The Cruiser Problem

In the designing of a cruiser as of any class of warship, the first step before which none should be taken, is to decide the primary object to be realized—what is this ship meant to do?—Mahan

In these simple words Mahan sets forth the basis of all intelligent warship design. Once we have answered the question, “What is this ship meant to do?” we know the offensive armament and speed necessary to accomplish the allotted task; while the hazards which will probably be encountered give us the defensive armament and protection necessary to provide reasonable insurance that the vessel will be able to meet those hazards. Hence we have a criterion by which we can test the soundness of the design of any type of warship. In applying it to cruisers, however, we must bear in mind that new weapons have changed not only many of their functions but also the risks to which they are exposed.

It is with recent and proposed future cruisers that this paper is mainly concerned. Since the post-war cruiser building programs of the leading powers have taken sufficiently definite form to enable us to draw conclusions as to the conceptions underlying the various designs, we propose to test them by Mahan’s criterion and, in addition, to study them in the light of history. Then, profiting by the good points and weaknesses of the various cruisers as developed by this study, we shall propose a solution of the cruiser problem as it exists today in the U. S. Navy.

Lessons from the past illuminate the cruiser situation as well as any other naval problem. If we study the development of this class of ships, we see one outstanding fallacy regularly recurring. Accordingly, the following section is devoted to tracing briefly the evolution of the cruiser, and to a careful study of recent designs, applying both Mahan’s criterion and the light of history.¹

Historical

The first of the steam-driven cruisers were apparently inspired by the remarkable career of the Confederate commerce destroyer Alabama. Since they were designed for overtaking and capturing practically defenseless merchant vessels, speed and gun power were sought after, while very little thought was given to armor. Then, naturally, men began to think of a counter to these raiders with a view to commerce protection.

In considering cruisers for the defense of trade, designers realized, of course, that such vessels mut be able to defeat the powerfully armed commerce destroyers. This implied the ability to stand a reasonable amount of punishment. These ideas as to the necessity for protection ripened into conviction after the unsuccessful action fought by the unarmored British cruisers Shah and Amethyst against the Peruvian armor-clad Huas-car.

Here we see a trend of thought which has since repeated itself nearly every time that a new class of cruisers has been evolved. In bringing out the new type, designers usually have seemed to picture their creation only as a destroyer of some smaller and weaker type which preceded it. This unfortunate conception has resulted in ships with plenty of speed and gun power but very little protection. Other powers have invariably replied with a vessel of similar or slightly greater displacement, and usually with a better balanced design, which the first type could not meet on terms of equality, and consequently became obsolete. Under the circumstances, the speed and the gun power were necessary. What was objectionable was purchasing them at the expense of protection and thus disqualifying the cruiser for subsequent encounters with similarly gunned vessels.

The first attempts at cruiser protection consisted of fitting an armored deck and arranging the coal bunkers to shield the ship’s vitals. As time went on, the offensive type was given more armament and speed with some protection. This necessitated more weight for guns and armor for the defensive type. Any increase in size by one power was promptly followed by the others. Thus displacements and costs steadily mounted until the armored cruiser was evolved; this class, in turn, increased in size until it was only slightly smaller than contemporaneous battleships.

When Fisher brought out the Dreadnought, the armored cruiser developed into the battle cruiser. The British designers seemed to make the usual mistake and pictured the battle cruiser as fighting the smaller and weaker armored cruiser which preceded it, for they protected their first vessels of this type with only a six-inch armor belt. The German designers, however, realized that their battle cruisers must fight similar ships and upon occasion, battleships. Consequently, they insisted upon a well-balanced design, even though it necessitated some sacrifice of speed, cruising radius, and armament. That the early British design was an admirable destroyer of armored cruisers was strikingly demonstrated at the Falklands; but that the German design represented the sounder view was even more strikingly demonstrated at Jutland. As a result of their experience at the latter battle, the British sharply modified their views and in the design of the Hood they insisted on adequate protection without any sacrifice of speed or gun power, despite the fact that this necessitated the enormous displacement of 41,200 tons. It is noteworthy that even this huge increase in size was promptly followed by both the United States and Japan.

We must, however, go back a little to complete our brief sketch of the cruiser. About 1906, Russia brought out the Novik, a small, fast, lightly armed cruiser with some protection, designed primarily for scouting. In appearance, it resembled a large destroyer. The British realized the utility of such a vessel and replied with the Pathfinder class. As the shortcomings of these scouts were appreciated, the type developed into the light cruiser. The latter was scantily armored at first; but, as is inevitably the case, more armament and protection were added with the usual increases in displacement. The design became standardized during the late war at about 5,000 tons, with an armament of 5.9- or 6-inch guns, several torpedo tubes, an armor belt three or four inches thick, and a speed of 28 to 30 knots.

During the World War, the British produced two types of ships as destroyers of light cruisers. The first was Fisher’s Courageous class of light battle cruisers with a displacement of 19,000 tons, a speed of 31.5 knots, and an armament of four 15-inch guns in twin turrets, besides eighteen 4-inch in triple mountings. The other design was the Raleigh class of 9,750 tons, 29 knots, seven 7.5-inch guns mounted behind gun shields, several smaller antiaircraft guns, and some torpedoes. Both of these designs were given an armor belt of only three inches, since they were intended to fight light cruisers armed with 5.9-inch guns.

The circumstances under which the first of these vessels were designed and built differed radically from those ordinarily prevailing. War had already been declared and it promised to be long enough to insure the completion of the projected vessels in time to be of service, while not being long enough to enable the Germans to build a counter thereto. Furthermore, in the early days of the war, the British shipyards turned out work with extraordinary rapidity, and there was no limit to appropriations. Under these special circumstances, a design to destroy existing ships was undeniably sound; although, with the wisdom which comes after the event, it is easy to see how both designs could have been improved.

History, nevertheless, has demonstrated unmistakably the folly of building cruisers in peace time with the sole aim of rendering obsolete their smaller and weaker predecessors, while ignoring the fact that other powers will inevitably reply with cruisers of similar or even greater displacement and usually with a better balanced design which the would-be supercruiser is unable to face. Hence it follows that in designing any cruiser we must remember that inevitably it will be compelled to fight ships of similar displacement. If it is able to do that, the weaker predecessors are usually taken care of automatically.

Formerly, no matter how well balanced a cruiser might be turned out, it could promptly be outclassed by another equally well-designed but larger cruiser. This was one of the most fruitful causes of competitive building. The Washington treaty, fortunately, has put an end to all that by setting a limit to cruiser displacements. Now, one can build a well-balanced 10,000-ton cruiser with the assurance that it will be considered an effective unit during its entire life.

This treaty ushered in a new era in cruiser construction. All leading powers except the United States began immediately to build cruisers with the maximum allowed displacement of 10,000 tons and guns of the maximum allowed caliber of eight inches. Since their speeds ranged from 32 to 36 knots, they were in reality only enlarged and faster Raleighs. In fact, the speedier of them had the objectionable feature of the Raleighs, the lack of balance between armament and protection, in an accentuated form; for the armament had been increased while armor had been reduced to almost nothing. In appearance the new type more nearly resembled miniature battle cruisers, due to the fact that, as a result of war experience, their main batteries were housed in turrets instead of behind gun shields. Even the slowest and most stoutly protected of these vessels had the same defect as the early British battle cruisers in that their protection was hopelessly inferior to their armament. This made them excellent ships for striking down the war-time light cruisers, but they could not be considered well-balanced designs for fighting ships of their own type.

As usual, however, history repeated itself. More thought was given to defensive strength and, in the Ersatz Preussen, the Germans brought out a cruiser which, on 10,000 tons, not only had adequate protection against 8-inch shells, but also had a battery of much greater power than any contemporary cruisers. They accomplished this feat, partly by cutting its speed to the modest figure of 26 knots and partly by remarkable skill in its design, as well as by the fact that the Versailles Treaty permitted them to mount a battery of 11-inch guns while the Washington treaty limits other powers to 8-inch guns for cruisers.

Aside from the remarkable skill shown in reducing hull, armor, and machinery weights, there are several points in the design of this vessel which deserve careful attention. First of all, the Germans recognized that the importance of speed had been greatly exaggerated, and that for most present-day cruiser functions, it was not worth the exorbitant price which was being paid for it. Next, they realized the value under modern conditions of a rapid rate of acceleration, and adopted the Diesel engine, which also gave these ships a remarkable cruising radius. They further saw that any ship as large as 10,000 tons should have reasonably adequate protection against the projectiles which it must encounter in the normal performance of its duties. Another point they grasped was that the requirements for a satisfactory aircraft carrier and a good gun platform differ so fundamentally that any attempt to combine the two types would result in failure; so they concentrated on building a good gun platform. Finally they perceived that where weight was at such a premium and where the projectiles fired by their main battery could so easily defeat the armor carried by contemporary cruisers, it was sound judgment to reduce the number of guns in the main battery to six, in order to save the weight needed for protection. These points will be discussed more fully in subsequent sections.

In the meantime, other powers showed a tendency to stray away from the standardized 10,000-ton cruiser. Japan led off with the Furutaka class of 7,100 tons, 33 knots, and six 8-inch guns. England followed with the 8,400-ton, 33-knot York, also carrying six 8-inch guns. These designs seem to be even more poorly balanced than that of the 10,000-tonners, which class they cannot meet on terms of equality. Hence they must have been conceived as destroyers of smaller cruisers. Even in this role they are inferior to the larger vessels. Although their designers may have had something else in view, it is obvious that this type would not meet our needs.

The British themselves must have regarded the design as unsatisfactory, for they announced recently that, instead of building more Yorks, they would lay down cruisers of only 6,000 tons with a main battery of 6-inch guns. Italy also has announced a program of six 5,300-ton, 38-knot cruisers. Since neither of these latter types can fight the 10,000-ton class, they must be regarded as destroyers of destroyers, or as commerce raiders. They probably meet the requirements of their builders; but, from our viewpoint, they appear to be unnecessarily large for attacking merchant vessels, and too small to deal with large cruisers supporting hostile destroyers.

There is one other trend in cruiser design to be considered. Japan has brought out the Yubari of 3,100 tons, six 5.5-inch guns, four torpedo tubes, a 2-inch armor belt and 33 knots. France has built several destroyers of 2,400 to 2,700 tons, 35 to 37 knots, five 5.1- or 5.5-inch guns, six torpedo tubes, and no protection other than that they have unusually rugged hulls. Although both types seem to have been built primarily for flotilla duties, they have the necessary striking power, cruising radius, and seaworthiness for the performance of certain cruiser functions. Eventually this type will probably eliminate the 1,000- to 1,500-ton destroyer, whose limited cruising radius makes it strategically, and whose low speed in bad weather makes it tactically, the lame duck of the fleet.

This brings us up to the present; we have yet to consider the types of cruisers best suited to our future needs. Since, according to Mahan, the soundness of any given design is determined by its fitness to perform the allotted tasks, it behooves us to think what these ships will have to do. That the duties of cruisers are as varied as those of all other types of warships put together is not generally realized. There are, for example, certain cruiser functions such as scouting and raiding which call for high speed and the maximum striking and resisting power that can be obtained after that speed has been provided. Obviously, for these duties, we want the nearest thing we can get to a battle cruiser on 10,000 tons and a battery of 8-inch guns. Then there are certain duties which require only a moderate speed, but demand the maximum in armament and protection. Clearly they can best be executed by the nearest thing we can get to a battleship on 10,000 tons and a battery of 8-inch guns. We can go on down through the various classes of warships and find corresponding cruiser types. Accordingly, in the following sections devoted to the study of the types best suited to performing the various present-day and future cruiser functions, we shall refer to them as the battle cruiser type, the battleship type, the aircraft carrier type, etc.

The Battle Cruiser Type

Under this heading, we group cruisers of from 7,100 tons to 10,000 tons standard displacement, 7.5- or 8-inch guns, and 29 to 36 knots speed. Our first question is: “What is this ship meant to do?” In view of the exorbitant price which must be paid for high speed, we conclude that these vessels were designed primarily for those functions in which maximum mobility is an absolute necessity. These are: scouting, supporting or breaking up destroyer attacks, raiding, and hunting. The first of these roles has been taken over by scouting planes in such weather as permits their operation. It is consequently of greatly reduced importance and will likely continue to diminish with probable improvements in planes and aerial navigation. Hence, scouting must now be considered a secondary role for these cruisers. The primary fleet function of this type is, therefore, assisting or repelling the onslaughts of destroyers. This view is supported by the fact that both England and Italy have recently announced the laying down of cruisers which appear to be designed to fight torpedo craft rather than other cruisers. Our problem is, then, to design a cruiser with the primary object of supporting or breaking up destroyer attacks, while not losing sight of its suitability for raiding, hunting, and scouting.

In deciding what sort of cruiser is best adapted to this duty, the first thing to be settled is its size. The small cruiser has the advantage that it affords a reduced target to gunfire, has greater maneuverability, and that its 6-inch guns are probably better suited to fighting destroyers than are the 8- inch guns of the larger cruiser. The trouble is that they will have to fight and defeat other cruisers before they can turn their attention to the hostile destroyers. When it comes to engaging the former, the advantages of size and gun power are apparent; and we see the futility of building a warship with the sole idea of fighting a smaller and weaker vessel, while ignoring the fact that it must be able to fight ships of its own class.

Besides the usual well-known reasons why we should adhere to the maximum displacement allowed by the treaty, an additional one is that the more expensive individual units become, the more is competition slowed down in that class. It now seems likely that only the three leading naval powers will build 35,000-ton battleships, and it is noteworthy that only the six leading naval powers are building 10,000-ton cruisers. The minor navies have turned to smaller cruisers, destroyers, and submarines as the only types in which they care to compete. Hence, it is clear that the cause of the limitation of armament is advanced by keeping up the cost of individual ships, and that we should proceed by reducing the number of units, not their size.

One argument against the big cruiser is that it is large enough to afford a tempting target to the main battery guns of battleships. It seems very unlikely, however, that any destroyer attack will be pushed home, except under cover of darkness or a smoke screen, unless the enemy battleships are so closely engaged with our own that they cannot afford to turn their big guns elsewhere. A 10,000-ton ship, moreover, affords only a slightly larger target than one of 6,000 tons. This argument, therefore, need not be taken too seriously. If we agree on this point, the obvious conclusion is that the displacement of these cruisers should be the maximum allowed by the treaty.

Since this type must be designed primarily for fighting other cruisers and secondarily for fighting destroyers, it is obvious that it should have more protection than has been given earlier vessels of this class. The battle cruiser action at Jutland demonstrated too clearly the folly of putting everything into guns and speed, while forgetting that the gun platform must be kept afloat, the guns in action, and the propulsive machinery intact. Manifestly, these ships should have reasonably adequate protection against 8- inch shells. This would automatically provide immunity to any projectile fired by destroyers or destroyer leaders, even though the range be point-blank. It would also take care of medium sized bombs. Such protection can be obtained only at the expense of armament or speed or both. How much may these qualities be reduced?

To begin with, it is proposed that the number of 8-inch guns be reduced to six, mounted in two triple turrets. There can be no question that this battery is sufficiently powerful to sink in short order any treaty cruiser afloat today. The 8-inch shell can so easily defeat the armor carried by these large, scantily protected vessels, that it is simply a matter of getting on the target. This is one of the points recognized by the Germans when they put only six guns in the main battery of the Ersatz Preussen.

The previous tendency to overgun these cruisers has been justified by quoting Farragut’s famous maxim: “The best protection against the enemy’s fire is a well-directed fire from our own guns.” Although it would be the height of presumption to question the wisdom of Farragut, ought we not to consider the circumstances under which he made the statement? In the first place, he was not discussing the proper characteristics for future construction; he was courageously facing the difficult task of capturing New Orleans with the obsolete ships at his command. Next, he had already done everything in his power to protect these vessels and their personnel, such as rigging splinter nets, securing chain cables along the ships’ sides, and placing hammocks, bags of sand, coal, and ashes to protect the ships’ vitals. He had even daubed them with mud to make them less conspicuous. The only thing left to do was to point out the importance of good shooting. He was, moreover, attempting a task of the utmost seriousness with his old wooden ships, and may have considered it advisable to direct attention away from their obvious lack of protection. Finally, it should be noted that, after monitors became available, he was perfectly willing to await their arrival before entering Mobile Bay. Were these the acts of one who scorned protection? If we judge the man by what he did, rather than by this much-quoted sentence, is it not clear that this great apostle of the offensive realized keenly the importance of defensive strength, and would have been the last to advise stripping cruisers of armor in order to overload them with guns?

Nobody questions either the offensive necessity or the defensive value of well-directed gunfire; but, in the piping times of peace, many of us forget that this depends upon several things besides the number of guns. First of all, the gun platform must be kept afloat and on a reasonably even keel, with the machinery intact, while the guns and operating personnel must be behind sufficient armor to enable them to continue to function in spite of a few hits. All of this calls for protection, since we must expect the enemy to open fire as soon as we do. Next, there comes the relative skill of the operating personnel. Armor begets confidence and makes for increased efficiency under the trying conditions of battle. Last of all, there is the element of chance. This is far more apt to go against a cruiser which has so little protection that it can be blown up by a single lucky hit than it is to go against one capable of standing a reasonable amount of punishment. So, on closer examination, we see that robbing a vessel of armor in order to overload it with guns reduces rather than increases its chances of maintaining a well-directed gunfire under the conditions of actual battle.

Then, if we succeed in defeating the hostile cruisers, our own cruisers must be able to deal with destroyers. For use against these totally unprotected vessels, the 8-inch gun is unnecessarily large and too slow in firing. Of course, the main battery should be turned against destroyers after the larger ships are out of the way, but it must be supplemented by something else. The exposed position which these cruisers must take at times in the discharge of their duties demands that they be given an unusually powerful antiaircraft battery. The weapon now most favored for this purpose is the 5-inch gun. If several of these were mounted with due consideration for their arcs of fire, they could be used with great effect against destroyers. This gun possesses ample range and destructive power to deal with such vessels. When we have obtained these qualities, any increase in caliber simply represents wasted energy and, of greater importance, wasted tonnage. Although, in the absence of concrete designs, one cannot be dogmatic, a battery of nine 5-inch guns mounted in three triple turrets would prove highly effective against either destroyers or aircraft. These should be supplemented by several automatic guns, also mounted in turrets, and the usual torpedo armament.

The next question is, how far do we dare reduce the speed of these cruisers in order to meet the other requirements and still enable them to discharge their allotted functions? It has long been an article of faith that they should be slightly faster than contemporary battle cruisers. This claim is now of greatly reduced importance. To begin with, the cruiser has been displaced by the airplane for scouting in clear weather. In any contact in thick weather, the outcome will not depend upon a slight difference in speed.

When these cruisers are used for independent duty, they now face a different situation, due to the aerial scout. This means that contact will usually be established at much greater distances than formerly. Suppose, for example, that one of these vessels discovers a superior force sixty miles away, that the pursuit is started immediately, that the pursuers have a four-knot superiority in speed, and that there remain ten hours of daylight. The pursuers will gain only forty miles and still be twenty miles away and hopelessly out of range when darkness falls. Of course the situation might be such that the slower vessel could be overhauled, but our point is that a few knots difference in speed is not the crucial matter that it was when contacts were made at visibility distance.

Future hunting squadrons, however, will probably be accompanied by an aircraft carrier whose planes will be launched in attacks as soon as the raider is discovered. Then the safety of the raider will depend upon its antiaircraft batteries and protection, rather than upon extreme speed. The latter quality will never enable any class of surface vessel to run away from any aerial attack. We may say that, in the average situation, speed alone no longer spells safety for a cruiser or any other type of warship. That dearly bought quality will seldom be needed for avoiding other surface vessels, thanks to the aerial scout, and is of negligible value for avoiding aerial attacks, while safety and, of greater importance, combat efficiency do depend upon those qualities which can be obtained only by sacrificing speed.

Another point in this connection is that, if the Washington treaty remains in force, it is doubtful if any more battle cruisers will be built. If they are built, it is fairly safe to say that their speed will not be over 28 knots.

If we agree that speed is of greatly reduced importance for either pursuit or escape and that a few knots either way make comparatively little difference, what is the maximum speed that can be attained after first providing the armament and protection previously specified? If we may judge from existing ships, this would probably be 30 knots. When the Japanese were able to get six 8-inch guns and 33 knots on 7,100 tons in their Furutaka class, we should be able to get six somewhat longer 8-inch guns, a stronger antiaircraft battery and adequate protection on 10,000 tons, particularly since we are reducing the speed from 33 to 30 knots.²

Even if it were necessary to drop to 29, or possibly as low as 28 knots, it is submitted that the resulting design would still be better able to meet the changed conditions of modern war at sea for the following reasons: it could defeat in a gun fight the present 10,000-ton cruiser of 31-36 knots; it could cope more effectively with destroyers than that type; it would be better fitted to meet the aerial menace because of its protection and its powerful battery of sky guns; it would be even more effective as a destroyer of destroyers than the small 6-inch gun cruiser, because it would have sufficient protection to be immune to any gun carried by a destroyer, and because its 5-inch battery would be as effective against the destroyers as the 6-inch battery of the small cruiser, while the addition of the 8-inch battery would be so much clear gain; it would still have enough speed to operate with destroyers, to keep clear of probable future battle cruisers and, with aerial scouting, it should be able to avoid even the present 32-knot vessels of that type.

We advocate then, a battle cruiser type of cruiser having a displacement of 10,000 tons, six 8-inch guns, nine 5-inch guns, several automatic guns, two triple torpedo tubes, 28-30 knots speed, the usual aviation equipment, and reasonable protection against 8-inch shells.

There is one point in connection with the Washington treaty that is frequently overlooked. This is that when a maximum displacement of 10,000 tons was established, a new situation was created. Formerly, any combination of speed and fighting power was possible if one were willing to pay the price. Now, with displacement limited, every ton devoted to high speed means that just so much less is available for guns, ammunition, and protection. Since any cruiser exists primarily for fighting, since fighting requires the ability to absorb as well as deliver punishment, and since the degree of striking and resisting power which we can give one of these cruisers is dependent upon how much we have been able to cut its speed, it follows that we should classify cruiser functions according to the mobility required, and assign a cruiser no higher speed than it absolutely must have for the execution of its allotted tasks. The question naturally arises then, is there not a field of usefulness for an even slower type? This is taken up in the next section.

The Battleship Type

The only existing specimen of this class is the Ersatz Preussen. With its six 11-inch, besides eight 6-inch and four 3.4-inch guns, and ample protection against 8-inch shells, this vessel has justly been hailed the most powerful 10,000-ton warship ever built.

Even this supercruiser, however, has its limitations. It cannot overtake the present type of treaty cruiser, but can usually defeat it if circumstances compel the latter to fight. If, for example, the Ersatz Preussen were escorting a convoy or screening some aircraft carriers which the high-speed cruisers were ordered to attack, the latter could not do so without first defeating the defender. Or, if the faster vessels were assigned a defensive mission where they must stand and fight, the German armored cruiser could probably defeat them. If, however, visibility conditions necessitated fighting at such short range that the 8-inch shells of the fast cruiser could pierce the armor of the Ersatz Preussen, would not the greater rapidity and volume of fire of the 8-inch battery more than offset the greater destructiveness of the 11-inch shells with the result that the slower firing vessel would be defeated?

Can we not build a cruiser within the limitations of the Washington treaty capable of doing everything that this German creation can do, while still having rapidity and volume of fire for short-range contacts? We could build one with nine to twelve 8-inch guns, a powerful battery of 5-inch and small automatic guns with some torpedoes, protection against 8-inch shells, and a speed of 21-25 knots, the latter quality to be decided by the speed of our next battleships. Although this vessel could not overtake the fast cruiser, circumstances may compel the latter to advance and fight or to stand and fight, in which event our proposed cruiser could defeat it. The Ersatz Preussen could do no more, although theoretically its bigger guns would enable it to open fire sooner than could a cruiser with 8-inch guns. Practically, however, visibility conditions would usually prevent it from taking advantage of the superior range of its main battery.

It is likely that our proposed battleship type of cruiser will usually be employed on defensive missions such as protecting convoys, screening the fleet at night or in thick weather, protecting aircraft carriers during an action, or breaking up destroyer attacks. For these duties, it would actually be more effective than the Ersatz Preussen. Against thinly armored vessels, its 8-inch shells would have ample penetrating and destructive power and, if engaged with superior numbers, its more numerous battery and greater rapidity of fire should be a great advantage; just as, when it comes to driving rivets, twelve pneumatic riveters would be far more effective than six sledge hammers. Nor would it be handicapped in short-range contacts as is the German cruiser.

The specification of a main battery of nine to twelve 8-inch guns for these ships may seem inconsistent with what was said in the preceding section when only six 8-inch guns were specified for the battle cruiser type. It is not inconsistent, however, because if we attempted to give a 28-30-knot cruiser enough guns to engage two large cruisers, the protection would have to be cut to almost nothing. Hence, its chances of staying afloat long enough to carry out its mission would be negligible and it must be rejected as an unsound design. On the contrary, the proposed battleship type of cruiser would have such stout protection that it could engage two or even three of the fast, flimsily protected cruisers with reasonable chances of success and it should be given sufficient armament to enable it to do so.

If we agree that our proposed battleship type of cruiser is the equal, if not the superior, of the Ersatz Preussen for fighting the frail treaty cruisers, how would it fare if confronted by this German armored cruiser? It could not, without aerial superiority, stand up to the heavier guns carried by the Ersatz Preussen in a long-range engagement ; but it is noteworthy that the latter type or a superior vessel can be built only by the weaker naval powers, and only out of capital ship tonnage. If we should become involved in a war with such a power, we would not only have our own capital ships available to escort convoys; but also, if they used their smaller capital ships for commerce raiding, we would have an excellent opportunity to cut off and destroy them. In any war with a weaker navy, the chief difficulty is to entice their vessels out for an engagement. If they employed their capital ships in destroying commerce, they would simply play into our hands.

Nor should we need battle cruisers to run them down. An aircraft carrier, accompanied by a battleship and four to six large ocean-going destroyers, would form an ideal hunting squadron. The planes of the carrier would be invaluable for locating the raider. If he sought to escape, the planes would constitute a striking force of great power and of incomparably higher speed than any battle cruiser. They could certainly disable, if not destroy him. If he were disabled or were inclined to stand and fight, the battleship could soon settle things. The destroyers would provide the necessary offense and defense for contacts in low visibility, as well as constituting an antisubmarine screen in clear weather. Thus we would have an invincible combination, regardless of weather conditions.

That is all very well for the weaker navies, but how about the use of our proposed battleship type of cruiser for protecting convoys against one of the leading powers? American naval officers naturally remember the keen anxiety they felt over the safety of our troop convoys in the autumn of 1918, when they feared a final desperate sally by the German battle cruisers. Here, we may as well face the fact that there is no such thing as absolute safety for convoys. Even when the British were protecting their Norwegian convoys with a full division of battleships, the Germans brought out their entire fleet to raid a convoy. Only the stripping of one of the Moltke’s propellers, and poor timing of the raid, prevented a very bad day for the Allies. Reasonable safety for convoys, however, can be provided, as indicated in the next two paragraphs.

The prime requisite is that the fleet base be so chosen with respect to convoy routes, or convoys so routed with respect to the fleet base, that no hostile raiding force can reach those vital arteries of supply without serious risk of being cut off and destroyed by our entire fleet. If, for example, there were war in the Pacific with our fleet based on Manila, the convoy route between that port and Hawaii would constantly be exposed to raids in force. The obvious counter would be to send convoys from Panama across the Pacific by the southern route, via Samoa, instead of by the northern route, via Hawaii. As pointed out by Captain Knox some years ago, the former has the advantage of being somewhat shorter, in addition to being much less exposed. Or, if the steaming radius of future vessels and other conditions should permit, we could send convoys out east bound, via Suez. If that canal were unavailable, we could fall back on the route via the Cape of Good Hope. In either of the two latter cases, convoys would be practically immune to raids in force.

The second condition is that each convoy be provided with an escort of sufficient strength to necessitate a stronger raiding force than the enemy could afford to risk for the possibility of destroying the average convoy. One cruiser of our proposed battleship type with an antisubmarine screen, and a merchant vessel converted into an aircraft carrier, should admirably fulfill the requirements. This escort would necessitate a raiding force consisting either of a capital ship and an aircraft carrier, or of an aircraft carrier and an overwhelming number of cruisers. The possibility of destroying an average convoy would probably not warrant the risking of so valuable a force. Such a raid also would have to be perfectly timed as it would be too dangerous to leave the raiders cruising about in an exposed position indefinitely. The necessary advance information would not be easy to get.

If, however, such a raid were made with an overwhelming force and perfectly timed, the planes of the escort would usually insure that the raiding force would be detected while still at a considerable distance. The convoy could be turned away at full speed and the commander in chief notified of the raid. If the distance of the raiders, when discovered, was great enough to prevent their overtaking the convoy before nightfall, fear of forces sent out by our commander in chief would probably compel the raiding force to abandon the pursuit due to the likelihood of being cut off from their base. Even if the raiders were so close, when discovered, that they could overhaul their prey before dark, the escort should be able to delay the raiding force long enough to enable the convoy to scatter and could probably damage the raiders enough to slow them down so that they could easily be cut off by surface vessels sent out from the fleet base. Even if, by some mishap, our surface vessels did not cut them off, the fleet air force would probably be able to overtake them and inflict enough damage to more than square the account. Thus, the raiding of our convoys would not be a tempting operation.

Unquestionably a battleship would afford more protection to a convoy than our proposed battleship type of 10,000-ton cruiser; but, if at war with a great naval power, we could not afford to disperse our capital ships for the protection of convoys. For that we must depend upon vessels of 10,000 tons or less. In other words, would our proposed 21-25 knot cruiser afford more protection to a convoy than one of 32-36 knots? This must certainly be answered in the affirmative. The one possible advantage possessed by the faster cruiser would be the ability to run away from an attack made by superior forces, and it could not do even that, if the raiding force included an aircraft carrier.

That there are hazards connected with the convoy system is undeniable. This might lead us to believe that it would be better to abandon it and simply have hunting squadrons patrolling the principal exposed trade routes. We are prone, however, to forget the unusual circumstances under which the late war was fought, particularly the handicap under which the German raiders operated.

Imagine the situation if we were at war with one of the leading naval powers: ten to twenty Emdens preying on our commerce; thirty or more disguised raiders of the Moewe type also at large; each of these raiders provided with scouting planes to assist in locating prizes; and each of them equipped with Diesel cruising engines which would give them an enormous operating radius. Finally, imagine that each of these had unhampered access to its base, which the Emden and the Moewe did not have. Also bear in mind that, in the late war, the Allies had an enormous preponderance in cruisers that we could never hope to enjoy. Then recall the damage done by the few badly handicapped German raiders at large in the early days of the war, as well as the fact that nearly one hundred vessels were employed in running them down, and one must agree that, with all its hazards, the convoy system is the soundest method yet devised for the protection of commerce in the critical area. It provides absolute security from lone raiders and affords us the opportunity of cutting off and destroying important enemy vessels if he attempts a raid in force.

In a war with a great power, when our capital ships must be kept concentrated, this battleship type of cruiser would also be very effective for hunting raiders. Accompanied by an aircraft carrier and four large destroyers, it would constitute an invincible hunting squadron; just as the battleship- carrier-destroyer combination would be invincible for hunting capital ships employed as raiders.

For combined operations, our proposed slow, heavily armed cruiser would be simply invaluable. Its shallow draft would permit it to go close inshore where its powerful battery would enable it to give excellent covering fire for landing troops. Its stout protection would give it immunity to all mobile artillery, other than railroad artillery. The protection afforded all gun crews by having the guns housed in turrets would be especially appreciated when anchored close inshore. The battery of small automatic guns mounted in turrets would be very effective against machine-gun nests or exposed troops as well as against aircraft or motor torpedo boats. The 5-inch battery could be used for counter-battery work, or against exposed troops, machine-gun nests, or aircraft. The 8-inch battery could be used against the larger guns, for long-range work, and, if necessary, against aircraft. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that, in this class of operations where the ships must anchor for effective firing, high speed is absolutely useless; whereas the gun power and protection that can be obtained by reducing speed are simply invaluable. Speed is undeniably essential for certain cruiser functions ; but building fast cruisers for the execution of those functions which do not require high speed is like purchasing caviar when one is in desperate need of bread and milk.

We advocate, then, a battleship type of cruiser having 10,000-tons displacement, ample protection against 8-inch shells, nine to twelve 8-inch guns with the same number of 5-inch guns and a strong battery of automatic guns, all mounted in turrets, two triple torpedo tubes, the usual aviation equipment, and a speed of from 21-25 knots. This would be especially designed for those defensive functions previously mentioned. For these, or for combined operations, it would actually be more effective than the Ersatz Preussen for the reasons previously given. In view of the furore created by this German armored cruiser, why should we hesitate to build one of the same general type, but which better meets our requirements?

The foregoing must not be misunderstood as a criticism of the remarkable design produced by the Germans. They are faced with a situation which differs fundamentally from ours and which is admirably met by their latest creation, the Ersatz Preussen.

The Aircraft Carrier Type

In the Proceedings for September, 1928, Lieutenant Commander B. G. Leighton wrote:

One may with profit give serious study to the suggestion that at least a considerable portion of the total tonnage which our present program contemplates for 8-inch gun cruisers be devoted to cruisers of the same displacement having armament comprising light bombing aircraft instead of 8-inch guns; these aircraft carrying cruisers to be employed on exactly the same mission as, and in coordinated action with, the 8-inch gun cruisers.

If one carefully reviews the various offensive functions of cruisers, it will seem that they all can be more effectively discharged by these carriers than by fast cruisers, in such weather as permits flying. The problem is to what extent carriers can replace the cruisers in view of the limitations imposed upon planes by the weather. However, as will be seen in the concluding section, this is one question whose answer can be postponed for several years.

There is even one defensive cruiser function in which these carriers would be valuable, the protection of convoys. Here, however, is an ideal field of usefulness for merchant vessels large enough to be converted to carriers but too slow for fleet use. Hence we may say that the 10,000-ton aircraft carriers will displace the battle cruiser type rather than the battleship type of cruiser.

There is one point of interest here in connection with the London conference. Other powers have expressed their willingness to let us have as many 10,000-ton cruisers, within the total tonnage limit, as we want, provided that they carry no guns larger than six inches. It is the 8-inch gun, 10,000- ton combination in which they wish to restrict us. Now, according to the Washington treaty, any aircraft carrier of 10,000 tons or less is classified as a cruiser, and may be built out of cruiser tonnage. If these proposed 10,000-ton carriers mounted no gun larger than six inches, and they probably would carry no gun larger than five inches, they also would come within the class in which other powers do not seek to restrict us. Suppose that, after the total number of 8-inch gun cruisers that we may build is agreed upon at London, we insert a clause permitting us to utilize the remainder of our cruiser tonnage in building 10,000-ton cruisers mounting no gun larger than six inches. Then when our Omahas become due for replacement, we could build seven 10,000-ton aircraft carriers which would be of the greatest value, instead of eleven or twelve small cruisers whose utility, for our purposes, would be very limited.

The Destroyer Type

The Yubari and Chacal represent this class. As was inevitable with the increase in cruiser displacements, it was realized that there were some cruiser functions which did not require the maximum in size and fighting power and for which the requisite numbers could consequently be obtained at much less expense by reducing the displacement. The Japanese solved this problem by building a small cruiser, while the French have gone in for large destroyers. The latter appears to be the soundest solution, for they meet the cruiser requirements and are at the same time excellent all-weather destroyers with unprecedented cruising radius for this type. Since they are primarily torpedo craft rather than cruisers, they do not come within the scope of this paper and will not be further discussed, except to call attention to the fact that these cruiser functions would otherwise be executed by the battle cruiser type of cruiser, the utility of which is correspondingly reduced.

The Submarine Type

The submarine cruiser has definitely been adopted by the leading navies. It takes care of such cruiser functions as observation off enemy ports, scouting ahead of the fleet, and commerce destruction in hostile waters where we dare not send surface raiders. Since it is primarily a submarine, we will not discuss it. The type is mentioned merely to call attention to the cruiser functions which it performs, and to the fact that they were formerly executed by the high-speed cruiser, whose field of usefulness is correspondingly diminished.

Fleet Flagship

The desirability of constructing a special fleet flagship was ably set forth by Captain Taussig in the Proceedings for August, 1922. While such a vessel is not primarily a cruiser, it must be built out of cruiser tonnage ; for nobody would advocate using one of our capital ships for this sole purpose, and it is obviously out of the question to quarter the commander in chief and his staff on a destroyer. Hence, we must consider such a vessel in any discussion of the cruiser problem.

It is not the intention to repeat here the convincing arguments employed by Captain Taussig; but we do propose to call attention to certain subsequent developments which have added greatly to the strength of his contention that: “Such a ship would be worth more to the Navy and the nation than any single unit which the limitation of armament agreement permits us to build.”

One of the principal changes is that the increase in probable battle ranges and the likelihood of more frequent employment of smoke screens mean that the commander in chief must rely less upon personal observation and more upon radio reports than he did in the past. In other words, it is of much greater importance for him to have uninterrupted radio communication than it is for him to be in the battle line. That he could not expect to have uninterrupted radio communication in a closely fought battle if he remained in the line is indicated by the experience of the ships more hotly engaged at Jutland.

The reports of that engagement also indicated that he would probably have much better personal observation if he were out of the battle line. When the ships became closely engaged, the splashes of hostile shells falling short almost obscured the enemy. If the commander in chief were a thousand yards or so on the unengaged bow of the leading battleship he would have not only a better view of the opposing line but also of his own command. The latter is fully as important as the former and is a view which he would not have if he were in the line itself. Whatever position he took, it could quickly be changed if it proved unsatisfactory.

The crying need of both Jellicoe and Scheer at Jutland was information. Most of the time, both commanders in chief had only a vague idea of what was going on. With the ever-growing multiplicity of weapons and consequent complication of fleet tactics, the need for intelligent and constant coordination of all arms is greater than ever. How can any commander in chief properly exercise his functions aboard a vessel in the battle line from which he and his staff would have very limited personal observation and from which they could not depend upon having continuous radio communication after the battle became general? In other words, the flow of information and orders would be most likely to be interrupted, just at the time when both were most needed.

Still another factor is the terrific strain and resulting exhaustion, both physical and mental, of being aboard a vessel which is firing and being fired upon for the probable duration of a naval battle. Anything which will reduce this exhaustion is bound to increase the efficiency of the high command. The mental machine of any human being, furthermore, will function better if somewhat removed from the distracting din of gunfire, the nerve-shattering impact of heavy shells, and the heart-rending cries of wounded men. Not only will this special flagship use its battery only occasionally, due to its ordinarily engaging only aircraft, but also, its freedom of movement with respect to other vessels, and its superiority in speed permitting it to zigzag widely, will keep it from being a tempting target for either guns, bombs, or torpedoes. If we believe in the value of intelligent leadership, should we not give the commander in chief and his staff every aid to increased mental efficiency in battle?

The advent of the observation plane has also affected the situation. In any future naval battle it will be a priceless advantage to the commander in chief if he can send trusted officers of his own staff up in planes to get specific information and report in person. It is not unlikely that he will want to keep one or more officers of his staff in the air throughout the battle. Obviously, flying operations could not be conducted by a ship fighting in the line. Of course, carriers could send planes aloft at the admiral’s order, but the vital element of personal contact would be lacking. This might suggest that one of the large aircraft carriers be used for the flagship, until we recall that the tactical employment of these vessels would almost preclude any personal observation by the commander in chief. In other words, so far as what the admiral could see is concerned, he might almost as well be ashore as on a carrier, if the carrier proceeded uninterruptedly with flying operations.

The logical conclusion is that we should build a 10,000-ton aircraft carrier as flagship. Until the surface forces were in contact, it would make very little difference to the admiral where he was, and his flagship would be free to function uninterruptedly as a carrier during the crucial phase of the air battle. By the time that was over, there would probably have been enough casualties among the planes, so that the surviving combat planes attached to the flagship could be transferred to other carriers, leaving only such planes as would be needed for the use of the commander in chief and his staff. His flagship would then be free to function exclusively as such during the time that it would be necessary for him to have absolute freedom of movement.

We must bear in mind that some future commander in chief might be of the old school of thought and insist upon a place in the battle line. In that event, this flagship could be used exclusively as an aircraft carrier. In no case would this be a 10,000-ton ship which could not be utilized to great advantage.

If we believe that such a vessel should be built, what about its characteristics? Its displacement should, of course, be 10,000 tons. In order to give the commander in chief the necessary freedom of movement, its speed should be approximately 60 per cent above that of the fleet as a whole, or between 24 and 29 knots, depending upon what should be selected for the future battle speed of the fleet. Since it would always be screened by more powerful vessels, the usual main battery of 8-inch guns would not be needed on this ship, regardless of whether this was used as a flagship or an aircraft carrier. It should, however, have an unusually powerful battery of antiaircraft guns, both 5-inch and 37-mm. Since this vessel would always operate behind a powerful screen, the possibility of short-range contacts need not worry us, and the usual armor belt might be omitted. It should, nevertheless, have a curved protective deck, proof against medium-sized shells or bombs.

With its 10,000 tons displacement and no gun larger than five, or at most, six inches, it would come within the proposed nonre- stricted class at London. Its construction, therefore, would not reduce the number of 8-inch gun cruisers that we may build.

The planes carried aboard this vessel would add to the offensive strength of the fleet; the powerful antiaircraft battery mounted by it would add to the defensive strength of the fleet; and the increased battle effectiveness of the high command made possible by such a flagship would add immeasurably to our chances of victory. On these grounds, we maintain that a specially constructed flagship should be included in the current cruiser-building program.

The Cruiser Situation in the U.S. Navy

It might be well, first of all, to review the points brought out in our study.

1. The type of 10,000-ton cruiser now so extensively constructed is merely a slightly enlarged and improved Raleigh. The latter was built as a destroyer of a smaller and weaker cruiser and hence is a poorly balanced design when it comes to fighting ships of its own class. These unbalanced vessels must inevitably be succeeded by a better balanced design. A battle cruiser type, therefore, is proposed in which the number of guns in the main battery is reduced to six and the speed is reduced to between 28 and 30 knots in order to obtain the necessary protection, and the additions to the defensive armament required to meet modern conditions.
2. Since cruisers are essentially fighting ships; since the degree of striking and resisting power which we can obtain on a fixed maximum displacement is dependent upon the extent to which we can cut the speed; and since there are many cruiser functions which do not require high speed, it is logical to build a slower type of 21-25 knots with the additional armament made possible by this reduction.
3. Other cruiser functions may be performed by enlarged destroyers, by cruiser submarines, or by planes operating from carriers, none of which are purely cruiser types. Consequently, they are not discussed, except to call attention to the fact that their functions were formerly executed by the battle cruiser type of cruiser. The usefulness of the latter is therefore greatly reduced.
4. A clause might be inserted in any agreement reached at London, which would permit us to build 10,000-ton aircraft carriers without reducing our allowed number of 8-inch gun cruisers.
5. A specially constructed fleet flagship is an absolute necessity for effective leadership in battle.

The question then arises, what are the needs of the U.S. Navy for these various types? We have ten Omahas built, ten fast 10,000-tonners under construction, and thirteen 10,000-tonners authorized but not laid down, besides seven cruiser submarines built, building, and authorized. We have no cruisers of the battleship, aircraft carrier, or destroyer types. The latter can wait until we replace our present destroyers. While the value of the aircraft carrier type is undeniably great, it is useless to build any of them until we have provided enough cruisers of the battleship type to defend the larger carriers already completed or authorized. Obviously then, our greatest need is for the latter class of cruisers and for a specially constructed fleet flagship.