and its relation to the destiny of a state. Mahan dealt with facts and realities, and what is more, how powers shaped their sea policies dependent upon their strength and interests, without the dictation of other powers. There are supreme facts in history which a naval officer cannot intelligently ignore. This is especially true at the present time when realities are often forgotten in the chase of the ideal, and an utter forgetfulness of those events and policies by which our national greatness, solidarity, and prosperity were effected.

History' will teach the careful student how hatred, greed, lust for power, material wealth, and militaristic tendencies have served as the progenitors for war. We shall learn to differentiate between an asservation of good intentions and the ultimate actions of many nations which made the declaration. In other words, we shall see history as it is, and learn from these fundamental facts of human existence. Mowrer, in a recent study of our foreign affairs, said:

Forasmuch as human character shows very little evidence of modification in the last four thousand years, one may reasonably suppose that, to given causes, men may continue, in the bulk, to respond by similar reactions, so that for statesmen history teems with revealing instances, the lessons of which are applicable daily. Europe may know too much history; but we do not know enough. By giving a little more heed to the past, both of ourselves and others, we shall come into a better and kindlier understanding of the present—of those things which, regarded in the soft glow of retrospection, seem possible to be attempted with success, and of those which do not.

History will teach us that the course of a world state is beset with many dangers, charted and uncharted. It will teach us that ponderable and imponderable factors enter into the situation, but we may make note of one certain fact that world prestige and predominant world trade have never lasted long without adequate protection. It is the way of the world.

In advance of our consideration of a method of study and a general outline of foreign policy, it is fitting that there be inserted at this point a few general conclusions. It it true that they might be called generalizations; nevertheless it has been my aim to arrive at some conclusion, if for no other purpose than that of crystallizing an opinion of the facts in the case. They are offered with considerable trepidation, and with the sole claim that they result from some years’ study of the treaties and foreign relations of the United States. If there be discerned a faint trace of pessimism, or a note of disillusionment, it may be attributed to a “debunking” of platitude, and the office-seeker’s interpretation of foreign policy. I read, as a boy, in a standard history, that the Americans won the battle of Yorktown and drove the hated Redcoats from the United States. It was later that I learned of our debt to France, for in that battle they furnished 7,000 men or well over half of the land troops, and the Comte de Grasse had 23,687 officers and men in the blockade force at sea. The British children still read, in all probability, of the story that was in their early readers telling of the day when the Indian Rajah asked the beloved Victoria how she accounted for the extent and size of her great empire. The story goes that the august Empress, looking at the Rajah, slowly extended her arm and laid her hand on the Bible. The point is here made, that without a study of official correspondence, documents, treaties, and the contemporaneous events, both political and social, one will never gain the true perspective of foreign policies and international relations.

General Observations

1. In general a government’s foreign policy is dictated by national interests.
2. No nation or group of nations in coalition has ever had a lease on world morality.
3. The United States realized early in its history that it was better to look carefully after her own interests than to have others do it for her.
4. Might has never made right; but edicts and policies derive the great measure of their force from the power behind them.
5. The rule of give and take applies in general to diplomatic transactions.
6. There are few cases in history where a country did “the giving” actuated solely by idealistic motives. The Washington Limitation of Armaments Conference very nearly approached that.
7. The United States, in the early days, considered the policy of isolation as the only rational doctrine that would lead to a strong sovereign state. There is a question as to whether or not this is applicable today.
8. Washington never used the expression “entangling alliances with none.” He did say: “Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary circumstances.”
9. An equitable and just balance of power is one of the world’s greatest stabilizing influences.
10. The principles of democracy have spread to practically all parts of the world, but its ultimate success depends more and more upon the political education and enlightened viewpoints of the masses.

11. Real leaders are needed as never before to instruct the people as to the great issues at stake. That profound student of government, Bryce, remarked: “Even leading statesmen are often strangely ignorant of European diplomacy, much more so, the average senator or congressman.” Admiral Mahan wrote: “I apprehend, that nowhere does the separation between the coordinate branches of our government operate more disastrously than in the sphere of foreign relations; for this is the subject from which the average congressman most easily releases his conscience, because it is of the least interest to his constituents and its importance has not come home to his own consciousness.” Henry Adams, speaking in the third person, said: “What he insists upon is only that, in domestic politics, every one works for an immediate object, commonly for some private job, and invariably in a near horizon, while in foreign affairs the outlook is far ahead, over a field as wide as the world.” There are indications of a quickened interest in foreign affairs in the legislative branch of the government.

12. A history of the governmental policy in the territorial expansion of the United States will show on close inspection that there are spots where the highest standards of international ethics did not obtain.

13. Certain great doctrines such as those of expatriation and arbitration are essentially American, and are lofty contributions to the long history of international relations.

14. Roosevelt’s pronouncement, “The Monroe Doctrine is as strong as the Navy and no stronger,” might equally be applied to the event of a war in which the United States was neutral, that the sea-borne trade of this country will be carried on in proportion to the strength of the Navy.

15. When diplomacy becomes bankrupt, war begins.

16. It is exceedingly doubtful that the Colonies could have won the Revolutionary War without the aid of France and the terms of the Franco-American Alliance.

17. France gave material aid to the American cause in order to weaken Great Britain and reestablish the balance of power in Europe.

18. The War of 1812 was fought principally over the issues of neutral rights and impressment of seamen; yet the subsequent Treaty of Ghent scarcely mentioned any of the subjects over which the war was fought. Many writers hold that Great Britain held to the principle of impressment until 1861, when she registered a vigorous protest over the removal of Mason and Slidell from a British steamer.

19. Sea power has for three hundred years been the chief factor of protection and maintenance of the foreign policies of the powers of the world.

20. Maritime law in war and neutral rights are at present in dire need of interpretation and codification by international agreement.

21. Until there is a Utopian world state, positive security and absolute disarmament are incompatible.

22. The social and economic tendencies of all states determine to a great degree what self-interest will actuate their respective policies towards other states.

23. In times of peace, the equilibrium of states rests upon faith. The desire to strengthen this faith should be in the hearts of all men; but until the millennium is reached, force must protect those who keep faith from those who break faith.

24. The Navy of the United States has, in all of its country’s conflicts, been of inestimable value. It has in time of peace reflected the American-born doctrines of arbitration, “the open door” in commerce, and to a degree unsurpassed by any navy in the world, rendered prompt and effective aid to humanity in distress because of catastrophe and disaster.

25. It should be the duty as well as the pride of every true American to insist that our Navy should never by any circumstance fall below parity with another power; the most positive guaranty for peace we can ever hope to secure until the millennium or a Pax Romana is “a navy second to none.”

IV

The traditional policies of the United States are those agents that have contributed directly to the attainment of our place in the family of nations. They might be called the sinews and steel of our international relations. There were definite causes that brought them into being. The student must look for causes in order to fully comprehend effect. In a study of foreign affairs, we must gain the spirit, as well as the letter of the doctrines, policies, and pronouncements of our government. The motives that actuated policies are to be understood in the light of their day, but the principles of justice and equity they contain are applicable today and tomorrow, and constitute what might be termed the essence of Americanism.

There are certain phases of our national life, as well as doctrines applicable abroad, that, when properly studied, will give the full picture. It is for this purpose that there are set forth below topics for study. The outline is not complete in detail, but it should have some value in tracing the attitude of the government from its humble beginning until the present day. In spite of the writings of many so-called “liberals” that we never had a foreign policy, one will observe a certain consistency and continuity, even a persistency, in the maintenance of certain American principles.

Topics for Study

1. The practical achievement of the Anglo-Saxon race in working out the principles of self-government.
2. The principles and doctrines gained from the French political and philosophical writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and their influence upon the minds of the fathers of our government.
3. The foreign policy of the United States from July 4, 1776, to March 4, 1789.
4. The territorial expansion of the United States, with attention to foreign meddling, the slavery issue, the so-called “land hunger” of the settlers, and what Roosevelt called “the winning of the West.”
5. The American doctrine of nonintervention, and the Monroe Doctrine.
6. The American doctrine of citizenship and expatriation.
7. The freedom of the seas, and neutral rights.
8. The doctrine of commercial freedom and equal opportunity, often called the "open-door policy.”
9. The pacific settlement of international disputes.
10. A history of the relation of the United States to the Latin-American states, with the attendant doctrine of Pan-Americanism.
11. The attitude of the United States towards international cooperation and organization.
12. The policy of the United States in regard to limitation of armaments.
13. A study of the Caribbean policy of the United States.

Conjecture as to the "inscrutable destiny” of the United States cannot be dismissed as wasted effort. Those policies and doctrines which we have just enumerated were formulated with wisdom and foresight. They looked to the future, not as the average politician to the next election, but as the real statesman looks--to the next and future generations. The greater part of the above policies and doctrines are pertinent to the well-being of the United States. The student will recognize in some of them the principles upon which all future policy might well be constructed. It has been necessary, in the past, to employ force to defend and protect some of these American principles. Can we safely argue that by signing papers, such violations will never occur again?

V

There should be a method of study of these topics. It is suggested that a period of time be devoted to the study of one topic, rather than an attempt to cover several at the same time. The subject should be covered from its inception, with due weight given to those factors that gave rise to its need of formulation or promulgation. This seems to be the only method by which a thorough knowledge of our basic doctrines may be satisfactorily grasped. The truth is the aim of all study and although in a subject such as this, there will be found a divergence of opinion on ethical or juridical grounds, even among the leading authorities, it is, nevertheless, inexcusable for a naval officer to be unacquainted with the facts. It is the duty of all government officials to know the orders, instructions, and the compromises that have determined our course on the rough sea of foreign affairs.

I have taken the Monroe Doctrine as an illustration for the method spoken of above. It is an outline of a method of study but no claim is made that it is the method.

A Study of the Monroe Doctrine

1. A study of the United States’ first treaty—that of alliance with France. This significant treaty, without which it is hardly possible that the United States would have gained independence, had in it a striking clause, which stipulated that France renounced "forever the possession of the islands of the Bermudas, as well as any part of the continent of North America, which before the treaty of Paris in 1763, or in virtue of that treaty, were acknowledged to belong to the Crown of Great Britain.” The sagacity of the fathers, coupled with the astute diplomacy of Franklin, is seen in this treaty to have given thought to what eventually materialized in the slogan, “America for the Americans.” Some authorities hold that this marks the beginning of the Monroe Doctrine. There is no doubt that this stipulation clearly shows that the United States cared for none of the great powers of Europe as near neighbors, even though they were allies, as in the case of France.
2. A study of the liberation of the Spanish colonies in Central and South America. Did the liberal tendencies of the United States affect them?

Why did the recognition of these colonies reach a political issue in the United States?

Why did the Spanish government delay ratification of the Florida Treaty?

What caused Spain to refrain from lending aid to the American cause although an ally of France? Read some of the correspondence of Talleyrand to the Spanish minister of foreign affairs.

3. A study of the high spots of British policy in regard to overseas trade and neutral rights during and after the Napoleonic wars.

In the subsequent treaties of the states of the “reactionary” continent, why did England oppose any acquisition by France of the Spanish colonies in the New World?

4. A study of the correspondence relative to the British proposal through Mr. Rush, the American minister in London.
5. A study of the comment made by Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison on the British proposal in contrast to the opinion of Clay and Adams.

In this connection Latane writes: "After our entrance in the great world conflict, several writers raised the question as to whether the three elder statesmen were not right, and Adams and Clay wrong. If the United States and England had come out in favor of a general declaration against interventions in the concerns of small states, and established it as a world-wide principle, the course of human history during the next century might have been very different, but Adams’ diary does not tell the whole story.”

6. Why was the British government so desirous of pressing an understanding with the United States in regard to the Spanish colonies?

Canning wrote: “If the United States acceded to such views, a declaration to that effect on their part, concurrently with England, would be the most effectual and least offensive mode of making known their joint disapprobation of contrary projects….”

7. An analysis of Monroe’s Message to Congress on December 2, 1823.

What other principle was combined with Canning’s suggestion?

How was this message received in England and on the Continent?

Would the Monroe Doctrine have been effective without England’s implied acquiescence to oppose the proposed action of the Holy Alliance?

Canning’s official correspondence throws much light upon the European attitude and particularly that of Great Britain when, in a speech of December 12, 1826, he said: “I looked another way—I sought for compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the old.”

8. A study of the powerful effect that sea power has on the maintenance of this doctrine.

How did the balance of power in Europe affect the situation?

The incidents wherein American sea power exerted an influence.

9. A study of the violation of the spirit and the word of the Monroe Doctrine.

How and for what reason did Great Britain acquire the Falkland Islands and British Honduras?

What powers backed, and for what purpose, Maximilian’s ill-starred attempt to set up an empire in Mexico?

What was the purpose of the British and French negotiations with Texas before that state was annexed? How was the delayed annexation treaty of Texas hastened to ratification by the information of the foreign interests in Texas?

Did the Monroe Doctrine cause Great Britain to desist in her effort to occupy California in 1844, or were there other reasons?

10. A study of the Monroe Doctrine, as it is understood at the present time.

How does it affect the relations of the United States with the other American states?

Is there any reason why certain interpretations of this basic policy should offend the sensibilities of the other American states?

What is the significance of Sir Austen Chamberlain’s official statement to the United States before signing the Kellogg pact, in which he said:

The language of Article I, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable that I should remind your excellency, that there are certain regions of the world, the welfare and integrity of v/hich constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty’s Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defense. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty’s Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States have comparable interests any disregard of which by a foreign power they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty’s Government believe, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States Government.

The above was quoted in order to show the recognition accorded this doctrine by another power. There is considerable debate in the United States as to whether or not our position is made clear in the Kellogg pact as signed at Paris. There should be nothing left to implication in such a comprehensive asservation.

The above outline gives a general idea of the ramifications of this important American doctrine. The application of its principles has not always been consistent. Nevertheless there is a marked thread of purpose throughout its long history and, although it has stretched at times to the right and to the left, and in several instances been nearly broken, it must be granted that the United States has in the main preserved the essence of this vital policy.

A reasonable study of our foreign affairs will impress the student with one irrefutable fact, and that is, that the strength of some of these policies is derived from the strength of our national defense. It is for the best interest of the United States that these policies be maintained, and further, that the United States make every effort to maintain the peace. War is national or international sickness, and peace is the good health of a state. The surest and the least expensive way in the final analysis to preserve the good health of the state is to provide adequate defense for the tremendous assets and foreign investments involved. American foreign policies will dictate that this Navy be one of good will and friendship and fully able to protect the nation’s legitimate possessions.

President Coolidge said in his Armistice Day speech of 1928: “It is our duty to ourselves and to the cause of civilization, to the preservation of domestic tranquillity, to our orderly and lawful relations with foreign peoples, to maintain an adequate Army and Navy.” In support of this most definitive pronouncement of our Chief Executive, it should be the duty of the naval officer to ever fully understand what policies are pertinent to “our orderly and lawful relations with foreign peoples.” They are studies that will lead to clear vision in all that relates to our international duties and responsibilities. The knowledge is necessary to combat parlor and pulpit pacificism. They are the facts in the case.

President Coolidge gave words of wisdom to all who have dealings with foreign states and peoples when he said: “It is befitting that we should pursue our course without exultation, with due humility, and with due gratitude for the important contributions of the more ancient nations which have helped to make possible our present progress and our future hope.” It is well to remember that the greatest diplomats and statesmen were those who understood that there were two sides to all questions, and that polite respect for other points of view tends toward dignified compromise and arbitration. We shall learn more of this in a study of our treaties.

A survey of the boundless field of foreign affairs should impress the naval officer with the professional value of such study. It will take but casual research to learn that great proficiency was reached in like studies by the officers of Spain, France, and Great Britain when those states were consolidating their powers and possessions. It is a just goal that each and every officer should endeavor to understand and to reflect the best that has been thought and practiced in our foreign relations. Each officer commences his career with a future consecrated to duty and national service, and by virtue of this initial advantage, he is in an enviable position to observe and to study the dangers that confront the state from afar.

The question of how we shall conduct ourselves as a world state is foremost in the thoughts of those who think in terms of foreign affairs. A true and intelligent understanding of the problems of the present and the future is scarcely possible without acquaintance with the policies formulated in our past history. The organized efforts of various groups to defeat the Navy legislation indicate that some of the supreme lessons of our history have been forgotten. They seem to forget that were it not for national defense there would be no United States as we know it. They forget the assets liable to be jeopardized.

Mankind wonders as never before “how far towards the millennium of human brotherhood can he advance with safety.” The solution is the supreme problem of modern civilization. A short cut does not seem to have appeared. To cast off our surest safeguard for peace can only invite disaster.

One asks again, why should the naval officer study foreign policy?

1. It is joined to our profession in its higher aspects, and is a determinant of the amount of national defense necessary to protect the interests involved.
2. It enables the officer clearly to understand how policy and defense shaped the course of our country from thirteen weak colonies to a world power.
3. It will give the officer a definite conception of the problems that confront us as a world state and why certain doctrines are essential to our well-being.
4. It will impress upon the officer the fact that the Navy’s mission is founded upon the protection of certain specific policies.
5. It is truly a study of inspirational value, and will make of the officer a better American.
6. It will tend to create a mental attitude relative to our contacts with other states, whereby firmness without insolence, and amiability without weakness, will become the guiding rule.