LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE
Progress Toward Security Pact.— Despite the heroic efforts of the British and American delegates at the London conference to avoid dangerous political commitments, it became increasingly clear during March that the conference could be saved only by meeting in some manner the French demand for a definite statement of what England and the United States would do on threat of war. At last, during the first week of April a solution appeared in sight when it was announced that British and French representatives had agreed in an interpretation of Article XVI of the League Covenant, relating to concerted action against an aggressor nation, which would in some measure meet French demands. Assurances in this point from Britain would clear the way for a purely “consultative pact” in which the United States would be included, and thus lead to French naval reductions, and the possibility of a five-power limitation agreement on the basis of figures already virtually accepted by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan.
The first weakening in the British and American reluctance to make political concessions came on March 9 when Premier MacDonald in a radio speech broadcast in the United States spoke definitely in favor of a “mild” political agreement. Then on March 26, Secretary Stimson gave out a statement the purport of which seemed to be that the United States “had no objection to entering into a consultative pact as such,” if it were perfectly clear that this involved no obligation of military assistance, and if French demands for increased security could be taken care of otherwise (i.e. by assurances from Britain). Reports from London expressed the belief that the American delegation had gone further than President Hoover would approve; and from Senator Borah, Senator Swanson of Virginia, and others came protests against a consultative pact which would apparently mean something to France and nothing to us. On March 29, however, the State Department declared that the President and the London delegation were in complete accord—an announcement which was interpreted in the press as meaning that the President preferred the risk of defeat of a political treaty in the Senate to a conference barren of results.
Japan Accepts Naval Figures.—In the middle of March announcement was made that definite agreement on naval tonnage figures had been reached in informal negotiations between Japanese and American delegates. The terms of the agreement when reported to Tokio aroused strong protests from Japanese naval authorities, but they were finally approved by the Japanese Cabinet in instructions to the London delegates
|
Classes |
TONS |
Japan’s percentage |
|
|
U.S. |
Japan |
||
|
8-inch gun cruisers |
180,000 |
108,400 |
60.2 |
|
Smaller cruisers |
145,000 |
101,500 |
70. |
|
Destroyers |
150,000 |
105,000 |
70. |
|
Submarines |
52,000 |
52,000 |
100. |
|
Total tonnages |
527,000 |
366,900 |
69.6 |
made public April 1. With certain reservations made by the Japanese, the tonnage figures tentatively agreed upon were as shown on the preceding page.
Codification of International Law.— Delegates of forty-four nations began sessions at The Hague on March 13 in an attempt under League of Nations auspices to harmonize and codify international law. The work of the conference was divided among three commissions: one on nationalities, one on territorial waters, and a third on the responsibilities of states toward foreigners. As codes are agreed upon they will be drawn up in the form of conventions to be submitted to the nations for acceptance.
EUROPEAN POLITICS
Ratification of Young Plan.—The final step in putting into effect the Young Plan in Germany was made on March 13, when President von Hindenburg signed the law within twenty-four hours of its passage by the Reichstag by a vote of 265 to 192. The separate American debt agreement was also ratified. President von Hindenburg issued an unexpected proclamation declaring the new arrangement a step toward Germany’s freedom and reconstruction, and calling for an end of political quarrels and united effort for economic improvement.
The French Chamber took similar action on March 29, the ratification marking a final triumph for M. Briand’s policy of conciliation begun at Cannes ten years ago, and insuring the removal of French troops from the occupied areas by the end of June, as well as the opening of the International Bank in May.
New German Cabinet.—The new German Cabinet organized by the Centrist leader Heinrich Bruening took office on March 30. Succeeding the ministry of Hermann Mueller. The new cabinet retained Julius Curtius as Minister of Foreign Affairs, thus insuring continuation of the Stresemann policies, and made only three changes in other posts, these latter representing a definite shift to the right. The fate of the new government, commanding only 199 votes against 218 for the opposition, was dependent on whether it could draw sufficient votes from the Nationalists to secure a majority.
Irish Crisis.—After eight years in office, the Irish Free State Cabinet headed by President William T. Cosgrave resigned at the close of March after sustaining a defeat in Parliament on its policy of opposition to old-age pensions. Under the constitution of the Free State, the selection of the cabinet head, or President of the Executive Council, is decided by a vote of the Parliament or Dail Eireann. When this vote was taken on April 2, with all government supporters present, Mr. Cosgrave was easily reelected over the chief opposition candidate Eamon de Valera.
Ireland’s chief problems today are the political problem created by the strong republican opposition led by De Valera, the constant decrease of population due to emigration, and the unfavorable trade balance, which shows an increased export trade but still greater increase of imports.
Franco-Italian Clash.—Perhaps as a hint that a security pact for the Mediterranean might be packed with trouble, press reports of March 15 announced the penetration of Italian military forces deep into African territory in dispute between France and Italy, the occupation of which by Italy would cut the communications between French Equatorial Africa and French Southwest Africa. According to these reports, the more ardent Italian expansionists are demanding an Italian corridor extending from Tripoli southward clear to the Gulf of Guinea.
Death of Statesmen.—March marked the passing of two figures long prominent in European politics. On March 16 former Dictator Primo de Rivera died suddenly in Paris, little over a fortnight after the fall of his government in Spain.
In England, the Earl of Balfour died peacefully at the age of eighty-two years. A most distinguished figure in British politics and intellectual life, he was the last of Queen Victoria’s ministers, a former premier, prominent among British delegates at the Versailles peace conference, and head of the British representatives at the Washington conference of 1922.
New Polish Ministry.—After two weeks of strife between Marshal Pilsudski and his Parliament, a new Polish cabinet was formed on March 29 by General Pilsudski’s closest friend Colonel Walery Slawec. Only two changes were made from the Bartel ministry, but these two changes insured more of a “strong-arm government” than before, which will continue the feud between the Sejm and the group of Colonels supported by the Marshal. The new cabinet plans to carry on without Parliament until the next budget session in September.
Soviets Modify Anti-Kulac Campaign. —A pronouncement in March from the Soviet dictator, Josef Stalin, accompanied by a Communist party manifesto, inaugurated a sharp modification of the Russian collectivist campaign against the kulacs, or more well-to-do peasants. The new order was said to have relieved millions of people from deprivation of property and civic rights. While not a vital shift of policy, the change indicated that the drive had encountered dangerous opposition, necessitating a halt and “consolidation of gains.”
UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
New Policy in Haiti.—At the close of March President Hoover announced the nine “sequent steps” which will govern future United States policy in Haitian affairs, based on the report of the recent Haitian commission. The new plan calls for:
- More rapid “Haitianization” of the American treaty services, with the object of training Haitians to take over full responsibility at the expiration of the existing treaty.
- In retaining or selecting American officials, preference for those “free from strong racial antipathies.”
- American recognition of the temporary president of Haiti and the new president to be elected next autumn.
- Abolishment of the office of high commissioner, and appointment of non-military minister to take over the commissioner’s duties and serve also as diplomatic representative.
- Gradual withdrawal of marines in accordance with future arrangement.
- Limitation of American intervention in Haitian affairs to those strictly provided for by treaty or other agreement.
This statement was practically a summary of the commission’s recommendations, which evidently contemplated ending American intervention so far as possible at the expiration of the treaty in 1936. In general, the commission gave high praise for the work of Commissioner Russell, and declared that the mistakes of the American administration were due to “failure to understand the social problems of Haiti and its brusque attempt to plant democracy there by drill and harrow.”
Temporary Haitian President.—To settle the problem raised by opposition to the reelection of President Borno, the American Commission in Haiti secured approval of both Haitian factions for a plan by which M. Eugene Roy, a man outside politics, was selected on March 20 to serve as temporary president until after legislative elections to be held “at the earliest possible date”—presumably next autumn. M. Roy is a wealthy Haitian banker, sixty-eight years of age, and generally respected.
The Commission left Port au Prince on March 15 after two weeks spent on the island.
FAR EAST
Northern Opposition to Nanking.— Both Shanghai and Peking dispatches during March emphasized the growing opposition to Nanking rule among Northern leaders, though these dispatches differed as to the danger threatened by this opposition. From Peking came reports that all Nanking government bureaus in the city had been taken over by local authorities under orders from governor Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi, and that rival armies were being concentrated along the railways connecting the territories under Northern and Southern control. By April 1 a part of Feng Yu-hsiang’s army had occupied Kaifeng, capital of Honan province, and forces of Yen had entered northern Shantung. Yen himself on April 2 assumed the title of commander in chief of the “National” land, sea, and air forces, and declared his efforts would be directed toward saving the Kuomintang and the nation by the overthrow of President Chang. Both sides were bidding for support from the young Manchurian dictator, Chang Hsueh-liang.
Philippine Independence and Peace in the Pacific.—Under this title Roosevelt in April Foreign Affairs presents a very strong argument against Philippine independence, on the general grounds that “the political equilibrium established during the last thirty years would be overthrown, forces of revolution would be unleashed, and America’s influence in the East would be sharply curtailed.”
First, as regards internal conditions in the Philippines, he maintains that the increased cost of government under independent rule would be overwhelming, business would suffer, and the racial groups in the islands would come into conflict. Second, as regards American interests in the Pacific, independence would seriously affect American prestige, and commerce, the Philippines themselves constituting a valuable source of raw materials and potential market, besides affording us a voice and influence in Oriental problems. Third, independence would be sure to stimulate anti-European movements in the Dutch East Indies and in India. The article concludes:
In fact, there is every reason to expect that Philippine independence would at once be used by the British as an argument in favor of enlarging their Navy. It is hard to see how even the most anti-English American could controvert such a claim. If the United States were to withdraw from the Philippines the maintenance of the political status quo in the insular world between Formosa and Australia would devolve entirely upon Great Britain. The need for the Singapore base would be greater than ever, for Great Britain would no longer be able to count on the presence in Manila of an important contingent of the American fleet, which, by its mere presence, is a force for peace.
That this prospect particularly affects Australia and New Zealand is clear from a reading of the debates in the House of Corrmons on the Singapore naval base. The people of the two Pacific commonwealths look on Singapore as their main defense in the Pacific. So also they regard the presence of the American fleet in the Far East as a sort of indirect shield between their own empty lands and the over-populated countries of Eastern Asia. The withdrawal of the United States from the Philippines would increase the Dominions’ dependence on Great Britain.
To those Americans who have studied the political situation in the Far East one of the most disquieting aspects of the entire problem is the position in which the United States would find herself if independence were granted. It requires but little knowledge of the force of American idealism to realize that if anything went wrong in the Philippines, and they were endangered, the very same American sentimentalists who have for years been crying “Give them their liberty!” would be the first to demand that the Unted States step in to help her former wards and to protect them from the “rapaciousness” of alien oppressors. This is the sort of appeal which moves Americans strongly. It flatters their vanity and appeals to their sense of evangelism. They like to think of their country as the rescuer of the downtrodden, the savior of the oppressed.
If the American government, once it had left the Philippines, were prevailed upon to go to their rescue, it would face the likelihood of a war of appalling consequences. Such a war would involve a vast naval construction program, long and hazardous expeditions to conduct military operations on the other side of the world, the probable mixing in of other powers, the stirring of new resentments among subject peoples of Asia. To the realist, what is most distressing about such a possibility is the virtual certainty that so long as we continue in our present relation these dangers are so remote as to be negligible. To remain is a fair insurance of peace. To withdraw is to invite disaster.
As an alternative it has been suggested that the United States might guarantee the independence of the Philippines, either alone or in company with other powers, or that the League of Nations might give America a mandate over them. These expedients would put the United States in the very position which she has so long sought to avoid—that of responsibility without authority. It would be only natural for the other powers to turn to the United States, in the event things went badly in the Philippines, and call on her to step in and right them. Here again the United States would have to interfere under the most unfavorable conditions. Her task would be far harder than is the present one of attempting to help the Filipinos maintain a stable government.
The crux of the matter, then, is that the Philippine Islands are like Mark Twain’s white elephant They are a burden to maintain, but there is no safe and effective way of getting rid of them. Retention—at least for a number of decades—seems the lesser of two evils.
MISCELLANEOUS
Articles in April Foreign Affairs.—Among the articles in the April issue of the quarterly Foreign Affairs, the following are briefly summarized as of special naval or international interest:
Viscount Grey on Freedom of the Seas.—After properly limiting the meaning of the term “freedom of the seas” by defining it as a question of the extent and limits of belligerent rights as regards neutral ships and commerce on the high seas, Viscount Grey argues that it would be wise policy for Great Britain to seek agreement with the United States in these points.
- Because the inventions of naval science have made it more difficult even for a superior navy to keep communications open in war time.
- Because in any future war in which England is a belligerent and the United States a neutral, there will recur the danger of conflict over control of neutral commerce.
- Because agreement in this matter will bring the two countries into friendly cooperation for world peace, whereas refusal will have the opposite effect.
Is a Second Canal Necessary?—Mr. John F. Stevens, chief engineer of the Panama Canal, 1905-07, points out that the Panama Canal at present is not operated up to 50 per cent of its capacity; that traffic is not likely to increase over 10,000,000 tons per decade; and that a third set of locks increasing the capacity by 75 per cent can be built when they are needed thirty or thirty-five years hence at a cost of from $75,000,000 to $100,000,000, or about one-sixth the cost of a new canal at Nicaragua.
Soviet Five-Year Plan.—Bruce G. Hopper takes up the Soviet “formula of industrialization, a gigantic but realizable scheme” by which Russia “expects to invest some eighty billion rubles in the national economy between 1927-1933 and double the national income.” Mr. Hopper’s opinion is that the plan may perhaps be carried out, the chief difficulties arising not from financing, but from lack of construction materials and skilled artisans and engineers, and also from the strain on the Russian people. He ends as follows:
The Russian people have no alternative to industrialization but continued economic backwardness. The population increases at the rate of three million a year, and the old economy, resting on unscientific agriculture, could not meet present demands for ordinary necessities or furnish the needed employment. In driving the population to industrialization the Soviet government is consciously sacrificing the welfare of the present generation to that of the next. Its chosen instrument is the Five-Year Plan. Under its provisions the Russian nation is stripped to the waist, paying for economic isolation and unprogressiveness in the past, and trying to work out its future economic salvation.